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A small note on websites 
 
The existence of the Internet makes a researcherʼs work relatively easy on the one hand 
and extremely frustrating on the other. Easy, because so many parties and individuals 
maintain websites that often feature information from leaflets and booklets that make it 
possible for anyone anywhere to peruse them. Frustrating, because, as is the nature of 
things, some websites and/or some features on those sites tend to disappear or 
areʻforciblyʼ removed. This is the case with a few of the sites listed here. However, I should 
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adat - principle of custom in fiqh 
arkana al Islam - the five pillars of Islam  
urf - principle of customary use 
amir - leader 
Dar al Harb - ʻhouse of warʼ(i.e. non-Islamic enemy territory) 
Dar al Iman - abode of faith 
dawah - missionary action or call 
fard - obligation according to Shariʼah 
fatwa - a juridical verdict upon an issue 
fiqh - Islamic jurisprudence 
hadith - narration of the Prophet (and sometimes the Sahabah) 
hajj - the pilgrimage to Mecca that Muslims have to perform at least once in their lives 
halal -allowed, permissible 
haram - forbidden 
hijab - Islamic headscarf 
ijma -The consensus of the scholars in Islamic jurisprudence 
ijtiha - the individual legal opinion of a scholars who - starting from previous laws and past 
events - exercises an independent judgement 
imam- prayer leader or head of a community or state 
jihad - struggle 
khalifah - Caliph 
khilafah - Caliphate, Islamic state 
qiyas - analogy 
ray - principle of opinion in fiqh 
ramadan - the month of the fast and the holiest month of the Islamic calendar  
shari’ah - Islamic law 
shura - consultation 
sirah - biography and stories related to the Prophet and part of the sunna 
 8 
sunnah - the narrated tradition of the actions and sayings of the Prophet. It is composed of 
sirahs and hadiths 
sawm - the word means fasting (the most important fast for Muslims is that of the Ramadan 
month) 
ulema - plural of ʻimamʼ 
ummah - the community of all Muslims and believers in one God 
vilayet i Faqih -  Guardianship of the Jurist; Khomeiniʼs theory of Islamic government 
wulaa - governors 
zakat - it means both ʻpurificationʼ and ʻgrowthʼ and refers to the amount of money that all 
adults Muslims, who are financially able, have to pay to support specific categories of 

























This dissertation critically argues that the dominant representation of the dominated groups 
can mirror its way into the self-representation of those groups. Moreover, a  fetishism for 
politics (i.e., a repression and denial of engagement in the political arena) deflects the 
interaction between the dominant and the dominated groups (in this case, the UK 
Government and Islamist parties in the UK) and ultimately disempowers them both. 
This research is an analysis of the discourses and practices of a large number of Islamist 
parties in the UK over a period of nearly 20 years (1989-2007); a period when they gained 
public attention during the debates over multiculturalism and the supposed threats to 
security from the rise of radical Islam. 
By ʻIslamist partiesʼ, I mean political groups who place their Muslim identity at the centre of 
their political practices and who see their political future in Islam. Such political groups are 
not just Muslims, but Islamists. In asserting this, I argue against the commonplace 
culturalist-orientalist approach that denies and rejects any ʻpoliticalʼ in relation to Islamists. 
As part of a dominant discourse, this culturalist-orientalist approach consists of a binary 
view whereby Islam is either a matter of private professed belief or a matter of a terrorist 
disruption into the Western democratic systems. 
In response to this stark dichotomy, I adopt a constructionist theoretical approach that 
sees ʻculturesʼ and ʻreligionsʼ as political acts within the terms of a power-relationship. 
Practically, I approach the issue based on two years of fieldwork amongst the British 
Islamists. 
I have interviewed a large number of Islamists from different parties. For practical and 
epistemological reasons, I divide them into two groups: the Participationists and the 
Rejectionists. Participationists are those who are willing to take part in British political life, 
for instance, by taking part in elections, while the Rejectionists are those who reject the 
British political system as illegitimate and plan to subvert it. 
The participationist parties act politically but show a strong reticence in adopting any 
political label themselves.The explanation for this lies in their fetishism for politics. Taking 
a collaborative and non-confrontational approach, they choose to remain in the category of 
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the ʻfaith-groupsʼ. Ultimately, this delegitimizes their Islamist quest because it mirrors the 
dominant culturalist-orientalist discourse that depoliticizes and disempowers them. 
The rejectionist groups are those with a confrontational approach toward the dominant 
discourse; they promote an Islamic system as the alternative. They declare that their 
struggle is aimed at instituting a ʻKhilafahʼ so that the ʻPoliticalʼ is at the service of the 
ʻSpiritualʼ. My findings indicate that, paradoxically, the exact reverse is true. Their efforts 
promote a ʻsecularizationʼ of Islam; this is denied (repressed) by the Islamists themselves, 
and exorcized by the dominant discourse under the label of religious fundamentalism. 
The ʻfetishismʼ for politics from both the dominant and the dominated distorts their 
interaction, and is ultimately responsible, both for the political ʻfailureʼ of Islamist parties, 
and for the string of past and future terrorist attacks. The novelty of my approach has been 
to analyze the hiatus between the two parties -- the political stalemate and the security 
threat -- through the convex mirror of repression and exorcism; politics, as discoursed and 
practiced through the emotional, the visceral, and the de-sacralization of the secular and 
the religious at the same time. 
The novelty also lies in providing a new ethnography of a political actor -- the British 
Islamist -- whose politics has been underemphasized, and who has been much maligned 
and commented upon from a dominant culturalist-orientalist framework.  The new 
ethnography acknowledges the agency of British Islamists as political actors and argues 
that they should be represented and recognized as such by the dominant discourse and by 
the Government. The Manichean representation of these political actors (British Islamists) 
as either faith groups or terrorists, debilitates the very democratic process and reproduces 






Since the events of September 11, it has often been declared that a new era has dawned. 
Certainly, ʻIslamʼ and the ʻMuslim worldʼ have become the focus of increased attention. 
The fact that Muslims across the globe have not uniformly praised the actions by Al-Qaeda 
but also denounced them, shows that expressions like the ʻglobal Muslim communityʼ are 
inaccurate and misleading. Moreover, this also problematizes the commonly held belief 
that there is an unchanging essence to Islam  that underpins the lives of Muslims. 
Likewise, the London bombings of 7th July 2005 stirred up anxieties, concerns and 
questions. This was the worst ever terrorists attack on mainland Britain and the most 
devastating bombing in London since the Second World War Nonetheless,this event was 
less traumatic for Britons than 9-11 for Americans (Verkaik 2010). Partly, this was because 
the scale was smaller, and partly, because 30 years of IRA terrorism had diluted the shock 
factor for the British (McRoy 2006, 11). The most startling revelation was that the bombers 
were UK citizens, and with one exception, British-born. Inevitably, the first question that 
arose was related to the reasons that led young British Muslims to kill themselves and 
others. 
This thesis attempts to reformulate that question by opening up new lines of enquiry on 
Islamism and Islamists in Britain, and by providing a different account of the events that 
are commonly referred to as examples of ʻIslamic fundamentalismʼ. My account is different 
in a few ways. First and foremost, I tell this story outside the demonology of 
fundamentalism and within the archaeology and genealogy (Foucault 1969, 1977) of 
Islamism in Britain. That is to say, this is a field- investigation carried out by collecting first-
hand material and data; a political  ʻexperienceʼ (Butler and Scott 1992, 32) within British 
Islamistsʼ discourses and discursive practices. This involved tracing, sharing and analysing 
the different Islamist practices, the conflicting representations, and the disparate practices 
of resistance to the dominant representations (El Zein 1977, 57). The aim is to understand 
and examine the possible factors affecting the relationship between the British Islamist 
parties and the UK Government. Lack of communication and interaction in this relationship 
leads to misunderstandings that result in political hiatus and seucrity threats. Finally, my 
thesis will seek to identify and analyze these broken dialogues by using the vocabulary of 
a ʻfetishistʼ desire for politics that is nurtured by both parties: the dominant (UK 
Government) and the dominated (British Islamist parties). Paradoxically, such repressed 
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longing connects them on the level of the self-representation and the representation of the 
ʻOtherʼ, but divides them on the level of interaction and of political dialogue, causing tragic 
outcomes. 
My dissertation is not simply focused on British Islamism and Islamists but it is also an 
attempt to inhabit their experience, by trying to work through and unsettle stereotypes; by 
not scavenging upon ready-made categories of understanding (Marranci 2008, 3). 
I have always treasured what Wittgenstein (1968, 21) enunciated once, that one does not 
start from theory, but that theory emerges in how one works through a series of puzzles 
and hurdles; theory comes along in intellectual activity rather than precede it. 
This seems a highly risky and potentially anti-intellectual strategy for me to adopt. It is also 
contrary to the advice that most of my fellow PhD students receive. I was allowed the 
courage to pursue what I thought were urgent questions without first having to postulate a 
hypothesis or review the academic state of the subject (Modood 2005, 3). So, I decided to 
engage with what was happening in the realm of  so-called British Islamism, by 
commencing the fieldwork and by ʻdisplacingʼ and ʻre-usingʼ subversively most of the 
assumptions, frameworks, and theories on Islamism.  
As a topic, Islamism has been brought to public attention in Britain by events like 9-11 and, 
principally,7-7. It has been closely monitored, investigated, researched by different experts 
within various fields including academia, policy-making and media (Trepagnier 2006, 5). 
In order to explain the two terror attacks, a plethora of hypotheses were conceived and the 
ʻWar on terrorʼ was advocated as the strategic response to those criminal actions(Asad 
2006, 8; Mcghee 2005, 4; Varisco 2005, 9; Verkaik 2010). Likewise, several disparate 
questions were raised with regard to the nature of Islamist movements and the origin of 
their ʻrageʼ against the West (Fallaci 2001, 6; Zakaria 2001). Awkwardly enough, I found 
myself unable to give an answer to most of them. The first plausible explanation that 
crossed my mind was that I did not have enough information and data to understand the 
reasons for such events. It was only later that I started questioning the questions 
themselves.  
 
My research began to take shape when I realized that perhaps the current lines of enquiry 
were not the main ones to be investigated; they seemed either irrelevant or, at the very 
least, misleading. 
It became clear to me that the events that were labelled -- hastily and disingenuously 
(mostly by the media and policy-makers) -- as examples of Islamic ʻfundamentalismʼ or, 
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more dangerously, of Islamic ʻterrorismʼ, were already an explanation of what they were 
meant to be enquiring about (Varisco 2005, 10). 
It is in this specific context that my research activity commenced, by posing questions such 
as: what is the archaeology (Foucault 1969) and mostly the genealogy (Foucault 1977) of 
Islamism in Britain?; what is the nature of the relation between Islamism and Islam, as a 
faith professed and practiced by a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim environment?; is it 
possible to speak of different ways of articulating Islamism in Britain?; how is the relation 
between Islam and Islamism lived and represented through the discourses and practices of 
British Islamists?; what is the suturing point, if any, among the variety of Islamist agendas? 
Is there any space for an Islamist politics, a space which is not administered or conceded 
by the dominant discourse as an ʻabsolutionʼ after proving good credentials?; above all, 
what is the reason, the perverse dynamic, that, on the one hand, stops Islamist parties 
from being ʻpoliticallyʼ relevant without being disruptive, and on the other, stops the 
Government from engaging with them, except by depoliticising them as religious groups or 
by witch-hunting them as terrorists? This perverse dynamic finally leads both to the 
Islamistsʼ political ʻfailureʼ and to the persistence of a security threat. I argue that the 
answers to these questions lie in a ʻfetishismʼ for politics that is nurtured by both sides, the 
dominant and the dominated, the British Government and the Islamist parties. 
 
Furthermore, my study is an attempt to comprehend discourses, practices, discursive 
practices voiced, dialogued and inhabited by the political actors themselves, without 
resorting to culturalist explanations and to orientalist frameworks of understanding, as 
these are politically disenabling and disingenuously ostracizing (Marranci 2008, 9). My 
dissertation does not speak of Islamic terrorism but of politics and of political actors. It 
focuses on the relationships of power and on the production of meanings and meaningful 
practices within those relationships. It is also a study of discourses and practices of 
resistance and subversion against some power structures. It analyses projects and ideas 
aimed at charting and changing those hegemonic structures and discourses. This also 
means that I intend to show the distinctive weakness of the assumption that every political 
movement, which articulates itself through the vocabulary of religion, is fundamentalist and 
potentially terrorist; to counter the disingenuous argument that the political practices and 
discourses of the political agents are genetically determined by their culture (Gellner 1981, 
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THE METHODOLOGY USED 
 
Above, I have outlined the main research questions that got me started and helped me to 
stay focused throughout the entire research process (Oakley 2000, 17). 
As mentioned earlier, the method I decided to adopt in order to investigate them might 
seem somewhat risky or anti-intellectual. I did not start from the theory or from a survey of 
the existing literature, but from the fieldwork (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 8), thus 
favouring an approach that would let theory emerge from the analysis of the data: the 
grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 6). 
A grounded theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomena it represents 
(ibid., 11). That is to say, it is discovered, developed and provisionally verified through 
systematic data collection and analysis pertaining to the phenomena under observation 
(ibid., 15). Therefore, data collection, analysis and theory stand in a reciprocal relationship 
to each other. I did not begin with a theory to then prove it. Rather, I commenced with an 
area of study and then allowed the emergence of what is relevant to it (ibid, 23). 
The context of my research related to a minority group in Britain, the Muslims, and as the 
following pages will better clarify, those among them who see their political future in Islam: 
the Islamists. 
For a period of two years (2005-2007), I was engaged in intense fieldwork with Islamist 
activists based in London and its outskirts. These activists were members of a wide range 
of Islamist parties, from the more moderate to the more radical.  
My objective was to learn about their political discourses and practices as Islamists in the 
UK; to find out how their Islamism was discoursed and practiced within the relations of 
power with the UK government and, how it was performing and interacting with UK 
Government policies.  
I began with a prepared list of relatively open-ended questions (Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007, 11), to enable me to find out more about each interviewee: their background, 
education, employment status and mainly, the reasons why they had joined the Islamist 
parties under observation. 
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Sometimes the interviews turned into a ʻconversationʼ; in some cases, other party 
members were present and contributed to the discussions. At other times, especially when 
I was interviewing party leaders, the interviews tended to stay quite formal.  
By and large, the party members were quite forthcoming about the shared goals of the 
Islamist agenda in the UK and in the rest of the world and about their own motivations for 
joining the Islamist struggle and call. 
What emerged from those encounters was the party membersʼ strong sense of ʻprideʼ and 
superiority in their contribution to propagating the Islamist message and in implementing 
its political agenda; they made it clear to me that doing this was the only right way of 
bringing about a change ʻin world politics, in terms of justice and developmentʼ. 
There were also some practical difficulties involved in the project, related both to my 
ʻstatusʼ as a woman (Oakley 2000, 16) and as a non-Muslim, inquiring about their idea of 
the ʻpoliticalʼ (Mouffe 2005, 9). It is important to stress that all my interviewees were male-
subjects: not because I selected them as such, but because all these parties are formed 
exclusively by men. 
It is also worth remembering that these interviews were carried out in a period when 
Islamism and Islamists had come under attack (Marranci 2008, 64), accused of being 
terrorists and fundamentalists, enemies of the West (Asad 2006, 9). Therefore, my 
interviewees were very suspicious at the beginning about my real purposes for conducting 
the research. It took a little time to win their trust, to be allowed to take part in their 
meetings and then to approach them for an interview. Once the trust was granted, my 
interviewees became more articulate and willing to talk profusely about Islamism in 
general, their own reasons for joining the specific Islamist party, the benefits of embracing 
Islamism in Britain and of implementing whole or part of the Islamist predicament 
(discourse) into practice. I was fully aware from the beginning that the interviewees were 
partly telling me what they perceived I wanted to hear (based upon their representation of 
me as a Western non-Muslim woman),and partly, giving me the official party line. 
I was also fully aware that there was no definite ʻtruthʼ to be reached (Abu-Lughoud 1989, 
300) or discovered and perhaps, also, that my interviewees did not want to share with me 
what they believed was their ʻtruthʼ (ibid., 301). As mentioned earlier, sometimes the 
interviews turned into conversations, specifically with the younger members (under-aged), 
who did not want to be quoted in the first place. On ethical and moral grounds, I do not 
refer to them in my research and I do not report our conversations. Nevertheless, I have 
learned and understood a lot from those experiences. Primarily, I have grasped and 
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retained something of the complexity of their situation: the overlapping levels of identities, 
which, as young boys born and bred in the UK, they have to cope with. They have decided 
to embrace Islamism as their political ʻideologyʼ (Metcalf 1996, 55), yet they profess an 
Islam very different from that of their fathers and grandfathers, which was still of a 
diasporic kind and which they consider traditional, in the sense of being obsolete (Haddad 
2002, 38). Still, these young Islamists go to school, have fun with their friends and school-
mates, who might be from a different religious, cultural or political background and might 
look at them suspiciously, sometimes because of their political beliefs. Equally, these 
young Islamists I spoke to and spent some time with, might work in a grocery shop to earn 
extra cash, where they need to sell wines and alcohol and, as other young boys of their 
age, might enjoy reading some menʼs magazines like GQ, all of which could hardly be 
considered ʻIslamicʼ or related to the core of ʻIslamistʼ discourse. 
These specific elements, the collection and recollection of these observations, which  
might seem somewhat irrelevant, probably ʻanti-academicʼ or even petty, were extremely 
precious ʻeye-openersʼ for conducting my research. They helped me understand the 
processual and ʻwork-in-progressʼ character of their Islamist discourse and practices 
(Marranci 2006, 34). These Islamist discourses and practices were not ʻarticulatedʼ and 
practiced in a vacuum: they were primarily lived and experienced in a country that had no 
Muslim background (UK), and which my interviewees could ʻfeelʼ and represent to 
themselves, as a country where they are a minority (Metcalf 1996, 17-20). 
All this convinced me greatly of the inaccuracy and flaws in every approach and theoretical 
framework that represents Islam and Islamism as a monolithic block, unchanged and 
unchangeable, incapable of changing and mostly unable of being discoursed and 
practiced as a political discourse (Del Valle 1997, 33; Fallaci 2001, 63; Gellner 1981, 36; 
Huntington 1997, 14; Kramer 1996, 45; Lewis and Schnapper 1994, 79; Philips 2006, 22), 
which is still somehow related to Islam, but it is practiced and divulged within a power 
relationship. That is to say a fully-fledged political programme (Varisco 2005, 4) and not a 
private professed belief, which we call Islam. What I was enquiring about and starting to 
better understand were political movements with political goals and plans for the future: 






The role of the researcher: the experience within 
 
As mentioned earlier, the collection of data in my fieldwork involved some complications 
related to my status both as a researcher and as a woman, as non-Muslim and (in view of 
my interviewees) Western (Oakley 2000, 55). 
The first question I had to face was the role of the researcher within the domain of her/his 
own research (Bowen 2007, 55). To put it another way, power-relations and politics do not 
simply exist as an area of research enquiry; they exist and have a relevant role in the 
research process too (Damasio 2000, 3). In terms of her/his own project, the researcher 
has traditionally been represented as a powerful figure (Butler and Scott 1992, 35), as one 
who exercises control over what happens and how it happens, whereas, the ʻsubjectsʼ of 
her/his own research are represented as partially ʻagency-freeʼ elements that can exert 
very little influence over the process (Damasio 2002, 116). More specifically, the whole 
process is not inscribed and represented as a power-relationship. My response to this 
approach has been to place myself as a part of the ʻexperienceʼ, within a relation of ʻinter-
subjectivityʼ (Damasio 2000, 145). This approach focuses critical attention not only on the 
ʻfindings, as in the empiricist tradition, nor on textuality, as in some post-modern 
approaches, but on the theory and politics of the representation of the other and on the 
meaning of research for the researchedʼ (ibid., 146). 
The problem for me arose in terms of how to document the experience of the others, how 
to offer the ʻevidenceʼ of experience? I have been, and am still, struggling with claims such 
as: what could be truer than a subjectʼs own account of what she/he has lived through? It 
is this kind of appeal to experience as un-contestable evidence and as origin of 
explanation, that has questioned my own research and jeopardized my effort and trust in 
writing a ʻ history/histories of differenceʼ (Gilsenan 1982, 5). The issue for someone 
conducting fieldwork should not revolve around taking as self- evident the identities of 
those whose experience is being documented, thereby naturalizing their differences 
(Daniel 1993, 28; Varisco 2005, 5). Put another way, when experience is taken as the 
origin of knowledge, inescapably the vision of the individual subject (be it the subject 
whose experience is being accounted for, or the researcher who makes the account) 
becomes the bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is built. The risk involved in this 
is that experience subtly becomes a sort of undisputed authority of knowledge (El Zein 
1977, 252) rather than a way in itself of exploring how difference is established, how it 
operates, how and in which way it gives flesh to the subjects: a language, a grammar for 
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their discourses, and a history (Essed 1991, 57; Trepagnier 2006, 89). My concern, 
mainly, is that a notion and a deployment of the ʻevidenceʼ of experience like this one, 
simply reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems, which assume that facts 
speak for themselves (El Zein 1977, 32). In the specific case of this study, the 
representation of the Islamist discourses and practices produced by the culturalist 
orientalist approach (analysed in the next chapter) rests on a ʻnaturalʼ difference (ibid., 32) 
between religion and political practices and discourses, between Islam (Islamism is not 
even taken into consideration) and an enlightened-secularized form of politics (Varisco 
2005, 19). 
It is certainly not enough just to give a voice to those political actors who are affected and 
marginalized by these dichotomized understandings of politics. The project of making 
experience ʻvisibleʼ cannot neglect the analysis of how this ideological system works, the 
process of its category-building, the premises upon which those categories  rest and how 
they operate with notions of subjects, origin and cause (ibid., 27). There is a need to follow 
and understand the historical processes, that through discourses, position subjects and 
produce their experiences. It is like saying that it is not individuals who have experience, 
but subjects who are constituted through experience (Crosby 1992, 131). Experience then 
becomes not the origin, the foundation of our explanation, but what we want to explain. In 
so doing, all the explanatory categories usually taken for granted start to be questioned, 
opened and broken down to their discursive, contested origin; experience itself is definitely 
one of them (ibid., 132). 
 
My main concern, when I embarked upon my fieldwork with Islamist activists, was that 
experience is not the linchpin or axiom of our explanation but what we want and we need to 
explain first (Geertz 1973, 25). This kind of approach does not undermine politics by 
denying the existence of the subjects, but it interrogates the process of their creation and it 
attempts to chart the power relations and struggles, which imbue and mobilize them 
(Damasio 2000, 30). By so doing, it powerfully refigures history, the experience itself and 
the role of the researcher. It is a process of historicizing that implies the critical scrutiny of 
all foundational categories used to represent and analyse experience, otherness and 
otherʼs experiences, where the researcher always stands out as an a-priori (Trepagnier 
2006, 68). 
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To wit, the role of the researcher cannot be considered as a ʻgivenʼ any longer and it is 
never a sort of ʻdeus ex machinaʼ1, rather it needs to be carefully enquired and thus 
ʻuprootedʼ. 
The researcher is, in fact, both the object of the enquiry and the investigator him or herself. 
Personally, I started conducting my fieldwork with the Islamist party members by raising 
questions about whether it matters for the history that researchers (including myself) write, 
that they are men, women, white, black, straight, gay, believers, atheist or agnostic; I 
found, instead, that all too often the authority of the subject of knowledge is established by 
the elimination of everything concerning the speaker (De Certau 1986, 218). The question 
of where the researcher is situated, who he or she is , how he or she is defined in relation 
to others, what the political effects of his or her history may be, never really enter the 
discussion. I considered it essential, while conducting my research, to raise a few 
important questions: questions about discourse, difference and subjectivity, as well as 
about what counts as experience and who gets to make that determination (Oakley 2000, 
69). Doing this would enable us to historicize experience and to reflect critically on the 
history we write. Instead of denying or being blind to the fact that knowledge and 
experience exist within a power-relationship and are indeed political (Damasio 2002, 114), 
it would help us to see that, as researchers, we need to stop acting as an a-priori 
ʻourselvesʼ and as a sort of foundational category of understanding and knowledge. This 
would imply taking all categories of analysis as contextual, contested and contingent 
(Essed 1991, 32); this would also lead us to ask how categories of representation and 
analysis -- such as class, gender, race, identity, subjectivity, experience, culture -- achieve 
their foundational status? What does it mean for a researcher to analyse the reality in 
terms of those categories; for individuals to think of themselves in these terms? Dominick 
La Capra has argued that there is a ʻtransferentialʼ relationship between an historian and 
the past, a researcher and his/her topic of investigation (La Capra 1987, 68). This means 
that there is a relationship between the power of the historianʼs analytical frame and the 
events that are the object of his/her study. To historicize both sides means denying the 
fixity and the transcendence of anything that appears to operate as a foundation, and 
                                            
1 In the tradition of Greek tragedy, the deus ex machina was an unexpected divine intervention, which resolved an 
intricate case, that was otherwise hopeless. Nowadays, the term is used to indicate an improbable twist in the plot of a 
story, which is used by the author in order to work his or her way out from a difficult situation. The main characteristic 
of a ‘deus ex machina’ is its lack of relation or consequential logic to the main plot of the story: it is a totally extraneous 
element. What I mean here by using this rhetorical expression is that the researcher is never detached and ‘external’ or 
extraneous to the topic she/he is writing about. The researcher is in the ‘plot’ and this cannot be denied or concealed any 
longer, in fact it needs to be exposed and analysed. 
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turning attention to the history of the foundational concepts themselves, to their genealogy. 
For a researcher conducting fieldwork, this also implies considering experience as already 
an interpretation and in constant need of an interpretation. What counts as experience is 
never self-evident or straightforward; it is always contested and therefore political (El Zein 
1977, 57). This kind of approach considers experience as what we need to explain, it 
interrogates the processes of the creation and suppression of subjects; it also re-figures 
history and the role of an historian and/or of a researcher (Abu Lughoud 1989, 299); it 
recognizes his/her stake in the production of knowledge; it is also aware of the fact that 
categories, and specifically identity categories, are never merely descriptive but always 
normative and, as such, exclusionary. This does not mean we stop using them, or reject all 
of them, but that we deconstruct and question them, use them subversively, remove them 
from a context where they have been deployed as taken-for-granted and unquestioned. 
This approach also aims to interrogate the formative and exclusionary power of discourse 
in the construction of differences and identities, by asking whether specific deployments of 
discourses for specific purposes determine the very notions used (Damasio 2002, 110). In 
Gayatri Spivakʼs terms, the issue consists in trying to understand the operations of the 
complex and changing discursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted or 
embraced and which processes themselves are un-remarked, indeed they achieve their 
effect because they are not noticed (Spivak 1987, 241). In other words, to be able to do 
this, there is the need of framing identities and mainly their emergence, as historical 
events in need of explanation (Marranci 2008, 49). This also means not assuming that the 
appearance of a new identity is some sort of positivist social fact; it is not inevitable or 
determined, always there waiting to be expressed, not something that will always exist in 
the form that it was given in a particular political movement or at a particular historical 
moment. As Stuart Hall explains ʻblack has never just been there either…It too is a 
narrative, a story with a history. Something constructed, told and spoken, not simply foundʼ 
(Hall 1987, 45). Evidently, this means that we ʻhistoricizeʼ the experience of the ʻblackʼ 
identity and of blackness. 
 Overall, this endeavour strives to open up new ways of thinking about change and for 
enquiring about what ought to be changed. It requires us to expose and unsettle the silent 
power, the silent genealogy of some discourses of erasure, exclusion and re-configuration, 
which foreclose political spaces and disenable political actors: in this case, the functioning 
of a culturalist-orientalist approach toward Islamism (Marranci 2008, 61), which needs to 
be continuously questioned, challenged and unsettled.  
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To conclude, I want to stress that the choice of the methodology summarised here came 
about both as a reflection on past research experiences and as a project, on how to start 
charting thoughts of change and how to think about subverting relations of power that exist 
at different levels, discursively, ʻepistemologicallyʼ and, obviously, in political practice. 
 
With my disciplinary background, I am sceptical of approaches in which analysis stands in 
some kind of theoretical (ideological) opposition to the social discourses and practices one 
is analysing. Furthermore, I have always been suspicious of theories that claim to know 
and to ʻtrulyʼ re-present what people really mean, before even listening to what people 
actually say, doing so implies the indignity of speaking on someone elseʼs behalf (Price 
2002, 5). 
Another way of making the point here is that I have tried to achieve an understanding of 
the topic of my research -- namely, the discourses and practice of Islamists in the UK 
within their relations of power -- that is firmly anchored in the comprehension of the 
political actors themselves (Banton 2001, 173-194; Elian 1978, 68; Bordieu 1990, 48). The 
enquiry that I have embarked upon aspires to find an understanding of the events and 
conceptualize them accurately, but ʻall this intellectual activity only makes sense if it 
illuminates the perceptions of actorsʼ, for, there is no social structure independent of the 
understanding of agents (Goffman 1974, 56). That is to say, the approach I have followed 
is eclectic and syncretic. In synthesis, I have tried to open up, break down and subvert 
foundational categories, in order to use them again, as de-constructed and displaced; this 
also allowed me to chart and expose the previous operations of power, otherwise gone 
unchecked (Grillo 2003, 170). 
These methodological considerations have also led me to realise that British Islamists do 
not live in a vacuum but that they inhabit and share a specific context (the UK), and so, 
they can neither be seen as a uniform part of a monolithic, universal ʻIslamic worldʼ 
(Gellner 1981, 36), nor can they be overlooked. This does not need to be investigated just 
in terms of numbers and by means of a quantitative analysis, but mainly in terms of lived 
experiences and through a qualitative investigation (Marranci 2008, 3). It involves 
considering, analyzing and sharing the experience within the discourses and the practices 
of a Muslim minority living in the West, and more specifically, Muslims living in Britain, who 
inhabit, share and represent Islam as their political identity: Islamists. 
At last, a final reminder is needed -- if there is a methodological error, it is not made by 
those who decide to meet and spend time with the Islamists before analysing Islamist 
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discourses and practices, but mostly, by those, who for so long thought that they could 
avoid such an effort. 
 
 
The interaction within the fieldwork 
 
There remains something that needs discussion in relation to my status as a non-Muslim 
woman researcher, interviewing Islamists (all my interviewees were men), and it brings me 
to a topic that is very relevant to the process of gathering firsthand data: equality. As I 
have previously emphasised, I argue that the researcher and the so-called researched are 
both, equally, active parts of the ʻexperienceʼ. It is very often assumed (Gatrell 2006, 241) 
that research should be conducted on the basis of equality. The first objection that can be 
raised against this proposition is that equality cannot exist where one individual has 
chosen to research a situation which she/he may not have personally experienced (ibid., 
255). And what do we mean by equality? I believe that this assumption sounds slightly 
unrealistic, because the experience of the interview in itself, and by and large of the 
fieldwork, is a process in the making, where both actors (researcher and researched) are 
players within the terms and the prolific ʻboundariesʼ of a power relationship; where 
practices of representation and self-representation have a pivotal role in the dynamics, 
strategies and developments of such relationship, and where final results and outcomes 
are not determined apriori: they all stand as possible, potential endings (Damasio 2000, 
56). As mentioned before, there was no theory I wanted to prove (Strauss and Corbin 
1990, 23) by commencing my fieldwork; rather, I was open-minded and ready to embark 
on the process of researching and understanding the making of political discourses and 
practices (Grillo 2003, 158). However, one observation has to be conveyed here. While I 
did not retain as relevant or implement-able the notion of equality, I considered it important 
that everyone involved in the process of research should have an equal entitlement to 
certain standard of treatment. However, although this is desirable, several different 
contingencies managed to ʻdisruptʼ my meetings with the participants; this means that they 
often happened under quite stressed conditions. 
In this case, I found the suggestions of feminist methodology researchers (Abu Lughod 
1993, 112) useful in tackling the dilemma of how to conduct the practicalities of the 
relationships between the researchers and the researched. They recommend unstructured 
or semi-structured interviewing. Open-ended interview research, notes Reinharz, 
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ʻproduces non-standardized information that allows the researcher to make full use of 
differences among peopleʼ (1992, 16). In this framework, one of the objectives of the 
feminist interviewing technique is to build a more sympathetic relationship between the 
researcher and the people who are sharing their stories. It is then receptive to unexpected 
patterns and stresses the importance of listening and respect. 
There is also another question of what I would call the underlying motives, both of the 
researcher and of the participants, and specifically, what it is usually defined as ʻthe 
researcherʼs desire to achieve a degree of detachmentʼ (ibid., 18-19). 
Personally, I do not believe that such attainment of a scientific detachment is plausible or 
realistic, neither do I consider it desirable; in my fieldwork, other skills were very helpful -- 
instinct, experience and the careful attention to the smallest details and elements, from the 
expressed ones to the just alluded, from the unsaid to the tabooed, from the way the 
bodies, as in the body language, were variously seeking distance and proximity from the 
other. 
The sociologist Ann Oakley proposed a new model of research based on a ʻ feminist ethic 
of commitment and egalitaranism in contrast with the scientific ethic of detachment and 
role differentiation between researcher and subjectʼ (2000, 27). This approach explains 
very well the difference between empathy and objectification. If one adopts a feminist 
interviewing technique, it allows a degree of creativity, not in the sense of ʻmaking things 
upʼ but rather in the sense that one is broadening the field to include every subject-actor of 
the experience of the fieldwork: the ʻresearcherʼ as well as the so-called ʻresearchedʼ 
(incidentally, terms I would avoid, as they indicate a relation of ʻdominationʼ, which goes 
against my own argument on the shared, dynamic and procedural experience of the 
fieldwork). 
 
This brings me to discuss another relevant topic for my fieldwork: the sensitivity of the 
research. A sensitive topic has been defined as ʻone which potentially poses for those 
involved a substantial threat, the emergence of which renders problematic the collection, 
holding and/or dissemination of research dataʼ (Lee, Renzetti 1990, 512). There is no 
doubt that exploring the political in relation to groups which are under continuous attack or 
suspicion of being terrorist and fundamentalist is a sensitive issue. Furthermore, some of 
my interviewees were under house arrest on the accusation of being terror suspects and I 
had to be cleared from the Home Office to be allowed to visit them, agreeing to be labelled 
as an ʻassociate to terror suspectsʼ. Some other groups I conducted field work with, were 
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banned and forced to go underground at the same time that I was interviewing and 
meeting them. Some others I did my fieldwork with, were under the constant threat of 
being banned and police and armed forces were always patrolling the area where they 
held talks. I was well aware of the difficulties and the possible shortcomings involved in 
conducting research on a sensitive topic. That meant that the individuals I wanted to meet 
and interview could have been unwilling to talk about their political stands, agenda, 
experiences and their pasts. So I definitely considered whether it was fair to subject my 
interviewees to any kind of emotional harm. Besides, I could not disregard other more 
immediate concerns. Some of the party members spoke to me only on condition of 
anonymity and I was, and I am still, under legal obligation not to reveal the identities and 
the contents of my conversations with the terror suspects I was cleared to visit. 
In addition, I had to consider the potential dangers and threats posed to my own safety by 
being ʻcloseʼ to a set of ʻpublic enemiesʼ in the eyes of the public forces and the then 
Labour Government. However, after much consideration, I still retained the importance and 
worthiness of embarking on this research, while bearing in mind the risks I could have 
faced, the suspicious treatment I could have been subjected to, from the ʻDominantʼ and 
the ʻDominatedʼ, from the UK government and from the Islamist themselves. 
 
 
The interview process 
 
As outlined before, the method I employed for my field-research was qualitative and 
interactive and depended on the intensive, sometimes informal discussions rather than the 
gathering of statistical information. Guidelines for the interview process were relatively 
broad and open. I was seeking to find out about my intervieweesʼ background, their 
biographical data, when, how and why they decided to embrace Islamism and what 
Islamism meant for them and as a political agenda. 
I decided to express and state clearly at the outset, the objectives and the reasons for 
conducting my research, just to eliminate any suspicion that I was a secret agent working 
for MI5, as my interviewees sensed or sometimes thought. 
In my encounters, it was necessary and fundamental to consider the difference between 
an interview and a conversation. While a conversation may at least be regarded as social 
interaction, an interview is a much more formal and structured affair and both my 
interviewees and I were aware of those differences; this did not imply any deficiency in the 
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relevance or ʻseriousnessʼ of the data and information collected, but just a difference in our 
interactions and subjectivities at work. 
 
 
Mapping the research and starting the fieldwork 
 
The first step in the research process was to individuate and select the Islamist parties 
with whom I wanted to conduct fieldwork. I decided to include, and tried to approach, the 
vastest range of them, from the more moderate to the more radical, by trying to interview 
not just the party leaders or representatives of the partiesʼ committees, but also the regular 
members and followers, from the youngest to the eldest, with some specific ethical 
concerns in relation to the under-aged. 
The method I used to gather information was a combination of semi-structured interviewing 
and informal conversations (when the situation required the latter approach, as in the case 
of minors and the terror suspects under house arrest). 
The set of questions for individuals was designed to establish their background, education, 
profession, their relations to Islam as a lived religion (what I would define in the next pages 
as religiosity), how they would define Islamism (how and if this was different from Islam), 
the reasons behind their choice of embracing Islamism and what were the benefits of 
implementing the Islamist message in world politics. 
In the case of the party leaders, as the following pages will show, I asked specific 
questions about the partyʼs relations to the UK government and its anti-terror policies, the 
relation with the UK democratic systems and its political arena, and to what extent they felt 
marginalised and/or (un)willing to participate in the British political system.This then led me 
to divide them into two groups: the participationists and the rejectionists. 
In relation to the first group, I met and exchanged conversations with members of parties 
as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), the Muslim Association of Britain 
(MAB), Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC). 
Unfortunately, and rather surprisingly, only one representative of these parties -- from the 
IHRC -- agreed to be formally interviewed and quoted. Members from the other parties 
were easy to approach but reluctant to concede a proper interview. Hence, they asked me 
that they remain anonymous and that I not disclose the contents of what then became an 
informal conversation and exchange of ideas. 
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Nevertheless, these encounters were very fruitful as I could get a proper and richer insight 
into the different partiesʼ dynamics. More specifically, I gained a pertinent  understanding 
of their ʻJanus-facedʼ relations with the UK Government, in terms of  their practices and 
discourses within that power relationship. I will offer in chapter 5 an examination and an 
interpretation of this kind of ʻmissing first hand dataʼ. Paradoxically, the lack of those formal 
interviews and the subjectsʼ reticence in talking about their notion of the ʻpoliticalʼ have 
provided me with a very subtle comprehension of their attitude towards the dominant (the 
UK Government), something I will later term as their ʻfetishismʼ for politics. 
In relation to the second group, I met, held conversations, and conducted formal interviews 
with the members of Hizbu-ut-Tahrir (HT), Al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect. The fieldwork 
with members of these parties, grouped as rejectionists since they refuse to take part in 
the British political life, has followed an opposite path. 
At the beginning, it was quite difficult to approach them as, at that time, they were under 
the continuous threat of being banned and two of them had actually been banned, while I 
was conducting my fieldwork with them. Therefore, to obtain their trust, I had to gradually 
ʻget closeʼ to them, by first attending more than a couple of meetings, demos and 
workshops. Then, when they could recognize my face as a ʻfamiliar, trustable oneʼ, I could 
invite them to give an interview. The process was slow and time-consuming, but finally I 
obtained various formal interviews from the party leaders, members of the party official 
committees and the party members. 
Among them, I had also the opportunity of spending some time and exchanging  informal 
conversations with the young ones, all under-aged. Some of the conversations cannot be 
quoted and reported for ethical reasons but the collection of the material turned out to be 
extremely rich and relevant for my research, to the extent that it offered a deeper and more 
variegated picture of the context I was investigating: a UK where the Islamists feel 
themselves to be a minority, in terms of numbers, but also mostly in terms of self-
representation. 
When I commenced my fieldwork, my purpose was to access as broad a cross-section of 
party members as possible -- from the youngest to the eldest, from the well-educated to 
the less-educated, from the ones in paid employment to the unemployed or those living on 
benefits, from the second and third generation immigrants to the converted or not 
belonging to any ʻMuslimʼ cultural background, from the Islamists free to practice and 
discourse their Islamism to the ones under the threat of being banned, from the politically 
banned to the ones under house arrests for political and security reasons. Most of my 
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interviews took place in London (north, south, east and west, mostly suburban areas) and 
its outskirts (Luton). 
As outlined above, I was received by my interviewees and the ʻsubjectsʼ of my study in 
different ways. A certain form of detachment and ʻofficialismʼ combined with a certain 
unwillingness to talk too much, from the more moderate parties. Suspicion, sometimes fear 
and unwelcoming remarks from the more radical parties, whose trust I had to gain after 
several attendances at their meetings as a non-participant observer (but once that trust 
was gained, they were very precious and relevant participants in the research). The most 
welcoming and kind people who were open to talking profusely were those under house 
arrest, whom I approached and frequentated for reasons of ʻhumanʼ comfort, driven by my 
personal desire and efforts to help them overcome the Kafkasque and inhuman conditions 
they were forced into. In such cases, our conversations were very broad and open-ended, 
with no specific time slot to respect and/or questions to be followed. To a certain extent, 
this resembled the oral history techniques (Charlton 2007, 5). 
By and large, and above all, I always tried to ensure that both the interview process and 
my conversations with all the individuals whom I approached, had the fluidity to encourage 
a degree of freedom and ease at talking, but also I was able to steer the conversation by 
focussing on particular topics such as Islamism in the UK. In most cases, my interviewees 
tended to link their own experience of Islamism to the broader cause of Islamism in the 
world. This, I believe, originated from the fact that I was a stranger, they did not know my 
background and they felt a sort of ʻobligationʼ to educate and convince me about their 
cause, political message and plight. 
Most of the interviews took between one and two hours; a few lasted less than one hour 
and the longest lasted for almost five hours. They took place in different venues: where the 
party members used to meet, or in their headquarters, in community centres, sometimes in 
the individualʼs house, and on other occasions in a coffee house. I was able to interview 
some of them more than once, especially when something relevant happened, such as the 
individual leaving the party or the party being banned. My visits to the people under house 
arrests happened with a weekly frequency stretched over a period of eighteen months. 
However, a majority of the interviews were based on a single meeting. In almost all cases, 
I spoke to one individual at a time; however there were a few meetings with groups of party 
members. Needless to remark that the mode of interaction (whether in a group setting or 
on their own) and the location of the meeting had some effect on the shape of the 
interview. 
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Behind the research process and directing it was the fundamental question of what was 
the individual party membersʼ political experience and practice as an Islamist in the UK, 
and how the then-occuring events of the London bombings and the consequent anti-
terrorism measures adopted by the UK government had affected that experience, and their 
ability to participate. Whether they explained this in terms of allegiance to their previous 
political stance, and rescue from wrong belief, or, if they  consequently saw the UK anti-
terror policies as human/civil rights violation, political oppression, fascism or Islamophobia, 
I wanted to glean the precise nature, origin, genealogy, discourse and practice of their 
Islamism as confronting the dominant political discourse and practice. I wanted to 
understand their agenda and plans within that relationship of power and their solutions 
regarding how to win that struggle or find an agreement on the more serious problems and 
conflicts affecting that relationship. 
 
 
Issues raised by the research 
 
There are some ethical considerations entailed in this research. Although there have been 
numerous studies on Political Islam and Islamism in the West, an investigation  pertaining 
to the field of Islamistsʼ discourses and practices facing the Dominant (the UK Government 
in my specific case), is a relatively unexplored area (Marranci 2008, 7). 
By concentrating on the face-to-face encounters with the political actors themselves, my 
research reveals the complex genealogy of political discourse and practices (Islamism) 
developing in a country (the UK) outside the Islamic cultural matrix, where the political 
actors themselves feel part of a minority (Haddad 2002, 68). One important result 
emerging from the fieldwork was that their practices are fully political, in terms of party 
organization, structure and agenda and that their discourses are evolving within specific 
relationships of power, where the so-called ʻreligiousʼ element is definitely of secondary 
importance (Marranci 2006, 35). As I will go on to state, Islam as a religion offers the 
vernacular to their political discourse, which is however performed within a power-
relationship that is politics (Asad 2006, 5).  
The experience of the fieldwork has been crucial to my understanding of the topic under 
examination: the power relationship between dominant and dominated, and the complex 
dynamics at work within this relationship of power. 
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However, there are conversations and data that I cannot disclose for several different 
reasons. Sometimes, the interviewees themselves asked not to be reported, quoted or 
referred.  I have definitely honoured their wishes and, what is more, understanding the 
reasons behind such choices, allowed my analysis to offer a broader and comprehensive 
explanation of their notion of the political. 
At other times, my interviewees were under-aged, therefore I was compelled by ethical and 
moral reasons not to report or quote our exchanges. In these specific cases, my 
understanding and collection of data was more ʻvisualʼ than worded or spoken, and I 
retained and considered precious what I could observe about their interaction with me and 
with their peers, be it just the body language (Varisco 2005, 3). 
In yet other specific cases, I am placed under a legal obligation not to disclose data about 
my ʻintervieweesʼ as they were, and some of them still are, under bail orders. 
 I cherished these experiences with the interviewees, on a human, intellectual and 
scientific level. Finally, the experiences, which cannot all be referred to, offered me the key 
to comprehending the entire ʻpuzzleʼ of the relationship of power between Islamists in the 
UK and the UK government, by showing a clear, living, undisputable proof of the 
backlashes and dangers inherent in that relationship when it is affected  by a fetishism for 
politics from both sides, the dominant and the dominated. The terror suspects under house 
arrest were, at the same time, suspects and victims of the same broken dialogues, 
deflected actions and, finally, of the same terror and terrorizing of minds. 
 
 
Plan of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation can be essentially divided into two parts: the first part (Chapters 1-4) 
reviews the culturalist and orientalist representations of Islamism, by examining the history 
of Islamism in Britain and analyzing the concepts relevant for the Islamist discourses and 
practices.The second part (Chapters 5-6) revolves around the practices and discourses of 
self-representation, offered by the political actors themselves, the objects of my fieldwork.  
The first chapter reviews and analyzes the culturalist-orientalist approach toward Islam 
and Islamism and it suggests an alternative approach: the constructionist approach. 
The second chapter examines the history of the Muslim presence in the UK and their 
minority status, it also introduces the concept of Islamism as a political discourse that 
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places Islam at the centre of political practice. The third chapter is an examination of the 
main sources of the Islamic beliefs (the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the Shariaa) to better 
understand how Islamism has evolved and how Islamists have variously given ʻworksʼ to 
the ʻwordsʼ (Mawdudi 1982, 13) by performing discursive practices of ʻmeaningʼ, and in so 
doing, created an Islamist discourse. This chapter also analyses  the concepts of jihad and 
democracy; much sought-after topics since 9-11. It demonstrates that the understanding of 
such concepts -- within an Islamist discourse -- is contextual and definitely political, and 
that subsequent practice of such concepts is political too. 
The fourth chapter analyses the history of Islamism in the UK through an examination of 
the main events since 1989 that have witnessed the emergence of Islamism and Islamists 
in the UK: the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War, the Bosnian crisis, 9-11, the invasion of Iraq 
and the 7-7 bombings. 
The fifth and sixth chapters analyse and discuss the findings of two years of fieldwork 
among British Islamists. The fifth chapter analyses the parties grouped as participationists 
or those willing to take part in the British political life. The sixth chapter examines the 
parties grouped as rejectionists (McRoy 2006) or those who reject the British political 






The theoretical framework 
 
Today, after the political and social events that marked the beginning of a new millennium, 
there is an increased tension between the stereotyped representation of Islam and the no 
less stereotyped image of a civilizing West (Varisco 2005, 3). We must reconsider how we 
have approached the study of Islam and Muslims from political, sociological and 
anthropological perspectives. 
Nonetheless, essentialism is still present as a philosophical belief and affects both the 
academic and popular discourse on Muslims (Marranci 2008, 6). This method could be 
called the fallacy of the ʻMuslim mind theoryʼ (ibid., 8). According to this fallacy, religion 
induces Muslims to believe, behave, act, think, argue and develop their identity as Muslims 
despite their disparate heritages, ethnicities, nationalities, experiences, gender and last but 
not least, minds. In other words, their belief in Islam makes them a sort of cloned CPU: 
different styles, different colours, same process (Damasio 2000, 56). Sometimes, this 
fallacy is the result of generalizations, some of which are difficult to avoid (Grillo 2003, 
159). At other times, however, it is more ideological and the byproduct of a culturalist-
orientalist approach (ibid., 161). 
In this chapter, I review and criticize the culturalist-orientalist approach toward Islam and 
Islamism and I suggest an alternative approach: the constructionist approach. 
My argument is that the culturalist-orientalist approach is politically disabling and 
disingenuously ostracizing; it deprives Islamist actors of agency and it forcibly removes 
them from the power struggle. In contrast, the constructionist approach develops from an 
understanding of ʻcultureʼ as a site of contesting representations. It re-affirms the 
articulation of ʻcultural identityʼ as a political act in itself, within the terms, the dynamics, the 
struggles, the possibilities, and the unforeseeable strategies of a power-relationship; it 
therefore assumes and represents the agency, the discourses, and the practices of the 
agents as intrinsically political. 
In this section, I also analyse some relevant concepts such as the practices of 
stereotyping, of racialized representations and the notion of fetishism within the practices 




The toolkit of the culturalist and orientalist approaches 
 
The culturalist approach 
 
The core assumption of the culturalist approach argues not only that culture matters,but 
that it is mainly a matter of culture (Barber 1996, 35; Fallaci 2001, 34; Huntington 1997, 89; 
Zakaria 2001). The principle is that culture exists in itself, it is transmitted unchanged from 
generation to generation and it is the ultimate explanatory model for any society. In relation 
to Islam, it holds the view that a perennial religion based culture (Del Valle 1997, 33; 
Fallaci 2001, 63; Gellner 1981, 36; Huntington 1997, 14; Kramer 1996, 45; Lewis and 
Schnapper 1994, 79; Philips 2006, 22; Pipes 1983, 56) is a relevant factor in explaining 
most of the characteristics (especially drawbacks, failures and dead-ends) of Muslim 
societies. 
The first objection to this would be that if everything is explained away through culture 
imagined as a fixed, de-historicized block, then where does change come from? Has the 
social actorsʼ agency been totally suppressed; reduced to silence and inactivity? Are they 
just bearers of cultural banners, while being stamped out from a whole, pervasive, integral 
super-entity called culture? Do they have any role? 
They have been fundamentally deprived of agency, and instead, they have been given 
transfixed and culturalist identities (Hull 1997, 23), politically de-activated and de-
legitimized, ostracized from the power relationship (Varisco 2005, 46). In such a 
framework of understanding, Islamism simply becomes synonymous with Islam as a 
totalizing and all-encompassing entity, a monolithic block without history (and/or histories), 
geographies and above all human agency (Lewis and Schnapper 1994, 23). 
This framework is employed by some social scientists, historians, anthropologists 
(Benjamin Barber, Alexandre Del Valle, Ernest Gellner, Samuel Huntington, Martin 
Kramer, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Franz Rosenthal, Richard Walzer, Fareed Zakaria, 
to name just a few), politicians, journalists (Anthony Browne, Oriana Fallaci, Melanie 
Philips), writers, and also common people in ther roles as readers, consumers, citizens.2 
However, this approach is too present among some Muslims (El-Zein 1977, 233) for whom 
                                            
2 In Chapter 4, I offer the specific examples and analysis of the workings of the culturalist-orientalist approach in 
relation to Islamism, by reviewing the history of Islamism in the UK. 
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everything pertaining to Islam is, or should be, related to something in the Qur’an. This 
indicates a confusion between Islam as a religion and Muslim ʻcultureʼ (ibid., 255). As a 
religion, Islam includes the Qur’an, the Sunna and the commentaries of the ulama. Muslim 
or Islamic culture includes literature, traditions, science, social relationships, cuisine, 
historical and political paradigms, urban life and so on. A so-called culture is not an 
immanent, transcendent super-entity (Varisco 2005, 16): it is itself constituted and 
constantly construed through the inhabiting, sharing, contesting, resisting and re-
presenting performed by the social actors themselves as agents; it does not exist but in 
the process of formation (Hall and Du Gay 1996, 34). It is itself the process and not an 
accountable property or asset belonging to one or another, to you or to me, but to ʻusʼ, 
when ʻWEʼ exist and ʻ WEʼ are represented as ʻUSʼ to each other (Damasio 2000, 45). 
The culturalist approach tends to explain all the problems of Muslims in terms of Islam: the 
absence of democracy, terrorism, the status of women are all addressed by using the 
category of ʻ Islamic culture or religionʼ (Barber 1996, 3). I find it peculiar  that after 9-11, 
the Qur’an became a sort of bestseller in the USA and Europe, presumably, as people 
tried to discover the ʻIslamicʼ point of view about almost every aspect of life. My argument 
is that this is a very fruitless and uninteresting quest (Marranci 2006, 5) since a sacred 
book is by definition subjected to arguments and interpretations, and to interpreters. If there 
is still a debate about what the Qur’an really says, it means that nobody knows, or at least, 
that the people who think they know, disagree among themselves. Many reflections, which 
seem plain platitudes, suggest that the key question is not what the Qur’an really says but 
what Muslims say the Qur’an says (Roy 2004, 45), and finally (it might be stated) that the 
Qur’an and ʻIslamʼ are what Muslims say that they are. My analysis is not focused on some 
theological corpus, essences, transcendental spirit or an imperfectly defined Zeitgeist 
(Herder 1769); my investigation is interested in discourses, discursive practices, practices 
of meaning, representations and self-representations, operations of erasure, exclusion and 
displacement, resistance to power within relationships of power as performed by Islamist 
actors in the UK (Daniel 1993, 24). 
The main thrust of the culturalist approach consists of deleting from analysis the actual 
agents and explaining everything through a monolithic, de-historicized, de-contextualised, 
immanent block -- culture (Gellner 1981, 36; Hungtington 1997, 14; Kramer 1996, 45; 
Lewis and Schnapper 1994, 79) -- which is deprived of agency, agents, time and places. 
The other is thus represented as passive, simply stamped out by his/her own cultural 
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heritage; this primarily implies that he/she is conceived and thus represented as incapable 
of changing (Gellner 1981, 56). 
 
The Orientalist approach 
 
The culturalist approach toward Islam, Islamism and Islamists finds a more radical or 
pejorative turn in the Orientalist approach. Frombeing seen as passive and fundamentally 
inactive in terms of the culturalist approach, the Other becomes, in the Orientalist 
framework of understanding, inferior and politically unable, the incommensurable ʻOtherʼ 
(Del Valle 1997, 25; Philips 2006, 13; Zakaria 2001) -- the basis of this ʻineradicableʼ 
distinction consists in the ʻsuperiorityʼ of the West and the inferiority of ʻIslamʼ (Said 1978, 
45). 
Combining the (culturalist and orientalist) two approaches, Islam gets represented as a 
totalizing entity that ʻswallowsʼ human agency, geographies and histories and is further 
caricatured on the basis of dyads and binary oppositions that end up reinforcing the 
discourse of the ʻWest and the Restʼ (Huntington 1997; Pipes 1983; Philips 1996). 
The Orientalist approach can be summarised by four main themes which provide an 
essentialising caricature of Islam: a) there is an absolute and systemic difference between 
the West and Islam; b) the representations of Islam are based on textual exegesis rather 
than on living realities; c) Islam is unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself; 
d) Islam has to be ʻfeared or masteredʼ (Sayyid 1997, 34). In particular, it is this last feature 
that offers a clear insight into the main characteristics and consequences of an agency-
free, immanent and casuistic representation of Islam and Islamism given by the culturalist 
and orientalist approaches. Within a state of fear or within a relationship of domination 
(master-slave, for example), a basic dynamic is fundamentally missing: interaction 
between the elements of that relationship. To be more precise, the mere possibility of an 
interaction is excluded a priori (Varisco 2005, 90). As Foucault aptly states, slavery is not 
an example of a power-relationship (Foucault 1972). Here, the notion of power in terms of 
power-relationships, as the multiplicity of force relations, as the process which, transforms, 
strengthens, or even reverses them, as the net-like organizations through which power is 
exercised (Foucault 1976; 92-93) becomes extremely helpful. This conceptualisation of 
power highlights the shortcomings of the two aforementioned approaches and makes 
apparent the way in which they intrinsically erase the other as an agent, i.e., one who acts, 
and is capable of acting, independently, without any conditionality or any given guidelines 
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that he/she must follow perforce. The specificity of the power-relationship consists of two 
elements: that the other (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized and 
maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and, that faced with a relationship of 
power, a whole field of responses, reactions and possible inventions may open up 
(Foucault 1980). That is to say, subjects are faced with a field of possibilities in which 
several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available. 
The ʻotherʼ in the culturalist terms does not act, as he/she is deprived of agency, by being 
seen as a simple replica of a whole, uniform, integral unity called culture. However, this 
way of conceiving and re-presenting the other is taken to a more radical level by the 
Orientalist approach: the other is not simply represented as inactive (de-activated), he/she 
also needs to be fundamentally stopped from action as he/she is judged as unable or 
radically inferior (Del Valle 1996, 56; Kramer 1983, 68; Philips 2006, 113). The underlying 
assumption is that if she/he acts, he/she will make a mistake, that he/she will threaten or 
destroy all that is valuable. Thus, there is the need to prevent him/her from acting. One of 
the main tenets of a power-relationship is a permanent ʻagonismʼ (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, 77), a relationship which is struggle and an incitement to struggle, a permanent 
provocation; that means a succession of actions and counter-actions without a predictable 
end in time, or a foreseeable conclusion in terms of the resulting positions of the agents. 
This whole dynamic of the power-relationship and its developments are removed from 
analysis and  representation by the culturalist approach. More powerfully, they are ruled 
out by the orientalist one (El Zein 1977, 112).  
As a consequence of these operations, the social actors (Islamists) are de-legitimized as 
political agents and they are instead represented -- under the operations of essentialising, 
erasure and exclusion -- and reduced to Muslim genes with an Islamic DNA (Damasio 
2000, 58). This also tacitly implies -- according to the Orientalist approach -- that they are 
inferior as actors and in need of being ʻeducatedʼ. Besides, their discourses and discursive 
formations are represented through stereotypes and foundational categories which 
constitute ready-made answers to the questions that they are supposed to enquire about 
(Varisco 2005, 67). 
It is possible to agree that the operation of essentialising is sometimes epistemically 
unavoidable and maybe heuristically useful under other specific circumstances (Gilsenan 
1990, 67), but my argument is that the particular operations of essentialising, erasure and 
exclusion performed by the culturalist and orientalist approaches towards Islamism and 
Islamists, obstruct thepolitics of a sensate, meaningful democracy (Butler 2004, 370) of a 
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kind advocated by my research. Therefore, I suggest an alternative to the flawed and 
disingenuously ostracizing culturalist and orientalist frameworks of understanding: the 
constructionist approach.  On the one hand, this allows us to articulate a discourse about 
change, and on the other, to engage in a politics of opposition to the different forms of 
exclusion, repression and oppression that have gone uncharted. 
 
 
The Constructionist approach 
 
The constructionist approach, which is adopted as the theoretical framework of my thesis, 
develops from an understanding of ʻcultureʼ (whatever this expression might signify3) as a 
site of contesting representations (Hall 1997, 67). It reaffirms that the articulation of a 
ʻcultural identityʼ is itself a political act within the terms, the dynamics, the struggles, the 
possibilities, and the unforeseeable strategies of a power-relationship; it therefore 
assumes and represents the agency, the discourses, the practices and the discursive 
practices of the agents as intrinsically political. That is to say, this approach allows us to 
see ʻcultureʼ in terms of relations of power and resistance, in contrast to the cuturalist and 
orientalist approaches, that present it as a limbo of sedimented features, hereditary genes 
and irreducible differences, all of which are in need of being acknowledged, but only in 
terms of inferiority, so that they can then be ameliorated. Where there is power, there is 
resistance and this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power (Foucault 2000, 
111). It might be stated that one is always inside power-relationships and there is no way 
of escaping it. 
In order to present and discuss the main characteristics of the constructionist approach, it 
is crucial to clarify the meaning of the term discourse. The use, and therefore the 
understanding, of the concept of discourse in this dissertation is very akin to the 
Foucauldian one. Foucault suggests that a discourse is a way of constituting and 
representing knowledge: a particular topic at a particular and defined historical moment 
(Foucault 1972; Hall 1992). Discourse is thus about the production of knowledge through 
language, but it is itself produced by a practice: discursive practice, which is the practice of 
                                            
3 I agree with Raymond Williams, who rightly affirms that culture is one of the more complicated and obscure terms in 
the English vocabulary (Williams in Duncombe 2002: 36). I would also add that, to a certain extent, it has become an 
empty signifier, which can be used to signify almost everything and its opposite too. However -- paradoxically -- I find 
its use still relevant, especially in order to oppose the arguments put forward by the culturalist approach that I consider 
totally flawed and ill-conceived. 
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producing meaning. Discourses constitute the ʻnatureʼ of the body, unconscious and 
conscious mind and the emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern. It is actually in 
the discourse that power and knowledge are joined together, so that discourse can be both 
an instrument and an effect of power but also a hindrance and a point of resistance 
(Foucault 1980; Laclau-Mouffe 1990). Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces power but it also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it. This leads me to introduce another element worth considering, a 
relation in need of being highlighted, namely, the linkage between knowledge, truth and 
power. The interesting and powerful nexus revealed by Foucault has been that power 
(rather than mere facts about reality) produces knowledge; this primarily means the power 
to make things true. Power and knowledge directly imply one other: there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute power relations (Foucault 1980b, 194, 196). In this 
context, truth is not some self-evident, concrete reality, always there waiting to be 
discovered but it is produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraint and it induces regular 
effects of power. There are, instead, regimes of truth, a general politics of truth, types of 
discourses which are accepted and made to function as being ʻtrueʼ, and it is these 
dominant disciplinary domains that focus and filter concerns about ʻthe Otherʼ. 
It is clear how these considerations radically change perspectives, since one starts raising 
a different question, such as ʻhow do discursive practices constitute truth claims?ʼ. Do 
discourses create ʻothernessʼ? One application of discourse theory is the way in which a 
whole group of people are categorized and discussed through the lens of discursive 
practices, this is helpful for my account and analysis of the discourses and practices of 
Islamist groups in the UK, within their relationships of power with the dominant discourse. 
Another relevant concept that needs to be introduced, and which is also as an important 
practice, is representation. In this context, the operation of representation is crucial in the 
process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between subjects, members of a 
society (Damasio 2002, 115). Here, the main focus is not actually on language per se, as in 
a sort of semiotic approach, but on the system of representation resulting from its 
employment and enactment: a more complex and dynamic structure, a matrix, which we 
call discourse. As mentioned above, in Foucaultʼs terms, discourse is a way of 
representing knowledge through language, and therefore, of producing knowledge (ibid., 
113). But since all social practices entail meanings and meanings shape and influence 
what we do (Damasio 2000, 68), all practices have a discursive aspect. Needless to 
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remark, this does not happen outside history; practices, discourses, knowledge are deeply 
historical and historicized (Spencer 2006, 24). To a certain extent, we might even state 
that they are stories with a history. 
The first point to consider is that representations are not fixed and eternal, some positivist 
scientistʼs social fact, but that they are the products of history and they are contested 
themselves, imbricated in power-relationships as well. There are a number of books that 
attempt to trace the significance and the dynamics linked to the operations of representing 
and to the functions of representations. Stuart Hall (1997) has been influential here. He 
offers a scheme called the ʻcircuit of cultureʼ, where  ʻrepresentationʼ is one position in a 
matrix, alongside processes of identity, production, consumption and regulation. This focus 
on the circulation of shared meanings and ideas has material consequences. For example, 
the racial thinking that led to ideas about eugenics, racial purity and paternalistic views of 
whites towards indigenous people, had consequences for millions of people under colonial 
rule in Australia, and right up to the 1970s, ʻhalf-casteʼ children were removed from their 
Aboriginal families and adopted away to white families in a clear attempt to ʻbreed outʼ 
mixed individuals (Spencer 2007, 2). Similarly, images and notions of whiteness or 
blackness are also converted into items for consumption, television programmes, hair 
products and so on. What this makes explicit is that the underlying values and belief in a 
society are forms of representation themselves, that mediate our experience of the social 
world and constitute elements with which the individual identifies and understands him/her-
self. 
This internal process could be considered as being affected by ʻdiscoursesʼ and ʻdiscursive 
practicesʼ that underpin our social and cultural life, and mediate between people and their 
relationship to society, as well as to their social identity. Put another way, it could be 
argued that discourse in Foucauldian terms constitutes the personʼs lived relation to the 
real; as an attempt to explain the forces that operate in producing human subjectivity and 
how individuals are summoned into place within discursive structures (Foucault 1982, 208-
212). 
The first consequence of this is that, instead of considering some ʻtrueʼ reality 
beneath/behind representations, the analysis must identify the modalities of their 
functioning. In terms of culture, there is no room for a discourse on the authentic features 
of a culture but, rather, the focus ought to be on how those features get represented as 
authentic (Marranci 2008, 20), why that is so, and what power relations, discourses, 
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discursive formations and practices lie behind, inhabit and mobilize those representations 
(Evergeti 2006, 186). 
Within this framework of understanding, there is the need to introduce two other concepts: 
subject and identity. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, subjects are constituted ʻdiscursivelyʼ, but there are 
conflicts among discursive systems. Subjects have agency, but they are not autonomous 
individuals, exercising free will, rather they are subjects ʻwhose agency is subject to 
conditions of existence, conditions of endowment of agents and conditions of exerciseʼ 
(Foucault 1972, 95-96). Once again, there is the need to recall Foucaultʼs conception of 
power, as a dynamic more than an entity, which is diffuse, everywhere, and exercised at 
innumerable points. As all discourses produce a discourse of resistance, so also the 
subject is engaged in a struggle, which is finally to define his/her identity (who is what) by 
resisting the Otherʼs attempt at heterogenizing (making Other) his/her identity (ibid., 195). 
According to the constructionist approach, identity is never a property but something that is 
relational and processual, politically and socially constructed (Hall and Du Gay, 1996, 79). 
It is easy to understand how this notion constitutes a radical alternative to the culturalist-
orientalist approach, which understands and represents identities by using an essentialist 
and essentialising method, where differences are stereotyped and taken as ontological 
and irreducible, till they finally become synonymous with inferiority and degeneracy. Within 
those two frameworks (culturalist and orientalist), differences are seen as self-evident, 
concrete and consistent; therefore they are seen to constitute a proper ground for theory. It 
is as if to say that my differences are given to me by my cultural heritage and my identity is 
encrypted in my DNA. 
Conversely, the constructionist approach understands and represents identities as 
historical events in need of explanation. The appearance of a new identity is not inevitable 
or determined, not something that was always there waiting to be expressed and always 
exist in the form that it was given in a particular political movement or at a particular 
historical moment (Scott 1992, 32). Identities are discursive events,  contested and 
resisted,and therefore they are inherently part of the power struggle and they are within the 
power-relationship: they are themselves political. In this context, the role of a researcher 
enquiring on this topic should consist in trying to understand the operations of the 
changing discursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted or embraced 
(Marranci 2008, 9) and locating which processes themselves are un-remarked, indeed, 
achieve their effect precisely because they are not noticed (Butler 1992, 19). As Stuart Hall 
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aptly writes, ʻblack has never been just there eitherʼ. It has always been an unstable 
identity, physically culturally and politicallyʼ (Hall 1997, 56). It too is a narrative, a story, a 
history. Something constructed, told and spoken, not simply found. 
These considerations conveyed here help me to highlight that there is an urgent need to 
focus on the process of identity production, on the ʻdiscursiveʼ nature of experience and on 
the politics of its construction. Treating the emergence of a new identity as a discursive 
event is not like adopting a form of linguistic determinism, or depriving a  subject of 
agency. It is refusing a separation between experience and language and insisting instead 
on the productive quality of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1990, 123). Experience is what 
the researcher conducting the fieldwork inhabits and shares; what he/she needs to explain 
and not what he/she can use as a grounding raw material for his/her explanation. 
This kind of approach also leads me to question and reflect more accurately on notions 
such as -- power and politics within practices of representation and self-representation; the 
role of the researcher or of any other student of human science conducting fieldwork; and 
writings on identity, politics and political movements. 
These concepts, in fact, have been essential for conducting this present study on Islamist 
parties in the UK: for understanding their discursive formations, for giving an account of 
their discourses and practices by embarking on two years of ethnographic work amongst 
them. In contrast to the culturalist-orientalist approach towards the Islamists groups 
operating in the UK, my efforts have always been aimed at opening  up new ways of 
thinking about change and for reflecting on what ought to be changed: for a more 
pluralistic system where the political space for fighting against forms of oppression and 
exclusion has no apriori determined limits; where such a space is not granted or conceded 
as a favour or conditional upon a test after proving good credentials (Mamdani 2004, 53). 
 
 
The problem with the notion of power 
 
The concept of power has always been very controversial: an interesting one to analyze 
and debate. In the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in the analysis, and 
consequently, in the writing on it: Power, with a capital letter (Spencer 2007, 121). 
Essentially, the main aim has been to displace an essentialist and reified notion of the 
state and the principal effort has consisted of formulating an alternative, expanded 
conception of the ʻpoliticalʼ. The central question has revolved around the way in which rule 
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is accomplished and whether rule is mainly based on interdictions. Quite clearly, this 
intellectual effort has been greatly influenced by Gramsciʼs notion of the state as ʻpolitical 
society and civil societyʼ, by Foucaultʼs notion of power as a ʻcapillary form of existenceʼ 
and by the feminist notion of the personal as political. As a result, the exercise of power 
has been explained through new signifying practices, theorised and represented as 
productive of meanings, truths and bodies; that is to say,ʻpowerʼ as inherently entangled 
with the forms of being, doing and knowing. Meaning itself has become located in 
discursive practices; produced, contested and transformed in socio-historical actions 
rather than in a sui generis scheme of timeless categories (Evergeti 2006, 179). Gradually, 
ʻpowerʼ has come to be analytically understood as crucial in the production of social 
identities; this is achieved by heavily relying upon a notion of hegemony, which is not an 
external relation between pre-constituted social agents but the ʻvery process of the 
discursive construction of those agentsʼ (Laclau and Mouffe 1991, 100). Furthermore, such 
a notion of hegemony is quite useful as it allows the inclusion of dimensions of subjectivity 
such as gender, race, religion, and ethnicity (to name a few) into analyses of domination 
and subordination (Evergeti 2006, 183). 
There is another important dimension, which is worth considering: time. In particular, a 
specific concern is directed towards history. Power and meaning are historically situated 
and the very notion of hegemony is based on the idea that it is produced, reproduced, 
challenged, contested, and negotiated in social action; hegemony itself is dynamic, a 
process always in progress (Damasio 2000, 6). 
Moreover, if social action is mediated by a history, it is because the past has a political and 
discursive significance, and the relative signifying practices are themselves historical 
(Grillo 2003, 170). In other words, history, or say, ʻmemoryʼ (as the way historical events 
are lived), meaning and power are internally related. In this way, hegemony can be 
perceived as historical and processual, and consequently, the attempt by dominant groups 
to impose their ʻdiscursive regimeʼ on the entire society (Grillo 2003, 171) can be seen as 
constantly subject to contestation and never fully achieved (Laclau and Mouffe 1991, 113). 
Then, spaces for practices of resistance and counter-hegemonic discourses become 
available. As Teresa de Laurentis brilliantly put it, there is ʻalways a tension of 
contradiction, multiplicity and heteronomyʼ between the represented discursive space of 
the positions made available by hegemonic discourses and the ʻspace off, the elsewhere, 
of those discoursesʼ, their forced marginality (De Laurentis 1990, 116). Such form of 
resistance mainly focuses on the constitution of subjectivities, despite the operation of 
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ʻalterationʼ (ʻhetereogenizationʼ) carried out by hegemonic forces. The primary task of 
those counter-discourses consists of challenging the stories of the dominant -- which fix, 
naturalize and legitimate a hierarchicalized order of forms of identity and power (Daniel 
1993, 121) -- by proposing an alternative vision to the official representations (the self-
representation offered by the Islamist parties being the object of the present study). 
These theoretical points highlighted above might sound slightly abstract and obscure but 
they are very helpful in analysing the discourses and practices of the British Islamist 
groups featured here, as they face or confront the dominant discourse and the UK 
Government on Islamic/Islamist issues. 
Finally, as highlighted above, the practices of representation and self-representation, the 
object of this dissertation, are strictly entangled within power-relationships. They are 
inherently political. My dissertation argues that the notion of politics as centred on power-
relations and interests, needs to be expanded to include the competition and struggle over 
the management of the discourses and the practices of symbols (Geertz 1973, 193-233). 
That is to say, politics as a struggle over peopleʼs imagination (Pekonen, 1989, 32). This 
also implies the necessity of considering and analysing relevant concepts -- essential for 




Power and the stereotyping practices of its subjects 
 
Simply put, stereotyping fundamentally reduces phenomena and people to a few, essential 
characteristics, which are represented as fixed and unchangeable in the naeme of Nature 
(Hall 1996, 37). Phenomena and people are basically individuated and represented as the 
ʻOtherʼ. 
In his essay on stereotyping, Richard Dyer (1977) makes an important distinction between 
typing and stereotyping. He argues that without the use of types, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to make any sense of the world. According to this reasoning, we understand 
the world by placing individual objects, events, and people into general classificatory 
schemes. Thus, we decode the specific object we encounter, according to the wider 
category. In other words, we understand the particular in terms of its type. Alfred Schutz 
(1970) defines this process as typification, by indicating that ʻtypingʼ is essential to the 
production of meaning. Dyer argues that we continuously ʻmake senseʼ of things in terms 
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of some larger categories; we come to ʻknowʼ something about a person, by assigning 
him/her to the membership of different groups according to class, gender, age group, 
nationality and so on. In broad terms, then, a ʻtype is any simple, vivid, memorable, easily 
grasped, and widely recognizable characterization in which a few traits are foregrounded 
and change or development is kept to a minimumʼ (Dyer 1977, 28). At this point, it is 
legitimate to ask what the difference is, then, between typing and stereotyping, and 
consequently between a type and a stereotype. The fundamental difference consists in the 
fact that stereotyping gets hold of the few characteristics about a person or an event and 
reduces everything to those few traits, by simplifying, exaggerating, inflating them, and by 
fixing them as unchangeable, as constituents of an imaginary DNA (Varisco 2005, 66). 
Another essential element of the practice of stereotyping consists in a strategy of dividing 
and splitting. That means, by stereotyping, the ʻnormalʼ, the ʻacceptedʼ and the ʻacceptableʼ 
is separated from the abnormal and the unacceptable: everything which does not fit the 
ʻnormality standardsʼ, is expelled and therefore rejected for being different, Other. In this 
context, Dyer crucially argues that a system of stereotypes refers to what is within, and 
beyond, normalcy (ibid., 29). 
This leads me to affirm that another distinctive feature of stereotyping is the practice of 
ʻclosureʼ, ʻexclusionʼ, and ʻrejectionʼ. It is easy to understand how this leads to fixing the 
boundaries of mental geographies or maps illustrating the frontiers between insiders and 
outsiders, Us and Them (Grillo 2003, 169). 
Mary Douglas (1966) brilliantly pointed out that whatever is out of place is considered as 
polluted, dangerous, taboo. Similarly, Julia Kristeva speaks of the expelled and the 
excluded groups as the ʻabjectedʼ, an expression that both conserves the literal meaning 
of being ʻthrown outʼ and indicates the feeling of being ʻabhorredʼ, as ʻoutcastʼ (Kristeva 
1982, 68). 
These latter observations are gradually shifting the discourse more towards the analysis of 
relationships of power and specifically, towards the inequality of power -- it is with these 
concerns in mind that I analyse the Islamist parties in the UK facing the UK Government 
and the culturalist-orientalist representations of them. 
Dyer argues that power is usually directed against the subordinate or excluded group; one 
specific aspect of this power is ethnocentrism: ʻthe application of the norms of oneʼs own 
culture, to that of othersʼ (Brown 1965, 183). Likewise, Derrida -- very acutely -- argued 
that a binary opposition like Us/Them is never synonymous with a peaceful coexistence or 
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a relation of equals, but ʻrather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the 
other or has the upper handʼ (Derrida 1972, 41). 
In this framework, it is not too difficult to see that the practice of stereotyping is very close 
to what Foucault defined as the ʻPower/Knowledgeʼ sort of game (Wikan 1999, 60). It ends 
up ʻsorting outʼ and ʻorderingʼ people according to a norm and it constructs the abnormal 
(excluded) as the Other. Dyer observes that the ʻestablishment of normalcy is one aspect 
of the habit of the ruling groups...so right is this world view for the ruling groups that they 
make it appear as natural and inevitableʼ (Dyer 1977, 30). Needless to remark that the 
goal of the ruling groups -- as mentioned above -- consists of establishing hegemony, as a 
form of power based on leadership by a group in many fields of activity at once, to the 
extent that its ascendancy commands widespread consent and appears natural and 
inevitable (ibid., 35). 
My point is that the notion of power implied here is a very Foucauldian one, as adopted by 
the present dissertation. That is to say, a net-like, diffused concept of power also includes 
the power of representing and making intelligible someone or something, within a certain 
regime of representation, as well as, within the operation of producing and spreading 
knowledge. It is thus much clearer how stereotyping becomes an important element of the 
exercise of power and of its signifying practices within the power relationships of the 
Dominant and the Dominated (as these terms relate to the objects of the present study). 
In this context, Edward Saidʼs analysis of Orientalism constitutes a clear example of the 
functioning of such a type of discourse. Said argues that Orientalism was the discourse by 
which European culture was able to manage -- and even produce -- ʻthe Orientʼ politically, 
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, and scientifically during the post-Enlightenment 
period. Within the framework of Western hegemony over the Orient, there emerged a new 
object of knowledge, a ʻcomplex Orient suitable for the study in the academy, for display in 
the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in 
anthropological, biological, racial, linguistic, historical theses about mankind and the 
universeʼ (Said 1978, 7-8). 
Here again, it becomes quite clear how Saidʼs discussion of Orientalism is close to 
Foucaultʼs argument on Power/Knowledge: a specific discourse produces, through 
different practices of representations, a form of typified, stereotyped, ʻracializedʼ 
knowledge of the Other (Orientalism), deeply implicated in the operation of Power 
(imperialism) (Hall 1997, 79). 
 45 
Together, the Foucauldian concept of power and the notion of hegemony -- as elaborated 
by Gramsci -- involve knowledge, representation, ideas, cultural leadership and authority, 
as well as economic constraint and physical coercion. The core of this  Focauldian-
Gramscian argument is that power cannot be solely translated into force and coercion. Its 
way of operating is much more subtle and pervasive: it seduces, solicits, induces and wins 
consent. Likewise, it cannot be thought of in terms of one group having a monopoly on 
power, and simply radiating power downwards on a subordinate group. It includes, and it 
requires, the dominant and the dominated, within its circuit. As Homi Bhaba has keenly 
observed ʻit is difficult to conceive subjectification as a placing within Orientalist or colonial 
discourses for the dominated subject without the dominant being strategically placed within 
it tooʼ (Bhaba 1986, 158). Another important characteristic emerging from this 
understanding and conceptualization of power is that power does not only foreclose and 
constrain, but it is actually a productive force. It produces new discourses, new kinds of 
knowledge, new objects of knowledge, new representations and regimes of truth; it also 
moulds new practices and institutions. To a certain extent, power pervades everyday life. It 
circulates and it is never-ending: it is a force that continuously regenerates itself. 
Notions of the ʻcircularityʼ and ʻpervasivenessʼ of power emerge as being particularly 
relevant in connection with the practice of representation. The argument is that everyone 
(the powerful, the less powerful and the powerless) is entangled within power and 
participates in the circulation of power. That is to say, no one can stand outside its field of 
discourses, operations and practices; he/she becomes an essential part of the flux by 
moving and operating within it. An act of forcibly removing someone from this circle can 
just backfire: the outcome can paradoxically result in the disempowering of both parties. 
This perspective is particularly helpful in order to analyse the practices of representation 
and self-representation of the Islamist parties vis-a-vis the UK Government. 
There is now a need to introduce and analyse another relevant concept in relation to the 





An emblematic and fruitful way of explaining the circularity of power, the relations between 
representation and self-representation, and its possible racialization is to refer to how 
black masculinity is re-presented within a racialized regime of representation. This 
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example is very helpful for analysing both the representation of Islamist parties by a 
dominant culturalist-orientalist approach, and for analysing their practice of self-
representation. 
Mercer and Julien (1994) argue that the representation of black masculinity ʻhas been 
forged in and through the histories of slavery, colonialism and imperialismʼ (Mercer and 
Julien 1994, 137). They observe that during slavery, the white master often exercised his 
authority over the black male slave, by depriving him of all the attributes of responsibility, 
paternal and familial authority, and by treating him as a child. Infantilization could also be 
interpreted as a symbolic ʻcastrationʼ of the black man, which is connected to the white 
manʼs fantasy about the excessive sexual appetite and prowess of the black men; aspects 
which they both feared and envied (ibid., 138). According to Julien and Mercer, the 
circularity and ambivalence of power work in such a way that black men responded to this 
infantilization of their image, by adopting a sort of caricature that was a reverse of their 
hyper-masculine and super-sexual stereotype. Represented and stigmatized as ʻchildishʼ, 
some black men reacted by ʻwearingʼ a macho-aggressive masculine outlook. 
Paradoxically, this only served to confirm the fantasy among the whites man of their 
excessive sexual nature and their lack of control (Wallace 1979, 45). 
Thus, those who are stereotyped become trapped by the same stereotype even as they try 
to oppose and resist, ultimately confirming it unconsciously. The point is that 
representation arguably seems to work at two different levels at the same time: a 
conscious and overt level, and an unconscious and repressed one. This implies that 
stereotypes refer as much to what is imagined in fantasy as to what is perceived as  being 
ʻrealʼ. And what is visually produced by the practices of representation is only half the 
story. The other half -- the deeper meaning -- lies in what is not being said, but is being 
fantasized, what is implied but cannot be shown (Hall 1997, 263). So, it clearly emerges 
how stereotyping is deeply invested with hegemonic and discursive power, which operates 
through culture, production of knowledge, imagery, and representation. Furthermore, it is 
circular: it implicates the subjects of power as well those who are subjected to it. 
Interestingly enough, ʻstereotypingʼ gradually takes shape as a practice based on fantasy 
and projection, with its paradoxical sides and its reverse ʻmirroringʼ effects. 
Said affirms that the ʻgeneral idea about who and what was an Oriental emerged according 
to a detailed logic governed…by a battery of desires, repressions, investments and 
projectionsʼ (Said 1978, 8). A legitimate question to ask would be  about the role played by 
fantasy in the racialized representation of the Other. It would be useful to understand how 
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those fantasies are allowed to speak, how they are channellised in order to ʻracializeʼ the 
Other and contribute to the stereotype. The answer could be sought by analysing the 
representational practice known as fetishism. Fetishism is a part of representation itself, to 
the extent that what is represented and shown can be grasped and understood only by 
referring to what cannot be seen and shown, but is implied, referenced and alluded to, and 
thus imagined and fleshed out. That is to say, there is the need to introduce the concept of 
fetishism, which is of paramount relevance for explaining the relationships of power 
between the Islamist parties in the UK and the UK Government; for understanding why the 
culturalist-orientalist representations of Islamism in the UK means their depoliticization; for 
explaining why -- paradoxically -- the Islamistsʼ self-representation is depoliticizing and 
depoliticized as well. 
 
 
Fetishism and fetishized representations 
 
In anthropology, fetishism refers to the way in which the powerful spirit of a God can be 
transferred onto an object, which then becomes charged with the spiritual power of that for 
which it is a substitute. In psychoanalysis, fetishism is analysed as a ʻsubstituteʼ for the 
absent phallus; meaning that the sexual drive is displaced onto some other part of the 
body (Mercer 1994, 53). In this case, it is the substitute that becomes ʻeroticizedʼ, invested 
with sexual energy, power, and desire, which are ʻmirroredʼ in the object before the eyes of 
the onlookers. Fetishism in representation borrows from all those meanings. It certainly 
involves displacement and a transferential relationship (La Capra 1987, 123). As Homi 
Bhabha superbly puts it, ʻit is a non-repressive form of knowledge that allows for the 
possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one 
archaic…one that allows the myth of origins and the other that articulates difference and 
divisionʼ (1986, 168). Fetishism also comprises a sort of reverse denial, implying that the 
powerful fascination, which is strongly felt, is both indulged and rejected.4 
It is not too complicated, then, to affirm that fetishism is a sort of disguising strategy: for 
both representing and not-representing, for alluding to something that cannot be shown, as 
it is forbidden and tabooed. What is declared and commonly regarded as different, 
                                            
4In his famous essay on ‘Fetishism’, Freud affirms that ‘the fetish is the substitute for the woman’s (the mother’s) penis 
that the little boy once believed in and -- for reasons -- does not want to give up…Yes in his mind the woman has got a 
penis, in spite of everything; but the penis is no longer the same as it was before. Something else has taken its place, has 
been appointed as its substitute’ (1977/1927, 353). 
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hideous, primitive and deformed is at the same time being obsessively enjoyed and 
lingered over because it is ʻexoticʼ (Gilman 1985, 78). Fetishism also allows a sort of 
voyeurism; as Freud argued, there is often a sexual element in looking, an eroticization of 
the gaze. Looking is often driven by an unacknowledged search for illicit pleasure and a 
desire which cannot be fulfilled. 
After having analysed the practices of stereotyping and representation, including in their 
racialized regimes, and having explored the concept of fetishism, there is a further 
important question that can be raised: Can the ʻstereotypedʼ actually turn, displace and re-
use, in a subversive way, the stereotypes that they have been stamped with? 
The immediate answer to this question would be that this is theoretically possible, since 
meaning can never be finally fixed (Hall 1997, 270). Certainly, there are strenuous efforts 
to fix meanings, and stereotyping is also a strategy that aims to achieve this, but 
ultimately, meanings are discursive practices and, as such, they begin to slip, drift, or 
assume new directions. To put it another way, new meanings start to be grafted onto old 
ones. Bakhtin and Volosinov speak of a practice called trans-coding (Bakhtin 1981, 45): 
taking an existing meaning and re-appropriating it for new meanings. Hall affirms that 
since the 1960s, when questions of representation and politics acquired a centrality in the 
politics of anti-racist and other social movements, a number of different trans-coding 
strategies have been adopted. In particular, he singles out three of these: reversing the 
stereotype, substitution of negative images with positive ones, and contestation from 
within. 
The point here is to try and understand how the practices of representation, the 
construction of a ʻdominantʼ regime of representation, the fabrication of stereotypes, the 
strategies of ʻfetishizingʼ and the possible counter-strategies adopted by the stereotyped 
(Grillo 2003, 168) can make sense of the discourses and practices of representation and 
self-representation in relation to the Islamist groups in Britain. How is it possible to speak 
of a mirroring effect between the practices of representation and self-representation? Is 
the ʻselfʼ of self-representation a ʻself-fetishizingʼ device, that, as such, denies what it 
wants to allude to and desire obsessively? 
The answers to this set of questions will be explored in the next chapters of this 
dissertation, through an analysis of the discourses and practices of representation and 
self-representation, of a large number of Islamists in the UK, with whom I have carried out 






The Muslim minority status 
 
The present chapter looks at the history of the Muslim presence and their minority ʻstatusʼ 
in the UK. It also considers the concept of Islamism which is often overlooked and denied 
in the culturalist-orientalist approach where it is collapsed into the notion of ʻMuslimʼ. This 
chapter strongly advocates that in thinking upon this issue, we need to start from Muslims, 
rather than from Islam, and that we ought to focus upon the feeling of being Muslims living 
as a minority in western contexts. 
This also means that we understand Islam as a map of discourses and practices of people 
who feel as Muslims, and we consider that some among them put Islam at the centre of 
their political practices and future (these latter being the Islamists). 
 
 
The displacement of a minority 
 
When I started reflecting upon the feeling of being a part of a minority, one  specific 
consideration sprang up in my mind: minority is an issue not of demography and numbers, 
but of feelings of alienation from a dominant culture that is mostly perceived as hostile and 
extraneous; in this case it is also lived as ʻsecularʼ. 
The vast majority of the Muslim population in the West consists of recent migrants. 
Patterns of migration, nevertheless, differ quite widely between the United States and 
Western Europe (Metcalf 1996, 12). The first generation of European Muslims were mostly 
working class, while those in the United States more often from the educated middle class. 
In Europe, most Muslims come from specific areas with historical ties to the host country 
(for example, North Africa in the case of France), while the United States has no colonial 
past with any Muslim country (Dassetto 1996, 56). 
Mass migration to Western Europe began in the late 1950s, reached its peak around the 
1970s, and never ceased, despite more restrictive legislation introduced after 1973 (which 
has been regularly tightened since then). For historical and geographical reasons, many 
immigrants were Muslims: North and sub-Sahelian Africans in France and Belgium, South 
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Asians in Britain, and Turks in Germany, The Netherlands and German-speaking 
Switzerland. 
At first, immigration involved mainly male industrial workers who intended to, and were 
supposed to, return to their homelands before retiring. No plans were put in place to deal 
with a long term Muslim presence in Europe. Around 1973, as a result of the oil crisis and 
the subsequent economic slowdown, most European countries decided to put an end to 
such immigration. Fearing they would be permanently banned from Europe if they returned 
to their countries of origin, most workers decided to stay and bring their families which 
benefitted from a policy of family reunions that was initiated to soften the human 
consequences of the immigration ban. 
Millions of second generation Muslims have since been born in Europe. In some countries 
-- France for instance -- they were entitled to almost automatic citizenship upon reaching 
majority, while in others, they had to go through a specific and complex process of 
naturalization (Anwar 2005, 32). 
There are no precise figures for the number of Muslims living in the USA or in Europe for 
two main reasons: first, the difficulty of defining who should be considered a Muslim and 
second, the reluctance of the European legal system to register race and religion in census 
and identity papers (Dassetto 1996, 23). The criterion of country of origin is no longer 
relevant as a means of determining the number of Muslims because most of them, at least 
in France and Britain, have a European citizenship. The statistics usually quoted in Europe 
vary from 8 million to 12 million, which is about the 2.5 % of the European Union 
population (Peach 2005, 24). 
This also implies that Muslims are no longer ʻforeignersʼ. But, the question here is what 
kind of integration has been achieved so far? Of my three attempted answers, two are 
negative: integration was achieved neither through a process of assimilation (as is often 
hoped-for in host countries) nor through the making of a multicultural society (as is often 
described) (Roy 2004, 67). It was achieved through the recasting of pristine identities into 
new variable sets of identity patterns (Daniel 1993, 78). 
The argument here is that identities are less a given fact than an individual choice, and 
can change over time or in relation to social circumstances, and they also overlap with 
other identities (Modood 2005, 25). Although the concentration of Muslims in Europe is 
based on a mutual relationship between a specific European country and a corresponding 
geographical area (France-North Africa, Germany-Turkey, Britain-Indian subcontinent), the 
transnational nature of the Muslim population in Europe does play a role in the process of 
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European integration. More importantly for the purposes of this study, many Muslims 
organizations see the construction of the European Union as an opportunity to bypass 
their own ethnic and national cleavages, and to create something closer to what an ummah 
should be (Marranci 2008, 106). In this context, I argue that immigration has certainly been 
the demographic framework for ʻWestern Islamʼ, but it emerges less and less as a relevant 
factor, when it comes to explaining and understanding the dynamics of the interaction 
between the ʻWestʼ and ʻIslamʼ, and so, for speaking of a Western Islam. My point here is 
that Islam in the West has been systematically researched through the lens of sociology of 
immigration and ethnic studies. Studies titled, for example, ʻPakistanis in Englandʼ (Dahya 
1972) in the UK, or ʻCultural action amongst Maghrebian migrants in Europeʼ (Mdaghri 
1975) in France, proliferated in an attempt to understand and explain how these migrants 
could integrate within their host societies. Such approaches were legitimate in terms of 
history but they overlook a crucial factor: the increasing dissimilarity between new forms of 
Islam in the West and the previous ones in the cultures of origin (Marranci 2008, 35). They 
also tend to underestimate a very important aspect -- which I consider essential for the 
analysis of British Islamism -- the concept of religiosity. Religiosity is not synonymous with 
religion. In my view, religion as a concept5 (Geertz 1993, 90) is not really epistemologically 
useful (El Zein 1977, 253), and it can end up essentializing Islam (ibid., 254); therefore it 
will not be my focus. Religiosity is, instead, the way believers live and build their 
relationship with religion. These relationships are marked by emotions -- which as 
Damasio has suggested (1999 and 2000) are a reaction to stimuli -- that produce feelings. 
This process has a fundamental impact on how identities are formed (Marrraci 2008, 7), 
and it has to be placed in the analytical space of the growing delinking between faith and 
the culture of origins, and right beside the changing nature of immigration, or more exactly, 
of ʻmigrationsʼ (Roy 2004, 42). 
Apart from economic immigration, there are new forms of immigration and mobility that are 
emerging in connection with the familiar phenomenon described as globalization. There is 
a phenomenon of a mobile population, usually educated, that plays a growing role in the 
affirmation of a de-territorialized Muslim community (Appadurai 1996, 67). Such a 
transnational dimension should not be thought of in terms of diaspora, because there is 
ever lessening reference or link to a country of origin, and it is very difficult to state which 
                                            
5 Geertz, in his famous definition of religion, argued that religion is ‘a system of symbols which acts to establish 
powerful persuasive and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic’. (Geertz 1993, 90). 
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patterns of integration or assimilation have been followed (Allen 2005, 53). New identities 
are moulded in hyphenated expressions or reconstructed identities: regional, ethnic or 
religious identities take precedence over citizenship and pristine nationalities, in 
accordance the choices made by the individual. Likewise, this dimension, that from now on 
I will define as ʻde-territorializationʼ (Augeʼ 1996), also has a relevant impact on the 
production of Muslim discourses. What interests me is firstly, that resettled or displaced 
Muslims demonstrate the urge to define what Islam means for them, or to answer 
questions and pressures from the non-Muslim environment; and secondly, that Muslims in 
the West -- as some of my interviewees declared -- often enjoy a greater freedom of 
speech than those in Muslim countries.  
This space, created by displacement and transnationalism, is the analytical context where 
my study takes place, and where my questions started being raised. What does religiosity 
imply in terms of the mutual recasting of identity between the non-Muslim dominant society 
and a Muslim community (Hoeber and Piscatori 1997, 68). How does this process unfold, 
and how has it been represented by the dominant discourse in the UK? What are the 
effects of those practices of representation for Muslims in general, and for Islamists in the 




The history of the Muslim presence in the UK 
 
Having stressed the importance of contingencies, shared practices, places, interactions 
and contexts in the formation of identities, there is the need to trace, very briefly, the 
history of Muslim migration to the UK, just to set the ground for our discussion.  
At the end of the Second World War, when Britain was no longer able to hold onto its 
colonies, and when, in 1947, the Raj gave India the independence it wanted, the region 
was in turmoil with ten million people displaced and as many as a million dead. After the 
partition of the subcontinent, there was a Pakistan in two segments with India in between. 
It was widely held that Kashmir should have been part of the newly-formed Pakistan and 
that the alliance between the last British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and the Kashmir-born 
Indian P.M Pandit Nehru had tilted the decision  in favour of India.The two countries have 
gone to war three times over the Kashmir issue (Anwar and Baksh 2003, 112). In Britain 
meanwhile, manpower was needed for work in certain industrial sectors that were in 
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decline, in part because the employment conditions were no longer attractive to the 
existing workforce. The economic recession of the late 1950s,makes this the consistent 
format throughout however, eliminated the demand for labour, whether domestic or 
immigrant (Anwar 2005, 35).  
Upon their first arrival in Britain the first generation of migrants tried much harder to 
replicate their traditional lifestyle; this can be gathered from their relative (and 
academically well-documented) isolation from the mainstream social, economic and 
cultural arenas (Seddon, Hussein and Malik 2004, 79). 
By this time, the local communities and national institutions had already developed  an 
overt hostility towards the ʻethnicʼ minorities (Peach 2005, 29). It was, increasingly, the 
case that South Asian Muslims were concentrated in the inner areas of older industrial 
towns and cities, living close to these working-class white indigenous inhabitants. The 
pattern was one in which immigrant labour in Britain, as in a number of other advanced 
Western European economies, originated in a once colonised land and filled the gaps in 
the lower echelons of the host society. South Asian Muslim immigrants were placed at the 
bottom of the labour market, disdained by the host society, and systematically ʻethnicisedʼ 
and ʻracializedʼ in the sphere of capitalist accumulation. These workers were recruited into 
these industrial sectors most in decline, and accordingly, their positions in society were 
located below the white working-class. This latter class was able to attain social mobility 
progressing from lumpen-proletariat to proletariat and from petty bourgeoisie to 
bourgeoisie (ibid., 35). 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the number of immigrants entering Britain from South Asia 
was at its peak (Abbas 2005, 73). Towards the end of the 1960s, however, immigration 
from South Asia had all but ended. Both the high point in 1961-2 and the decline in 1968 
were a result of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962) and the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act (1968). The 1962 Act changed the pattern of South Asian immigration; 
rather than pioneer men, it was their wives, fiancées and children that arrived, with many 
South Asians from India and Pakistan seemingly rushing to beat the ban created by the 
Act. Amendments to the original 1962 act, which followed in 1968, led to wider restrictions 
on immigration from the New Commonwealth countries. On each occasion, the move was 
affected by the politicisation of ethnic minorities in Britain. As a consequence of changes to 
the legislation, the South Asian settlements became more permanent and family 
orientated. At the turn of the 1970s, Britain had a large number of distinct South Asian 
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Muslim communities living and working in different parts of the country; although these 
were largely restricted to inner city areas in de-industrialized zones. 
However, if the major growth of the Muslim population dates from the post-war immigration 
of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians to fill the labour shortage in  London and the 
industrial cities of the Midlands, by contrast, the 1990s have witnessed an influx of 
refugees such as the European Muslims fleeing from Bosnia and Kosovo as well as from 
Afghanistan and Somalia.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the size of the Muslim population in the UK was the subject 
of controversy (Shaw 1988, Joly 1995, Anwar 1996, Modood 1997). This was due to a rise 
in the political importance of ʻIslamʼ internationally and domestically, after the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, which led to an inflation of local estimates of numbers. Estimates in the early 
1990s varied from a low of 900.000 (Peach 1997, 74) to a high of 3,000,000 as given by 
the Muslim Parliament (Siddiqui 1992, 3). The census of 2001 showed that Muslims were 
the second largest religion with a figure of 2.7 per cent. The census also showed that 68% 
of the Muslim population was of South Asian origin (Census 2001, ONS 2004). 
Characteristically the British Muslim population is predominantly comprised of Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims living in Britain. Yet, although South Asian groups 
represent Islam in Britain, there is a defnite danger in essentialising Islam and arguing that 
South Asian characteristics are fully representative of Islam or of British Muslims. The 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain may be almost entirely Muslim but Islam as a 
religion is not synonymous with an ethnos, it is pan-ethnic (Jacobson 1997, 67). There are 
Muslims in Britain of Arab, Albanian Bosnian, Iranian, Nigerian, Somali, Turkish and many 
other groups of origin, whose characteristics and socio-economic profiles are very different 
from those of the South Asian groups.  
The Muslim population is also characterised as having the youngest age structure of all 
the religious groups in England and Wales. One third of the Muslim population is aged 0-
15 years compared to the average of 20%for the whole population. Less than 10% 
Muslims are aged 60 years or over compared to 18% for the population as a whole. 
Educationally, the Muslim population is relatively poorly qualified. The 2001 census 
showed that over 40% Muslims had no educational qualifications. The combination of a 
young age structure, poor educational qualifications, and the small proportion of the female 
population engaged in formal economic activity results in a high age-dependency ratio 
(25%). The Muslim population of Britain is also highly concentrated in a small number of 
large urban areas: London, the West Midlands, Greater Manchester and the West 
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Yorkshire Metropolitan County. Ten of the twenty local authorities with the largest totals 
and the highest proportions of Muslims in England and Wales are London boroughs. 
Tower Hamlets in the East End of London has the highest percentage of Muslims among 
all the local authorities in the UK and it is also the third largest in size. It is the centre of the 
Bangladeshi population in Britain and the borough contains nearly a quarter of the total 
Bangladeshi population of the UK. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis represent some of the 
poorest minority ethnic populations in Britain, with Bangladeshis being worse off than the 
Pakistanis (Peach 1999, 57). A majority from both groups originally have a 
peasantbackground: Pakistanis from the Punjab and Azad Kashmir; Bangladeshis from 
Sylhet in the north-east of the country. The 2001 census showed Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis to be the most economically marginal of the minority ethnic groups in Britain. 
They have the highest percentage of those who have never worked or are long term 
unemployed among all the other ethnic groups; this represents the highest percentage of 
persons at home and the highest percentage with no educational qualifications.  
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women also had the lowest economic participation rates of any 
ethnic minority group in Britain. The 2001 British census allows us to examine the situation 
of Muslims as such, rather than needing to use Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as 
surrogates. Data published so far combine male and female population and refer to 
England and Wales rather than to the United Kingdom, and so it endorses the view that, to 
a certain extent, Muslims as a whole occupy an underprivileged position (Ballard 1990, 
57). The Muslim figures for those who have never worked or are long term unemployed 
were five times higher than that for the population as a whole; the reason seems to be the 
non-participation of Muslim women in the official labour force. The explanation commonly 
offered for the low female labour force participation rate of Muslim, (including Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis) as compared to Indian women is that the traditional Islamic values of 
purdah and izzet prevent women from contact with men outside their immediate family. This 
again uses the assertion of ʻcultural differencesʼ to describe ʻAsianʼ or Muslim identities as 
implacably alien or unassimilable. 
In this regard, it has been argued that the South Asian British Muslims form a virtual 
underclass. Throughout the 1980s, of the nine non-white groups identified by the Labour 
Force Survey, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffered the highest rate of unemployment 
and had the lowest number of educational qualifications. They have been most adversely 
impacted by the immigration laws and rules, and with the worst housing, they have 




The Muslim ‘minority’ effect 
 
It is certainly a fact that the phenomenon of Muslim minorities is not in itself new; in the 
past too, there has been the presence of huge Muslim minorities living under non-Muslim 
rule. A sort of ʻglobalizationʼ might have characterised other historical periods as well. In 
other words, the novelty of the two phenomena known as transnationalism and 
displacement should be investigated very carefully (Roy 2004, 67). 
The first case of Muslim minorities living under non-Muslim rule was probably that of 
Muslims in Sicily in the 12th century, who were allowed to remain under Christian rule by a 
fatwa of Sheik al Mazari. Then came the Mudejares in Spain after the Reconquista, the 
Russian Tatars after the fall of Kazan, followed by the Ottoman Muslims conquered by 
Russians and Austrians. For instance, Rashid Rida issued a fatwa in 1909 allowing the 
Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina to remain there after the Austro-Hungarian conquest. Also, 
Islam has been officially recognized by Russia since 1784, and by the Austro-Hungarian 
empire through the 1874 and 1912 laws that remain valid in present day Austria. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that it was the forced military conquest, which 
determined the minority status for Muslims; it was not the product of a voluntary decision 
(Roy 1996, 54). On the other hand, there are also many cases of Muslims living from the 
outset as minorities due to conversions or trade relations, such as in Black Africa or China 
(the Hui). Finally, I should remark that the bulk of Indian Muslims remained in India (as a 
minority) after  the 1947 Partition and they have always been loyal to the secular Indian 
republic. 
In light of all this, it seems legitimate to question whether there is something new about 
Muslims living with a minority status. An attempted answer would be that the novelty is not 
related to that status per se but to the relationship between ʻreligionʼ and ʻcultureʼ, a 
relationship which the culturalist-orientalist representation of Islam and Muslims 
compresses into a dehistoricized, depoliticized, decontextualized dynamic (Asad 1993, 
248) 
Many of the minorities mentioned above could be associated with a given culture, 
language, and sometimes, with a territory (for example, the Tatars in Russia), even if they 
share language and culture with their non-Muslim neighbours (as for example, Bosnians 
and also Indian Muslims). To a certain extent, it is correct to state that some Muslims have 
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already experienced a sort of disconnect between religion and culture, but in general 
terms, Islam was definitely rooted in a given culture, whether specific to Muslims or shared 
with others (Azzam 1992,56). The difference in the case of the current wave of 
globalization is the lack of such ʻentrenchmentʼ. As highlighted here, it seems that the 
making of Muslim minorities is carried out more through a process of ʻde-culturationʼ than 
of ʻacculturationʼ (Appadurai 1996, 68). That is to say, none of the previous cultural 
markers are retained and identity is not perceived as a whole, but as fragmented, broken 
down into different levels (parochial, ethnic, national, and religious) which might also 
contradict each other. The outcome is that collective identities have to be recomposed or 
re-invented. This sort of disembodiment of religion from culture may run counter to 
centuries of practical experience (notwithstanding the insistence of some) Muslim 
theologians who have been adamant that Islam as a religion should not be identified with a 
specific culture, see Ahmed 1979, 67; this has always been more a theoretical approach 
than a real social experience). 
The past forms of globalization experienced by Muslims were through travel, pilgrimage, or 
through the widespread role of Arabic and a common teaching curriculum. Arabic as a 
lingua franca existed mainly for a very restricted group of the learned, who could travel 
from Morocco to India to learn and teach in a network of comparable and homogeneous 
institutions. Although this was a phenomenon affecting a very limited group, it resembled a 
kind of pre-modern globalization, which attempted to revive a common Muslim culture 
through the medium of Arabic. Today the learned Muslim elite no longer circulate in a 
purely Arabo-Muslim context and English is as important as Arabic, if not more so, 
especially outside the Arabic-speaking world, which comprises only 20 percent of all 
Muslims (Eickelmann 1981, 89). Therefore, the first striking difference that emerges is that 
the earlier form of globalization did not borrow its linguistic and technical tools from 
another culture, as  is the case nowadays. This constitutes what I call a de-culturation that 
is not the product of a violent military action or the result of an external imposition but it is 
the consequence of a chosen, deliberate displacement and a switch from ʻpristineʼ cultures 
to a common but ʻunmarkedʼ, disconnected and displaced Muslim identity (Asad 1993, 
266; Esposito 1983, 45; Marranci 2008, 46). 
The link between those reflections and my topic of research (British Islamism) is that this 
sort of ʻdisengagementʼ of Islam pushes Muslims to reflect upon the meaning of being a 
Muslim living as a minority; that is fundamentally what I call religiosity: a concept totally 
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ignored by the culturalist-orientalist approach that portrays ʻagency-freeʼ Muslims 
swallowed by a global entity called Islam (Lynch 1990, 33; Marranci 2008, 6). 
In this context, it is often argued that because Islam is an all-encompassing religion  
addressing all aspects of individual and social life, it is impossible for true believers to live 
permanently under non-Muslim rule; the option would be to leave, or more precisely, to 
migrate to a truly Muslim land, Dar-ul-Islam (Qureshi 1979). It is easy to understand how 
such premises can stir up the debate on the compatibility of Islam with a Western system 
of values, and on its potentiality to adjust to democracy and secularization. In this regard, 
my questions are mainly two. Firstly, I question whether there is a dominant theoretical 
paradigm that applies to the case?, and secondly, even if there is, I question whether the 
practices and choices of todayʼs Muslims are really shaped by such a paradigm? Likewise, 
to what extent is the issue of ʻWhat does Islam say about...?ʼ really relevant in order to 
explain and understand the discourses and  practices of Muslims? 
This brings me to another relevant topic: the use and exact employability of cultural and 
religious ʻparadigmsʼ in order to explain societal and political issues (Grillo 2003, 78). Do 
cultural and religious ʻpatternsʼ as such, ever matter as a key to understanding the current 
issues involving Muslims? More specifically, who gets to elaborate that paradigm or 
pattern, and then, who gets to make the decision of using and applying it? My argument, 
which will be developed in the following pages, is that the culturalist-orientalist approach 
replies in the affirmative to the first question, and eludes the second and the third one, thus 
bypassing the power-relations and power struggles implied within discourses and the 
practices of representation (Marranci 2008, 68). 
My alternative approach involves answering in the negative to the first question and 
exploring, investigating, and challenging those power-relations and power struggles. 
 
 
Reformulation of Islam  
 
When I started reflecting upon the phenomenon of British Islamism and British Islamists, 
there was one main consideration that persuaded me to consider their ʻminority statusʼ as 
a relevant factor (apart from the need to revise a certain culturalist-orientalist way of 
representing the Muslim minority in the UK). It was this: given that religion is ʻdisengagedʼ 
from a cultural and social matrix (Daniel 1993, 112), it has to be thought over very 
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carefully. In other words, there is the need for a sort of personal effort and individual 
elaboration, not only for Muslims but also for non-Muslims. 
Besides, another element also needed to be considered: the lack of social authority in the 
western context. This implies that every action has to be performed as a choice. For 
example, the Ramadan fasting is easier in a ʻtraditionalʼ Muslim society than in the West, 
where working hours are not adapted and fast-breaking is not announced (Roy 2004, 57). 
As a British Muslim declared to me: ʻLiving in a non-Muslim society, Muslims have to be 
very careful of every step they take. They must be conscious of what they are doing at all 
timesʼ (personal chat with Emdad Ramadan). In other words, what it means to be a 
believer must be expressed and stated explicitly and, continuously, reconfirmed. In this 
regard, Eickelmann and Piscatori (1996) have coined the relevant concept of 
ʻobjectification of Islamʼ, meaning that to be able to define Islam becomes a pre-requisite 
for any practising believer, because Islam is no longer embedded in a culture and a social 
practice. Themes like ʻwhat is Islam?ʼ, ʻwhat does Islam say about this and that?ʼ have 
become quite common today in relation to textbooks and sermons. This also shows a 
peculiar trend: Islam has turned into an ʻobjectʼ that must be apprehended as such 
(Eickelmann-Piscatori 1996, 15). My approach in relation to this new development is to 
focus less on the actual answers and contents provided, and more on the processes they 
set in motion: the discourses and practices performed by the social actors, who share, 
contest, negotiate traditional and novel meanings as well. The ʻobjectificationʼ of Islam 
clearly does not happen in a vacuum, but it does function as a sort of osmotic process; it is 
stimulated, articulated and ʻprovokedʼ by the non-Muslims, especially during periods of 
crisis (Marranci 2008, 41) when Muslims are summoned to answer questions such as, 
ʻWhat does the Qur’an says on this and on that?ʼ. So, there is a need to consider the 
dominant and the dominated discourses, practices of representation and self-
representation, as interrelated and equally relevant for understanding the phenomena 
under observation. 
Another important remark that should be made is that the disconnect with the cultures of 
origin, and the effort to objectify Islam, mean that the Muslim actor is in the process of 
creating a new and purified form of Islam, which is not linked to any society or culture. 
In other words, it is an Islam in vitro, oblivious of its historical and cultural sedimentations. 
In this regard, the passage to the West offers a good opportunity to rethink an Islam rid of 
cultural and national peculiarities (Metcalf 1996, 113), something which goes along the 
lines of the above-mentioned processes of individualization and reconstruction of a 
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community on a ʻpurelyʼ religious basis. Individualization results from the dissolution of 
previous social links. Some actors -- as a few of my interviewees have pointed out -- even 
consider immigration to be a positive factor, because detaching Muslims from Muslim 
cultures and pushing them to recast their identity in purely religious terms, helps to 
promote -- from their perspective -- a return to the true ʻfundamentsʼ of Islam. The 
argument my dissertation makes is that, paradoxically, the exact opposite actually occurs: 
such movement helps in advancing innovations and novel developments; it leads to the 
ʻatypicalʼ scenario where the common defining factor for Muslims is a purified form of 
Islam, deprived of its cultural and historical roots. 
Authors like Tariq Ramadan (1996), for example, go so far as to state that a Muslim enjoys 
a greater freedom to practice his or her religion in the West, than in most, if not all, Muslim 
countries. The same idea was promoted by someone like Abu Hamza, who, when asked if 
he favours migration from non-Muslim to Muslim lands, answered that his advice was to go 
into a Muslim environment, not to a Muslim country, since most of these are not Islamic 
states. In his words, the concept of a borderless Islam, without any national identification, 
can be even better implemented in the West, where Muslims can re-construct their Islamic 
identities by truthfully following the Islamic teachings (Supporters of Shareeʼah, 2000). 
Hence, it is easy to understand that within a non-Muslim environment, the borders of such 
a Muslim community do not correspond to any geographical territory or area. They are 
constituted through discourses, discursive practices, and finally practices: they are a 
product of the mind first, more than a concrete territorial entity. At the same time, these 
borders are more unstable and transient, and therefore, they need to be constantly 
defended and reconfirmed. The point I am trying to make is that such a borderless 
(dislocated) form of Islam pushes towards a greater quest for definition and identification 
as achieved through the discursive practices of the believers, since ʻIslamʼ is no longer 
embedded in ʻterritorialʼ cultures. Likewise, the same individual may employ various levels 
of conceptual references, jumping from the letter to the spirit of the scriptures and back 
again. This is also the reason why my research advocates the importance of analysing the 
discourses and practices of Muslim actors, and their operations of self-representation, 
without lingering over theological issues. Compromises, construction of attitudes, casual 
use of various levels of self-identity, ad hoc quotations from Hadith or the Qurʼan: the 
range of attitudes is very wide and flexible (Burgat 2005, 68). While the study of available 
literature is useful to understand the sources, it does not exhaust the complexity of 
individual religious experiences and feelings. Furthermore, my study is an appeal to reflect 
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on years of anthropological and sociological studies, which, because they have focused on 
Muslims as products of Islam (Marranci 2008, 8), have overlooked the human beings who 
felt themselves to be Muslims. 
 
 
Who are they? Who gets to define them? 
 
In order to explain the implications of living as a Muslim minority in the West, it  remains 
necessary to investigate the ʻMuslimsʼ, before introducing the subjects of my research, the 
Islamists. This distinction is definitely important for the purposes of better understanding 
the differences between, someone who declares him/her-self as Muslim, and, someone 
else who places that Muslim identity at the centre of his/her political discourse and 
practices (i.e., to finally defuse any latent, mild form of the culturalist-orientalist approach 
that cannot discern any difference between the two terms and uses them interchangeably). 
Whom do we call a Muslim then? And more pertinently, do we need to define Islam to 
understand Muslims? 
Most debates on Islam today, either jump from one to another definition or persist with one 
alone, disregarding the relevance of the different levels. However, as highlighted above, it 
is noteworthy that the question ʻWhat is Islam?ʼ is no longer debated only among analysts 
and ʻoutsidersʼ. Nowadays it is a cornerstone of discussion among an ever growing 
number of Muslims as well. This attitude consists  of drawing a line within the Muslim world 
between what is Islamic and what is not (Bordieu 1994, 43). A ʻMuslimʼ society, in the 
cultural and sociological sense, is not  an ʻIslamicʼ society ipso facto (that is, a society 
established on the principles of Islam). Therefore, the need to formulate what it means to 
be a Muslim, to define objectively what Islam is -- something I earlier referred to as the 
objectification of Islam -- becomes a logical consequence of the lack of social authority of 
religion (Eickelman-Piscatori 1996, 67). There is another important process relating to the 
status of a Muslim minority, that we must take into account: de-culturation that results from 
the crisis of the culture of origin yielding to re-constructed identities. 
It is important to specify that I do not argue that the pristine cultures (of origin) were static 
and immune from external influence, nevertheless, they were re-constructed and lived by 
first generation immigrants as their own past; this is what most Western actors dealing 
with immigration usually call tradition (Lewis 1994, 32). References to tradition by 
community leaders in the West and/or politicians from the country of origin serve as a 
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means of maintaining the link between immigrants and the home country, which could also 
function as a political lever in the host country, and as a channel for funding in both 
directions. The interesting and unusual aspect in relation to ʻWestern Muslimsʼ is that their 
relation with Muslim countries is no longer based on the concept of diaspora. I argue that 
the relevant link is no longer the diasporic one, but the one between immigrants and a new 
set of identities, mostlyelaborated or provided by the host country itself (Asad 1993, 268). 
Maghrebin and beur in France are not terms to identify someone who is from a North 
African country. As terms,  they explicitly refer to a different cluster of identity markers, 
which have been developed within the experience of being part of a set that has a minority 
status.6 
Certainly, there are some groups, which retain a diasporic dimension longer than others, 
perhaps enhanced by marriages with a spouse from their village of origin. But among 
some groups of Muslims in Europe there is a specific trend toward a renewed, reinvented 
sort of Muslim identity, disengaged from pristine cultural links. The other interesting 
element is that among these same groups of Muslims there is always a quest for 
authenticity but this is not aimed at recovering or maintaining the pristine identity, rather it 
is about going beyond such culturally sedimented reality and reaching a pure ahistorical 
model of Islam. In a way, such effort represents a rejection of the culture of origin, and 
paradoxically, it works as a process of ʻacculturationʼ. Some authors (Burgat 2005, 32) 
speak of a process of re-Islamisation to refer to this process of re-appropriation of Islam, 
purified of its cultural scoriae. This development is possible specifically because it is 
enacted in a non-Muslim cultural environment. I argue that this dynamic, which has been 
seen as a process of ʻre-Islamisationʼ, is more the product of the fact that a Muslim 
identity, self-evident so long as it belonged to an engrained cultural legacy, has to express 
itself explicitly in a non-Muslim or Western context (Piscatori 1990, 46). The construction of 
a disengaged Islam is a way of experiencing Islam itself that is not linked to a given culture 
and it should nominally fit in with every culture (Bayart 2005, 58). More precisely, the issue 
is not only one of recasting an Islamic identity, but of reformulating it in very explicit and 
clear-cut terms. The point about resorting to an ʻexplicitʼ formulation is important, because 
it formally obliges one to make choices, by trying to disentangle what appears to be the 
different and often contradictory levels of practices and discourses; such a need is not felt 
urgently when a religion is already embedded in a given culture (Khan 1999, 82). 
                                            
6 This contradicts Appadurai’s argument about the need for migrant communities to establish ‘diasporic links’ with the 
countries of origin (1996, 57). 
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Especially in times of crisis and turmoil, Muslims feel compelled, or more likely, are 
explicitly asked to explain what it means to be a Muslim. Quite often the Western press 
publishes articles stating what Islam is or is not. Such talk weighs on the shoulders of 
every Muslim, rather than only on legitimate religious authorities, simply because there are 
not many established Muslim authorities in the West (Asad 1993, 268). In this manner, 
each Muslim is accountable for being a Muslim (Roy 2004, 56). 
What is nowadays labelled a pervasive movement of re-Islamisation or Islamic revivalism is 
often explained in terms of identity protest. I do not argue that this kind of interpretation 
(Burgat 2005, 112) is misleading, but I suggest that the foremost task is to place it within 
the framework of reformulating a ʻdisengagedʼ Islam: as a specific urge for the individual, 
linked to a gap in the social authority. Explicit elaboration of Islam in this way also implies 
a projection into the future, a plan to realise the ummah beyond the heterogeneity of 
societies and cultures. It is easy to understand that this leads to the endeavour to define a 
universal Islam of a kind that can be valid in any cultural context. Of course, by definition, 
Islam is universal, but after the time of the prophet, it has always been incorporated into 
different cultures (Roy 2004,83). These cultures are seen by some Muslims as merely a 
product of history and as the result of many influences and idiosyncrasies; having thus 
altered the pristine message of Islam. Because of this, the new generation of Western-
born Muslims do not want to be Pakistanis or Turks (Dassetto 1998, Roy 2004, 112); they 
aspire to, and represent themselves, as Muslims first. Therefore, it is evident how this 
quest for a ʻpureʼ Islam could potentially signify the impoverishment or simplification of its 
content, which then needs to be explicit and delinked from an inherited habitus or 
traditional knowledge (Roy 2004, 34). 
As mentioned earlier, my study focuses on Islamism and Islamists in the UK vis-a-vis a 
dominant power structure and discourse. With this in mind, I need to advance some more 
questions: what is the difference and the suturing point, if any, between Islam and 
Islamism? How is the relationship between Islam and Islamism lived, inhabited, discoursed 
and practiced by the Islamists themselves? How can it be analysed, discoursed and 
represented, without deploying the culturalist-orientalist framework of analysis, which is 
disenabling and politically ostracizing? 






My research concerns British Islamists: the political activists who live and represent Islam 
as their political ideology, and who -- I argue -- are therefore bringing some innovations to 
a certain tradition themselves. Islamist parties are movements that, for more than a 
decade, and particularly during the last decade, have mounted different kinds of 
challenges against both the West and the regimes in place in the Middle East (Roy 1994, 
28).  
Needless to remark that by discussing the relationship between Islam and politics, I totally 
diverge from the culturalist-orientalist approach, which speaks of one Islam, eternal and 
timeless, and represents Muslim societies as a global cultural system (Huntington 1996). 
Such an approach also delegitimizes and depoliticizes the Islamist quests, either by 
confining them to the realm of the religious ʻfaithʼ groups, or by witch-hunting them as 
fundamentalists and terrorists. My principal aim is to offer an alternative framework of 
analysis, firstly by showing that there is a broad range of opinion among Muslim 
intellectuals as to the different political and social implications of the Qur’anic message. 
Western Orientalists, however, tend either to cut through the debate by deciding for the 
Muslims what the Qur’an means, or to accept the point of view of a particular Islamic 
school while ignoring all others (Mamdani 2004, 74). 
I have decided to limit my inquiry to British Islamists and I am taking them at their word on 
Islam and Islamism, by considering the whole range of meanings, apparent contradictions 
and several levels of identity markers, adopted by these political actors themselves, who 
are the object of my analysis. To be more precise, Islamists are people who use Islamic 
metaphors and vocabulary to think through their political future (Sayyid 1997, 89); by doing 
so, they construct and ʻdiscourseʼ through an Islamist discourse. Islamism is a political 
discourse and, as such, is akin to other political discourses, such as socialism or 
liberalism, for instance. My point is that no one would ever raise the question that those 
political discourses are not a uniform totality even while they include many varieties and 
different versions; knowing this, it is still possible and valid to speak of socialism and 
liberalism. Likewise, it should be possible to speak of different versions of Islamism, while 
still referring to Islamism.  Islamism is a discourse that centres Islam within the political 
order. Islamism can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-blooded 
attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles (Sayyid 1997, 32). This definition is 
similar to Oliver Royʼs definition of Islamism. Roy also distinguishes between Islamism and 
what he calls ʻneo-fundamentalistsʼ. In his view, neo-fundamentalists are those whose aim 
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is to see the establishment of an Islamic order in terms of its privatization, in contrast to 
Islamists who see the establishment of an Islamic order necessitating intervention in public 
affairs, the capture of the state. 
Like Roy, I see Islamism as a political project, but unlike Roy my notion of the political is 
not limited to projects which aim directly at seizing state power through a singular founding 
act (a revolution, for example). The political is the moment of the institution of the social 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1991, 54). It may range from the capture of the state apparatus by a 
dedicated vanguard to a more diffused strategy of intellectual moral reform of civil society 
as a precursor to acquire state power (Mamdani 2004, 79). Thus, within this broad 
definition of Islamism as a political project, there is room for very different strategies of 
Islamization. Similarly, I do not agree with authors (Mandaville, Mamdani, Esposito, 
Keppel, to name but a few) who distinguish between Political Islam and Islamism, on the 
basis that the former notion indicates movements simply aiming at reforming the society 
according to Islamic principles, but without planning the seizure of political power, and the 
latter indicates movements planning to institute an Islamic state. I consider both agendas 
as political, regardless of their actual or planned targets; I do not like speaking of ʻPoliticalʼ 
Islam mainly for the reason that it presents and stresses the concept of the ʻPoliticalʼ 
simply as an attribute, stemming from, or simply juxtaposed with a professed faith called 
Islam. To a certain extent, the political discourse is undoubtedly related to some core 
assumptions and tenets of Islam, but these are lived, mobilized and practiced in the realm 
of the political and of the power struggle; therefore, they are not just an appendix to Islam 
as the expression Political Islam might suggest. They are inhabited, represented, shared, 
discussed and disputed in varying contexts and thus their discursive nature and formations 
are different from a private professed belief. This is the reason why this thesis will adopt 
the term ʻIslamismʼ instead of ʻPolitical Islamʼ. 
Having said that, it is clear that to reduce all the problems of the contemporary Muslim 
world to the effects of Islamic culture is a disingenuous argument and a tautology (Roy 
2004, 114). It is akin to imposing the grid of a culturalist reading upon Muslims, by 
projecting as a reality whatever was predetermined by the grid, especially with regard to 
what can be called the ʻIslamic political imaginationʼ (Eickelman-Piscatori 1990, 47). 
In relation to the fieldwork, my approach has consisted of taking generic statements  -- 
such as, ʻin Islam there is no separation between politics and religion because they are 
part of the political actorsʼ imaginationʼ (Daniel 1993, 46) -- seriously, but cautiously so as 




Some historical coordinates for Islamism 
 
Long before Islamism appeared in the twentieth century, Islamic reformers had felt that 
colonialism was the key challenge facing contemporary Muslims (Mamdani 2004, 45). 
The question was posed quite strikingly by Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani (1839-1897). When 
Ernest Renan published a piece on ʻIslam and Scienceʼ in Journal des Debats (March 29, 
1883), Al-Afghani responded in the same journal (May 18, 1883). Renan published a 
rejoinder the day after Al-Afghaniʼs response, acknowledging that Al-Afghani had made a 
great impression on him. In his lecture, Renan had claimed that ʻearly Islam and the Arabs 
who professed it were hostile to the scientific and philosophic spirit, and that science and 
philosophy had only entered the Islamic world from non-Arab sourcesʼ (Keddie 1983, 87-
89). Al-Afghaniʼs retaliation challenged Renanʼs racist assumption (that the Arabs and/or 
Islam were hostile to science), and in its place argued a surprisingly modern case: that 
science, as philosophy, develops everywhere over time (ibid., 95). 
Al-Afghani had travelled widely outside his native Iran, from India in the east to France in 
the west, before he came to Egypt. His traditional madrassah education had included fiqh 
alongside falsafa (philosophy) and irfan (mysticism). His Indian experience both convinced 
Al-Afghani of the future importance of modern science and mathematics and exposed him 
to Britainʼs brutal repression of the 1857-58 anti-colonial revolt in India (Tibi 1988, 70). 
Whereas the early nineteenth century Islamic thinkers who embraced progress tended to 
be enamored with Western modernity and saw Britain and France as benign bearers of 
progress, Al-Afgani highlighted modernityʼs contradictory impact (ibid., 79). On the one 
hand, Muslims needed modern science, which they would have to learn from Europe, but 
on the other, this very necessity was proof ʻof our inferiority and decadenceʼ for ʻwe civilize 
ourselves by imitating the Europeansʼ (Keddie 1983, 97). Al-Afghani had located the 
center of this historical dilemma in a society that had been subjected to colonialism: if 
being modern meant, above all, free rein for human creativity and originality, how could a 
colonial society modernize by imitation? (Mamdani 2004, 46). 
There is also the link to colonialism and independence. Not surprisingly, forward-looking 
Islamic thinkers sought within the Islamic tradition, the sources of innovation, renewal and 
change. Even if both reformers and radicals spoke in the vocabulary of Islam, they turned 
to doctrine and history not just for continuity but also for renewal, and so they provided 
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different answers to the question of how to confront Western modernity and global 
dominance (Armstrong 2000, 45). 
This process was completely different from the earlier development of Christian 
fundamentalism and political Christianity. Unlike Christianity, mainstream Islam has no 
institutionalised religious hierarchy; it has a religious clergy, but no single organized 
parallel to the hierarchy of the state (ibid., 45). 
Whereas the development of a political Christianity in the United States was mainly the 
work of a ʻfundamentalistʼ religious clergy -- such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson -- the 
development of Islamism has owed more to the work of non-clerical political intellectuals 
such as Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammed Ali Jinnah in colonial India and Abdul Aʼla 
Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati in post-colonial Pakistan, Egypt and Iran 
respectively. Unlike the fundamentalist clergy behind promoting political Christianity, the 
pioneers of Islamism were not the religious ulama but ʻpoliticalʼ intellectuals with an 
exclusive worldly concern. It is for this reason that this thesis will not refer to ʻIslamic 
fundamentalismʼ in relation to Islamism, though this term is most often used in post 9-11 
America (Mamdani 2004, 47). 
The split between religious ulama and political intellectuals was evident as early as the 
anti-colonial movement in India during the first half of the twentieth century. Their religious 
and political conservatism did not necessarily go hand in hand: it was the intellectuals, not 
the ulama, who pioneered the development of Islamist movements, ultimately championing 
the call for a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, namely Pakistan (Jalal 2001, 56). 
Contrary to what might be expected, the conservative ʻulamaʼ remained inside the secular 
Indian National Congress, whereas the modernist secular intellectuals called for an Islamic 
polity, at first autonomous, then independent (ibid., 75-78). 
Whereas the ulama made a clear distinction between Islam as a cultural and political 
identity that Muslims may espouse, secular intellectuals came to insist that Islam was not 
just a religious or cultural identity; it had become a political identity (Mitchell 1969, 75). The 
Indian experience reveals that those who called for a ʻnationalist politicsʼ were not always 
progressive and those who championed religious political nationalism were not all 
reactionary (Armstrong 2000, 67). The two camps were not properly divided by the line 
between democracy and authoritarianism. The poet Muhammad Iqbal and the politician 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, both spokespersons for the political rights of Muslims, were 
determinedly secular in orientation. Iqbal, who is considered to be the spiritual founder of 
Pakistan, was among the few Muslimintellectuals who rejoiced in 1922 when Turkey 
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abolished the Ottoman Khilafat, in effect severing any relationship between the state and 
religion. He called for the institutions of ijtihad (legal interpretation) to be modernized and 
democratized, he argued that the law should be interpreted by a body elected by the 
community of Muslims, the umma, and not the ulama. Jinnah, who is considered to be the 
political founder of Pakistan, was similarly determined that independent Pakistan must 
have a secular constitution, guaranteeing separation between the state and religion and 
due protection to the rights of minorities (Jalal 2001, 244-246). 
The shift from reformist to a radical agenda in Islam is best understood in the context of 
the transition from colonialism  to post-colonialism and can be highlighted by the history of 
a single mass organization: the society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt (Mamdani 2004, 48). 
Beginning in 1930, Hasan-al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and 
Abul-Ala-Mawdudi the creator of the Indo-Pakistani Jamaat-I-Islami party (Bahadur 1978), 
introduced a new movement of thought that endeavoured to define Islam primarily as a 
political system in keeping with the major ideologies of the twentieth century. But they 
brought legitimacy to this new vision by focusing the theme of a return to the texts and to 
the original inspiration of the first community of believers. And so, I will refer to the 
contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as Islamism.  
From the outset, Islam was divided into three geographic and cultural tendencies: the 
Sunni Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian subcontinent and Irano-Arab Shiʼism. These 
groups are distinct both politically and geographically, which is why it is more appropriate 
to speak of an Islamist sphere of influence than of an international union. The largest 
organization is that of the Arab worldʼs Muslim brotherhood (MB), which is vaguely 
dependent on their Egyptian leadership, but in reality organized on a national basis 
(Mitchell 1969, 89); several dissident and minority groups have also branched off from this 
common base. Next, there are the organizations on the Indian subcontinent  (the various 
Jamaat-I-Islamis of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh), the Afghan Mujahidin (Hizbi-Islami, 
Jammat-I-Islami), and more recently the North African Islamists (the Algerian FIS, or 
Islamic salvation front; the Tunisian Nahda party) and the Islamic Renaissance party in the 
former Soviet Union. This bloc has recently tended to merge with other movements like the 
Saudi Wahabis and the Pakistani Ahl –I-Hadith (Mawdudi 1985, Euben 2000, Noor 2001, 
Schulze 2002). 
The Islamist movement has developed over half a century, beginning more or less in 1940. 
Yet, concepts have evolved and historical circumstances have changed, and splits and 
differences have brought diversity. However, there is a sort of conceptual matrix and a 
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demographic base common to all the groups. Indeed, as much from a sociological as from 
an intellectual point of view, it can be said that these movements are products of the so-
called  ʻmodern worldʼ (Kepel 1986, 78). The militants are rarely mullahs but off-springs of 
a modern educational system, and those who are university educated, are usually more 
scientific than literary.7 Islam is considered as much a religion as an ʻideologyʼ (Bayart 
2005, 60). Their political education comes from college and university campuses and not 
from religious schools (Euben 2002, 46; Mamdani 2004, 113). Much emphasis is placed 
on the organization, a pattern reminiscent both of Leninist type parties and of Sufi 
brotherhoods (Cole-Keddie 1986, 68). Likewise, the masses who follow the Islamists are 
not traditional or traditionalists either; they live in a world of movies, theatres, cafés, jeans, 
videos and sports. It is also striking to notice the Islamist adaptation to the modern urban 
setting, from the use of modern weapons and communications technology to the 
organization of large demonstrations. Therefore, far from being an irruption of an archaic, 
irrational phenomenon, the Islamist movement is strictly intertwined with two tendencies. 
The first is centred on the sharia, that is setting the reformer, the censor and the tribunal 
against corruption, against foreign influences, political opportunism and the forgetting of 
sacred texts. The other tendency is more recent and it has a slightly different connotation: 
it is that of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, today it is subsumed under the label of 
anti-Westernism (Mortimer 1982, 68). The main targets are foreign banks and local 
governments accused of ʻcomplicityʼ with the West (Mamdani 2004, 67). The interesting 
aspect is that there is a sort of continuity in the targets and also the participants: the same 
individuals who followed Nasser in the 1960s have turned into being Islamists today. It is 
not difficult to see the connection between Marxist groups and Islamists. Without question, 
the Shiʼites have provided the best bridge between the two Third world movements. Ali 
Shariati, for instance, an ideologist of the Shiʼite movement (Sivan 1985, 78), was a great 
reader of Franz Fanon.8 And of course, the Iranian revolution has best expressed the Third 
World continuity by embodying the North-South opposition in Islamist terms (ibid.,79). 
To a certain extent, there are also parallels between different kinds of guerrilla fighters and 
militants, especially in recent history. The 1950s and 1960s were years of communion: the 
                                            
7 For an extensive and ethnographically based account and analysis of the social roots of Islam see the book by Gregory 
Starett Putting Islam to work: Education, Politics and Religious transformation in Egypt (Berkley: California 
University Press, 1998) and Genevieve Abdo’s No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
8 Specifically, Franz Fanon‘s works like The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1965), A dying Colonialism 
(New York: Grove, 1967), Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove, 1967), Toward the African Revolution (New 
York: Grove, 1969). 
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Algerian guerrilla fighters and the Palestinian activists seemed to be the brothers of 
progressive Western militants. In the 1970s, a sort of divorce occured when the Islamist 
militiants were no longer understood by the Western militants (Mawdudi 1980, 24). In a 
way, in terms of their social origins and their relationship to knowledge, Islamist militants 
share several values with their Western counterparts. They have, in common, the cult of a 
return to the past, of authenticity and purity (the rebuilding of a traditional way of life in a 
context and by methods that presuppose that the tradition is obsolete), and the shift into 
terrorism for the most radical fringe (Asad 2006, 67). For the most sectarian, it could be 
said that the hegira is akin to a return to the countryside. Nevertheless, whereas the 
Marxist guerrillas were peasant, the Islamists were ʻurbanʼ and thus sociologically more 
ʻmodernʼ (Schulze 2002, 197). The parallels between Islamism and third world movements 
also extend to their decomposition and the shift of the most radical sectors into terrorism, 
this latter being a product of the 1970s and not an Islamic invention9 (Esposito 1983, 79; 
Armstrong 2000, 55). However, there is a main distinction that needs to be made. The 
Third World Marxist vulgate allowed some to understand the Baader-Meinhof Gang or the 
Red Brigades but not the Hizbullah (Roy 1996, 42). That is to say, unlike Marxism, 
Islamism and Islamists cannot reach beyond certain culturalist and orientalist  
representations (Mamdani 2004, 39). 
 
 
The debate on Islamism within a ‘modern’ political system 
 
Comparisons do not prove much.  It is certainly engaging for a scholar to demonstrate the 
historicity, contextuality and  ʻmodernityʼ10 of the Islamist movements but, paradoxically, it 
goes against some Islamistsʼ own arguments. Put other way, according to this group, there 
is only one way of being Islamist. But this vision of Islam and Islamism as possessing a 
single essence is -- as shown above -- not unique to the Islamists, since it is present both 
among ʻtraditionalistʼ ulamas and Western orientalists, who are, in turn, adopting Max 
Weberʼs reading of Islam as a culture, a civilization, and a closed system (Rodinson 
1974;Weber 1976).  
                                            
9 For an extensive analysis of the phenomenon see Paul Berman’s Terror and Liberalism (London:Norton, 2003). 
10 For an interesting discussion on the ‘modernity’ of the Islamist movements, see Martin Bright ‘On the Trail of 
Osama Bin Laden’, The Guardian 11 May 2003. 
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Needless to say, even though they speak in terms of a global timeless system, the 
Islamists and Orientalists do not agree on what constitutes the essence of Islam and of 
being Islamist. 
On the other hand, as argued before, the culturalist-orientalist approach consists of 
defining a timeless ʻIslamic cultureʼ (Gellner 1981, 45), a conceptual framework that 
structures both political life and urban architecture, the thought of the ulamas and of their 
detractors, and which results in the non-emergence of capitalism (Weber, 1976) and the 
absence of an autonomous space for politics and institutions (Badie, 1987). On this view, 
Islamic culture leads to a timeless civilization in which everything is interrelated and 
reflects the same structure. Such a civilization has then been brutally confronted with the 
challenge of a modernity arisen from outside (Lewis 1993, 57). According to this narrative, 
Islam is the major obstacle prohibiting access to political modernity. 
In the political domain, the ʻinvention of modernityʼ (Hall-Gieben 1992) lies in the 
emergence of an autonomous space separated from both the religious and the private 
spheres. Secularism and politics ʻare born of a closing in of Christian thought onto itselfʼ 
(Hall 1985, 57). This is not to deny that there has been some remarkable historical and 
political research addressing the birth of politics and the modern state. But the 
consequence of most of these works has been to suggest that there is no modernity 
outside of the Western political model (ibid., 68). The argument that is usually put forward, 
consists of two main points: parliamentary democracy, the ideology of human rights and 
the law based state are ethically desirable and economically more efficient; historically this 
configuration comes out of Christian Europe (Sayyid 1997, 111). In postcolonial settings, 
this argument has stirred up heated debates and provoked passionate reactions; mainly it 
is considered as a tool of  ʻpost-imperialistʼ strategy and thinking (Marranci 2008, 96). 
My argument here is that the real problem might revolve around comparativism. Put  
another way, comparativism tends to take one of the elements of the comparison as the 
norm for the other, finding that there is either a resemblance or a lack of one, but never 
ʻquestioning the primitive configurationʼ (Castoriadis 1987, 68). The risk involved in this 
approach is the isolation of the two specific entities, and the dismissal, not only of their 
individual dynamic, but also -- more relevantly -- of the dialectic of their relationship. That 
is to say, there is definitely an Islamist corpus and an Islamist discourse, but it would be 
misleading to simply set an equivalence between a civilization and a history on the one 
hand and this corpus on the other (Turner 1994, 57), without thinking of their mutually 
constitutive discourses. 
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If comparativism is adopted as a method, a link is instituted between the Islamic corpus 
and the concrete sociological reality. It is argued that the lack of modernity in Muslim 
countries is explained by the absence of some conceptual categories that are present in 
Western thought: for example, given the absence of the concept of a state based on 
territory, it is claimed that it is impossible to achieve a proper modern state that is, by 
definition, ʻterritorializedʼ. At times, the same lack of modernity is explained by the 
presence of certain specific sociological categories not reflected in this corpus: the 
patrimonial state, the segmentation into solidarity groups, asabyyia. (Hall-Gieben 1992; 
Badie 1993). 
The point that I am making here is that, far from being marked by a lack, Islamist thought 
is just inscribed within a different configuration of the relationship between Power and Law: 
what the philosophy of cognitive science would call ʻthe contextualityʼ (Gershenson 2002). 
That this configuration could, in turn, be a source of difficulties is not in doubt, but what my 
dissertation argues is that the assessment should not be produced in relation to the 
Western state but, according to its original meaning (El Zein 1977, 68). What is definitely 
original, for instance, is the place of the sharia, Muslim law, with respect to power. The 
sharia has two characteristics: its autonomy and its incompleteness. At the same time, the 
sharia does not depend on any state, on any actual positive law, on any political decision, 
and neither does it depend on any official body, church or clergy. Another important 
element is that the sharia is never closed, for it is based not on a core of concepts but 
rather on an ensemble of precepts, which is at times very general, and at times, precise. 
While the basic precepts, as they are explicitly formulated, cannot be called into question, 
their extension is a matter of ʻcasuismʼ (Damasio 2000, 78). These two main 
considerations highlighted above (i.e., no institutional or conceptual closure) also give me 
the opportunity to present another relevant reflection. Totalitarianism, as the kidnap of the 
entirety of the social realm into the political realm, is absolutely foreign to Islamic culture 
(Roy 1996, Euben 2002, Mamdani 2004). On the other hand, the excess of the state 
(totalitarianism) is always latent in the place the state occupies in the West. It is not 
surprising, thus, that Western contemporary thought on the birth of the state ʻwould be a 
reflection on and against totalitarianismʼ (Roy 1996, 57). 
These very brief, and perhaps sketchy, reflections are aimed at showing that there are 
different configurations and dynamics in the relationship between the state and society in 
the so-called Islamic and Western cultures. To investigate the first culture on the basis of 
the concepts of the second, elevated to the level of universality, can only highlight an 
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absence, a lack of something: an empty category that does not explain much but could 
cause several misunderstandings. 
I might add that the culturalist-orientalist approach is echoed by a similar response given 
by some Muslim intellectuals (Marranci 2008, 78). Their stereotypical arguments can be 
summarized into three categories: the so-called nostalgia argument (it was Islam that 
brought civilization to the West); rejection of any serious hypothesis and analysis of 
Western models; apologia for Islam (everything is in the Qur’an and in the Sunna) (Roy 
1996, 58). The first one is defensive: it just evades the question. The second and the third 
ones are analysed in my dissertation. 
To put it another way, paradoxically enough, some Islamists analyse and study Islam by 
approaching it in the same guise as conceived by the culturalist-orientalist approach: a 
timeless, dehistoricized entity beyond criticism, a sub specie aeternitatis (ibid., 61). Ironically, 
they refuse to look at the Islamic civilization as a socio-historical configuration; they project 
an Islam deprived of its historical sedimentations and therefore ʻfictitiousʼ, not real but -- as 
my dissertation argues -- certainly a novel development. 
On the culturalist-orientalistsʼ side, this kind of approach to Islam is not synonymous with 
innovations, but with lack of perspectives. It is a matter of the same essentialising attitude, 
which, however, produces different contents. Furthermore, there is an interesting dynamic 
to take into consideration: what is promoted by the Islamists as a return to the true origins 
or fundaments of Islam, but is instead an innovation, is considered by the culturalist-
orientalist discourse as a backward refuge into the past. 
In other words, there is a sort of paradoxical dynamic, which means that the categories 
imposed from above, become unconsciously internalised from below, although both 
parties propose an inverted image of what is real: namely, the mirroring effect. 
My point here is that dismissing this element in the analysis could mask a refusal to 
address a failure in making a serious political examination of the phenomenon itself.  
Doing this also implies endorsing a casuistic analysis based on empty categories and 
sharp ʻde-contextualisedʼ definitions (Gershenson 2002), without venturing into 
questioning, challenging and deconstructing them. 
My hope is that this dissertation has managed to avoid such perspectives. This intention 
also explains why I decided to adopt a constructionist approach that sees ʻculturesʼ and 
ʻreligionsʼ as political acts, within the terms, the dynamics, the struggles, the possibilities, 
and the unforeseeable strategies, of a power-relationship.  The same purpose clarifies why 
I decided to embark on a two-year fieldwork to share the experience of the political actors 
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themselves, to study the discourses and practices, to understand the self-representation of 










The Set of Islamic beliefs and beyond 
 
This chapter looks at the main sources of the Islamic beliefs (the Qur’an, the Hadith, and 
the Sharia) to better understand how Islamism has evolved and how Islamists have 
variously given ʻworksʼ to the ʻwordsʼ (Mawdudi 1982, 13) by performing discursive 
practices of ʻmeaningʼ and in so doing, creating an Islamist discourse. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the knowledge and comprehension of these main 
sources are important in order to grasp the variety of their representations, the breadth of 
their potential representations, and mostly the discursive operations of their agents, the 
British Islamists. This implies that the main focus of my analysis is not what the Qur’an 
actually says, but what the Islamists say the Qur’an says. In this, my examination differs 
from the culturalist-orientalist one, which represents Islam as a global timeless system and 
ignores the fact the ʻIslamʼ exists only through the practices and discourses of its agents, 
the Muslims and the Islamists. This is also the reason why I have decided to analyse here 
the concept of jihad and the debate on ʻIslam and Democracyʼ, both of these being much 
sought-after topics in the West, especially in the aftermath of 9-11. My aim is to show that 
there is no one univocal understanding of jihad among Islamists; its interpretation differs 
according to their various Islamist discourses and contextual practices. 
In relation to the issue of the incompatibility between Islam and Democracy, in summary, 
my argument is that Islamism is a political discourse, and as such it is compatible with 
different political systems. Therefore, Islamist groups should not be ostracized from the 
political arena. It is a certain dominant culturalist-orientalist discourse which assumes, to 
such an extent, that there is an ʻontologicalʼ incompatibility between ʻIslamʼ and 
ʻDemocracyʼ, that it, paradoxically, turns Democracy into a corpus of religious beliefs, and 








The excessive emphasis on Islam 
 
Certainly, one element that captured my attention about the debate on Muslims, and 
mostly on Islamism, is the fact that it turns on one question: What is Islam? The tacit 
premise here is that most events involving Muslims are related to Islam as such; this 
paves the way to other questions like, what does Islam say about jihad, suicide bombers, 
democracy, women, and so on? Islam is therefore seen as a coherent entity, a closed and 
unchanged set of beliefs, values and cultural patterns, imbued in a common society, 
history and territory, which could allow a use of the term as an explanatory concept for 
almost everything involving Muslims (Asad 1993, 90; El Zein 1977, 118; Marranci 2008, 
91; Sokefeld 1999, 427). 
Another important element to consider is the lack of understanding, or constant confusion 
between ʻIslamʼ as a religion (a set of beliefs) and the so-called ʻMuslim cultureʼ (if I am 
allowed to use this term). A good starting point for the analysis would be to recognise that 
Islam as a religion comprises the Qur’an, the Sunna and the commentaries of the Ulama. 
On the other hand, ʻMuslim or Islamic culturesʼ include, and are made up of, literature, 
traditions, science, social relationships, cuisine, historical and political paradigms, urban 
life, and so on. 
If such a ʻcultureʼ is difficult to spot or single out from among cultures based in certain 
historical eras and geographical areas, it is certainly misleading to explain most of the 
characteristics involving Muslims and Islamists in terms of Islam as a religion. The core 
argument of the culturalist-orientalist approach (outlined earlier) is that not only does 
culture matter but that it is mainly a matter of culture, defined as a fixed, unchanged, 
unchangeable entity and, mostly, deprived of agency and agents. In this connection, the 
famous question raised by several journalists and commentators post-9-11 ʻWhy do they 
hate us?ʼ (Fallaci 2001, 12; Philips 2006, 11; The Times 2004; Zakaria 2001) was often 
answered in very simple essentialising terms, by highlighting that ʻAmerican culture stands 
for freedom and choiceʼ while their culture is based on atavistic ʻtraditionalʼ patriarchal 
repression (Fallaci 2001, 45; Philips 2006, 78; Schwartz 2002, 56). Even when there was a 
serious attempt to look for the political factors behind the very ill-defined ʻIslamic rageʼ, it 
ended up assuming, without questioning, the putative category of Islamic rage (Marranci 
2008, 94). It is easy to understand how these culturalist-orientalist frameworks of 
understanding are disingenuously flawed, and largely, politically disenabling and 
marginalising (Varisco 2005, 24). If everything is reasoned on the basis of culture 
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imagined as a fixed, dehistoricized, totalizing and pervasive entity, then there is no room 
for any change and the agency of the subjects has been totally denied or, worse, ruled out. 
For instance, expressions like the ʻArab mindʼ clearly show this operation of 
disempowering stereotyping. It assumes that there is an entity or super-entity called ʻArab 
cultureʼ, which determines an ʻArabʼ mind (Marranci 2008, 6). This leads me to affirm that a 
culturalist-orientalist analysis of cultures is always fundamentally stereotyped, as it tries to 
homogenize and ʻfreezeʼ a process that is otherwise diversified and contested: 
continuously in progress, without a ʻdefiniteʼ product. 
As Stuart Hall (1997, 125) puts it, cultures are about circuits of meanings and different 
actors always debate those meanings and, in the process, construct cultures.  With regard 
to Islam, and therefore Islamism, it is sometimes argued that it is grossly incompatible with 
the democratic system, and this argument is supported by adducing as central factors the 
anti-democratic, despotic, violent essence of Islam, Muslim culture, and to this end, a more 
robust proof is found by quoting passages of the Qur’an.  
An observation would be that a sacred book is subjected, by definition, to arguments and 
interpretations; therefore, it is not a matter of written text, but mainly of ʻdiscursive 
practicesʼ and interpretations carried out by the agents. Furthermore, if there is still a 
debate about what the Qur’an ʻactuallyʼ says, this means that nobody really knows, or at 
least, the people who think they know, disagree among themselves. 
Hence, my answer to the culturalist-orientalist framework consists of adopting a 
constructionist approach and examining the complex variety of the Islamist discourses and 
discursive practices, according to the temporal, spatial and political contexts; by analysing 
the genealogy (Foucault 1977, 151-152) of ʻBritish Islamismʼ within the Islamistsʼ 
imagination. 
An important reminder that needs to be made here, is that clear-cut categories 
(conservative, moderate, mainstream, radical) which are used in order to make sense of 
the Islamist discourses, might sometimes be useful, but they cannot pretend to subsume 
the real life of millions of people, even if these terms seem to be heuristically relevant. The 
same individual -- object of my analysis -- may employ various levels of conceptual 
references, jumping from the letter to the spirit of the scriptures and back again. Certainly, 
there is still the need to study the available literature, in order to give more ʻsubstanceʼ to 
these categories when they are deployed in the analysis, and to trace the discursive 
operations and practices of the agents. Doing so does not constitute a counter-claim to my 
argument that categories can never exhaust the complexity of the experience of the 
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individual (unless we consciously decide to resort to some kind of essentialism); for 
categories are never merely descriptive, but they are normative, and as such, exclusionary 
(Butler 1993, 19). However, I am also aware of the fact that this operation of categorizing, 
erasing and representing, performed by a researcher (by myself in this case) cannot easily 
be avoided; nevertheless, it continually needs to be charted, acknowledged, questioned, 
unsettled, and finally, displaced. 
 
 
The Fundamentals of Islam 
 
The beliefs and rules of worship found in Islam are based on three sources: a holy 
scripture (Qur’an), stories about the Prophetʼs life (hadith), and Islamic legal scholarship 
(shari’a). The fundamental elements of the faith, the ʻFive Pillarsʼ, are:  
1. Shahada: The recognition of the oneness of God, and that Muhammad is His  
Prophet; 
2. Salat: Prayer five times a day; 
3. Zakat: A ʻsocial responsibilityʼ tax to care for the poor; 
4. Hajj: Pilgrimage to Makkah once in oneʼs lifetime, if possible; 
5. Ramadan: Observing daytime fasting and undertaking spiritual reflection 
during the month of Ramadan. 
Beyond such basics, however, Islamʼs principles have been interpreted in widely different 
ways, and the practices of Muslims have varied just as much as those of any other ʻworld 
religionʼ. Indeed, shortly after the Prophetʼs death (632 C.E.), a schism occurred between 
two groups, Sunni and Shiʼia, over who should be his rightful successor: Abu Bakr 
(Muhammadʼs uncle) or Ali (his son-in-law). 
The Qur’an is divided into chapters called surah, meaning ʻfencesʼ. They are arranged in 
order of length rather than chronology. The themes within each surah are not entirely 
sequential, but (according to Sunnis) purportedly reflect the order established by 
Muhammad. Shiʼite Muslims assert that the Qur’an should be in chronological order. The 
verses are called ayahs meaning signs. The Qur’an is held to have been gradually revealed 
over 23 years, reflecting the prophetic career of Muhammad. Sometimes, the reader 
encounters contradictory injunctions or comments in the text and this reflects the changing 
circumstances of Muhammad. Muslim scholars believe in a concept called naskh or 
ʻabrogationʼ and the Qur’an itself refers to this concept. Basically, the later verses abrogate 
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the earlier ones. More specifically, certain verses that materialized when Muhammad was 
a powerless preacher in Mecca are replaced by those emerging when he was a ruler in 
Medina, following the hegira (migration). This concept becomes very relevant for its effects 
on Islamism, when a concept like jihad is considered. For example, the Surah 43:89 
enjoins that pagans be ignored; Surah Baqara 2: 190-191 orders that they be resisted and 
slain. The logic would be that the later verses abrogate the earlier. In practice, the uses 
and implementations by the Islamists themselves vary widely, from alternatively quoting  
both Surah, to finding a justification for both Surah in different situations; from preferring 
one over the other in the same situations, to preferring one over the other in different 
situations; from denying the value of the second to even denying the existence of the first 
one (Marranci 2006, 11). 
This brief account of an apparently schizophrenic attitude (ibid., 15) is helpful as it shows 
the ʻconsistencyʼ of my hypothesis that the analysis should focus first and foremost on the 
discourses and practices of the Islamist actors, and not on the ʻtheologicalʼ corpus ascribed 
to them. Nevertheless, knowledge and perusal of this corpus is essential in order to 
understand how the Islamist discourses and the practices are performed and legitimized, 
even when the human imprimatur is utterly denied.11 
The second source of authority for Muslims is the Sunna or the ʻpath, way, manner of lifeʼ. 
Essentially, the difference between the Qur’an and the Sunna is that, with the Qur’an, 
Muhammad is said to have brought the direct speech of God, precise and incorruptible, 
whereas, the Sunna is human speech and action, unprotected and subject to fallibility. The 
Sunna is transmitted through the Hadith, meaning news or narration; records of the life of 
the prophet. This becomes relevant for the present analysis in several ways. For example, 
on the question concerning how to interact with a wider ʻsecularʼ non-Muslim society (such 
as whether to participate in elections), the prophetic model is looked at for guidance. It is 
often argued that, in Medina, Muhammad established a multi-faith society with a 
constitution. Moreover, the Prophet Joseph was effectively Prime Minister in pagan Egypt, 
and therefore, involvement in non-Muslim structures is allowed (Momen 1985, 135). 
However, Islamists who are opposed to voting, claim that there is no record of Muhammad 
acting in this way.12 
A major division between Sunni and Shiʼia is in their hadith collections. Sunni Muslims 
                                            
11 This concept will be fully analysed in chapter 6, when reporting the findings of my ethnographic work. 
12 Parties like Hizbu-ut-Tahrir, the Saved Sect, Al Ghurabaa have repeatedly claimed the forged nature of this hadith. 
See chapter 6 for more details. 
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regard six of these collections as authoritative: Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Abu Dawud, 
Al Tirmidi, An Nasai, Ibn Madja. Shiʼia Muslims adhere to their own collections and regard 
many of the Sunni ahadith as forged. 
As Tariq Ramadan aptly affirms, in the West, the idea of Sharia calls up all the darkest 
images of Islam: from the repression of women to stoning, from the cruelest physical 
punishments to the denial of a democratic political system. This association is strong to 
such an extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not even dare to refer to the concept, for 
fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the 
word (Ramadan 2004, 31). It is certainly a fact that dictators have used it for repressive 
and cruel purposes, and that the ideal of the Sharia might have been betrayed by Muslims 
themselves, but this should not prevent a study of this central notion in the Islamic 
universe of reference. My analysis is aimed at understanding the ways it has been, and 
the reasons why, it still remains, fundamental and active in the Muslim consciousness 
through the ages, and what place it holds in the Islamist discourse. To an extent, it might 
be stated that if the shahada translates the idea of ʻbeing Muslimʼ, the sharia shows ʻhow to 
be and remain Muslimʼ. This also means that the Sharia responds, not only to the 
expression of the universal principle of Islam, but to the framework and the thinking that 
makes for its actualization in human history, considering -- as my analysis shows -- that 
the concept of ʻbeing Muslimʼ has been subjected to changes and developments through 
time, place, history and geography. Likewise, the Islamist discourse has undergone the 
same ʻcontextualʼ developments (Marranci 2006, 24). 
The Qur’an and the hadiths are central to the formation of what Muslims called sharia 
(Marranci 2008, 21). For example, it is from both the Qur’an and the hadiths that the five 
pillars of Islam (arkana-al-islam) fundamental to the sharia are derived (Dien 2004, 56; 
Esposito 1988, 59). The arkana-al-islam are the shahada or professing of faith, salat or the 
five daily prayers, zakat or almsgiving, sawm or fasting in the month of Ramadan, and hajj 
or the pilgrimage to Mecca to be performed at least once in a lifetime (Dien 2004, 59). Yet, 
both the Qur’an and the Sunna (the narrated tradition of the actions and sayings of the 
Prophet, composed of sirah and hadiths) were still insufficient to resolve all the 
circumstances in which a legal decision had to be taken (ibid., 61). After the death of 
Muhammad, the ummah lost its supreme judge and guide for deriving the divine law from 
the Qur’an. Muslims needed a mechanism to maintain their legal system within Godʼs will 
(Marranci 2008, 21). The solution was a process in which ijtihad (the individual opinion of a 
scholar) was based on analogical reasoning starting from the Qur’an and then the hadiths, 
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qiyas (Dien 2004, 65). But, individual opinions could lead to disagreements or khilaf. For 
this reason, a new law was considered valid only if consensus, ijma, was reached (ibid., 
68). 
Fiqh in Islamic jurisprudence, literally means the ʻtrue understanding of what is intendedʼ 
(Philips 1995, 13). Technically however, ʻfiqh refers to the science of deducing Islamic 
laws from the evidence found in the sources of Islamic lawʼ (ibid.,14), and it addresses 
specific situations not directly considered in Sharia (ibid, 45). Mawdudi states that ʻfiqh 
deals with observable conduct…that concerning itself with the spirit of conduct is known as 
Tasawwuf’ (Mawdudi 1998, 75). The essence of Islamic conduct centers on the concept of 
halal (permitted) and haram (forbidden), and so, a major function of fiqh is to determine the 
appropriate response to questions concerning practical ethics. As a result, the following 
categories have emerged: obligatory; recommended; indifferent; disapproved but not 
forbidden; prohibited. 
It is easy to understand how these concepts become immediately relevant when we 
consider -- for instance -- the ʻpermissibilityʼ option of Muslim and Islamist participation in 
the electoral context. In the British context, parties like Hizbu-ut-Tahrir and the Saved Sect, 
Al Ghurabaa and the SOS, have all declared and established that voting is haram. 
Other important concepts utilized by one or another of the distinct school of fiqh include ray 
ʻopinionʼ, as well as the Sahabah ʻCompanions of Muhammadʼ and the fuqahah. Yet another 
means of establishing an opinion, that is favored by some, is ʻcustomʼ or adat and 
customary usage or urf,either of the Ummah, or especially, the Caliphs. Among others, the 
concept of welfare or istislah, is a category which enables a juristic decision. The public 
interest, especially where issues of finances are concerned, may, at times, be an 
overriding concern. These concepts are increasingly used by British Islamists in order to 
decide on the Muslim-Islamist participation in elections in a non-Muslim majority context. 
As mentioned above, these concepts are highly ʻflexibleʼ and can be discoursed in a 
variety of ways which ultimately depend on the userʼs uses, discourses and practices. 
 
 
The Schools of fiqh 
 
Throughout early Muslim history, several madhabs or schools of fiqh arose but only four 
schools of the Sunni sect continue. These are the Hanafi, Shafi, Hanbali, and Maliki 
schools. In practice, Shiʼite fiqh is a little different from the Sunni counterparts (Guillame 
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1978, 100). It is interesting to note that the Islamic revolution in Iran has led to a more 
dynamic ijtihad and an element of convergence with Sunni fiqh. Traditionally, the Shiʼia 
held that during the occultation of the twelfth Imam, civil government authority could only 
derive from the common law or ʻurfʼ, rather than from Islamic law. They also held that the 
rulings of a dead mujtahid were not binding on the living. The elevation of Khomeini to the 
position of ʻSupreme Jurisprudentʼ and representative of the hidden Imam, transformed the 
situation. His fatwa against Salman Rushdie for blasphemy, for example, was felt by most 
Iranian Shiʼites to be irrevocable (Cole 2002, 194-195). 
Khomeini also applied the Sunni principle of ʻmaslahʼ or ʻstate action on behalf of the 
public goodʼ which previous Shiʼite fuqaha had not recognized, and which allow the Islamic 
Republic to do virtually anything and declare it in accordance with the Islamic law, on the 
basis that it benefits the Ummah. Once again, this consideration confirms the view that 
human practices are dynamic, subject to change -- changeable -- and more powerful and 
effective than written texts, even when those texts are regarded, and referred to as, 
divinely inspired or transmitted. Neglecting this aspect of the analysis would mean taking 
the risk of failing to address the analysis entirely, and of sidestepping the issue of the 
many stereotypes hovering over Islamism, Islamist discourses and Islamistsʼ practices. 
There is also the added risk of portraying the relation between Islam and Islamism as 
causal and direct, by making a ʻcasuisticʼ examination of a political phenomenon. 
The other two major distinctive features of the Shiʼia fiqh are the rejection of the ijma of the 
Sabaha and their belief that their fuqaha can still exercise ijtihad, which the Sunni have 
regarded as a closed science since the Mediaeval Abbasid era. Furthermore, the Shiʼia 
jurists stated that the sources of the Sharia are four: the Book, the Sunna, ijma, and aql 
(reason); emphasis on reason being a major feature of Shiʼism. The shiʼia position is that 
ʻEverything that is commanded by reason is also commanded by religionʼ (Al-Islam, 1998, 
35). 
The present overview of the main sources of the Islamic belief has been mainly aimed at 
offering some more background elements in order to discuss issues -- such as jihad, 
ʻdemocracyʼ and involvement in non-Muslim political structures -- in relation to the British 
Islamist parties which are featured in chapters five and sixth of this dissertation. 
In this context, an important issue is ijtihad. By the Mediaeval period, the gates of ijtihad 
were considered closed, although Hanbalis and some Shafis upheld the prerogative of a 
jurist to employ ʻrational and independent judgement in legal questionsʼ. Most had 
concluded that ijtihad was no longer necessary since all possible issues had already been 
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raised and addressed (Philips 1995, 105). However, Islamic faithfulness in time has been 
variously challenged, and new ʻfaithfulʼ answers were required in connection with the 
Sources. In particular, ʻhuman reasonʼ has been active and creative in putting forward 
original proposals in keeping with the time and place (Ramadan 2004, 62). This means 
that there have been several attempts to revive ijtihad, to provide answers to questions 
that previous fuqaha could not have addressed. Moreover, since large Muslim minorities 
have arisen in Western lands and become a ʻpermanent featureʼ, this question has 
become more acute. Islamic theology/jurisprudence prescribes that normally Muslims 
should migrate from non-Muslim lands to Islamic countries; similarly, exposure to the 
reality of complete religious liberty and the right to convert have led some scholars13 to 
question traditional Islamic rulings on apostasy. In this same context, it is very interesting 
to report what Abu Hamza answered, when asked if he favors hijra from non-Muslim to 
Muslim lands: ʻI tell Muslims to go into a Muslim environment not a Muslim country, 
because in our countries of origin, we have Muslims but we do not have Islamic statesʼ 
(Angelfire, 2001). This is a clear definition of what could be called a de-territorialized Islam, 
an environment more than a definite territory or land, where ʻreligiosityʼ ought to be 
transformed and discoursed and practiced in ʻoriginalʼ fashion. These are the relevant 
elements of analysis -- which my thesis has been seeking to illustrate and single out -- to 
reach a less ʻessentialisticʼ understanding of Muslim minorities living in the West and work 
against certain culturalist-orientalist representations of the Islamists (Varisco 2005, 79). 
This also implies that within de-territorialization and de-culturation, the ways the self is 
reconciled with ʻreligionʼ (religiosity), are several, disparate and thus, not easy to 
categorize (Marranci 2008, 89). Those modalities are variously discoursed, practiced, and 
mobilized within different relationships of power. Nevertheless, these developments are all 
equally ʻlegitimateʼ and interesting to analyze, without imposing any ready-made category, 
for any such category is never merely descriptive (ibid., 91), but tends to be normative, 





The Arabic word jihad is derived from the root word jahada. The latter word has the sense 
                                            
13 See for example Hassan-al-Turabi, Yusuf-al-Qaradawi and Azzam Tamimi. 
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of strive or exert. Jahada has been classically defined as ʻexerting oneʼs utmost power, 
efforts, endeavors, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobationʼ (Firestone 
1999, 16). The literature characterizes such an object as deriving from one of three 
sources: a visible enemy, the devil, and the aspects of oneʼs own self. There are, 
therefore, many kinds of jihad and most have nothing to do with warfare (Al Banna 1996, 
34). Scholars of Islam distinguish between two broad traditions of jihad: al-jihad-al-akbar 
(the greater jihad) and al-jihad-al-asghar (the lesser jihad). The greater jihad, it is said, is a 
struggle against weakness of the self; it is about how to live and to attain piety in a 
contaminated world. Inwardly, it is about the effort of each Muslim to become a better 
human being. The lesser jihad, in contrast, is about self-preservation and self-defense; 
directed outwardly, it is the source of Islamic notions of what Christians call ʻjust warʼ, 
rather than ʻholy warʼ. Thomaz Mastnak has affirmed that jihad cannot properly be defined 
as holy war. In his view, jihad is a doctrine of spiritual effort, of which military action is only 
one possible manifestation; the crusade and jihad are, strictly speaking, not comparable 
(Mastnak 2002, 64-65). An observation that needs to be made is that it has been  ʻmodern 
western thoughtʼ (Mamdani 2004, 47) -- strongly influenced by Crusades -- era ideas of 
ʻholy warʼ -- which has tended to portray jihad as an Islamic war against unbelievers, 
starting with the conquest of Spain in the eight century. At the same time, as Al Banna 
observes, political action is not contradictory to jihad. Islam sanctions rebellion against an 
unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not, and the lesser jihad can involve a mobilization for that 
social or political struggle (Al Banna 1996, 35). On the other hand, Mawdudi states that ʻto 
alter peopleʼs outlook and spark an intellectual and mental revolution though the medium 
of the speech and the written word is a form of jihadʼ. Contrary to a widely held Western 
belief (Tamimi et al 2004, 19), historically speaking, the practice of lesser jihad as central 
to a ʻjust struggleʼ, was occasional and isolated, marking points of crisis in Islamic history. 
After the first centuries of the creation of the Islamic states, there were only four 
widespread uses of jihad as a mobilizing slogan -- until the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. 
The first was by the Kurdish warrior Saladin in response to the conquest and slaughter of 
the First Crusade in the eleventh century.  
The second widespread use was in Senegambia region of West Africa in the late 
seventeenth century. By the second half of the seventeenth century, the slave trade had 
become the principal business of European powers on the African coast. Among those 
who sold slaves were Islamic rulers in the region. The crisis was felt most deeply in Berber 
society, which was caught in a ʻpincer movementʼ (Mamdani 2004, 51) between Arab 
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armies closing in from the north and the expanding frontiers of the European slave trade in 
the south (Boubacar 1998, 51-58). In this context, Islamism started to take shape as a 
movement led by Sufi leaders (marabout) intent on unifying the region against the negative 
effects of the slave trade.14 
The third time jihad was widely waged as a just war was in the middle of the 18th century in 
the Arabian peninsula, proclaimed by Muhammad-Ibn-Abdul-Wahab (1703-1792), who 
gave his name to a contemporary doctrine identified with the House of Saud, Wahabism. 
Ibn-Wahabʼs jihad was declared in a colonial setting, on an Arab peninsula that had been 
under Ottoman control from the 16th century. It was  clearly not a jihad against unbelievers 
since its enemies included Sunni Muslims from the Ottoman Empire (the colonizers) and 
Shi’ia heretics, whereas its beneficiaries were a newly forged alliance between the 
ambitious House of Saud and the new imperial power on the horizon, Great Britain. 
The fourth widespread practice of jihad as an armed struggle was in Sudan when the anti-
colonial leader Muhammad Ahmed declared himself as Al-Mahdi in 1881 and began to 
rally support against a Turko-Egyptian administration that was rapidly becoming absorbed 
into an expanding British Empire. In this context, the battle for a jihad was a battle against 
a colonial occupation that was both Muslim (Turko-Egyptian) and non-Muslim (British). Al-
Mahdi and his followers were spectacularly successful; armed with no more than spears 
and swords, they won battle after battle, and in 1885 they reached Khartoum where they 
killed the British general who was then governor in the Turko- Egyptian administration. 
However, once the victorious Al-Mahdi moved to unite different regions and create a united 
Sudan, the anti-colonial coalition disintegrated into warring factions in the north and into a 
marauding army of northern slavers in the south. As the war of liberation degenerated into 
slave raids, anarchy, and famine, it is estimated that the population of Sudan fell from 
around 7 million before the Mahdist revolt to somewhere between 2 and 3 million after the 
fall of the Mahdist state in 1895 (Deng 1995, 49-52). As in Saudi Arabia and West Africa in 
previous centuries, the experience of Sudan also showed that the same jihad that began 
as a rallying cry of a popular movement could be turned around by those in power -- at the 
expense of its supporters (Schulze 2000, 116-117). 
                                            
14 The first war of the Marabout began in 1677 in the same area that had given rise to the 11th century Al-Moravid 
movement. The difference was that whereas the Al-Moravids had moved north, ultimately to conquer Spain, the 
Marabout moved South. The second war of the Marabout culminated in the Muslim revolution in the plateau of Futa 
Jallon in 1690. The leaders of the revolution in Futa Jallon set up a federation divided into 9 provinces, with the head of 
each appointed a general in the jihad. When the last of revolutionaries leaders died in 1751, the leadership passed from 
the religious marabout to commanders in the army. The new military leaders began an aggressive policy, targeting 
neighbours and raiding for slaves, all under the guise of a jihad (see Boubacar 1998,46, 58, 94-95). 
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Traditionally, fiqh has divided the world in two main conflicting orbs: Dar-al-Islam (abode of 
Faith) and Dar-al-Harb (abode of War). Defensive and offensive jihad relate to these two 
concepts. It must be remembered that these are theological constructs, not primary sources 
(unlike the Qu’ran and the hadith), and as such, they are not ʻset in stoneʼ (Ramadan 1999, 
123). It happens too often that commentators seize on these two terms when addressing the 
subject of jihad, without emphasizing that they are not binding on all Muslims, and that 
they are essentially theological hypotheses and therefore can be altered. In this context, 
Tariq Ramadan emphasizes that Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Islam are two concepts that 
cannot be found either in the Qur’an or in the Sunna. As he aptly observes, it was the 
ulama who, during the first three centuries of Islam, started to classify, define and border 
the different spaces in and around them (Ramadan 2004, 56). The definition of Dar-al-Harb 
has become increasingly complicated. Traditionally, the concept of Dar-al-Harb is 
understood in the following terms: Dar is home and Harb is war. It is a term used to 
describe enemy territory or a country that is under the political authority of a non-Muslim 
government that is at war with Muslims (Tamimi 1993, 181). 
The Hanafi majority view has been that if ʻFriday and the religious holiday can be 
observed, the land is Dar-al-Islam’ (Lewis 1995, 191). Conversely, Dar-al-Harb is the land 
where Muslims are neither protected and safe, nor at peace.  
Paradoxically, by following this reasoning, it might be argued that the appellation Dar-al-
Islam is applicable to all Western countries, whilst this is not the case for a great majority of 
the Islamic countries where the population is overwhelmingly Muslim (Ramadan 1999, 
125). Taking this reflection a bit further, Rachid Gannouchi has suggested that the 
establishment of a ʻsecular democratic governmentʼ which will respect human rights, 
ensure security and freedom of expression and belief, is, in fact, ʻthe essential requirement 
of mankind that Islam has come to fulfillʼ (Ghannouci 1993, 60). 
Ramadan concludes that a discussion on the definition of Dar-al-Harb and Dar-al-Islam is 
mostly sterile and the terms are no longer relevant, given globalization and migration 
movement (Ramadan 1999,129). 
My contribution to this debate would be to say that, given the deterritorialization of Islam 
today, it might be useless to struggle for finding a borderline between the two entities.  
However, Omar Bakri, the leader of al-Muhagiroun, who lived in the UK until 2005, once 
stated that there is no Dar-al-Islam today, since the whole world is Dar-al-Harb because it 
is the sphere of non-sharia; there is Dar-al-Harb everywhere in terms of military 
aggression and occupation (Al-Bakri 2003). 
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My methodological approach for the present research has consisted of focusing on, and 
analyzing, the discourses, practices, sometimes the silences and the allusions, made by 
the political actors themselves (the Islamists), over an hermeneutics of the theological 
corpus. In other words, in the light of Bakriʼs statement above, we are again at square one, 
and forced to see and to consider how, where, when the borders of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-
al-Harb have shifted or are claimed to be shifting. My second  argument against a quick 
dismissal of this division between the two abodes, is that in the so-called era of 
globalization, borders are more often ʻvocalʼ than ʻmaterialʼ and ʻvisualʼ, ʻmentalʼ more than 
ʻgeographicalʼ. If this hypothesis can be accepted for a discussion about the plausible end 
of the nation-state and the opening up of the traditional geographical frontiers, it cannot be 
rejected when voiced by Islamists for an analysis on Islamism. Ultimately, this also implies 
that, to deny the existence and the consistency of these terms and concepts does not help 
in understanding the reasons why a group of people feel the necessity of marking those 
borders and ʻpoliticallyʼ acting to secure them. By doing so, they define a political entity 
and -- as political actors -- they hail a political project, within an Islamist discourse:  
acknowledging this is the first object of my analysis, before assessing the practical 
applicability and political implications of the foregoing. 
 
 
The call for a jihad through ‘modern’ history 
 
Historically speaking, the call for a jihad, which has been considered by the Egyptian 
Farag as the absent obligation (the sixth pillar), can be traced to two key thinkers at the 
beginning of the Cold War: the Pakistani journalist Abu-Ala-Mawdudi, whose work began 
being published in Egypt in 1951, and Sayyd Qutb. 
Mawdudi appeared at a moment when the ulama organized as the Jamʼiyat-i-Ulama-i-Hind 
(Society of the Ulama of India) were supporting a multi-religious, decentralized yet united 
India against the demands for the creation of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the poet Muhammad 
Iqbal, considered as the spiritual founder of Pakistan, had envisioned Islamic identity not in 
terms of a nation-state, but as a borderless cultural community, the ummah. To an extent, it 
was ironic that though the formation of Pakistan gave its Muslim inhabitants self-
determination, this was as residents of a common territory and not as an ummah. Instead of 
being a profound critique of territorial nationalism and nation-state that Muhammad Iqbal 
had intended Pakistan to be, it was a territorial nation. Mawdudi seized upon this specific 
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contradiction, by appealing to the so-called ʻpost-colonial Islamist intellectualsʼ. Mawdudi 
claimed that the Islamic state could not just be a territorial state of Muslims; it had to be an 
ideological state, an Islamic state. To realize that end, he established Jammat-Al-Islami in 
Karachi in 1941, had himself confirmed as its Emir, and talked of an ʻIslamic revolutionʼ, 
perhaps being the first man to do so.15 A key feature of Mawdudiʼs thought was centralized 
power and jihad was the ultimate struggle for the seizure of the state power; as Kalim 
Siddiqui reads Mawdudi, this was a way ʻto take Pakistani nationalist sentiments on board, 
his (Mawdudiʼs) political thought and the Islamist party he foundedʼ (Siddiqui 1996, 85). In 
Mawdudiʼs view, the ultimate objective of Islam was ʻto abolish the lordship of man over 
man and to bring him under the rule of one Godʼ, and jihad was its ʻrelentless pursuitʼ 
(Mawdudi 1985, 285-88). 
Far from advocating a spiritual power, he re-defined the meaning of Din in a purely secular 
way, by stressing that it was ʻuseless to think that you can change things by preaching 
alone… Din actually means the same thing as state and governmentʼ (Mawdudi 1986, 
296-97). It might be observed that he ʻsecularisedʼ Islam,16 by equating it not with other 
religions but with political ideologies that seek the conquest of the state, such as popular 
sovereignty or monarchy or, above all, Communism. Mawdudi clearly affirmed that ʻa total 
Din, whatever its nature, wants power for itself. A Din without power to govern is like a 
building, which exists in the mind onlyʼ. He was also the first to claim that armed struggle 
was central to jihad and the first to call for a universal jihad. Those features made him the 
ʻpioneer of Islamic political thought in the subcontinentʼ, making the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
ʻrelevant againʼ (Siddiqui 1996, 56). 
Mawdudiʼs decisive influence on Sayyd Qutb regarding the necessity of jihad as an armed 
struggle is widely recognized; nevertheless, there are some differences between the two, 
which are in need of being acknowledged. Even if Qutb advocates the absolute 
sovereignty of God, he does it in a totally different way from Mawdudi (Algar 2000, 15). 
Unlike Mawdudiʼs preoccupation with the state as true agent of change in history, Qutbʼs 
thought is far more society-centered. Reinhard Schultze has noted that the deputy of 
divine sovereignty for Qutb is man ʻas an individual and not the stateʼ as Mawdudi saw it 
(Schultze 2000, 176). Qutbʼs search for an Islamic road to modernity placed him alongside 
Al-Afghani and Al-Banna as his predecessors; he elaborated Mawdudiʼs thought and took 
                                            
15 Kalim Siddiqui, in his Stages of Islamic revolution celebrates Mawdudi as the founding father of the new ‘Islamic era 
of political renaissance’. (Siddiqui 1996, p 58-60). 
16 He therefore discoursed an Islamist discourse. 
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it to a more radical conclusion. He made a distinction between modernity and 
westernization, calling for an embrace of modernity but a rejection of westernization, thus 
having a profound influence on the Islamic revolution and on Khomeiniʼs political project 
(Sayyid 1998, 112-119). Qutbʼs reformulation of jihad resonated with contemporary 
Marxism-Leninist, both Maoist and Leninist. Echoing the Maoist distinction between the 
ways of handling contradictions among the people and the enemies, Qutb argued that 
jihad involves both persuasion and coercion, the former appropriate among friends but the 
latter suited to enemies. In Qutbʼs compelling reasoning, only physical force will remove 
the political, social and economic obstacles to the establishment of a true Islamic 
community. Islam had not only the right, but also the obligation, to exercise force to end 
slavery and realize human freedom (Qutb 1990, 92-94). 
Here it is hard to not notice, a resemblance to the dialectics of Marxism-Leninism. Qutb 
argued that jihad is a process beginning with the organization of a vanguard, followed by a 
withdrawal that would make possible both study and organization, and then return to a 
struggle. Again in his Milestone, Qutb echoed a key dictum of Leninism: ʻHow to initiate the 
revival of Islam? A vanguard must set out with this determination and then keep going, 
marching through the wide vast ocean of jahilia which encompasses the entire world…I 
have written the Milestone for this vanguard, which I consider to be a reality waiting to be 
materialisedʼ (Qutb 1990, 5-6). It is worth considering that it was Lenin who, in 1905, spoke 
of the difference between a just and an unjust war and of revolution as the only ʻjust warʼ; 
Kalim Siddiqui later in 1996 will say, ʻthe Islamic revolution is the only just warʼ (Siddiqui 
1996, 3). 
In the history of the ʻSociety of the Muslim Brotherhoodʼ (Ikwan-al-Muslimina), Sayyid Qutb 
is identified with the ascendancy of radical Islamism, in contrast to Hassan-al-Bannaʼs 
moderation. The difference between moderate and radical Islamism -- although I do not 
fully agree with those two categories as being epistemologically exhaustive and consider 
them to be highly problematic -- could be put in the following way: whereas moderates 
fought for social reforms within the system, the radicals were convinced that no meaningful 
social reforms would be possible without taking over the state. This consideration has also 
led some authors ,such as Oliver Roy, for example, to distinguish between Political Islam 
(the first form) and Islamism (the latter expression). As previously discussed, I consider 
Islamism as a political project and my understanding of the ʻpoliticalʼ is not limited to 
projects which aim directly at seizing the state power through a singular founding act 
called revolution. My argument is based on a notion of the political as the moment of the 
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institution of the social (Laclau 1990, 31). It may involve the capture of the state apparatus 
by a vanguard, but it may also include a different strategy of ʻintellectualʼ reforms of civil 
society as a possible precursor to acquiring state power. This also implies that, within such 
a broad understanding and definition of Islamism as a political project, there is room for 
very different Islamist strategies, or for Islamization according to such an open-end 
category. 
In the case of Qutb, it might be argued that, perhaps, fifteen years of forced labor in 
Nasserʼs camp convinced him that religious and ʻsecularʼ intellectuals could not live at 
peace in the same society. It might also be sustained that Qutbʼs renunciation of reforms 
through coexistence was ʻinspiredʼ by other contemporary schools of political thought, 
such as Marxism and Leninism. 
This takes me to another relevant consideration, which might sound platitudinous, but it is 
what the dominant culturalist-orientalist approach refuses to acknowledge, and therefore, 
as a concept, it needs to be stressed. Islamist intellectuals whether ʻsecularly inspiredʼ or 
ʻreligiously educatedʼwere, like other intellectuals, mostly preoccupied with the issues of 
political power and political identity. There is little doubt that Islamist intellectuals 
discoursed and developed Islamism through encounters not only with the ulama, but also 
with other intellectuals who ignored the Islamic tradition and drew on sources such as 
Marxism or Western liberalism. Through this double encounter, they developed Islamism 
in multiple directions: the different interpretations and potential uses of jihad as a ʻpolitical 
toolʼ to achieve an Islamic state are further proofs of this statement. Above all, if we just 
look at the different directions and conclusions reached by the two Islamist intellectuals 
Qutb and Mawdudi -- who have been written about here -- it is easy to understand how the 
common ʻIslamicʼ matrix (intended as the teleological corpus and sources) can offer a very 
little insight into their thoughts and political projects.  
According to Mahmood Mamdani, the single conviction that unites radical Islamist 
intellectuals is the preoccupation with taking power. They are convinced that the historical 
moment defined by the collapse of Communism is the moment that ʻMuslims must seize to 
advance Islam as a universal ideology of emancipationʼ (Mamdani 2004, 59). If this holds 
true, it is very difficult to establish a priori which understandings of jihad have to be 
rejected and which ones accepted; to do so would mean there exists a syllabus of 
unchanged and unchangeable political practices originating from a theological corpus, and 
this is something that my thesis considers to be a fruitless, foundationalist method of 
analysis, mostly deriving from a dead-end culturalist-orientalist approach. 
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In this context, it is very interesting to report what Sheik-Yusuf-Al-Qaradawi, a leading 
figure in the Ikwan, has stated in relation to the different uses of jihad in different contexts; 
he vigorously distinguished 9-11 from HAMAS actions, saying that in the case of 9-11, the 
objectives and the means employed (using civilian aircraft full of non-combatants against 
people not occupying homes taken from Muslims and attacking buildings full of innocent 
people) were totally illegitimate. 
Azzam Tamimi expressed this point, very strongly by explaining that the Palestinians are 
simply ʻresisting an occupation of their homes, by invaders who came from Eastern 
Europe, America, South Africa and many other placesʼ (Islamic Institute of Political 
thought, 1993). 
There seems to be widespread theological support from ulema for the view that shahid 
(martyr) operations against the Zionist enemy are wholly legitimate, while the attack on the 
World Trade center was not. Dr. Ramadan-Al-Bouti of Damascus University draws a clear 
distinction between the actions of Al-Qaeda and those of the Palestinian resistance. In his 
view, if people in the Twin Towers had unjustly occupied them, without permission of their 
owners, then ʻhumanness justifies that the owners of the buildings take action and avenge 
this wrongdoingʼ. This example is a way to justify, by analogy, the Palestinian resistance, 
and to de-legitimize the 9-11 attacks. (Dr Al-Bouti stresses that if the Twin Towers had 
been owned by certain individuals and were forcibly taken from them by thousands of 
other men and women who inhabited them, it might be said that those people are 
occupying buildings that do not belong to them, something which is blatant injustice. But, 
this was clearly not the case in the 9-11 situation since ʻthose people dwelled in those 
buildings rightfullyʼ) (Al-Bouti, M. Saʼid Ramadan 2001, p.16). 
A similar position regarding the Palestinian resistance is held by the Leader of Al-
Muhagirooun, Omar-Al-Bakri, who nevertheless, has several times shown support for the 
ʻMagnificent 19ʼ, seeing them as martyrs to avenge the sufferings of the Muslims around 
the world. To the objection that among the victims of 9-11 were hundreds of Muslims, his 
reaction was to quote the words pronounced by Bin Laden, who claimed that the ʻIslamic 
Shariat says Muslims should not live in the land of the infidel for longʼ (Jihadunspun, 2001). 
Drawing some conclusions, let me state that the present section was aimed at showing 
how a discussion of jihad should, first and foremost consider that the term ʻjihadʼ is, in 
itself, broad and contested enough, so that it can include different (or even any) actions to 
allegedly advance Islamism as a political project. As claimed above, my analysis has 
found it fruitless to refer strictly to the Islamic sources in order to categorize or judge the 
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variable uses of jihad made by the different Islamist leaders and activists. Such platitudes 
would suggest that it is a political discourse which functions through a ʻreligiousʼ 
vocabulary, being very weakly connected with religious tendencies, whether extremist, 
radical, moderate, conservative or even secular, if those categories make any sense. By 
trying to find an ʻIslamicʼ explanation of jihad while referring to Islam as a theological 
corpus, would mean downplaying the political, precisely that my dissertation suggests, is 
fundamental to understanding Islamism, to even its extreme manifestation as political 
terrorism. 
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that, just because an Islamist would endorse jihad as 
physical force and violence in one sphere and by one group, he will support such an 
operation in another arena and by a different organization. The point is that such action will 
always be born of a political encounter, and within a relationship of power: the practice of 
ʻmaking senseʼ of this action (its discursive practice) will always be political as well. In 
other words, jihad is what the Islamists say jihad is: a discursive practice of producing 
meanings, which actuallyis producing, use, re-using, subverting and displacing them. 
 
 
Islam and Democracy: the concept of Democracy in Islam. 
 
An analysis of the discourses and practices of the Islamist parties operating in the West, 
that examines the ʻplausibilityʼ17 of their agendas within a ʻWesternʼ political system, 
inevitably ends up discussing the topic of the compatibility between Islam and Democracy. 
My argument is that the way the debate is set up and the topic is framed, itself leads to the 
creation of the problem, and towards the thesis of the incompatibility between the two (viz. 
Islam and democracy), on the basis of their  supposed ʻontologicalʼ differences. 
Besides, nowadays such debate has become so frequent among the media, academics 
and policy-makers (as much as it has become shallow), that I find it important to explore its 
structure and reasoning, in order to demonstrate the lack of depth of the arguments and 
criticize, once again, the culturalist-orientalist approach, that informs it. 
The clash of civilizations discourse certainly echoes a modern version of the ʻculturalist-
orientalist approachʼ. The celebrated phrase, ʻa clash of civilizationʼs is taken from the title 
of the closing section of Bernard Lewisʼs 1990 article ʻThe Roots of Muslim Rageʼ. Lewisʼs 
                                            
17 I emphasize the word ‘ plausibility’ because I clearly disagree with this approach, which I find, at the very least, anti-
democratic. 
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text provided the inspiration for a second and much more exuberant and aggressive 
version of the same, which was written by Samuel Huntington, a political scientist at 
Harvard, (and variously involved with the US policy establishment since the era of the 
Vietnam War). It might be stated that whereas Lewis confined his thesis to the historical 
relations between the two civilizations he called ʻIslamicʼ and ʻJudaeo-Christianʼ, 
Huntingtonʼs reach was far wider and more ambitious, to the extent of covering the entire 
world. To summarize, Huntingtonʼs argument was built around two ideas: first, that since 
the end of the Cold War ʻthe iron curtainʼ of ideology had been replaced by a velvet curtain 
of culture, and second, that the velvet curtain had been drawn across ʻthe bloody borders 
of Islamʼ (Huntington 1993, 22). However, Huntington was not alone. Regis Debray, for 
instance, saw the new era as sharply defined by a ʻGreen Perilʼ -- the color green clearly 
standing for Islam -- that was far more dangerous than the ʻred scares of yesterday 
because it lacks rational self-restraintʼ (Debray 1990, 44-45). 
My opinion is that it is Bernard Lewis, who has provided the more durable version of this 
approach (Sen 2001, 46). He writes of the Islamic civilization, ʻof the religious culture of 
Islamʼ, as if it were an unchanging doctrine in which Muslims are said to take refuge in 
times of crises (Lewis 1990, 5). 
Lewis elaborated his notion of the doctrinal core of Islam in a book that ʻwas already in 
page proofsʼ by the time 9-11 occured, but was published soon after; it was provocatively 
titled What went wrong? Paraphrasing Hegelʼs old claim that freedom is the distinctive 
attribute of Western civilization (Gilroy 2003, 15), Lewis wrote: ʻTo a Western observer, 
schooled in the practice and theory of Western freedom, it is precisely the lack of freedom, 
that underlies so many of the troubles of the Muslim worldʼ. To this, he added the absence 
of secularism as the second explanation for the yawning gap between contemporary Islam 
and modernity (Lewis 2002, 103, 158-159). 
One of the main consequences of this approach is that ʻreligionʼ swallows up and denies 
the political discourse of Islamism (Sen 2001, 78) . Had this discourse not developed so 
powerfully, it would not be easy to understand a statement such as: ʻDemocracy lags in 
the Muslim worldʼ(Freedom House study of political systems in the non-Western world 
concludes with this). As if inspired by Bernard Lewisʼs thought, Stephen Schwartz, director 
of the Islam and Democracy Project, claims that the roots of terrorism really lie in a 
sectarian branch of Islam, the Wahabis. 
The same sort of approach permeates problematic affirmations such as ʻIslam clashes 
with the basic features of democracy because Islam itself is a special type of religion that 
 95 
presents itself as a totality or complete way of life, not separable into the components to 
which we are accustomed in modern Western thoughts…Religion by definition has a 
dogmatic core and it is therefore on tense terms with Democracy, which encourages 
ceaseless debates and self-questioning. Democracy promotes secularismʼ (Tamimi 1993, 
27-29). 
There is little doubt that such a reading of Islam is slightly parochial, a-historical (or de-
historicized), that is to say, very culturalist and orientalist. In other words, although it 
advocates that the discrepancy between Democracy (which is paradoxically turned into a 
theological corpus) and Islam consists of the fact that the first ʻfears and resists the 
absolutism of the Pure, the Grand Ideologyʼ (ibid., 30), it is itself a very diasgnostic 
analysis. Furthermore, the observation that Islam is a ʻspecialʼ religion, smacks a bit of 
ʻessentialismʼ. Paraphrasing the late Edward Said, this ʻspecialʼ vision of Islam is like a 
stable and undisturbed thing, like a room full of furniture in the back of your house (Said 
2000, 581). 
I have already argued (in the second chapter of this dissertation) that the focus of my 
analysis is not religion, but religiosity. I have also endorsed my choice by demonstrating 
that the examination of a theological corpus is somewhat unproductive for understanding 
the discourses and practices of its believers: in my specific case, to comprehend those 
among them, who, speak through the vocabulary of religion to discourse their political 
projects and future (Asad 1993, 67; Mamdani 2004,12; Roy 2004, 46). If the difference 
between Islam and Democracy is asserted by the fact that the latter promotes a ceaseless 
debate, while the first is highly dogmatic,Then, what about the innumerous interpretations 
of the Qur’an, the endless debates about the meaning and the values of the hadiths, and 
the existence of the multiple arguments and debates regarding the fiqh? The same could 
be said of the possible interpretations and practice of jihad, the function of Sharia inside 
the state, and the possible configurations of an Islamic state. Thus, an argument that 
advances the incompatibility between Islam and Democracy might suffer from several 
stereotypes, dogmatic assertions, and culturalist- orientalist echoes (Varisco 2005, 90). 
Therefore, in order to engage in a less ʻessentializedʼ analysis of the concept of 
Democracy in Islam, I would begin by quoting Abu-Ala-Mawdudi, who claims that ʻthe 
Islamic government is a divine democratic government because the Muslims have been 
given a limited popular sovereignty under the sovereignty of Godʼ, or alternatively, ʻa 
theocratic democratic state run by popular vice-regencyʼ (Al–Hakim 1993, 79). 
I would then reiterate here, the view expressed by Mamdani, who claims that the 
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difference among the different tendencies of Islamism resides in the different status of 
sharia and then democracy in the state (Mamdani 2004, 46). Put another way, we are 
compelled to analyze the concept of Democracy in Islam (rather than Democracy and 
Islam as two incompitable topics), in a more detailed and specific way, by setting it within a 
proper context. 
As Muhammad Al-Awa aptly observes, neither in the Qur’an nor in the Sunnah does Islam 
prescribe a specific system of government. Nevertheless, it clearly defines the values and 
the guidelines the ummah should adhere to and that the rulers should abide by. In addition 
to other nomenclatures - he continues- these values may be referred to as ʻgeneral rulesʼ 
or ʻcomprehensive issuesʼ (Al- Awa 1993, 70). 
The basis for Islamic governance and legislation is the Qur’an and the Sunna elaborated 
by the fiqh. To a certain extent, it might be said that the Qur’an and the Sunna act as the 
political constitution of Islam. The Qurʼan and the Sunnah are held by Muslims to have 
been revealed by God, therefore there is no space for alteration. The only possibility lies in 
re-interpretation, ijtihad, which is not divinely inspired. 
The upshot of this is a belief that political sovereignty in a state is prerogative of God,  and 
not of the Human, and herein lies the debate and conflict within Islamism and indeed 
between the Islamists. A modern Islamist sustains that, if in the Islamic state, sovereignty 
is invested in the Almighty God, the authority to run the affairs of the State is delegated to 
the people. According to his reasoning, Islamic government takes the form of a republic. 
The term ʻIslamicʼ confers the ideological basis for the state (Al-Akim 1993, 78). 
Essentially, the belief is that the state should be governed by Godʼs revelation in the 
Qur’an and the hadith, and this would reject the idea that the Human is an autonomous 
being who may initiate laws. However, there we surely enter the area of ʻsemanticsʼ and 
signifying practices, since inevitably the ʻallegedʼ Islamic state18 and Islamic government 
have to, and surely do, initiate laws, although this is usually presented as an ʻextendedʼ 
interpretation of ʻdivineʼ legislation. The human is (theoretically) merely entrusted with the 
ʻadministration’ of divinely instituted legislation. In this sense, he is the ʻrepresentativeʼ of 
God on earth. Mawdudi elaborated very precisely and compellingly the concept and the 
meaning of Caliphate. He suggested that Khilafa means representation. The Human, 
according to Islam is his vice-regent and the authority of the Khilafa is bestowed on the 
                                            
18Here I use the adjective ‘alleged’ for two sets of reasons. Firstly, I am reporting the Islamists’ opinion, that there is no 
current state in the world which can be called Islamic. Thus, there is the need for a political change (see chapter 4 and 5 
for more details). Secondly, I myself agree with them and find it difficult to name a proper example of an Islamic state 
(which countries like Iran or Saudi Arabia cannot exhaustively represent).  
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whole of any community that is ready to fulfill the conditions of representation (Mawdudi 
1980, 9-10). Siddiqui argued that ʻThe Islamic state was the movement and the person of 
Khilafa was the centre of allegianceʼ (Siddiqui 1983, 185). 
However, sovereignty is presented as Godʼs unique prerogative and to propose human 
sovereignty is to usurp a divine attribute. Mawdudi states explicitly -- by quoting the Sura 
An-Nisa (4:48) -- that ʻanyone who claims the authority or power independent of or in 
rebellion against God, commits shirkʼ (Mawdudi 1984, 86). 
Looking closely at the British context, groups as the MCB have been heavily influenced by 
figures such as Qutb and Mawdudi, while the MAB was directly influenced by Al-Banna 
and Qutb. However, they have all ʻrevisedʼ and  ʻcontextualizedʼ the teachings and the 
conceptualization of democracy, according to political and discursive practice. Therefore, it 
is important and valuable for understanding the subject, to closely investigate these 
thinkers in their historical context, before having them wear the ideological cloak of the 
anti-democrat  
The Ikwan-Al-Muslimiina (the Muslim Brotherhood) was founded in Ismaylia, Egypt in 1927 
by Assan-Al-Banna, a teacher. At the time, Ismaylia was dominated by the British Suez 
Canal Company and -- as Al Banna pictured it -- the Europeans (with their corrupting traits, 
which included ʻsemi-naked women, imported liquors and vicesʼ) worked assiduously (Al 
Banna 1996, 22). While Al Banna was badly affected by the Westernization of Ismaylia, 
his successor Sayid Qutb had a much more direct encounter when he spent two years in 
the USA from 1948 onwards. His anti-Western hostility -- if phrasing his aversion in those 
terms makes any sense -- was mainly based on the racism he encountered in America; he  
had quite dark skin. He was also extremely angered by the support for Zionism and the 
American delight at the execution of Al Banna (Esposito 1983, 69). 
Qutb was a noted and knowledgeable Qurʼanic exegete. As mentioned earlier, Qutb took 
some of Mawdudiʼs thoughts to a more radical conclusion and also supplied a radical new 
addition to Al Bannaʼs teachings. The core of his argument was that Islam is a totally new 
revolutionary movement, which has come to inherit the earth in order to remove all the 
false ideologies, false beliefs and false social systems, and it must do so using all the 
means at its disposal, including war. So, jihad is ʻa movement to wipe out tyranny and to 
introduce true freedom to mankindʼ. In this context, Islam is intended as a means to 
liberate human beings from enslavement by other human beings and, apart from this, it 
must undermine all other systems- such as Materialism, Communism, Hinduism, 
Christianity. Indeed, as Qutb put it, Islam does not force people to accept its beliefs, but it 
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wants to provide a free environment in which they will have the choice to believeʼ (Qutb 
1990, 91-94). As mentioned above, there is more than a just a passing resemblance to the 
dialectics of Marxism and Leninism; it might also be argued that Qutbʼs own life experience 
and historical and geographical settings and contingencies had a relevant influence on his 
thought. This is a further consideration which bolsters my argument that Islamism is the 
product of a complex, dynamic, fluid discourse of an intellectual and political encounter at 
a specific historical conjunction. Islamism cannot be analyzed as an appendix to the 
theological corpus of Islam, unless the analysis aims to endorse the essentialist and a-
priori positions and, in so doing de-politicizes of the Islamist actors. 
This is the reason why, for instance, British Islamist groups such as the MPGB claimed 
that, although theywish for and support the institution of an Islamic state, they consider it 
an impossible option in Great Britain, where they live and operate as an Islamist party 
(Muslim Parliament of Great Britain 1992, 7). Similarly, the Islamic society of Britain does 
not list among its objectives, the establishment of an Islamic state in Britain. The 
Mawdudist Young Muslims UK states, under the heading of ʻtadarrujʼ (gradualness): ʻthe 
Sunnah necessitates hard work and struggle before power is givenʼ. The YMUK defines 
itself as being ʻhere to create and maintain in Britain a society where the people rule by 
Islamʼ (YMUK, www.idiscover.co.uk). In this, they echo Mawdudi, when he stresses that 
the difference between a Western Democracy and an Islamic Democracy lies in the fact 
that ʻthe latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, while the former is based on 
the concept of popular Khilafa’ (Mawdudi 1980, 10). 
As highlighted earlier, the concept of Khilafa stands for representation; in other words, 
human vice-regency. As the Muslim Brotherhood specifies, ʻthe ruler is a mere guardian, and 
the Ummah cannot delegate anyone it chooses to rule for it, except in matters that the 
Sharia has permittedʼ (Muslim Brotherhood 1994, 24). 
By those wanting to draw comparisons, the nature of the caliphate has been described as 
ʻPresidentialʼ; to some degrees it follows the American model, rather than the British 
system of parliamentary rule where the Premier is simply the leader of the largest group of 
MPs and the Crown in Parliament is effectively sovereign. The caliphate system makes the 
Amir the de facto sovereign in terms of veto (Mawdudi 1980, 10). An example of this was 
the fact that Khomeini could freely direct the course of the state without any reference to 
his Majlis. However, practices and interpretations directly imply one another, so that there 
is no practice without the correlative constitution of a field of interpretation, nor any 
interpretation that does not presuppose and constitute a practice; the same holds for 
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intervention (or the interference) and the role of the political practice and discourse in place 
and time. 
Al-Akim, for instance, argues that the understanding of Shura in the West has mostly been 
misled, and it is also misleading. The meaning of ʻshuraʼ has been conceived as 
ʻconsultationʼ whereas it is a legislative process whereby the executive authority is obliged 
to accept the decisions of the legislative authority. In his view, shura is an integral and 
constitutive process in the function of the Islamic state since it is the only collective legal 
way through which the ummah could enact and legislate laws or decisions related to the 
pursuance of its ʻnational interestsʼ. It constitutes the backbone of the Islamist system. It is 
interesting to note the following. First, that the author speaks of ʻnational interestsʼ, which a 
depoliticized culturalist-orientalist representation of Islamism would consider as a blatant 
contradiction, since the Ummah should not be confined by any national borders or have 
any national (read political) interests. Second, that on this basis, the Caliph would be 
subject to the Majlis, which is more in conformity with the British parliamentary system. As 
Al-Alkim describes it, ʻthe Islamic government is a mixture of presidential and 
parliamentary systemsʼ; he also notes that another distinguishing feature of the Islamic 
system is ʻpluralismʼ, and the only condition for non-Islamic parties is to adhere to the state 
constitution (Al Akim 1993, 78-81). 
The concept of pluralism -- as Tamimi aptly puts it -- is not an innovation among Islamists. 
Tahtawi, for instance, who is considered to be the father of ʻmodern Islamist thinkingʼ, 
compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that have 
existed in the Islamic experience. Muhammad Abduh, who was a proponent of 
parliamentary democracy, defended pluralism and opposed the view that it would 
undermine the unity of the Ummah (Tamimi1997, 3). 
The brief but significant historical overview presented by Tamimi would support the 
argument that ʻforward lookingʼ Islamist thinkers have very often looked within the Islamic 
tradition for sources of innovation, renewal and change, by coming to terms  with, and 
making sense of, a ʻtraditionʼ (ibid., 16). They looked at doctrine and history, not just for 
continuity, but also for reforms. This consideration would also help Tamimi and 
Ghannouciʼs argument that the rejection of Democracy by some Islamists is based on a 
ʻfaultyʼ understanding of the nature and the purpose of divine law and divine government. 
As Ghannouci underlines, Hukm-u-ullah is a revolution in the sense that it limits a 
governorʼs powers. Hukm-u-ullah does not mean that ʻGod comes down and governs 
humansʼ, but means the ʻsovereignty of lawʼ -- which Ghannouci notes -- ʻis a fundamental 
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feature of the modern state, the state of law and orderʼ (Ghannouci 1993, 53-54). 
When it comes to the qualifications for a Caliph and or a member of the Majlis, Islamists 
will look at Sharia, as well. As Mawdudi elaborated on this, the usual refrain for the Amir is 
that he must be ʻsane, male and a Muslimʼ. And Mawdudi seems to imply much the same 
for the members of the Majlis; the exclusion of women and religious minorities from ruling 
the ʻIslamic Emirates of Afghanistanʼ was a feature of the Taliban governance. However, 
this specific procedure cannot be taken as being synonymous with ʻIslamist practice of 
governanceʼ.19 It might also be noted that under the Ottomans, the various confessions 
were organized in semi-autonomous millats and not necessarily on a geographic basis. 
Furthermore, there are sufficient historical traditions of Jewish or Christian Grand Viziers 
for creative ijtihad to resolve this issue. In the past as well, as McRoy notices, Egypt and 
Syria have had Christian Prime Ministers, and Jews have held ministerial posts in the Iraqi 
and Moroccan governments (McRoy 2006, 115-116). One objection to this consideration -- 
one that my interviewees would raise -- is that these above-mentioned historical 
experiences have nothing to do with an Islamic state and they ʻcannot be considered as 
examples of a Khilafahʼ (interview with Taji Mustafa). Without taking sides with any of the 
political actors featured in this research, I would contribute to the debate by simply quoting 
a very interesting statement once pronounced by Makrqam Ubeid, the Egyptian Christian 
leader of the Wafd Party: ʻMy homeland is Islam, my religion is Christianityʼ (Burgat 2005, 
35). It is quite challenging to attempt an explanation of such a claim, where the two 
religions, Islam and Christianity, co-exist according to different practices of religiosity, 
inhabited by the same subject, acting as a believer and as a political actor. Islam is 
advocated as a territorial and cultural entity, a cluster of traditions, habits, political and 
historical paradigms; it is certainly geographical and imaginative. On the other hand, 
Christianity is claimed as a corpus of religious beliefs, which is inevitably intertwined with 
the Islamic homeland and with the feelings of belonging to such an entity.  
This last example is just a way of suggesting that an ʻallegedʼ religion can function and be 
discoursed according to a complex variety of discourses, practices and discoursive 
practices of meaning. It can ʻinhabitʼ and embody different practices, depending on the 
practitioners: the human agents. In other words, it is very difficult to determine the ʻlegal 
                                            
19 As Tamimi points out, in the Sudanese and Iranian cases, there were seats reserved for the Christian, Jewish, and 
Zoroastrian minorities. However, what emerges clearly, is the impossibility that a woman or a non-Muslim could be the 
ruler of the Khalifa and this seems to be a majority opinion. Tamimi also adds that there are moves such as a modern 
‘Sudanese ijtihad, which grants Christian Majority provinces in Sudan the right to opt for a legal system other than 
Sharia in order to organize their affairs’ (Tamimi, www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/humanrights.htm). 
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boundariesʼ, and thus the practical examples of an Islamic state. This becomes more 
complicated when it is overlooked that even as the ʻpoliticalʼ discourse (Islamism) interacts, 
ʻdialoguesʼ and comes to terms with other political discourses, practices and practitioners of 
meanings: the agency still resides with the human (and not with the Divine), within several, 
different relations of power. In this way, the outcome of the process (the establishment of 
an Islamic state) can never be determined a priori , as a toy provided with its instructions, 
or a colonial government or state imposed from above (Rodinson 1979, 132). This 
consideration also leads me to stress the fact that the disputes and debates on the 
incompatibility between ʻIslamʼ and ʻDemocracyʼ are often very ideological, and mostly 
informed by a culturalist-orientalist framework of analysis (Marranci 2006, 80) which this 
dissertation considers to be politically disenabling and flawed. 
Having said that, the authorʼs intention is not to endorse a shallow dismissal of the whole 
debate, but just to warn against the use of too many categories, sweeping statements, and 
stereotypes that stress an inherent anti-democratic nature of Islam. 
As Ghannouci brilliantly puts it, an Islamic state can never mean that ʻGod comes down to 
ruleʼ. The decisions and deliberations are still, and they definitely have to be, ʻman- madeʼ 
and -- from my humble point of view -- man-inspired; this implies the need for a detailed 
and historical analysis of both parts, supporters and detractors of the ʻIslamic stateʼ 
(Ghannouci 1993, 45). 
On the other hand, divisions and ʻinternal jihad strugglesʼ go back to the early days of 
Islam (Tamimi 1993, 89-90). The death of Muhammad produced a major political and 
ʻconstitutionalʼ struggle that is still present (this being the Sunni-Shiʼia divide).20 As 
                                            
20 When Abu Bakr became Caliph by popular acclamation, the ʻpolitical toolʼ and mechanism used was the 
ʻpublic electionʼ (Mawdudi 1982, 19). Conversely, according to the Shiʼia position, the prophetʼs succession 
should have gone to his son-in-law Ali (who eventually become the fourth Caliph). This also implies that his 
descendants have the unique right to lead the Ummah. Thus, there is a major point of divergence with the 
Sunnis in relation to the question of legitimate government. The Shiʼia rejected the first three Caliphs 
specifically because they questioned the Caliphsʼ legitimacy as rulers, rather than on account of any major 
ʻtheologicalʼ difference. With the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, a major constitutional crisis emerged in 
Shiʼism. From ʻlate Safavid (17th to 18th century) some mujtahids claimed that they had more right to rule than 
did the impious, wine bibbling Shasʼ (Keddie 1981, 19). This had to come to an end – arguably -- when 
following the Iranian revolution, Khomeini established the Vilayet-i-Faqih, the ʻGuardianship of the Juristʼ. The 
theory is that the ulema ruled, according to fiqh, as a ʻtrustʼ until the return of the Twelfth Imam. Their Islamic 
Knowledge and Taqwa permits this. 
The negative implication of both Sunni and Shia theories of government – as Tamimi highlights -- is that these rulers 
not fulfilling those qualities – such as Ataturk-type secularists or Saudi-like western puppets -- are disqualified. 
However, the relevant point to consider here is that the historical practice of the Islamic movements, which wanted to 
‘reinstate the Islamic way of life’, is that they formed and defined their political in resistance against  the 
‘westernization campaigns aimed at undermining Islamic cultures and values’. (Ghannouci 1993, 79). Once again, apart 
from ‘doctrinal’ and ‘theological’ explanations, there are historical, political events (read the experience of colonialism) 
and power relations that need to be taken into account in order to understand the Islamists’ thought, (in conjunction with 
the preoccupation of taking the political power and the state, for some of them). 
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Ghannouci explains, the constitutional arrangement that Islamists would endorse,  mirrors 
and includes the views of both Shiʼite Islamists and Sunnis. In this respect, Ghannouci 
himself advocates the concept of power-sharing with non-Islamists where a Khalifa is not 
possible for some reason. He also stresses the fact that any power-sharing be is seen as 
a transitional step to a full Islamic state (Ghannouci 1993, 57). 
The considerations and perspectives voiced by the different Islamist thinkers featured here 
have shown that there is no any ʻontologicalʼ incompatibility between ʻIslamʼ and 
ʻDemocracyʼ. As strongly stated by some of them, democracy is intended as a means to 
achieve an end; the most appropriate mechanism through which the Sharia can be 
applied. 
When the detractors of the so-called Islamic state (within the Democracy and Islam 
debate), quote examples of ʻIslamic tyrannical governmentʼ (Roy 2004, 35) in order to 
dismiss the possibility that there could be something like an Islamic democratic state, they 
are forgetful of the fact that ʻthose extreme forms of oppressions and worst types of 
tyranny in historyʼ, were the result of the ʻinterpretationʼ of religion so as to satisfy and 
meet these specific political needs or ambitions of the ʻoppressorsʼ (Al Awa 1992, 66). In 
this case, the allegedly ʻreligiousʼ motivations behind such tyrannical oppressions are just 
ʻfictionsʼ created in order to justify the reasoning about the incompatibility between Islam 
and Democracy. 
Here, it would also be very useful to consider that the excess of the state, which is latent in 
the place the state occupies in the West, is totalitarianism. It is not surprising that the 
contemporary Western thought on the birth of the state should also be a reflection on, and 
against, totalitarianism. Nonetheless, this specific aspect never led anyone to claim that in 
the ʻWesternʼ concept of the state, there are some features which are ʻontologicallyʼ un-
democratic. 
As one Islamist thinker brilliantly pointed out, ʻrealism and flexibilityʼ are among the most 
important features of Islamic ideology and, as a matter of fact, the exercise of ʻpoliticalʼ 
ijtihad for the purpose of organizing and administering the state has never ceased through 
history (Al-Awa 1993, 68-70). As Al-Akim has declared, democracy is a tool and a means 
to achieve an end, which should be the community well-being. My argument is that it might 
be slightly misleading to elevate Democracy to a value in itself, or to a Universal Truth. To 
certain extent, it might be said that some argumentations turn Democracy into a religion or 
a theological corpus. And yet, it does not constitute a valid counter-argument to this 
proposition to say that Islam is a religion and a theological corpus. Therefore -- as the 
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reasoning goes -- I am implicitly denying that there is any space for religion in politics and 
within a democratic system.  
My response to this observation is that we are not dealing with ʻIslamʼ21 here, but with 
ʻIslamismʼ. That implies, we are speaking of a ʻpoliticalʼ discourse, of political practices, 
interpretations and of ʻpower-struggleʼ, which opens up a field of different possible 
responses, reactions, inventions within that relationship of power. It is not relevant for the 
analysis to underline that some subjects within that relationship of power speak the 
vocabulary of  religion (Islam) to voice their political identity and to re-present themselves 
as subjects and agents (Islamism and Islamists); that Islam and Islamism share the same 
ʻlexemeʼ, therefore there is a direct and archeological relation between them. The genealogy 
of Islamism is, primarily, within the Islamistsʼ imaginings. 
In other words, my point is that there is no need to ossify the debate around  ʻDemocracy 
and Islamʼ to the extent of adopting a very ʻideological or foundationalʼ approach by 
treating the ʻpracticesʼ of Democracy as a ʻTheologicalʼ corpus, which ʻallegedlyʼ cannot be 
altered. 
To conclude, the reflections conveyed here have endorsed the view that an Islamic 
democratic state is possible, thinkable and implement-able, by using Democracy as a tool, 
which could be used according to Islamic guidelines. Beyond this, there are the human 
agencies and practices to take into consideration; there are the political practices and 
discourses to evaluate, and eventually, to contest and challenge. By failing to recognize 
this dynamic, we completely refuse to address the analysis and our possible analytical 
mistakes. Even worse, taking such a view has some uncomfortable similarities with 
George Bushʼs propaganda when he was claiming to wage ʻendless warsʼ to spread 






Finally, I ought to say something about the concept and the practice of da’wah, which is 
strictly linked to the concept and practices of jihad. Firestone observes that ʻpeaceful 
means of striving for religionʼ include jihad-al-lisan or ʻstriving with the tongueʼ, jihad-al-
                                            
21 In relation to this point, an interesting argument is offered by Ayubi (1991; 1995, 231) on the limits of the political 
claims of Islam in the classical traditions.  
 104 
da’wah or‘striving by propagating the faithʼ and jihad-al-tarbiya or ʻstriving through 
educationʼ (Firestone 1996, 109). 
The concept of jihad-al-da’wah is especially important in terms of the conduct of jihad, 
since in the offensive jihad the call to conversion to Islam is normally supposed to precede 
the act of war. For example, Taqiuddin-an-Nabahani, founder of Hizbut-at-Tahrir declared 
that fighting the enemy would not become lawful until the ʻcall to Islam has been delivered 
to the peopleʼ (Taqiuddin 1998, 144). In his collection of the sayings of Imam Ali, Nahjul 
Balagha reports that when Ali was asked about the division and meanings of jihad, he 
replied that jihad is divided into four branches and daʼwah (mission), and by extension 
political lobbying and activism, constitutes one of its interpretations (Nahjul Balagha 30). 
Bringing the concept into the contemporary age and to the British context in particular, 
MPAC claims that its lobbying activities constitute jihad. For instance, in June 2003 they 
lobbied the British Broadcasting Corporation about a two-part programme in a series 
called Spooks that concerned MI5 fighting an extremist British Mosque. The MPAC felt that 
the programme was a smear against Islam and British Muslims and their final victorious 
words were ʻour job is to fight the Jihadʼ, which clearly meant a political lobbying activity, 
without any use of violence (MPAC 2003). 
In Britain, if a main ideologue of daʼwah has to be identified, this would be the Mawdudist 
Khurram Murad. Previously deputy leader of the Pakistani Jamaʼat-al-Islamyya, he moved 
to Britain to become Director of the Islamic Foundation. In the words of Larry Poston, ʻwhat 
Hasan-al-Banna did for Egypt and Mawdudi did for the subcontinent, Khurram Murad did 
for the Westʼ (Poston 1992, 82). And according to the YMUK president Zahoor Qureish, he 
ʻformulated a strategy and gave a vision for Muslims living in the West and more 
specifically, in the UKʼ (Qureish 1997, 21). 
The form of ʻIslamismʼ proposed by Murad, which some authors persist in calling ʻIslamʼ,22 
is influenced by the thought of Abu-Ala-Mawdudi and Jama’at-al-Islami to the extent that 
the Islamic Foundation has not merely acted as a pro-Jamat thinktank, but it has also 
played a major role in effecting the contextualization of Mawdudism in Britain. 
Among these acknowledgements, there is the assertion made by a member of the Islamic 
Foundation, Ataullah Siddiqui, who prizes the organization for ʻrepresenting an Islam 
                                            
22 Here, I am referring in particular to Jenny Taylor’s‘ An Islamic vision for Britain?’ that was published in Faith and 
Power: Christianity and Islam in ‘Secular’ Britain (edited by Lesslie Newbigin, Lamin Sanneh, and Jenny Taylor, 
London: SPCK, 1998, p109). The author explores the role and the clear Mawdudian stamp on Murad’s thought, but she 
never acknowledges the fact that Mawdudi was indeed one of the leading figures of contemporary ‘Islamist’ thought; 
instead, she persists in speaking of ‘Islam’ as a cluster of ‘religious’ practices in ‘secular’ Britain. 
 105 
untainted by cultural accretionʼ (Siddiqui 2005). Interestingly enough, this statement gives 
further substance to my argument that Islam and Islamism ʻin vitroʼ have been crafted 
mostly by the British Islamists, despite their denial of it. 
Although this issue will be fully analyzed in chapters four and five of the present thesis, it 
seems reasonable to introduce the topic here by offering some initial considerations in light 
of Ataullah Siddiquiʼs claim. 
ʻAn Islam untainted by cultural accretionʼ clearly means an Islam, whose representation is 
conceived as unchangeable and dehistoricized: essentialised and stereotyped. ʻIslamʼ, 
which is always voiced and experienced as an ʻall-encompassing system of lifeʼ, thus 
becomes deprived of its attributes: it is socially, politically, culturally ʻde-contextualizedʼ 
(Foucault 1972, 95-96). This also implies that such dehistoricized -- and therefore ʻa-
historicalʼ -- Islam stands, if not as ʻvirtualʼ, then as a totally ʻnovel productʼ; an offspring 
rather than a legacy, within the Islamistsʼ imaginings (Marranci 2008, 57). 
My argument is that this is mostly due to the fact that the passage to the West, and  
specifically to Britain, has accelerated and favored a radical change in the nature of 
ʻreligiosityʼ, which allows, and then requires, the invention of a ʻnovel Islamʼ, to the extent 
of legitimately speaking of ʻBritish Islamʼ and ʻ British Islamismʼ. 
This element becomes more clear when such ʻIslamʼ is set specifically into action: ʻwornʼ, 
inhabited, discoursed as a political discourse, ready to enter the political ʻspaceʼ, to be 
ʻvisibleʼ, and therefore, to take part in the political ʻstruggleʼ -- it is Islamism. By so doing, it 
plays a very active political role in the ʻwesternʼ context, in terms of ʻpoliticalʼ agency, and 
in terms of a process of substantial transformation from a supposedly original form (ibid., 
36). 
In this context, it appears slightly myopic to assert the Foundationʼs main aims as: ʻto 
create an Islam, which is suited to the environment of the West, without losing the 
fundamentals of faithʼ (Geavis 1996, 204). Similarly, it is also forgetful of the fact that in the 
ʻWestern environmentʼ, such ʻIslamic faithʼ has to be read as ʻIslamismʼ, with a very clear 
ʻpoliticalʼ agenda, as the concept of daʼwah itself demonstrates. This is not exhaustive and 
it could be misleading (in relation to the Foundationʼs activities and Muradʼs ceaseless 
efforts) to speak of a ʻfaithʼ, which becomes ʻsuitedʼ to the Western environment. Such 
phrasing also leads to a double denial: the political aspects of the ʻFaithʼ (Islamism and not 
Islam) and its ʻactive roleʼ in the interaction with the ʻWestʼ (which is more than a matter of 
a merely adaptive process). 
Had it not been this way, it would be rather difficult to understand and appreciate  Muradʼs 
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long-term commitment to organizing the very training measures for Muslim youth that his 
writing advocated. In 1982 Murad formed, under his own leadership, a steering committee 
of 10 to 15 young people, with the idea of training the youth. The YMUK was the practical 
realization of this vision: ʻthus in 1982 the idea of launching the vehicle to carry out this 
mission, the YMUK, was producedʼ (Qureshi 1997, 21). Tariq Ramadan sees YMUK as a 
major force combating the ghetto mentality, and one that does it along the lines clearly 
expressed by Murad in terms of ʻpolitical and financial independence from foreign statesʼ 
(Ramadan 1998, 253). Also, Murad showed his concern in relation to the issue of Muslim 
socio-political powerlessness in  the West, which he rated as ʻzeroʼ (Murad 1981, 7). As 
stated above, it is very difficult and mystifying to analyze these issues if we neglect their 
ʻpoliticalʼ discursive practice. As a further example of such political drive, it is perhaps 
interesting to remember a powerful call once voiced by Murad. He declared that Muslims in 
Britain have only three possible futures: first, being assimilated and absorbed in a secular 
culture, with just a ʻniche where you can practice your private customs and festivalsʼ; 
second, to face genocide or extermination, like the Muslims in Spain and Bosnia and the 
Jews in Germany; third, to bring Islam to the West and the West to Islam (Islamic Society 
of Britain 1995, 8-9). 
Had not Muradʼs claims been inherently political, there would not be such a hyperbolic 
phrasing to represent the threat of a domination (within that relationship of power); he 
would not be calling for decisive ʻactionʼ to subvert the situation: ʻto bring Islam to the West 
and the West to Islamʼ. This third alternative is offered as a remedy against the two 
negative perspectives outlined before: being unwilling to act (ʻbeing passiveʼ), and 
therefore ʻbecoming assimilatedʼ, or worse -- in a crescendo -- becoming unable to act 
(ʻbecoming a victimʼ) ʻby facing genocide and exterminationʼ. My ʻpoliticalʼ reading stands 
as a possible interpretation that reflects upon the fact that any act performed in a 
perspective of power is indeed a political act. It finds its confirmation and representation in 
Muradʼs words, which read that ʻDaʼwah and Tabligh are politicalʼ (Murad 1981, 36). 
Might I add again, the denial of this political is in turn political and a product of a culturalist-
orientalist framework of analysis. 
To conclude, the considerations offered in this chapter in relation to the concepts of jihad, 
democracy and daʼwah are the product of the authorʼs own reading and perusal of the 
written texts. In the next two chapters, these reflections will be expanded, questioned, 
inhabited, displaced, and unsettled by entering the ʻdiscourseʼ and the practice, by sharing 












The Geneaology of British Islamism 
 
This chapter looks at the history of Islamism in the UK, through a series of relevant 
historical events that witnessed the emergence of a British Islamist discourse and practice 
-- from the Rushdie affair to the 7-7 bombings -- over a period of nearly 20 years. 
My purpose is to review and critique the culturalist and orientalist analysis and 
representation of these events, by showing how this approachʼs constant denial of any 
political aspirations in relation to the Islamists, and its reductive examination of their claims 
in terms of ʻracialʼ or ʻreligiousʼ community issues, renders them non-political, to the 
extreme of condemning their quests and actions as ʻfundamentalistʼ and a threat to 
national security. 
My analysis demonstrates, instead, how those aspirations are inherently political and 
essential to the Islamist discourse and practice; how they are not the product of any 
ʻfundamentalistʼ or terrorist plot, and how their dismissal from the dominant discourse is 
itself an act of political ostracization (Varisco 2005, 56), which could, possibly, have had 
some responsibility for endangering the very same national security. 
 
 
The Rushdie Affair 
 
The publication of Salman Rushdieʼs book The Satanic Verses in 1988 is commonly 
considered as a defining moment for British Muslim identity and is seen as less as a sign 
of the emergence of an Islamist identity in Britain (Keppel 1997, 123; McRoy 2006, 56). 
Muslims were only seen as part of a general ʻAsianʼ community (Metcalf 1996, 67), despite 
the fact that Muslims were, and they still are, ʻraciallyʼ diverse (Trepagnier 2006, 67); 
likewise their activism was perceived as being limited to ʻraceʼ issue. The other fact is that 
the academic celebration of ʻdifferenceʼ has led to the creation of separate and bounded 
ʻethnic bubblesʼ (Asad 1993, 24; Bhaba 1989, 78; Gates 1992, 67; Gilroy 1987, 13) in 
which the emphasis has been on ʻcultureʼ as the primary source of collective identification 
(Grillo 2003, 171). The central symbol of this ʻmulti-culturalist rainbowʼ (McGhee 2005; 
Modood 1998, 75) vision is the ʻcommunityʼ, in which individual subjectivity blends with 
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collective ideals of culture, ethnicity and belonging (Damasio 2000, 44). Consequently, 
according to this vision, there is very little room for contact and change and less for conflict 
and confusion. The image is that of homogenous, bounded, autonomous groups (Benson 
1996, 56). 
This section aims to explore and understand which factors -- in concomitance with the 
Rushdie affair -- have concurred in changing the category of representation for the term 
ʻBritish Asianʼ: from the ʻessentializationʼ of their ethnos to the one of their religion (Varisco 
2005,49). This section  also attempts to explore the possibility that in the aftermath of The 
Satanic Verses affair the black/white division has been replaced with one of the 
British/Muslims, with Muslims being placed as the new social pariahs, and increasingly, as 
the new objects of ʻdesireʼ for academic research (Grillo 2003,170). Alongside this, Islam 
has been increasingly positioned at the centre of the political and academic discourse as 
Public Enemy Number One: the enemy within. 
In this context, I argue that this focus on religion (Islam), shares with its precursors the 
evocation of fixed boundaries and absolute identities in which religion, ethnicity and culture 
are naturalised and essentialised (Marranci 2008, 6) to the point of becoming, in effect, 
synonymous with race (Gilroy 1992, 13). Muslims have then, ironically, become the ʻnew 
blackʼ. This section examines such an attitude as the result of a disempowering culturalist-
orientalist approach (El Zein 1977,228), that primarily implies the denial of any political 
aspiration in relation to Islamists, and confines them to Islamic issues. Ultimately, this 
means the ostracization of Islamist parties from the public space and  the political arena 
(Asad 2006, 12; McGhee 2005, 11). 
Having said that, the topic of The Satanic Verses affair still remains very complex and difficult 
to unravel, considering that Rushdie himself was of non-white British origin, an Indian, a 
successful writer, and famous for his anti-racist statements and outspoken criticism of 
Margaret Thatcherʼs policies. He was someone about whom middle-class Indians and 
Pakistanis could feel proud, a symbol of success; someone who had managed to 
overcome British societyʼs racial prejudice. 
Rushdie has often spoken of the way he was mocked by fellow pupils for not being able to 
eat the traditional breakfast kippers without choking on the bones. Suddenly, in England he 
discovered he was Indian, he was later to recall. His identity was thus formed in reaction to 
the ʻdisparaging eyeʼ of the Other, within a cultural system of differences and reciprocal 
perceptions. This complex construction of identity in the postcolonial and post-modern 
world of immigration constituted the lietmotiv of The Satanic Verses (Keppel 1997, 135). It 
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reflects an image of the world where legacy and tradition blend into a universe of 
migrations, electronic communications and satellite transmissions (Appadurai 1996, 57). In 
this framework, The Satanic Verses used the derogatory term Mahound for Muhammad, and 
reversed the articles of faith in by employing the term Jahilia for the holy city of Mecca, and 
the name of the wives of the prophet for the prostitutes in the city. What emerged, 
metaphorically speaking, from The Satanic Verses, was mainly a new individual: a kind of 
mutant, the product of a cocktail of cultural influences. The hybrid migrant characters in 
The Satanic Verses are a clear embodiment of this view (Marranci 2008, 56). However, for 
those who felt and presented themselves as the defenders of the Islamic communityʼs 
identity, the world presented in Rushdieʼs novel meant the dissolution of the Muslim 
community through the adulteration of its faith (Ruthven 1991, 67). The melting pot vision 
presented by Rushdie was thus perceived and stigmatized as a new form of Islamic 
adulteration akin to the earlier political crises stretching back to the 19th century, against 
which the internal hegira of the various Deobandi, Tablighi-Jamaat-at-Islami movements 
had formed in imperial India (Appignanesi and Maitland 1989, 122; Marranci 2008, 59). 
In a way, it could be said that Rushdie work was bound to upset the religious leaders who 
had managed to establish ʻtheir control over the populations of Muslim origin in Britainʼ 
(Sardar and Davies 1990, 45). Likewise, it could also be argued that by undermining the 
very basis of an Islamic community identity, it threatened their cultural, social and political 
domination of their flock (ibid.,46). 
However, the significance of the affair cannot be fully grasped if the events are not 
contextualised properly. At the time of the publication of The Satanic verses, in September 
1988, the British  Muslim community (McRoy 2006, 57) was at a turning point. Pressure 
groups had been set up to lobby councils in several key cities and they were capable of 
achieving their demands regarding ʻMuslim educationʼ and of managing a network of social 
services linked to the mosques. In addition, several city councillors and officials 
responsible for race-relations policy were themselves originally members of various 
mosque committees. In many towns, this form of Islamic representation also meant that a 
link between Muslims and British political authorities had come to dominate the political 
and cultural expression of the population of Muslim origins (Lewis 1994, 56). In Pierre 
Bourdieuʼs terms, the local leaders had re-created an Islamic ʻreligious fieldʼ (Bourdieu 
1971, 23), establishing its hegemony over their followers. However, it is a fact that the 
services which the Islamic community leaders had access to, remained limited. The so-
called employment quotas for ʻnon-whitesʼ within positive discrimination policies opened 
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jobs for Muslims, but only within the limit set for each-ethnic racial group; therefore, these 
opportunities had to be shared with West Indians, Africans, Indians and others. (Modood 
1990, 36). Finally, in relation to the structure of the Muslim community, there was a great 
divide between the older generation and the younger English-speaking Muslims. While the 
elders tried to perpetuate lifestyles imported from the subcontinent and to protect practices 
and customs, the second and third generation Muslims were constantly exposed to the 
ʻcultural world of television, soap-operas, electronic gamesʼ (Kepel 1997, 131); this latter 
generation definitely knew the British society from the inside and had mastered some of its 
cultural codes. 
It was in this context that the Rushdie affair exploded. By ridiculing the Prophet, his wives 
and his companions, Rushdie violated an inherited, diasporic Islamic identity and exposed 
it to the agents of identity re-construction in post-colonial and post-industrial Britain 
(Metcalf 1996, 67). On the one hand, the ranks of ʻtraditionalʼ Muslim notables found 
themselves unable to respond to The Satanic Verses, which, to an extent (albeit in a 
hyperbolic guise), expressed the identity problems faced by young British Muslims (ibid., 
70). On the other hand, the affair offered the opportunity to other better-educated political 
actors, to challenge the traditional notablesʼ domination of the ʻreligious fieldʼ by presenting 
themselves as better defenders of the community. The violence and the unrest which 
came to characterise the affair was not only the result of the confrontation between 
Rushdieʼs supporters and opponents, but also of the rivalries between the various groups 
competing for the control of Islam in Britain (Sardar and Davies 1990, 151). Paradoxically, 
the controversy had the merit of bringing together a very wide section of the British Muslim 
population, reinforcing their sense of ʻaffiliationʼ and making them more receptive and more 
eager to have Islamic leaders. In other words, the affair pushed some British Muslims to 
enter the political and public arena in the name of Islam: to start using Islamic metaphors 
to express their political identity, by discoursing an Islamist discourse (Marranci 2008, 60). 
This also implied blending, surpassing and bypassing any other national, ethnic, and 
ʻracialʼ element: dismissing any diasporic link in favour of a political discourse (Trepagnier 
2006, 67). 
The first moves were made by the Islamist movement inspired by Mawdudiʼs Jamaʼat-Al-
Islami, whose secular arm was the Leceister-based Islamic foundation. The movement, 
strengthened by a strong international backing through Saudi Wahabism, led the 
campaign until mid-January 1989, when the Bradford Council of Mosques took over with 
its spectacular burning of the book, which captured the worldʼs attention. The stakes were 
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upped when the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his famous fatwa and this also prompted a 
new protagonist on the scene, the Muslim Institute, later to become the Muslim Parliament. 
The result was the establishment of a sort of separate self-styled ʻparliamentʼ, sitting in 
parallel to the Westminster Parliament. Besides these movements, the anti-Rushdie 
campaign also attracted to its front-line young English-speaking Muslim intellectuals. 
Ultimately, both sets of protagonists were seen by the local notables and mullahs as a 
threat to their hegemony (Bowen 1992, 72). The case was that the campaign against The 
Satanic Verses required leaders able to operate at a national or even international level; 
leaders who were well-educated and capable of conveying the feelings and frustrations of 
the young generations of English-speaking Muslims, born in Britain and ʻradicalisedʼ by 
their own experience of race and racism (Essed 1991,56). Put an other way, the affair 
begot a considerable shift for Islam in Britain, from a ʻcommunalismʼ of management 
(Kepel 1997, 145) -- which perpetuated the diasporic link of the traditional Islamic order 
from the subcontinent -- to a radical political mobilization. 
The ascendancy of the Bradford Council of Mosques started to fade when the anti-Rushdie 
campaign found its ultimate champion in the Ayatollah Khomeini, who, on the 14th 
February 1989, issued his exceptionally notorious fatwa, against ʻthe author of The Satanic 
Verses and all those who have published itʼ, calling on ʻcourageous Muslims to execute 
them as soon as possible, wherever they maybeʼ (Marranci 2008, 58). 
Again however, a single event like this is not fully understood, if it is not properly 
contextualised. 
At the beginning of the 1989, Khomeini, who had been forced to agree to a cease-fire with 
Iraq the previous year, was certainly in need of reasserting his ideological hegemony as a 
champion of Islam, especially since his Saudi rivals had mobilised their international 
networks of influence in the anti-Rushdie campaign. According to Islamic law, the fatwa 
should have concerned only the Shiʼites who recognised the Ayatollahʼs spiritual authority 
and respected his interpretations of Islam. The relevant aspect was that, by addressing all 
the Muslims in the world in his judgement against Rushdie, Khomeini was proclaiming 
himself as the spiritual guide of all Muslims (ibid., 61). Moreover, the peculiarity was that 
no precedent existed for a fatwa condemning to death, in the name of Islam, an individual 
living outside the ʻMuslim worldʼ. The message that Khomeini was sending was clear and 
outspoken: the universal mission of Islam was not constrained by any national frontiers but 
it included people who had emigrated to Islamic enclaves in Europe (ibid., 63). Whilst the 
British media and non-Muslim public opinion unanimously condemned the Ayatollahʼs 
 113 
death sentence on Rushdie, many different shades of opinion could be observed among 
the Islamic community in Britain (Trepagnier 2006, 78). In particular, the associations that 
aspired to an intermediary role between their followers and the authorities, dissociated 
themselves from the incitement to murder. But at the grass-roots level, many Muslims, 
especially the young, were deeply involved in the campaign: slogans calling for Rushdieʼs 
death and posters depicting him covered in blood were elements of the proceedings. Amid 
such an escalation of events and tensions, a new political actor was emerging; an 
organization which proclaimed support for the fatwa in order to ʻbank onʼ (McRoy 2006, 10) 
the anger of the Muslim youth, and consequently set up a Muslim Parliament to counter 
the Westminster Assembly. The author of the project was Kalim Siddiqui, the son of an 
Indian landowner who fled to Pakistan in 1947, had arrived in Britain in 1954, having  
begun a career as a journalist, was hired by The Guardian. He had studied Islamist 
political thought, through Mawdudiʼs writings, and whilst studying for his PhD at the 
University of London, he was in contact with other Islamist students from the subcontinent. 
At the start of the anti-Rushdie campaign, Kalim Siddiqui did not organize any major 
activities, but he soon became a sought-after speaker on radio and television. Unlike the 
often self-educated leaders of the Islamic associations who spoke English with difficulty, 
he performed very well in debates, and by endorsing the Ayatollahʼs fatwa, he soon 
became the so-called bad guy that the British media wanted, (Varisco 2005, 38). In terms 
of his political strategy, Siddiqui de-legitimized the other campaign leaders by stressing 
their inefficiency and criticising the ʻcomplicityʼ between the Saudis and the West. He 
expressed contempt for the Saudi lobby as embodied in the UK Action Committee on 
Islamic Affairs and declared that the campaign had paradoxically helped Rushdie to 
publicize his book. Kalim Siddiqui set about bringing together all those who had supported 
the fatwa by convening a series of meetings all over Britain to discuss a text, which he 
himself had drafted, titled the Muslim Manifesto. His objective was to establish a ʻbody that 
can speak with authority on behalf of Muslims and operates like a parliamentʼ (Siddiqui 
1989, 9-10). According to the Manifesto, the Muslim Parliament was to ʻconsolidate the 
Muslim population in Britain into an organized community in pursuit of the goals set by 
Islamʼ (ibid., 11). In this connection, the acquisition of a British nationality through birth or 
naturalization ʻdoes not absolve the Muslim from his or her duty to participate in the jihad; 
this participation can be active service in armed struggle abroad and/or the provision of 
material and moral support to those engaged in such struggle anywhere in the worldʼ 
(Siddiqui 1990, 5). The inaugural session of the Muslim Parliament took place in London 
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on 4 January 1992. In his opening speech Kalim Siddiqui declared that ʻwe are a political 
system in every sense and meaning of that term. We want to take our place among the 
primary institutions of Great Britain. The inauguration of this Parliament transforms the 
disparaged Muslim minority in Britain into a political community with a will and purpose of 
its ownʼ (ibid., 13). Siddiquiʼs plan of giving an embryonic organization the grandiose title of 
Muslim Parliament, was of course, in order to obtain maximum publicity; he also declared 
that Muslims would oppose and defy any public policy and legislation regarded as inimical 
to their interests. However, manipulation and political rhetoric aside, the initiative in itself 
was very rich in significance (Marranci 2008, 62). It was a clear announcement of the birth 
of a political entity. It was definitely inaugurating the emergence of an Islamist discourse 
and witnessing the performance of an Islamist practice, something which was construed 
and represented by a certain dominant discourse as an issue to be discussed under the 
rubric of the multicultural society (Marranci 2008, 64;Trepagnier 2006, 68). 
The culturalist-orientalist discourseʼs use of the category of ʻcultureʼ was a way to avoid 
and deny any political implication and aspiration in relation to the Muslims (Grillo 2003, 
160). A proof of this can be found in the fact that the Rushdie affair certainly had the merit 
of rekindling the debate among British politicians about the meaning of integration (Anwar-
Baksh 2003, 143). In 1965, the Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins had defined 
integration as a combination of equal opportunities and cultural diversities ʻin an 
atmosphere of mutual toleranceʼ (Webster 1990, 54). In March 1989, he declared that 
Muslims ʻhad clearly not succeeded in blending their cultureʼ (Appignanesi and Maitland 
1990, 134). A statement like this explains how the anti-Rushdie campaign, the 
demonstrations, the unrest and the consequent institution of the Muslim Parliament, were 
read and represented by a certain culturalist and orientalist approach as a negative sign of 
a ʻmulticulturalʼ failure (Varisco 2005, 115) and not instead, as the positive symbol of the 
emergence of a new political discourse. It was not a matter of a lack, of an absence, of a 
negative event, but the positive, deliberative fulfilling of a political discourse and of its 
aspirations (Essed 1990, 67). Again, what the dominant discourse was reluctant to ʻacceptʼ 
were the political discourses and the practices of the dominated (the Islamists). They were 
reprimanded as inadequate, according to ʻmulticulturalʼ standards, and as such, in need of 
being ameliorated (Grillo 2003, 161; Trepagnier 2006, 68; Varisco 2005, 66); this is finally 
the assumption at the base of the culturalist-orientalist approach, where the Other is not 
just different, but inferior, and as such, in need of being educated (Asad 1993, 168; Asad 




The Gulf Crisis 
 
After the Rushdie affair, there was another crisis -- although it was less a ʻdomestic affairʼ 
(Lewis and Schnapper 1994, 105) and more an international one -- which soon captured 
the attention and  imagination, and dominated the efforts of British Islamists: the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Among the several British Islamist groups, this event was mainly 
interpreted as an ʻanti-imperialistʼ action to reverse the artificial colonial borders imposed 
after the First World War by Britain and France. In this specific case, the Foreign Office 
Minister, Douglas Hogg, was subjected to ʻcontinuous hecklingʼ at the UMO February 
conference for ʻsupporting the war against Iraq whilst rejecting similar action to end the 
Israeli occupation of Arab landsʼ (Muslim News 1991, 1). At a conference in Manchester, 
one of the speakers condemned the ʻsham and hypocrisy of Western claims to be 
following the international law, while neglecting issues such as Palestine and Kashmirʼ 
(McRoy 2006, 73). In this same context, Saddam Hussein was praised because he had 
dared to challenge the West directly, and the USA was opposed partcularly, for its 
perceived pro-Israeli bias, and for the fact that its forces were attacking Iraq from the 
Muslim Holy Land (Werbner 1997, 145). An important actor on the scene was the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia; anti-Saudi sentiments amongst Muslims during the Gulf crisis were very 
public, the reason being that ʻthe Saudis could invite American and European forces onto 
Saudi territoryʼ (Muslim News 1991, 3). As Werbner acutely observes, a popular Muslim 
reaction to protests that Saddam was a tyrant, was the rhetorical question ʻWhich is the 
greater evil, America or Saddam Hussein?ʼ. At this point, some authors observe that ʻthe 
lesser of the two evilsʼ is a feature of Islamic law (Del Valle 1997, 6; Fallaci 2001, 40; 
Kepel 1997, 19; Lewis and Schnapper 1994, 67; McRoy 2006, 51). In other words, this 
case demonstrates how the culturalist-orientalist framework of analysis represents and 
explains the British Islamist discourse by specifically referring to a written text and a legal 
source (Marranci 2008, 28). In so doing, the Islamist actorʼs agency is suppressed and 
his/her practices and discourses are de-politicized (Asad 2006, 41; Bowen 2007, 69). The 
reference to the Holy text automatically eradicates and expels Islamism from the ʻnetsʼ of 
the relationships of Power, from the struggles, the provocations, the actions, re-actions, 
resistances performed by the Dominant and the Dominated at the same time (Mamdani 
2005, 27). 
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At a national Muslim meeting in Bradford on 20 January 1991, a resolution was tabled in 
order to condemn the USA-led aggression against Iraq and the Saudi ruling familyʼs 
decision to allow European and American forces to have access to the Islamic heartlands. 
There was a definite escalation in the British Islamist groupsʼ opposition to the USA-led 
attack when, during an air-raid shelter operation, an allied missile caused a large number 
of civilian deaths through incineration. The Bradford Council of Mosques issued a heated 
statement entitled the ʻBaghdad Massacreʼ, accusing the British government of being 
responsible for the incident. The statement demanded the avenging of the deaths and it 
declared that ʻthe House of Islamʼ was at war with all those who attack its interests, 
including the ʻconspiratorsʼ with the forces of Western imperialism (Muslim News 1990, 1). 
The Bradford Council of Mosquesʼ reaction is interesting, since it represents the view of a 
leading, and broadly representative, body of British Muslims, on the nature of the war 
(McRoy 2006, 55). The main perception was that Muslims were under attack by the 
imperialist West, aided by its puppets, the ʻso-called Muslim regimesʼ (Muslim News 1990, 
2), specifically, the Saudi regime. There is an interesting parallel concerning the Saudi lack 
of political credibility in front of the leading British Islamist groups, in the cases of the 
Rushdie affair and the first Gulf war. If, in the first case, the ʻSaudi family had shown a very 
soft approach in dealing with the eventʼ (McRoy 2006, 57), now they were allowing the 
West to attack and massacre Muslims. Paradoxically, the Gulf crisis also resulted in giving 
a dangerous stimulus to the violent incidents against British Muslims and British Islamists, 
and this ʻevident rise in anti-Muslim sentimentsʼ (Siddiqui 1996, 46) has been interpreted 
as a clear sign of Islamophobic opinions among the British population. 
The prevalent view was that British Muslims and Islamists were fanatic supporters of 
Saddam Hussein. Media involvement in spreading this image was paramount (Trepagnier 
2006, 66; Varisco 2005, 71). As Vetrovec notices, the mediaʼs vilification of Muslims during 
the Gulf crisis, the hostility of the general public, the very fact that the holy buildings were 
defiled and Muslims were physically assaulted, all, in a sense, brought the attacks on 
ʻMuslims in Iraq home to Muslims in Britainʼ (Vertovec 1996, 183). 
In this context, the British Government paid little attention to the Islamist groupsʼ concerns 
(Marranci 2008, 51). The Rushdie crisis had already demonstrated (to the Islamists) how 
powerless they were, and it had also left them virtually friendless (ibid., 49). 
At the Manchester conference, one speaker attacked the misrepresentation of British 
Muslims in the media and then bemoaned the Muslim communityʼs lack of proper political 
organization and mobilization. Werbner (1997, 154) refers to the sense of frustration, the 
 117 
basic political inactivity of Muslims in Britain, and the call for more activism, over not just 
the Gulf crisis, but also domestic concerns, such as immigration rules and discrimination 
against Muslim schools (ibid., 155). Likewise, he considers the claim -- ʻin order to 
preserve our rights, identity, integrity, we need to fight, and fight hardʼ(ibid., 156). -- 
relevant, and warns against it .According to Webner, this could easily be read as a weak 
political statement, which gives relevance to secondary issues – pure rhetoric such as 
identity and integrity -- by neglecting the more important matters such as a strategy to 
achieve a better integration (ibid., 156-157). In other words, this is a further example of an 
inherently de-politicizing approach in relation to the Islamist discourse, which is, otherwise, 
represented under the rubric of discourses and practices of ʻmulticulturalʼ integration 
(Trepagnier 2006, 15; Mcghee 2005, 14). It also implies a negative representation of the 
Islamist identity, constantly proposed as an absence, an entity not conforming to the 
standards. This also means, according to the culturalist-orientalistic approach, the 
representation of the ʻOtherʼ as the distant, the stranger and ultimately the inferior, which 
cannot be discoursed, but as the negative of a ʻdominantlyʼ accepted image (Grillo 2003, 
160; Varisco 2005, 66). 
The Bosnian conflict and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, analyzed in the next section, 
further confirm that that the dominant discourse of representation of Islamism (Varisco 
2005, 78), was strongly based on the dual dynamic of a political rejection and a culturalist ʻ 
dismissalʼ of its political discourse and practice (El Zein 1977, 230). 
 
 
The effect of Bosnia 
 
During the Gulf crisis, there had been accusations that Muslims were disloyal to Britain in 
a war situation. The implication was that Muslims were not really British, and therefore, not 
part of the ʻWesternʼ or ʻEuropeanʼ civilisation (Haddad and Qurqmazi 2002, 55). 
Furthermore, that they were unwelcome because of their religion, or more specifically, their 
assertiveness about it (McRoy 2006, 68). As the Home Office Ministers worded it, British 
Muslims could only fully ʻfunction in Britain, if they become integratedʼ; this was interpreted 
as ʻto become passive about their religionʼ (MPGB 1993, 3). 
The Bosnian crisis shocked the British Muslim community, partly because -- to a certain 
extent -- Bosnian Muslims held the very identity that the government ministers were 
understood to be suggesting for British Muslims, and yet, this did not prevent their being 
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slaughtered (Haddad and Qurqmazi 2002, 56). Their perception was that Muslims were 
unwanted in Europe: given Bosnia ʻs proximity to Britain, Muslim voices expressed 
concern that they could be the next victims of European ʻIslamophobiaʼ (Hasan 2002, 67; 
Trepagnier 2006, 77). There are several indications of a widespread fear in the community 
resulting from the crisis. When Jacobson engaged in field-research among the Muslim 
youth of East London, one interviewee stated that some young men of his acquaintance 
did not wish to be interviewed in the wake of events in Bosnia, because they felt that 
Muslims in Britain should be wary of researchers gathering information about them. 
Jacobson found that Bosnia was a recurring international issue raised by the interviewees. 
One of them declared that research could be used against Muslims in the same way that 
in Germany statistics had been used in the efforts to round up and kill the Jews (Jacobson 
1998, 55-56, 79). 
That young men could feel threatened by a writer engaged in research, indicates the 
degree, both of the psychological trauma inflicted by the Bosnian crisis on the community, 
and also the sense of conspiracy involving the British government. 
In this context, it is interesting to analyse the conclusions offered by the Runnymede Trust 
report on Islamophobia. According to the report, many Muslims in Britain believed 
Islamophobia had played a major part in western attitudes to events in Bosnia. One of their 
correspondents (not himself a Muslim) wrote that the British politiciansʼ reluctance to 
sanction military intervention in Bosnia was rooted, to a large exent, in their reluctance to 
support the creation of a new Muslim polity in Europe. The cabinet minister, when asked 
the reason why the UK government was refusing to lift the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian government, replied that ʻMuslims have a tendency to radicalismʼ (Runnymede 
Trust 1997, 10). 
Here, it is certainly worth analyzing the way certain authors (Dayan-Herzbrun 2000, 
11;Kepel 1997, 138; Werbner 2002, 56) framed and represented the events involving the 
ʻMuslim organizationsʼ and their reactions to the Bosnian events. Keppel (1997), for 
instance, affirms that such ʻfearsʼ in the community were used by several ʻMuslim 
organizationsʼ in their struggle for power in the community; in particular, ʻUMO, the Muslim 
Parliament of Britain (Kalim Siddiqi) and the Mawdudists were promoting those fears to 
compete against each other and to undermine tendencies towards more secularised 
approachʼ (1997, 139). My comment here is that, an analysis like this, assumes and 
represents the Islamist discourse and practice as ʻa-politicalʼ. There is little doubt that the 
British official declaration mentioned above regarding ʻthe Muslim radical tendencyʼ 
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denotes a substantial degree of Islamophobia (Trepagnier 2006, 67) or a very culturalist-
orientalist approach (Marranci 2008, 59). The Islamist ʻfearʼ and outrage in the face of the 
Bosnian carnage was surely within reason. To point out that, the current events at the time 
were used by Islamists in order to gather consensus and support, does not add much to 
the understanding of the Islamist partiesʼ activities themselves. Practices and strategies 
like these, are not unusual among political parties and political leaders, irrespective of their 
ideologies, especially in periods of crises. My point is that, the assumption underlying 
Keppelʼs analysis is that Islamist parties are not political; therefore, the fact that they acted 
according to a ʻlogicʼ which is commonly followed by party leaders and, more generally, by 
political actors, elicits surprise. 
As highlighted in the previous section, the representation of Islamist quests and 
aspirations in the dominant approach is construed in terms of an exception and a 
disruption to the normal functioning of a multicultural society (Grillo 2003, 172; Varisco 
2005, 79): each assertive stand is interpreted as illegitimate, as not conforming to the 
ʻstandardsʼ of a faith group, and therefore, in need of being ʻtamedʼ and replaced within the 





Whilst all these crises (Rushdie affair, Gulf Crisis, Bosnian Crisis) were continuing, a ʻnew 
phenomenonʼ -- identified as Islamophobia -- was perceived by the British Muslims to be 
increasingly growing. 
As highlighted in the first chapter, the hypothesis that my dissertation advances, is that the 
operations of categorizing and stereotyping performed by the dominant discourse toward 
the dominated (the mode of ʻoppressionʼ) function in such a way that reifies the mode-of-
being stereotyped. Specifically, the culturalist-orientialist operations of categorizing and 
stereotyping toward Islam and Muslims result in a substantial depoliticization of the latter 
as social actors; something which functions as a dangerous practice, remains unnoticed, 
and is therefore, perpetuated. The perverse effects of this dynamic can be analysed in 
relation to the phenomenon of ʻIslamophobiaʼ. 
The main perception among Muslims was that such a feeling of ʻracismʼ or aversion 
towards Muslims and Islam (Runnymede Trust 1997, 12) was equivalent to anti-Semitism, 
and that it had first manifested itself during the Rushdie crisis. The generally negative 
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reaction to the Anti-Rushdie campaign shocked Muslims widely. This was mostly due to 
the fact that such a response had been given by sections of society previously seen as 
sympathetic and supportive, the liberals and leftists. The focus of the antagonism 
displayed by the latter was not understood as a biological or a cultural difference, but an 
ideological distinction. The media and the general public viewed British Muslims as 
ʻintolerantʼ, ʻNaziʼ, ʻbigotsʼ, as was claimed by the press reaction to the Bradford book 
burning (Lewis 1994, 158). A particularly ironic response came from Roy Jenkins, former 
Labour Home Secretary and architect of the 1976 Race Relations Act. In the Independent of 
4 March 1989, he lamented that ʻwe might have been more cautious about allowing the 
creation in the 1950s of a substantial Muslim community hereʼ. This quote, and the fact 
that Jenkins was responsible for introducing the 1976 Act, surely undermined the 
confidence in ʻtraditional race structure and policyʼ (Modood 1990, 46). This was also 
interpreted as a clear sign of the fact that ʻMuslimʼ discrimination did not yet have a name 
and maybe there was the need of creating one: a category that could be put under the 
rubric of ʻreligiousʼ discrimination. 
Islamists themselves started to exert pressure for legislation against religious 
discrimination. This point was strongly made by the Islamic Human Rights Commission 
Chairman Massoud Shadjareh, at the launch of the report entitled Anti-Muslim 
Discrimination and hostility in the UK, 2000. The reportʼs findings indicated that unless 
something was done urgently at the government level, ʻMuslims in Britain and Europe are 
likely to face the same fate this century as Jews in Europe in the lastʼ (Islamic Human 
Rights Commision 2000, p.5). 
Three years earlier, in 1997, the Runnymede Trust had published its report titled 
ʻIslamophobia -- A Challenge for Us All’, and since then the phrase ʻIslamophobiaʼ has 
entered the public discourse,  receiving increased recognition, despite the lack of a precise 
definition. However, some authors contend that using the term Islamophobia itself is a way 
to intensify the assertion of the priority of the Muslim identity and the ʻradicalismʼ that 
accompanies it (McRoy 2006, 26);that ther term does not explain much about the 
ʻphenomenonʼ itself and it could be the product of an obsession with categories and 
categorization, which too often silences a more accurate analysis or diverts it from a more 
subversive one (Butler 1992, 56). The reaction to hostilities of the kind expressed by Roy 
Jenkins is not surprising, and to imply that it was exaggerated, is contentious. 
My question here is of a different kind. I enquire about the nature of Islamophobia, in terms 
of the urge to find a category to describe a phenomenon of alleged hatred against Muslims 
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qua Muslims (Trepagnier 2006, 6; Grillo 2003, 171). Furthermore, I will discuss and 
attempt to analyse the effects produced by the publication of this seminal. 
In order to conduct a more detailed examination of the topic and to give substance to my 
argument about the mode-of-oppression reifying the mode-of-being, (whilst dangerously 
masking and endorsing forms of depoliticization), it is useful to analyse the text in itself, by 
attempting -- with hindsight -- to trace its resonance, ten years after its publication. 
My first remark is that ʻIslamophobiaʼ is, at best, a term that everyone knows and uses, but 
probably could not accurately define (Allan 2005, 78). 
At the time of its publication, the Report clearly announced the urgency of finding a label 
and a category, by stating that there was a ʻnew reality that needs namingʼ. The report not 
only named this new reality, but also established an eight-point typology in order to create 
a more accessible way of understanding Islamo-phobia. The Runnymede typology thus 
described ʻclosedʼ (as opposed to ʻopenʼ) views.  
 
The ʻclosed viewsʼ that they established were: 
1. Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities; 
2. Islam is seen as separate and other -- (a) not having any aims or values in 
common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing 
them; 
3. Islam is seen as inferior to the West -- barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist; 
4. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, 
engaged in a 'clash of civilisations'; 
5. Islam is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage; 
6. Criticisms made by Islam of the ʻWestʼ are rejected out of hand without 
consideration; 
7. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards 
Muslims and their subsequent exclusion from mainstream society; 
8. Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal'. 
It is a fact that, despite its overwhelmingly simplistic approach -- maybe even because of it 
-- the initial impact and subsequent legacy of the Runnymede research has been both 
highly significant and deeply influential, not just as a policy document but also as a 
blueprint for academic engagement. 
Subsequent to the reportʼs publication on Islamophobia in Britain, almost all academic 
research has tended to acknowledge its indebtedness to this very typology and has rarely 
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gone any further than this particular understanding (ibid., 81). The Runnymede definitions 
and typologies have played an important role in understanding and identifying 
Islamophobia, and it might be fair to suggest that 
the reportʼs overview of the coverage and subsequent representation of Muslims and 
Islam in the British media became the catalyst that inspired and shaped much of the 
work relating to ʻMuslims in the Mediaʼ that has emerged since. Elizabeth Pooleʼs analysis 
of the representation of Muslims in the British press (Poole 2002, 253), as well as other 
work with a much broader geographical focus (for example, byMalise Ruthven) is surely 
indebted to the Reportʼs original efforts (Donnan 2002; Hafez 2000; Ruthven 2002; 
Siddiqui 1997). 
The report acknowledged the seriousness of Islamophobia in the media, by suggesting 
that many in the media were guilty, not only of perpetrating inaccuracies and 
misinformation, but also because such inaccuracies and misinformation attained an 
unchecked and blanket acceptance as fact, without any alternative recourse to accuracy or 
accountability. Put an other way, it might be stated that this was paving the way to a 
process of naturalization of the phenomenon in itself. In addition, the proliferation of media, 
and a rapidly expanding globalised audience renders the situation bleak; whether at the 
local or the global level, the problem remains equally relevant. 
I will consider an example of this media coverage, by utilising the Runnymede typology of 
closed and open views. The article I have chosen was written four years after the Report, 
but the example can highlight just how relevant these ʻclosed viewsʼ could be, and how 
important is the selection of the parameters of analysis. 
The article in question is from a regional daily newspaper from the West Midlands, The 
Express and Star, dated 13 October 2001. Beneath the headline, ʻWhy they hate you...ʼ, 
there is a photograph taken shortly after the Friday prayers outside Birminghamʼs 
(Englandʼs second largest city) most prominent and well-known mosque. The photo is 
framed so that Arabic text is central to the focus. As worshippers are leaving the mosque, 
so-the image suggests that they are all queuing for the books, tapes and CDs that a seller 
has to offer. There is the blatant ʻUsʼ and ʻThemʼ contrast, for instance, in the central focus 
juxtaposing the words ʻBirmingham Central Mosqueʼ with the Arabic calligraphy next to it. 
Similarly, the appearance of the man selling the goods, clearly suggests a ʻnon-Westernʼ 
look. The short text accompanying the photograph informs the reader that this ʻnon-
Westernʼ man was also once ʻJewishʼand he was ʻgiving outʼ -- rather than selling -- 
pictures of Osama Bin Laden, videos and CDs; and through these, one might understand 
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why Muslims everywhere hate the West. 
Here, many of the closed views described in the Runnymede Report are easily 
recognizable. Muslims are seen to be all the same, by implication they are also alleged to 
be supporters of Osama Bin Laden. By re-proposing the ʻUsʼ and ʻThemʼ dualism, Islam is 
uncritically established as distinctly separate and other from ʻthe Westʼ. The image of 
Muslims apparently interested in getting such material clearly suggests an interpretation of 
ʻthemʼ as being threatening and supportive of terrorism, especially when ʻdirected towards 
Western powersʼ. Moreover, Islam as a whole is implicated as being largely synonymous 
with a dangerous political ideology, So that any criticisms that Muslims may justifiably have 
of the ʻWestʼ are rejected out of hand, and any hostility towards Islam or Muslims could be 
justified on the basis of other ʻclosed viewsʼ. 
I remain slightly perplexed about the fact that the newspaper illustrates, in the photo and 
the text, everything detrimental and denigratory -- possibly Islamophobic -- to Muslims. 
(Whitaker 2002, 53-57). One needs to re-analyze this particular article from the premise of 
the final closed view (point 8 in the Runnymede list), i.e, that Islamophobia was becoming 
increasingly ʻnaturalizedʼ. Looking at the headline alone, not only does it reaffirm the 
dualistic opposition of the over-employed simplistic entities ʻIslamʼ and ʻthe Westʼ, but it 
also indiscriminately uses the word ʻtheyʼ. My question here is very simple: who are the 
ʻtheyʼ? 
ʻTheyʼ are a fairly defined yet wholly indiscriminate group: ʻMuslimsʼ, as an external and 
separate entity. Such language confirms that all Muslims (ʻtheyʼ) hate ʻyouʼ, where ʻyouʼ 
becomes the everyday reader, part of an equally indiscriminate, undifferentiated and 
homogenous group. At the same time, this image reminded its readership that this was 
happening at the very heart of Muslim communities in Birmingham. Consequently, the 
logical assumption might be, that as a result of such blanket demonizing and inappropriate 
generalization, the newspaperʼs readership may become subsequently more suspicious 
and distrustful of those Muslims and their respective communities. Ultimately, such logic of 
stereotypy would cause Islamophobically motivated beliefs and attitudes to become 
increasingly accepted and taken for granted; in other words, a process of ʻnaturalisationʼ  
would occur. 
This leads me to ask another significant question regarding this article and what it stands 
for: ʻWhy?ʼ Why, for example, was the picture printed? Why were there so few words? 
And, Why was this particular piece printed in preference to others, particularly when 
Birmingham experienced no problems concerning its Muslim and non-Muslim communities 
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at the time? 
In attempting to answer this question, I suggest that we must go beyond the Runnymede 
typology of open and closed views. This is because, whilst they give indicators that 
negativity is present, they do not explain why or answer questions relating to the thought-
processes or reasoning that underpins the phenomenon. This might imply a lack of 
reason, or ascertain a self-feeding process (Damasio 2000, 13). 
Since there was no backlash or public questioning of the newspaper article either, one 
must also ask why such articles can covertly embody such meaning, whilst maintaining a 
natural or normal enough appearance.  
Islamophobia is clearly not as simple and single-layered as the Runnymede report might 
have (or possibly just appeared to have) suggested. 
The Runnymede theoretical framework for understanding Islamophobia excludes anything 
within its typology that can even begin to ask ʻwhyʼ and ʻwhatʼ; thus, it is largely redundant 
for anything beyond the superficial level. 
Subsequently, the ʻopen-closedʼ distinction cannot accommodate subtlety, complexity, 
difference or implication. And whilst it can identify, it cannot answer why (Modood 2005, 
56). 
My argument is that Islamophobia in the contemporary climate is a significantly different 
entity to what it was when the Runnymede report was produced, and it has certainly 
evolved as a ʻphenomenonʼ. Events, within the local and global contexts, have given 
impetus to allegedly ʻanti-Muslimʼ expressions that might be considered under the rubric of 
Islamophobia, and they might have given credence to theories and ideas that had 
previously been academically dismissed. Whilst Islamophobia is authoritatively defined in 
terms of the Runnymede report, in the British context at least, it is legitimate to ask, to 
what extent such authority and status continues to be relevant and justified today. 
Considering the remit of the Runnymede typology and definitions, it would seem that a 
reasonably vast disparity exists between the ʻsimplisticʼ Islamophobia via Runnymede, and 
a much more insidious, complex, implicit and naturalized version that is lingering outside 
its framework. Such processes can be better identified through a more detailed discursive 
analysis of the material to hand. And whilst an interdependence will almost certainly exist, 
there is much to suggest that research into Islamophobia now needs to go beyond the 
Runnymede baseline, and that we need to analyze more accurately the impact of the 
Runnymede theorization as well. 
That is to say, the most influential piece of research into Islamophobia in the UK 
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desperately needs reevaluation, refocusing and reassessment; not only in light of the 
reality of global contemporariness, but also in light of the fact that the report itself stated 
that the phenomenon of Islamophobia will be undergoing change, whereby it would shift 
and become relatively unidentifiable and unobserved as it goes through increasing 
ʻnaturalizationʼ or ʻnormalizationʼ. 
Also, as the sophistication of media reporting changes and reacts to these very same 
processes -- alongwith the very definite shifts that have occurred in this period of ʻurgent 
historyʼ (Nielsen 2003, 155) -- so too must we change the way in which we analyze the 
media in order to validly maintain a rigorous and legitimate anti-Islamophobia critique of it. 
Definitions and understandings of Islamophobia must therefore be flexible and fluid 
enough to be able to accommodate and acknowledge that some form of naturalization has 
occured, and will probably continue to occur, to the extent that the dichotomy established 
by the report is consistently reified in an unchecked way. 
This could be regarded as the failure of the evolution of the report and research into the 
phenomenon itself: not only has its legacy been stagnant and mostly ossified across 
academic research, possibly because of its distinctly ʻnon- academicʼ remit, but also as a 
policy document, it failed in getting many of its recommendations implemented.  
Without a radical overhaul of ideas and theoretical understanding, the increasing levels of 
ʻnormalizationʼ, and the greater sophistication and complexity of such disseminated 
messages and meanings, may result in a situation that becomes even more difficult to 
comprehend, as other rigid dualistic definitions, typologies, and dangerous ossifications 
come to hold sway. 
It is, therefore, essential that research into Islamophobia is continued beyond and outside 
the Runnymede legacy. There is always the risk that instead of erasing stereotypes, new 
ones will be created in a sort of self-feeding process that reproduces the same categories 
that the critique itself is meant to de-construct and de-legitimise. That itself might be the 
main failure of the Runnymede report. 
 
 
2001: Oldham and Burnley and Bradford riots: A retroactive omen for the enemy within 
 
2001 is considered by many scholars as a watershed year for British Muslims (Abbas 
2005, 46; McRoy 2006, 81; Modood 2005, 115;Ruthven 2002, 46). I am not fully convinced 
by this analytical framework and I contend that such a way of interpreting those events is 
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slightly rhetoric, or at least, not useful for understanding them. However, I acknowledge the 
fact that the above-mentioned time span was extremely dynamic and need a more careful 
examination that goes beyond the media sensationalism. 
In the summer of that year, riots (variously characterized as Asian/Muslim race riots) 
erupted in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford. Consequently, the Government commissioned 
reports on these disturbances. The reports approached the riots from the twin poles of 
ethnicity and socio-economic issues.This methodology virtually ensured that their 
conclusions would effectively reflect their presuppositions, because the deployment of 
those categories excluded a priori any other explanation or hypothesis of the emergence of 
a political discourse. 
Marsha Singh, the Labour MP for Bradford West, declared after the Bradford riots: ʻWe 
have to put the events into some sort of perspective. It was nothing to do with deprivation, 
this was sheer criminalityʼ (Thisisbradford, 2001). Furthermore, a police report stated that 
ʻthe majority of violent racist incidents are perpetrated by Asians on whites, which is an 
ongoing trend involving primarily Pakistani and Bangladeshi teenagersʼ. To support this 
view, the report added that ʻthe issue of racial attacks on whites dates back to 1992ʼ 
(Manchesteronline, 2001). 
A crucial question was raised by some scholars about whether seeing this as a racial issue 
was misleading, since the sociological explanation for the ʻNorthern riotsʼ significantly 
ignored the fact that the riots did not involve blacks, Hindus or Sikhs (Allen 2005; McRoy 
2006, 87; Verkaik 2010). Indeed, reports from Oldham recorded Muslim youth attacks on 
Hindus and blacks. It might be said that the riots had to be positioned mainly within a 
religious context and represented as a matter of ʻreligiousʼ hatred (Trepagnier 2006,43). I 
think that a view like this does not add or divert much from a ʻracialʼ or ʻethnicʼ explanation; 
it reproduces and re-presents the same categories within the culturalist-orientalist 
framework of analysis (Varisco 2005, 3). 
A further, more specific, question would be: what does ʻAsianʼ mean? Is it broadly referring 
to immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and their British-born children? Because, the 
majority of Asians rioting in the North of England were British Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, who were thereafter united by being subsequently targeted for their ʻIslamic 
faithʼ. 
Besides, within the problem-oriented approach to ethnic and religious identities, the 
generational issue is implicit, though often unstated. The police report itself highlights this 
as it refers to ʻAsian teenagersʼ. The groups most often positioned as being ʻin crisisʼ are 
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young people, particularly of course, young men. Although the category youth has been a 
popular focus of study since the 1950s, as Giroux (1996, 153) has aptly argued, the 
category ʻyouthʼ itself denotes a specific set of associations focusing on crisis, making the 
seamless link with deviance, violence and threat. Or as  Hebdige (1976, 3) appropriately 
points out, ʻyouthʼ in our society is present only when its presence is a problem. More 
precisely, the category youth gets mobilized in official documentary discourse, and 
concerned editorials at those times when young people make their presence felt by going 
ʻout of boundsʼ, by breaking rules and bottles, by issuing challenges to the law. In the 
specific case of the Northern riots, the question is: how did the Asian youth -- a 
demographic group largely invisible to white mainstream society -- once seen as passive 
and largely ignored, become the most volatile, destructive and misunderstood ʻkidsʼ of 
2001? Recall how the three minutes of news footage from Oldham showed young Asian 
men speaking in a northern slang, dressed in high street sports gear, and expressing 
grievances that few would have believed existed in 2001 (Masood 2006, 57). 
As Werbner (1990) observes, many studies of ethnic or religious communities tend to reify 
the community to the point of rendering the youth invisible, and where they do appear, 
usually as an afterthought, their generation is experienced as conflict and as a threat, as a 
product of cultural over-determination on the one hand, and ʻfailing masculinities on the 
otherʼ (ibid.,15). In this framework, the primary source of youth identities almost by default 
becomes the peer-group, a repository of self-esteem, security and status. That leads me to 
two observations. Firstly, that the representation of the riots as having been provoked by 
ʻyoung Asian teenagersʼ could also be explained by advancing the hypothesis that, within 
the culturalist orientalist attitude, there is a strong tendency of  ʻinfantilizationʼ of the Other. 
This implies representing the Other as not responsible of his/her actions, as being 
deprived of his/her agency, and thus, depoliticized (El Zein 1977, 232). Secondly, that 
there is another important category of representation implied here, which combines youth 
cultures with deviance, the ʻgangʼ. 
It might be stated that the idea of the ʻgangʼ is, in many ways, the ʻarchetypeʼ of the 
intersection of all these dimensions -- race/ethnicity/youth -- as the ultimate symbol of 
crisis, deviance and threat. Klein (1995, 191), for example, in the American context, has 
noted in his description of the American street Gang, that ʻgangʼ identity is largely defined as 
black, male youth. He argues that ʻgangsʼ tend to be self-identified groups of ethnically 
racially homogenous, almost exclusively African-American or Hispanic, men with an 
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average age of 20 years. In addition, they are always urban, territorially-based and 
involved in criminal activity, having a strong association with violence. Although the ʻBritishʼ 
history of gang activity traditionally differs (with its somewhat romanticized notion of the 
East End villains), it can be argued that the notion of gang has been re-inflected through 
the American discourse, to present the idea of the Gang as an already-raced entity, 
standing for the dangerous ʻOtherʼ in contemporary British society (Hall et al. 1978, 10; 
Hasan 2002, 35). It might be observed that the term works not only to naturalize and 
criminalize group identities, but it also serves as a substitute for analysis, in particular 
where ethnicity or race is privileged as the primary group-marker and offered as a self-
explanatory motivation for conflict or control. The same can easily be applied to religion as 
a primary group-marker, and this occurs in particular in relation to Islam as a religion. 
This sort of shifting of categories in the representation and perpetuation of ʻOthernessʼ is 
easily recognizable when we compare the media framework of analysis on the ʻNorthern 
riotsʼ before and after 9-11. 
The so-called summer riots, which were described as being the most violent in the UK in 
20 years, took place between May and July 2001, in the Northern cities of Oldham (25-28th 
May), Burnley (24-25th June) and Bradford (7th July), just two months before the 9-11 
events. By collecting articles and browsing through the BBC news for Bradford and West 
Yorkshire, the Bradford Telegraph, the Daily Telegraph, the Manchester on-line, and the 
Guardian, one finds the unanimous view that it was a matter of ʻracial clashesʼ, of ethnic 
community rivalries, stirred up by young Asian gangs, and escalating due to provocations 
from BNP members in Bradford. 
The explanation which is most often invoked, links the eruption of violence to the 
phenomenon of ʻethnic segregationʼ, and thus to the poor level of schooling among the 
young Asians, and to their inability to integrate with the wider ʻBritishʼ community 
(Trepagnier 2006, 45). 
Only a few voices arose at the time to point out the fact that the riots were not the product 
of racial or ethnic hatred among the Pakistani (Verkaik 2010), Bangladeshi, and Indian 
communities, but just a matter of ʻsheer criminalityʼ, that cannot be vaguely labeled as 
being ethnically inspired (Essed 1991, 17). 
However, as mentioned above, the ʻclimateʼ changed after the 9-11 events, when 
paradoxically -- it might be argued -- another type of gang came in handy: the Al-Qaeda 
(Asad 2006, 6). The ʻNorthern riotsʼ were now explained in terms of Muslim disaffection 
(Haddad and Qurqmazi 2002, 38) and their ʻunwillingnessʼ to integrate; in Britain clearly 
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the word ʻAsianʼ had outlived its usefulness (Varisco 2005, 55). 
During the period of autumn-winter 2001, politicians like the Prime Minister Tony Blair, and 
the Home Secretary David Blunkett, showed a certain readiness to jump on the 
bandwagon of labling the ʻBritish Muslimsʼ as a self-segregationist group and the enemy 
within (BBC Radio 4-18 November 2001). On the occasion of several official speeches 
regarding the need for ʻtackling extremism and violenceʼ among young Muslims in Britain, 
they found it useful to give the powerful example of the past ʻsummer riotsʼ (ibid.), by 
highlighting the fact that the young Muslim rioters (once described as Asians) had shown 
banners and symbols supporting Hamas (ibid.). This implicitly meant that in order to 
support Hamas, one had to be a Muslim foremost, and according to this logic, also a ʻbadʼ 
Muslim, who has to be put under surveillance (Mamdani 2004, 3). 
The other underlying assumption allowing analysts and observers like Blair and Blunkett to 
declare that it was a matter of Muslim riots (since they were supporting Hamas), (BBC 
Radio 4-18 November 2001) was that Hamas was considered to be as party whose 
allegiance was related to a religious membership and not to a political choice (Grillo 2003, 
159). Instead of acknowledging its ʻpoliticalʼ nature as an Islamist party, it was considered 
to be a sectarian expression of the Muslim minority in Britain (Trepagnier 2006, 69). 
Therefore, as the reasoning went, if you support Hamas, you have to be Muslim. For a 
group like Hamas, this tacitly rejects any chance of an independent political space 
detached from religion as the primary group-marker (Asad 2006, 21). It also reinforces my 
argument that the use of certain categories, and specifically that of religion, works in a way 
to depoliticize Islamist groups. (Marranci 2008, 7). 
On another interesting note, in a guise very similar to the Prime Minister Tony Blair, it was 
Nick Griffin, an ʻacceptableʼ face of BNP (and its chairman), of who said to Jeremy 
Paxman that it was not an Asian problem, it was a Muslim problem: ʻStop saying Asian. It 
is not Asian versus whites, this is a Muslim problem. There are Hindus who have been 
pushed out of their homes. There are West Indians who have been burnt outʼ (Newsnight, 
2001). 
My point is that there is little doubt that an assumption like this could be taken to be slightly 
Islamophobic. It is certainly peculiar that a leader from an active far-right party defends 
Blacks and Hindus and then talks about Muslim segregation? (Hasan 2002, 68) It might be 
stated that the BNP was playing out at a local level, what global forces have been claiming 
since the end of the Cold War, that Islam is the ʻnew communism and the new Enemy 
withinʼ (Barber 1996, 24; Del Valle 1997, 8; Huntington 1997, 11; Fallaci 2001, 34; Zakaria 
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2001). Furthermore, a similar approach -- as the Prime Ministerʼs declarations clearly 
testify -- is not just adopted by the infamously ʻIslamophobicʼ far-right parties, but it is much 
more widespread in the British political panorama (Siddiqui 2006, 123). 
Unfortunately, some scholars (McRoy 2006, 32) have also joined the ranks of media and 
politicians in the efforts to represent the once ʻracial/racistʼ summer riots as, newly 
discovered, ʻsectarianʼ clashes. Needless to remark that most of these ʻunmentionedʼ 
reports came to light in the aftermath of 9-11. 
According to this novel representation, of ʻMuslim riotsʼ, it was reported that Bradford 
churches had been physically vandalized, pastors and church officials physically attacked. 
It was mentioned that Rev. Paul Bilton of St. Columbaʼs and St.Wilfridʼs had reportedly 
stated that he had received physical threats from Muslim youths and his church had been 
threatened with arson. Similarly, Rev. Paul Ahckwood of St.Margaret allegedly faced 
intimidation from ʻMuslimʼ youths and the word HAMAS was spray painted on his church 
(ibid., 32-33). Such refashioned sectarian (as opposed to ʻracistʼ) representation finds a 
further element of credibility by mentioning the fact that a black majority Pentecostal 
church, Victor Road Church of God of Prophecy, was also intimidated. My suggestion is 
that there are two important elements, which have been used to justify the prevailing 
sectarian dichotomy over the racist one (Trepagnier 2006, 5). The very way of discoursing 
it, paradoxically, attestats of a very ʻracist and racialisedʼ view over an Islamophobic one 
(ibid,. 10). The church attacked was a ʻblack majority Pentecostal churchʼ; therefore, if 
ʻblackʼ is assaulted, then it could not be the case of a racial clash since black is still 
retained as the ʻOtherʼ in matters of race (Essed 1991, 56). But the target of the riot was a 
ʻChristianʼ church. Therefore, as per reasoning, the attackers had to be Muslims. This re-
proposes the ʻCrusadersʼ metaphor or Huntingtonʼs clash of civilizations (1997) in its post-
Cold War version. 
Thus, that this discourse and the representation of Islam as the Enemy Within, had 
developed quite consistently in the years following the riots (Marranci 2008, 57), to the 
extent that it was stated: ʻthere was no surprise that the 7-7 bombers originated from West 
Yorkshireʼ (this latter place being the scene of the riots) (McRoy 2006, 36). 
 
 
9-11 and the Iraq war: a self-fulfilling prophecy? 
 
As if to add substance to the discussion surrounding British Muslims and Islamists and 
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their primary form of allegiance -- as represented by the cuturalist-orientalist framework: 
religion over politics, Islam over Britain -- the 9-11 events came into the scene (Varisco 
2005, 46). 
Surprisingly, the terrorist attacks in the USA led to attacks on ʻMuslimsʼ and mosques 
across the UK, including in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast; this happened by and large, 
as an effect of the 9-11 events (McRoy 2006, 113). 
The terror attacks had also the effect of ʻpolarizingʼ British Muslims into two quite 
distinctive camps (Varisco 2005, 78; Mcghee 2005, 10) -- a minority deeply affected by 
ʻanti-Westernismʼ to the point of having an acute sense of ʻOccidentalismʼ (Said 1991, 67) 
and a vast majority who declared themselves to ʻbe proud of being British, Western and 
Muslimsʼ (Hussain 2004, 68). 
In this climate of ʻurgencyʼ, under the powerful effect of mirroring stereotypes, several UK 
Islamist groups felt bound to condemn the 9-11 attacks. In particular, the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB), as an umbrella organization raising Muslim issues ʻnationallyʼ (Mosaad 
2006, 35), stated that ʻBritish Muslims, along with everyone elseʼ, were watching ʻevents in 
America with shock and horrorʼ. They declared themselves to be standing ʻshoulder to 
shoulder with remarks made by our Prime Minister Tony Blairʼ, and conveyed ʻthe deepest 
sympathies to President Bush and the people of Americaʼ(MCB press release, 11-9-2001). 
However, parties such as the Supporters of Sharia (SOS) aired the theory of a Zionist plot 
behind the scenes. They stated that ʻ4000 Jews did not go to work at the World Trade 
Center on that day, 11 September 2001ʼ. They reported that Stern-Intel, Aeronautical 
experts had suggested ʻthat the plane was not even hijacked....Civil engineering experts 
suggest that it was a pure demolition, no steel framed towers fell like the way WTCʼs fallʼ 
(Angelfire, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the public pronouncements of British ʻMuslimʼ and Islamist identity were 
soon frustrated when the government committed troops to USA-led bombing of 
Afghanistan. While the majority of British Muslims unconditionally supported the bringing to 
trial of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the bombing 
of Afghanistan was seen as an indiscriminate act of aggression by America and Britain 
upon the Afghan nation. The MCB had no hesitation in questioning the validity of the 
bombings, and publicly condemning them. 
According to a ʻtemperature-gauging pollʼ conducted by The Muslim News online, the single 
most difficult issue for British Muslims to reconcile with, was the Governmentʼs role in 
international affairs (Muslimnews 2001). A massive 86 percent believed that UN and the 
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West had double standards in dealing with the ʻinjustice in the worldʼ (ibid.). More than two 
out of five agreed that if the West had been more tough and exacting against Israel, they 
would have been more supportive of action against Osama Bin Laden (ibid.). 
Therefore, an overwhelming 79% of Muslims disagreed that it was right to bomb 
Afghanistan, 73% said that they would have preferred a criminal investigation and an 
extradition process. More than 2/3rds believed that it was wrong of the USA and the West 
to describe September 11 as an act of war (ibid.). 
This was not the first time that the British had been exposed to the ʻeffectsʼ of Osama Bin 
Ladenʼs actions and USAʼs retaliation. In 1998, bombs had exploded in Kenya and 
Tanzania outside the US embassies, killing and maiming a number of people. Soon Al-
Qaeda was blamed by America, and in response the USA had bombed Sudan and 
Afghanistan because of their purported links with the dissident leader (McRoy 2006, 89). 
The MCB had charged at that time that the American action was a ʻclear violation of lawʼ, 
ʻtaking us back to the days of gunboat diplomacy when might was right and the law of 
jungle prevailedʼ(MCB, 1998). Similarly, the IHRC had attacked the bombings as abuses of 
international law, and by accused Clinton of trying to divert attention from the Monica 
Lewinsky crisis (IHRC 2005). 
These reactions demonstrate how widespread and deep-rooted the overt opposition to US 
policy had become amongst British Islamists (Allen 2005, 89). However, it should be noted 
that this is not generally to the way migrant minorities sympathize with their home 
governments being in confrontation with the host country (Haddad and Qurqmazi 2002, 
78). Pakistan, Bangladesh and Yemen, for instance, are US allies. So the support for 
Sudan or Afghanistan was not based upon a sentiment of ethnic nostalgia;comparatively, 
a minority of British Muslims are of Sudanese or Afghan heritage (ibid.,80). Rather, my 
argument is that this was a political stand: an Islamist one, which could not be represented 
by using an ethnic or diasporic ʻcategorizationʼ of the phenomenon (Grillo 2003, 160). 
When Islamist organizations like the MCB condemned the UKʼs bombing of Afghanistan, 
they were asserting their politicals view and beliefs, as conveyed by the ʻideologicalʼ 
metaphor of the Ummah (Marranci 2008, 61). 
A culturalist-orientalist approach, as displayed by several commentators, would point to 
the fact that this was the case of a religious (Islamic) response prevailing over a political or 
national one (ibid., 57); that the reason behind the support for ʻradical Islamist statesʼ like 
Afghanistan is the common Muslim heritage and the priority given to the religious identity 
over a secularized one (Keppel 2001, 57; McRoy 2006, 115; Ruthven 1998, 79). Once 
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again, the culturalist-orientalist analysis works to avoid a ʻpoliticalʼ analysis of the 
phenomenon: essentially, it degrades and downplays the ʻIslamistʼ (and not ʻMuslimʼ) 
challenge to UKʼs foreign policies in Afghanistan (Hasan 2002, 67). Besides, reflections 
like these are likely to raise further ʻrhetoricalʼ questions about British Muslims -- are they 
British Muslims or Muslims in Britain? (Varisco 2005, 79). 
Why are the same questions of allegiance and identity not put to non-Muslim anti-war 
campaigners or political dissenters? British Catholics are not suspected of subversion to 
the monarchy because of their alleged loyalty to Rome and the Pope. Nor are the majority 
of Irish Catholics suspected to be members of the IRA. British Jews who have the luxury of 
dual nationality (British and Israeli) are not asked to prioritize their oaths of allegiance, 
even after many have offered military service in Israel. The culturalist-orientalist approach 
functions in a way that denies the political of the Islamist parties, and reduces everything 
which has the word Islam as its ʻlexemeʼ and its signifier (e.g., Islamism) to being a matter 
purely of religious beliefs. It does this by maintaining that the relation between Islam and 
Islamism is direct. Furthermore, the underlying assumption is that groups and parties 
which politically speak the language of religion are dangerously fanatical and have to be 
disenfranchised. 
In this climate of ʻurgencyʼ, it is also relevant to examine the role played by the Stop the 
War Coalition, that was formed shortly after 9-11 (Marranci 2008, 63) to protest against the 
Afghanistan War. It is a very broad alliance of leftists, pacifists and Muslims (notably the 
Muslim Association of Britain, or MAB). The movement grew even more in the wake of the 
UK-US plans to attack Iraq, when ʻMuslimsʼ were joined by a majority expressing the 
public skepticism about this war (Seddon, Hussain and Malik 2004, 135). This was 
exhibited in a very practical way on 15 February 2003, when upto two million people 
congregated in Hyde Park to protest about the war plans. More importantly, the rally 
organizers went further than opposing the war on Iraq, they demanded ʻFreedom for 
Palestineʼ (ibid., 136). 
The fact that the 2003 Hyde Park rally was comprised of a very broad alliance of political 
parties might be said to have sheltered the Islamist groups and protesters from any further 
accusation of fanatical behavior or suspected allegiance to a global Islamic community 
(Marranci 2008, 65). This merely confirms the view that ʻMuslimsʼ -- read Islamist groups -- 
are always under the obligation to prove their credentials: unless proven to be ʻgoodʼ, 
every Muslim is presumed to be ʻbadʼ (Mamdani 2004, 36). Once again, the presumption 
that there are such categories masks a refusal to open a serious political debate or 
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address the failure to make a serious political analysis of the phenomenon itself (ibid., 38). 
 
 
The prophecy fulfilled: the 7-7 bombings 
 
The 7/7 attacks on the London underground in Aldgate, Edgware Road, Russell Square 
and on a bus in Tavistock Square are considered to be another watershed moment in the 
history of the British Muslim community (McRoy 2006, 10; Phillips 2006, 2). The 
ʻcommunity relationsʼ re-kindled in the aftermath of the Hyde Park rally soon returned to a 
very unsteady and frail state; as if to confirm that the number of suspected ʻbadʼ Muslims 
was still outnumbering the good ones and ʻIslamʼ had once again proven to be the ʻEnemy 
Withinʼ (Barber 1996, 56; Del Valle 1997, 56; Fallaci 2001, 6; Zakaria 2001). 
The oddity consisted in the fact that Britain had faced terrorist outrages before,(notably by 
the IRA), but it was observed that there were two essential differences: three of the four 
bombers were from mainland Britain (highlighting that they were essentially betrayers of 
the motherland) and, the attacks were ʻmartyrdom operationsʼ, confirming the clear Islamic 
stigma (Dodd 2005; Duff 2005; Mendick 2005; Morris and Benetto 2005; McRoy 2006, 5). 
As if to add substance to similar Islamophobic understandings of the events, there was a  
wave of Islamophobic attacks across the country, including attacks on mosques, assaults 
on Muslims, anti-Muslim graffiti, and in one case, the murder of a Muslim man. The 
Guardian reported that the number of ʻfaith hate crimesʼ had risen five-fold in the fortnight 
since the London bombings. Such statements were supported by the official reports from 
the Metropolitan Police that recorded 800 ʻraceʼ and ʻfaith hateʼ crimes after the July 7 
attacks and reported that nationally, the figure for ʻhate incidents directed at Muslims has 
passed 1200 as a backlash continuesʼ (Dodd 2005). 
On the other hand, there was a swift response from the main Islamist organizations. The 
MCB expressed its utter condemnation of these ʻindiscriminate acts of terror in Londonʼ 
(Vikram, 2005). The IHRC were equally forthright, condemning ʻin no uncertain termsʼ, the 
ʻattacksʼ perpetrated in London. Likewise, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC) 
conveyed similar sentiments, but also pointed out that UK foreign policy was the main 
cause of the attacks. It further urged Muslims, and in particular Mosque leaders and 
Mosque Media teams to be proactive in countering Islamophobia, by calling for a rethink of 
the root cause of the incidents (MPAC press release, 2005). 
Other Islamist parties such as Hizbu-ut-tahrir, Al-Ghurabaa, and the Saved Sect were less 
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urgent in issuing any condemnation, waiting for evidence but nonetheless observing that 
such acts contradicted Islamic law. The HT observed (wisely in my opinion) that to 
condemn Muslims qua Muslims with little evidence would be just an act of self-catharsis, ʻin 
order to remove the pressure from ourselvesʼ(Hizbu-ut-Tahrir, 2005). 
One relevant aspect of all those official declarations, reports and culturalist-orientalist 
representations (Marranci 2008, 35) in the aftermath of 7-7, was that the crimes, assaults 
and abuses against ʻMuslimsʼ qua Muslims were exclusively regarded as ʻfaith hateʼ 
crimes, whereas the ʻattacksʼ on ʻLondonersʼ (considered to be Muslim attacks) were 
undoubtedly regarded as terrorist: innocent civilians had been killed (Trepagnier 2006, 8). 
The interesting observation is that Muslims had only been defined by their religious 
membership: perceived on the whole as an indiscriminate entity, identified merely by their 
faith,as per the assumptions at the core of the culturalist-orientalist framework (Varisco 
2005, 9). Conversely, when ʻMuslimsʼ allegedly launch attacks on other fellow ʻhumanʼ 
beings, this same obsession with categories and primary group-markers (religion) totally 
vanishes (Asad 2006, 39); the whole event is represented by using the neutral noun of 
ʻciviliansʼ and is dramatized by speaking of ʻvictimsʼ. 
My point here is that this is a further example of the way in which the culturalist-orientalist 
approach frames issues and represents events. This dissertation argues that the same 
stereotypes and ʻracializedʼ categories of analysis insidiously affect, the stereotyped as 
well, to the point that such categories become constitutive of the way that the debate is 
structured, without a possible alternative, but still within its discursive domain (Grillo 2003, 
157; Varisco 2005, 78). In doing, so the operation of depoliticization goes unnoticed till it is 
allowed and finally endorsed by the stereotyped themselves; dynamics my thesis explains 
in terms of a fetishism for politics, which is  nurtured equally by both the dominant and the 
dominated, the stereotypers and the stereotyped (El Zein 1977, 136). The tragic 
consequences are the persistence of a security threat on one side, and the political failure 
of the Islamist parties, on the other. 
In the aftermath of the 7-7 bombings, London had become a centre for foreign militants 
ʻmullahsʼ and it had been dubbed Londonistan (Phillips 2006, 5). There were endless 
comments on the need to counter ʻextremistʼ teaching, though there was no precise 
definition of the term itself. Despite the vagueness of the concept, and perhaps because of 
it, extremism soon became a very popular ʻtropeʼ in the official discourses (Asad 2006, 6). 
On 19th July, Prime Minister Tony Blair met with 25 Muslim leaders in order to ʻtackle 
extremismʼ. The main outcome of the encounter was to set up a task-force that ʻwould 
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explore the extent of disaffection among the Muslim populationʼ (Morris-Bennetto 2005). 
The first element that was soon questioned was the composition of the group that had met 
with Blair. It was noticed that there was a dearth of younger Muslims in the delegation; as 
the Guardian observed, they were ʻmostly established figures in their 40s and olderʼ (Dodd-
White, 2005). Considering that ʻthe bombers were from the younger generationʼ (ibid.), this 
was a questionable response to the events of 7-7. In other words, the issue was mainly 
framed as a ʻgenerationalʼ crisis of ʻyoung Muslimsʼ disaffectionʼ with Britain and with 
British politics. As previously mentioned, the clever use of those two categories combined 
(youth criminality and disaffection to politics) set the framework of analysis and provided the 
solution to the problem at the same time. 
The generation gap in the British Muslim community was also expressed by the MPAC in 
its main response and reactions to 7-7 (MPACUK 2005). Following the Government 
guidelines, MPAC wanted mosques to educate their youth ʻin the British political process 
as a way of addressing issues of concernʼ(ibid.). Since 7-7, this effort had been consistent; 
a survey of over 100 mosques was carried out to check if Mosque leaders had in fact 
taken ʻany serious steps to stop this happening again by educating the youth and 
channeling their anger into a more constructive routeʼ. The outcome -- according to MPAC 
-- was not encouraging, since every mosque called ʻhad not taken any steps to change 
their syllabus or reach out to young Muslims to ensure that they were educated about how 
they could practically make a differenceʼ (ibid.). The main failure, according to this report, 
consisted of the fact that the Muslim leaders seemed not to take the threat seriously and 
they were certainly ʻfailing in their responsibilityʼ (ibid.). 
If the Muslim community and its leaders were to blame, we might also consider that there 
was very little proof that the 7-7 bombers had links with any ʻextremist or radicalʼ 
organizations (ibid). As the investigation into the bombing proceeded, it emerged that, 
whilst the Edgware Road bomber Siddique Khan did have some tenuous links with 
ʻmilitantsʼ, the other four were ʻclean-skinsʼ (in the media vocabulary, this meant men with 
no established ties to ʻextremist or terrorist groupsʼ) (McRoy 2006, 79). 
This really undermines the assumption that it is the membership of a radical organization 
or exposure to ʻradical preachersʼ (Asad 2006, 67) that radicalizes British Muslims.Another 
observation might be that the role of the mosque in producing the kind of ʻAl-Qaeda typesʼ 
who carried out 7-7 is highly questionable. My argument is that this overall way of framing 
the debate and setting the analysis is not just questionable, but highly misleading. Further, 
I maintain that the use of certain categories and the obsession with some of them, is a way 
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of avoiding a more careful examination, or perhaps, of silencing a more accurate one 
(Damasio 2002, 115). 
At this point, the supporters of the theory that the answer to the ʻAl Qaeda type of violenceʼ 
is in the Qur’an and in Islam as a set of beliefs, quote the words pronounced by the 
bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan in a video aired by Al Jazeera TV on 1st September 
2005 (BBC News 2005). 
According to this essentialist and ʻessentialisingʼ analysis (within a culturalist-orientalist 
framework), his words demonstrate the futility of trying to persuade Al-Qaeda supporters of 
the ʻimmoralityʼ of their actions, because ʻtheir source of ethicsʼ is not based on ʻsecular 
humanismʼ but rather on the Qur’an and hadith (Barnwell 2005; McRoy 2006, 115; Phillips 
2006, 125). Other similar analyses point at the fact that echoes of Bin Laden could be 
heard in Siddique Khanʼs claim that the support of ʻhostile governmentsʼ by their 
electorates make the voters culpable in government actions. Khan had indicated that the 
provocation of the attack lay in the governmentʻs foreign policy, and that he and his 
brothers were responding to what they saw as attacks on Muslims world-wide; the 
language of Ummah and of defensive jihad was clearly expressed in his words (McRoy 
2006, 116; Phillips 2006, 128). 
Taking a similar interpretation of Khanʼs words, my first observation would be that a good 
methodology consists of exercising extreme caution when dealing with discourse from a 
subject in general, and that is an obvious fact that you ʻmust not take their word for itʼ 
(Bower 2007, 29). My second comment would be that the so-defined ʻsource of ethicsʼ is 
not based on the Qur’an and on the hadith per se, but rather on what -- I would say -- the 
Qur’an and the hadith are perceived and understood to be saying (Marranci 2006, 19). 
Thus, it is not important what the Qur’an and the hadith actually say, but what Muslims -- 
and in this case Islamists -- say the Qur’an says. A sacred book is not, in fact, a text where 
everything is put in unequivocal terms; by definition, it has various arguments and 
interpretations. If there is still a debate about what the Qur’an really says, it means that 
nobody really knows or that the people who think they know, disagree among themselves 
(Roy 2004, 89). 
In a broader context then, my argument is that Al-Qaeda or the ʻAl-Qaeda typeʼ of violence 
is not an isolated phenomenon. Suicide attacks became a standard tactic of guerrilla 
warfare in the 80s through the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who supposedly 
practice Hinduism. The first suicide attack on Israeli soil was perpetrated in 1972, by the 
Japanese Red Army; supposedly the product of the Confucian ʻcivilisationalʼ religion (ibid., 
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91). Hence, that it is rather difficult, and it could be misleading, to link suicide attacks to 
specific religions or cultures. 
A different possible interpretation could be that the real genesis of Al-Qaeda violence has 
more to do with a Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt for an elusive ideal 
world than with the Quranic conception of martyrdom (Asad 2006, 41; Gray 2007, 5). It is 
certainly striking that the delusional overemphasis on Islam is peculiar in the clichéd 
reference to the 72 houris, perpetual virgins, and so on, who are expecting the martyr. In 
my view, it is highly improbable that the two Palestinian women who committed suicide 
attacks in 2002 were driven by the prospect of houris. The figure of the lonely 
ʻmetaphysicalʼ terrorist who blew himself up with his bomb appeared in Russia at the end 
of the 19th century and it was soon treated as a literary topic by Malraux in the La 
Condition Humain (1933). 
Put another way, Al-Qaedaʼs type of ʻjihadʼ could be more related to the ethos of a 
Western terrorist, given that Al-Qaedaʼs pool of recruitment has more to do with the West 
than with the Middle East (Asad 2006, 29). It follows that the discourse and practice of 
British Islamism, and of Islamist parties in the UK, have to be located and ʻdiscoursedʼ in a 
specific context and within a geographical space: the British one. The reference to the 
global ʻUmmahʼ is rhetorical (Marranci 2008, 103) and part of a political discourse: the 
political groups can certainly discourse through the vocabulary of religion, but this does not 
make them ʻfundamentalistʼ and terrorist. In other words, analysis ought to consider and 
focus on their political, without censoring and neglecting it behind religious categories of 
analysis (as is done within culturalist-orientalist frameworks. 
My hope is that the following pages of this dissertation will contribute to such an analysis, 
which will serve as a prelude to framing signifying representations and discursive, 
contested, contextual practices,thus enabling a more ʻsensateʼ democracy where diversity 








The un-political discourses of being political 
 
This chapter and the next one open the second part of this dissertation on the Islamistsʼ 
ʻself-representationʼ: the discourses and practices of British Islamists facing and 
confronting the UK Government on Islamist and Islamic issues.  
The findings presented here are the product of over two years of fieldwork, spent meeting 
and interviewing a large number of Islamists, in various locations, within and outside 
London.  
I have divided the Islamists into two separate groups, according to their approach to the 
British political and public life: the participationists -- groups willing to take part in the 
British political and public life (featured in this chapter), and the rejectionists -- groups 
rejecting the British political  system and planning to subvert it (featured in chapter 6). 
The participationist parties act politically (as they are willing to take part in the elections), 
but paradoxically, show a certain reticence in adopting any political label themselves. They 
opt to remain in the category of the ʻfaith groupsʼ, with a collaborative and non-
confrontational approach. In doing so, they emulate and mirror the same dominant 
culturalist-orientalist discourse, which depoliticizes and marginalises them. 
As my dissertation argues, they put themselves in the position of being ʻscrutinizedʼ and 
represented according to the dichotomous culturalist-orientalist framework of analysis, 
which either represents them as ʻgood Muslimsʼ (non-political religious groups) or as ʻbad 
Muslimsʼ (terrorists, a national security threat, and therefore, still non-political). 
The paradox in this behaviour consists of the fact that, the groups themselves act 
politically in terms of political practices and agendas (domestically and internationally), but 
refuse to acknowledge their political discourse in dealing with the Government and the 
dominant discourse. There is a sort of fear or repression of a political identity, which is 
exorcized by the Government and repressed by the parties themselves. My dissertation 
explains this dynamic through the concept of a fetishism for politics: a desire, repressed by 
the dominated (the Islamist parties) and exorcized by the dominant (the Government and 
the culturalist-orientalist approach), for purposes of control. 
The rejectionist parties featured in the next chapter nurture a similar fetishism for politics, 
but their attitude toward the British government is discoursed through a rejection. My 
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argument is that such a confrontational approach places them in a similar depoliticized, 
ʻweakʼ position when facing the dominant discourse, which, in turn, represents them as 
ʻreligious fundamentalistsʼ, terrorists, and still non-political. 
Here again there is a mirroring effect between the dominant representation and the self-
representation of the dominated. Even if the reflecting surfaces (the images) of the 
participationists and rejectionists appear as being opposites (the first being collaborative 
and the second being rejectionist) the outcome is similar in both cases -- their 
depoliticization and their lack of  ʻincisivenessʼ in the political panorama, resulting in a 
broken dialogue between them and the Government. 
 
 
The Islamic Human Rights Commission 
 
As mentioned in the introduction (in the ʻmethodologyʼ section), reflecting on how to collect 
and report data about the experience of the ʻotherʼ has not secured my ʻobjectivityʼ or 
impartiality in conducting this research. However, it has helped me to better understand 
my own limits as a researcher, and the contextual, contingent, and inherently political 
aspects of the present research topic. 
The political is deeply entangled within the research process itself: in the face-to-face, first-
hand collection of data and information, in the understanding and in the accounting of it, in 
the difficult acknowledgement of my own stake in the analysis. This awareness of limits 
has not foreclosed a deeper comprehension of the subject, it has instead opened new 
doors, offered the keys for a less essentialised, less structured but more progressive and 
fruitful method of inquiry and analysis. 
This was my mindset when I started analysing the first group of Islamist parties, namely, 
groups willing to participate in the British political and public life and as such intrinsically 
political. The first party to be featured in the present study is the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission (IHRC). 
The IHRC essentially began life when it split off from the Muslim Parliament of Great 
Britain (MPGB) which was founded by Kalim Siddiqui. Siddiquiʼs death was followed by 
some rifts and tensions within the MPGB, which led to the defection of the MPGBʼs human 
rights committee alongwith its leader, Shadjareh, who then founded the IHRC. 
At its very beginning, the MPGB was definitely characterised by an outspoken 
confrontational attitude towards the Government. The Rushdie affair saw the climax of the 
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MPGB approach, which accused the UK political system of being inherently Islamo-phobic. 
However, this kind of approach was not limited to just the establishment but was also 
directed toward other Islamist parties. Remarkably, Siddiqui stated that he would not go 
ʻcap in handʼ to other organizations that were ʻalienatedʼ from him; it was advisable that 
they ʻremained outʼ (Siddiqui 1993, 2). It would not be overstating the case to say that 
there was a certain lack of ʻcollaborativeʼ approach in his political attitude. He had an 
urgent sense of being invested with the role of the leader and, as such, of ʻdictatingʼ the 
rules and making the choices. 
An aggressive attitude of this kind backfired and the immediate outcome was that the 
Government ignored the body and the Home Office Minister Patten dismissed the venture 
by expressing the hope that all law-abiding Muslims would reject such ʻnonsenseʼ (Keppel 
1997, 144). This led to a high degree of isolation for the MPGB, as was visible during the 
1993 MPGB Bosnia conference which had 3000 people in attendance (including speakers 
even from pro-Ikwan around the world), but was boycotted by the other Islamist 
organizations, such as the UMO, Bradford Council of Mosques, UKIM, and the Islamist 
Foundation. In the words of one Islamist leader (Q-News 1993, 7), the gathering was 
boycotted as a way of denying recognition to, and ostracizing, Siddiquiʼs leadership. 
Participation in the event ʻwould have given Siddiqui precisely the credibility he does not 
deserveʼ (Ehsan 1993, 6). Besides, Siddiquiʼs championing of ʻIslamic Iranʼ was something 
that many Sunni Muslims could not accept (Philips 1996, 16). In other words, the entire 
political discourse and the practices of the early Islamist scene in the UK seemed to be 
revolving around personal struggles for power and leadership, something not too different 
ʻstructurallyʼ from the stories and experiences of other political parties, despite their 
different ideological orientations and the rather secularised origins and formations. Here 
again, my argument is that the ʻIslamicʼ element has to be comprehended and positioned -
- within and because of a political practice and discourse -- as a struggle for power, 
according to the various political programmes and mainly according to different degrees of 
preoccupation with taking the power. It is the culturalist-orientalist approach, which tries to 
deprive Islamism of its ʻpoliticalʼ dimension and excludes it from the political arena and 
competition, under the category of faith groups. 
This was the Islamist panorama when the IHRC was founded, amid power and leadership 
struggles.  In the words of Philips, ʻthe IHRCʼs main achievement was to move away from 
the MPGBʼs confrontational nature and to remain firmly interdenominationalʼ (Philips 1996, 
8). Likewise, it has shown a more collaborative attitude with other faith-based groups, 
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sharing the same perspective on human rights with the Sikh Human Rights Group or the 
anti-Zionist Orthodox Jewish Group. For example, in June 2005, they organized a 
conference on the theme ʻTowards a new liberation theology: reflections on Palestineʼ, 
which was aimed at ʻdiscussing the role religion plays in the lives of peoples, struggling for 
justice looking at other liberation strugglesʼ (IHRC, 2005). The speakers included an 
Evangelical Anglican vicar, an Irish Catholic priest, Orthodox Rabbis, an Israeli lecturer, a 
Greek Orthodox priest and an American Sunni Imam. The event, which gained great 
appreciation from other Islamist groups, and even more kudos from other ʻfaith groupsʼ, 
was meant to demonstrate -- in the words of the IHRC leader -- the ʻpolitical independence 
of the organization, the lack of affiliation to any other party or government. A main concern 
of the IHRC is the rights of Muslims in the UK and abroad, in accordance with Islamic 
teachings and doctrineʼ (IHRC, 2005). The overall impression, however, is that the group 
itself has been refusing any political label, mostly opting to remain in the category of the 
ʻfaith groupsʼ. Taking a collaborative and non-confrontational approach, it has sought 
refuge in the realm of the ʻreligious groupsʼ, which are not interested in politics as ʻstruggle 
for power, dictated by human greedʼ.23 It is hard not to question such an understanding of 
ʻpoliticsʼ, given that there is a clear support for Palestine as a liberation struggle; the 
origins and aims of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict having a dubious role of religion, it being 
(in my opinion) a war of national independence or ʻpost-colonial liberationʼ (Massari 1979, 
82). Such an attitude could be elaborated in terms of the ʻcolonizedʼ being the exact image 
of the colonizerʼs imagination (Memmi 1969-2003, 189); participationists like the IHRC 
unconsciously mirror the culturalist-orientalist approach that depoliticizes and ostracises 
them. It ʻallowsʼ them to act only within the domain of faith-groups, which reads as being 
non-political (Varisco 2005, 78). The practice of self-representation, performed by the party 
itself, reflects the representation offered by the dominant discourse, in this case by the UK 
Government. My argument is that both parties are locked in a fetishism for politics, which is 
repressed by the dominated while being denied and exorcised by the dominant, as a 
practice of control. The outcome of this attitude is a dangerous and risky dynamic, which 
depoliticises and ostracizes the Islamist parties on the one hand, and threatens national 
security, on the other. In each case, both actors are doomed to fail: the Islamist parties 
end up being politically irrelevant and the Government becomes unable to protect national 
security. 
                                            
23 An interview with Mr. Emdad Rahman, a former activist of the IHRC, is contained in the appendix. 
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It is interesting that the parties featured in this chapter perform political practices but they 
silence political discourses: they act politically at the domestic and international levels but 
they do not ʻdiscourseʼ politically (Buck-Morss 2003, 36). 
Since its inception, the IHRC has produced reports on various international and domestic 
issues; its declared main aim being to ʻlook into discrimination cases in Britain as part of 
our campaign to make religious discrimination illegalʼ (IHRC 1996). In this specific regard, 
the IHRC also achieved something that Siddiqui never managed -- securing publication of 
its report on religious discrimination, Anti-Muslim Discrimination and Hostility in the United 
Kingdom, 2000. It was launched by Lord Ahmed at a meeting in the House of Lords that 
was addressed by the Home Office Minister Mike OʼBrien. The launch of the report clearly 
marked an end to the lack of access to Government and the hostile attitude that had 
hindered the MPGB in the previous years. Notably, the report concerned what was 
considered to be the most immediate problem confronting British Muslims: domestic 
Islamophobia, something that allegedly the ʻisolation of the MPGB never allowed it to 
address in any practical or effective wayʼ (Bodi 2000, 12-13). 
The IHRC has also produced reports on the Oldham Riots (2001) and the BNP. Moreover, 
it conducted a strong campaign for ʻPrisoners of Faithʼ, i.e., ʻMuslim political prisonersʼ 
around the world, including those at Guantanamo Bay (IHRC 2000, 4-6). My point here is 
that ʻcampaigningʼ for political prisoners is certainly a ʻpoliticalʼ activity, regardless of the 
fact that the prisoners themselves are Muslim and therefore defined by a religious 
membership. By silencing their own political discourse, the partyʼs chance of having a 
voice in the British political arena is deeply undermined or mostly self-denied. The hostile 
attitude of the MPGB towards the Government and the confrontational and slightly 
egocentric approach shown by its leader Siddiqui did not achieve many results in terms of 
political influence on the politics of the UK Government. However, I think that the IHRC 
approach is also damaging in the long term. A depoliticized approach is equally counter-
productive in terms of representation, recognition and engagement in the political arena 
(Grillo 2003, 170). The outcomes of these two attitudes have been the following -- either 
being ostracized by the establishment (Siddiqui case), or alternatively, being ʻallowedʼ to 
speak, after being regarded as a faith-group, that implies ʻnon-politicalʼ, and consequently, 
non-threatening (Mamdani 2004, 34). 
The IHRC criticism of human rights abuses has not been restricted to Western governments 
(such as France on the hijab issue or other ʻliberal Muslim countriesʼ such as Turkey on 
similar matters), it has also condemned ʻmilitantʼ Islamic regimes such as Sudan for 
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Human Rights abuses in Darfur, ʻa fact that makes our work more credibleʼ (IHRC 2004, 
8). However, a declaration such as the following denotes a certain degree of self-
orientalism by the IHRC: 
ʻthe situation in Sudan has been a crunch issue for Muslims everywhere. The 
initial silence from Muslims evidenced a combination of a lack of knowledge 
of the situation, and a reluctance to take a stance when Muslims are the 
oppressorsʼ (IHRC 2004, 6-8) 
By referring to the ʻoppressorsʼ as ʻMuslimsʼ and by appealing to the rest of the Muslims 
(qua Muslims) for a decisive action, the IHRCʼs stance reflects a culturalist-orientalist 
approach (Said 1978, 299). It is a relatively myopic way of conducting a political analysis, 
which degrades the ʻpolitical credentialsʼ of its discourse and undermines the practices of 
its political agents (El Zein 1977, 230). 
In this same context, Shadjareh expounded the IHRC position on the relationship between 
Islam, human rights and democracy in a presentation in the year 2000. In his view, the 
most important element in the meaning of ʻIslamic Human Rightsʼ is: to stand against 
ʻoppressors, whoever they are and wherever they are, even when this means standing 
witness against ourselves and our own people…The whole of the sharia law deals with the 
question of implementing justice and mizaan (balance)ʼ (IHRC, 2000). 
It has been noted that Shadjarehʼs points on justice and resistance to oppressors are very 
close to the Shiʼia positions. ʻThe emphasis on divine justice has influenced not only the 
theoretical aspects of Shiʼism, for the Shiʼia regard justice as such so fundamental an 
aspect of Islam that they have often called for its implementation in societyʼ (Shomali 2003, 
93). Another surprised commentator claims that there is no reference to Khomeiniʼs theory 
of the Vilayet-i-Faqihi in the IHRC discourse (McRoy 2006, 121). In other words, within this 
(culturalist-orientalist) framework, either Shadjarehʼs discourse neglects some important 
theological/ideological aspects or alternatively his discourse shows clear signs of 
plagiarism. 
That the main priority of the IHRC might consist of addressing subjects from a practical 
perspective and not from a theological/ideological angle, is not contemplated. Further, the 
reflection that it is difficult and mystifying, within the Islamist discourses and practices, to 
draw a line between the Shiʼia and the Sunni ʻfrontsʼ, does not even enter the analysis 
(Marranci 2008, 45). Such analysis is deeply affected by a culturalist-orientalist attitude 
and by several stereotypes and misconceptions of Islamist discourses and practices 
(Hasan 2002, 6). 
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Even so, the IHRCʼs approach toward the use and implementation of Sharia law appears 
to be much more contextualised, even though there are still some aspects of an apologetic 
emphasis and a culturalist-orientalist approach, where ʻIslamʼ becomes a category, which 
ʻexplainsʼ but also ʻessentializesʼ everything (Marranci 2008, 7). 
The IHRC also reproduced an interview with Sheik Ibraheem Zakzaky, who firmly stated 
that ʻIslamic law is not meant to be practiced under an un-Islamic systemʼ, warning against 
the abusive implementation of Sharia in order ʻto oppress peopleʼ (IHRC, 1999). 
Likewise, the IHRC has also supported calls for Iran to improve the treatment of religious 
minorities by encouraging the Islamic Republicʼs authorities to ʻcontinue their efforts 
towards the full realization of the Human Rights of the religious minority citizens of the 
country as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsʼ (ibid.,). 
In relation to jihad, the IHRC affirms that it wages a ʻpolitical jihadʼ, which mostly signifies, 
in practice, the involvement in, and support of, Muslim rights and political causes in the UK  
and abroad. Strikingly, this amounts to a full declaration of a political engagement but still 
there is a clear division between the category of religion and politics. As it emerges, the 
IHRC is willing to support the ʻpoliticalʼ within a faith-group discourse. It does, in fact, 
support the political rights of ʻMuslimsʼ as religious subjects but it refuses to be called 
political (Grillo 2003,158), to advance its political rights, and to stand as a political party. 
My observation is that such an approach is somewhat schizophrenic. It also confirms my 
hypothesis of a sort of fetishism for politics, nurtured by the party itself, which performs a 
political practice, but refuses to speak ʻloudlyʼ (openly) about a political discourse. It 
advances, instead, a sort of ʻcommunity-faith groupʼ discourse, displaying a self-
ghettoization attitude (Damasio 2000, 56). This is typical -- I argue -- of certain kinds of 
politics of identity practices and discourses (Marranci 2008, 55). These are generally 
hailed in a period of multiculturalist ʻfrenzyʼ but abruptly criminalised in a period of turmoil 
and political instability, as the events following the 9-11 and 7-7 attacks have clearly 
shown (Asad 1993, 268). 
This position was clarified in the aftermath of 9-11, which the IHRC unequivocally 
condemned. However, the organization specified that whilst its condemnation of Al-Qaida 
was beyond doubt, there remained the need to make a distinction between Al-Qaida and 
what Al-Qaida considered legitimate resistance movements. In this respect, the reference 
was to Palestine. Its own contribution to the Palestinian struggle has led the IHRC to picket 
the Zionist Federationʼs Celebration of Israel. It has also taken part in other pro-Palestinian 
events and it was very active in the Stop the War rallies. To assume that the movement is 
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not ʻpoliticalʼ but just a ʻfaithʼ group supporting ʻMuslim rights in the UK and abroadʼ -- for 
the fact that its ʻtheologicalʼ and ʻideologicalʼ apparatus is poorly organized (McRoy 2006, 
132) -- amounts to a culturalist-orientalist position. Likewise, on the matter of self-
representation, the fact that the IHRC declares itself as just ʻreligiousʼ and fighting for 
ʻMuslim rightsʼ because they inwardly consider politics to be despicable (fetishism), equally 
amounts to an essentialist position, which forecloses political action and denies the 
possibility of being publicly heard and represented (Damasio 2002, 116). 
On the one hand, in relation to the critiques of IHRC for its lack of ideological apparatus, a 
sensible counter-argument might be that the political discourses and practices of Western, 
secular political movements have rarely been blamed for their progressive ʻdetachmentʼ 
from ideological positions; on the contrary, they have been praised (Varisco 2005, 80). If 
the reason behind such disappointment concerning the IHRC is based on the 
consideration that their ʻideologyʼ (discourse) is in fact a religion, and thus, untouchable in 
its dogmas, then we have the proof that such ʻreligionʼ lent to politics (Islamism) is not 
different from any other political discourse and practice. As such, it constantly changes 
and progresses by working through the practices of its agents, as well as being inherently 
and inescapably political. 
On the other hand, in relation to some positions of the IHRC, it can be said that it is 
counterproductive to take part in the political struggle and practice but refuse to discourse 
ʻpoliticalʼ discourses, by hiding behind ʻreligious categoriesʼ (Grillo 2003, 173). To a certain 
extent, this amounts to the same ʻblindnessʼ as is shown by the detractors of Islamist 
parties. The IHRC is responsible for ʻallowingʼ the ʻestablishmentʼ to allow them to speak, 
for not discoursing an Islamist discourse, and for letting the security threats and terrorist 
attacks speak on their behalf. 
 
 
Muslim Association of Britain 
 
The Muslim Association of Britain was founded in 1997 and soon achieved both notoriety 
and favour among the other Islamist parties. Its main ideologue is the Palestinian-born 
Azzam Tamimi, an Islamist intellectual. Tamimi runs a London-based Islamist thinktank, 
the Institute of Islamic Political thought, which is mainly concerned with issues related to 
the Middle East, specifically Palestine, but it also tackles the relationship between Islam 
and Democracy, a subject on which Tamimi (1993, 2000) has widely written and 
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published. The other main figure is Anas Altikriti, son of an exiled Iraqi politician. Once a 
President of the group, he stood down to run as a RESPECT candidate in the 2004 
European elections. 
The MAB has experienced two main episodes of controversy. Louise Ellman, the Labour 
MP for Liverpool Riverside and a member of the Labour Friends of Israel used the 
protection of parliamentary privilege to attack the MAB accusing its leading members of 
ʻanti-Semitismʼ and terrorist links. She stated in Parliament that ʻthe House should not 
adjourn until it has debated the important issue of the role that Islamicist organizations play 
in inciting racial hatred in the United Kingdom through propagating anti-Semitism under the 
guise of anti-Zionism…It is time that the spotlight fell on the Muslim Association of 
Britain…All of them are connected to terrorist organizations, Hamasʼ (Parliament 
Publication, 2004). This soon led to furious denunciations, not only by the MAB, but also 
by the Muslim Council of Britain, which ʻrejected utterlyʼ Ellmanʼs comments, by affirming 
that the MAB had always been well-known for their balanced views and admirable work in 
the Muslim community. In relation to Mrs. Ellmanʼs wrath, the MCB suggested that 
perhaps the true reason behind the episode was the crucial role played by the MAB in 
drawing public attention to the illegal and quite brutal Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
lands (MAB 2003). Likewise, in a letter to The Guardian, Altikriti rejected the accusation that 
the MAB was a supporter of terrorist organizations and  he clarified that the MAB was 
transparent about supporting all oppressed people and had never shied from criticizing 
states and individual who create death and wreck. He also stated that their many 
supporters and sympathisers include Jews (Altikriti 2003). 
The MAB gave a concrete expression to this last clause during the 2005 general election 
when it supported Mark Krantz, the RESPECT candidate for Stretford and Urmston. In this 
specific case, Altikriti stated: ʻthat Mark Krantz who is a Jew, is standing for Respect and I, 
a Muslim, give him my full support, shows that what really matters is showing respect for 
peopleʼ (Respect Coalition, 2005). My argument is that this is a clear sign of a decisive 
political engagement and shows a determined will to be ʻpoliticalʼ among other political 
actors. On the other hand, it could be argued that Altrikitiʼs words still show a certain 
legacy of a culturalist-orientalist framework; otherwise, there would not be any need to 
stress that a ʻJewʼ and a ʻMuslimʼ could unproblematically be part of the same political 
party. My point here is that the framework of this (his) discourse is still the culturalist-
orientalist approach. The Islamist (and not Islamic) discourse does not emerge as a 
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counter-argument to this, but as an exception that needs to be reasoned and justified, 
allowed by the dominant. This sort of attitude is deeply depoliticizing (Varisco 2005, 7). 
 The other major row that engulfed the MAB was the visit by the Sheik Yusuf-al-Qaradawi, 
arguably one of the most influential Sunni scholars in the world. When he arrived in Britain 
for a series of meetings, The Sun newspaper ran the headline ʻthe Evil has landedʼ (The 
Sun, 2004). At the MAB conference, Tamimi observed ʻthe negative publicity that had 
bedevilled Qaradawiʼs visit to the UK, in a campaign initiated by the board of Deputies and 
faithfully executed by politicians such as Michael Howard and Louise Ellman, and media 
such as The Sun and The Daily Mailʼ (MAB 2004). The controversy largely surrounded his 
support for Palestinian and Iraqi insurgents, though  Qaradawi clearly distinguished their 
jihad from that of Al-Qaida, which he utterly denounced (Marranci 2006, 67). The media 
coverage of the event and the government attitude toward the arrival of Qaradawi 
demonstrated a general lack of information and a tendency to generalise and stereotype 
when it comes to the ʻIslamicistʼ discourses (Trepagnier 2006, 78). In other words, the 
culturalist-orientalist approach was definitely widespread and functioning in a way to 
exclude any possibility of dialogue: by not acknowledging the ʻotherʼ as a potential 
interlocutor (Grillo 2003, 166). 
In this context, another recurrent accusation against the MAB is worth mentioning -- the 
links between the MAB and the Muslim Brotherhood. This constitutes another example of 
stereotyped representations imposed on the Islamist discourses, and thus, practices. It is 
undeniably a fact that many MAB founders were connected to the Ikwan but they have 
clearly contextualised their beliefs and praxis for the UK situation (Marranci 2006, 66). It is 
certainly vital to highlight the MB influence on the MAB Islamist discourse. Similarly, it is 
also essential to recognize, stress and understand how this influence has been translated 
and embodied in British Islamist practice (this concept is neglected and denied by the 
culturalist-orientalist approach (El Zein 1977, 229). 
Aptly, in a statement replying to an attack on the group by Anthony Browne in The Times of 
11 August 2004, the MAB referred to the intellectual background of the group and 
specifically its links to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. The article affirmed that 
MAB was proud of the diversity among its members, in terms of origins, cultures, 
traditions, schools of thought, ages, education, skills and specialities. It did not deny that 
among them are those who, back in their original countries, were members of the M.B. It 
stated that one of these founding members is Dr. Kamal Helbawi who was elected as the 
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first president of MAB in 1997 for two years in free elections, which ʻBrowne seems to think 
are not applicable for Muslimsʼ (Mabonline, 2005). 
Browneʼs article is a clear example of Islamophobic and culturalist-orientalist press when it 
calls Islamist movements -- and in particular MAB -- fascist, and compares Islamist 
policies and agenda towards the ʻJewishʼ people with Hitlerʼs shoa. The mere fact that 
Qaradawi was invited to speak by MAB is presented as a clear proof of MABʼs 
ʻfundamentalistʼ politics and the dangerous radicalism inside Britain. The underlying 
assumption is that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization, which follows the 
teachings of Said Qutb. What Browne grossly fails to notice is that Qutbʼs ideology and 
corpus of thought is not held as ʻsacredʼ even by the Ikwan themselves across the Muslim 
countries (Mamdani 2004, 77). Certainly there are some fringes of the MB, who have 
followed Qutbʼs ideas in their political discourses and practices and taken up ʻjihadʼ against 
the Egyptian government, but this does not allow a generalization in relation to the rest of 
the Brotherhood and does not imply that sympathisers of the MB elsewhere are about to 
take up arms against the government. A position like the one held by Browne is certainly 
uninformed and deceiving: it is culturalist-orientalist and Islamophobic. My argument is that 
an ideology, a corpus of thought (Qutbʼs, for example), does not mean its ʻliteralʼ exact 
translation into a practice. The way the political discourse is ʻdiscoursedʼ into practices and 
through the agentsʼ practices is shaped and developed (Damasio 2000, 56), gives the 
meaning (a signifying practice): along with this process, a discursive formation can also be 
enhanced (Fortin,Vieira,Trmbling 2006, 8). If this holds true for the variously inspired 
Marxist- Leninist, communist parties around the world that are not all synonymous with 
RAF, Red-Brigade, ELN, FARC, Sendero Luminoso (SL), 17 November (to name just a 
few), then it has to be deemed equally true for the several diverse Islamist parties around 
the world (Asad 2006, 8). 
To confirm this, MAB itself declared that despite the fact that it considers Qutb as one of 
the most prominent Muslim thinkers and intellects of his time, he is not undisputable, 
because no one in Islam -- apart from the Holy Prophet Muhammad -- enjoys such a 
status. Many scholars, thinkers and intellectuals disagreed with Qutb on a variety of issues 
and they still do. 
In this regard, MAB also explained its relations with the MB, by declaring its appreciation 
for their ideology in terms of urging dialogue with others, rejection of terrorism, and 
respecting those who differ in views or opinions. At the same time, MAB ʻreserves the right 
to disagree with or divert from the opinion and line of MB, or any other organization, 
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Muslim or otherwise on any other issue at handʼ (Mabonline 2004). As further proof of the 
fact that MAB ideological apparatus is the product of different intellectual influences and 
Islamist discourses, and not an offshore branch of MB, the MAB also acknowledges an 
ideological affinity, in some respects, with Jamaʼat figures such as Mawdudi and Murad. In 
other words, behind and beyond ideological affiliation and discursive references, what 
clearly emerges is a fully ʻpoliticalʼ practice, and as a result of this, a firm determination to 
get involved with the British politics in order to influence and change the Government 
approach toward Muslim and Islamist issues. One aspect in particular has caught my 
attention as a distinguishing feature of MAB. In its agenda, there is always a clear and 
strong emphasis on political activism and interaction with the wider British civil society 
(Islamist practice), but there is never the clear admission of a political (Islamist) identity as 
such, beyond the protection and defence of ʻMuslimʼ rights in the UK and in the world. It is 
certainly interesting to have a close look at MAB objectives and the methodology used in 
order to achieve their goals. MAB states its targets as follows: 
• To promote and propagate the principles of positive Muslim interactions with all 
elements of society to reflect, project and convey the message of Islam; 
• To be part of the wider British Islamic movement and a supporter of all other 
ventures that agree on the proper principles of Daʼwah and human collaboration; 
• To affirm the principles of Muslim citizenship and the firm undeniable roots of Islam 
and Muslims within British society 
 
 
What do we want? 
 
• For British Muslims to act as the first line of defence for Islam and Muslims all 
over the world; 
• For a constructive dialogue to be initiated between Muslims and elements of the 
ʻmodern societyʼ for the betterment of all concerned; 
• For Muslims to become involved in the making of laws, the shaping of political 
and social decision making procedures and the installation of government 
(Mabonline, 1999) 
These points clearly indicate how the MAB focuses on interacting with other Islamist-
Muslim groups, with the rest of the British civil society, and with all the other political 
parties, notwithstanding their ideological affiliation, and therefore, divergences. The MAB 
 151 
has reportedly been very successful in this, gaining widespread support and increasing 
very rapidly the number of its members. The Guardian has defined MAB as one of the 
organizations that has totally changed the way the war in Iraq has been reported, and the 
former London Mayor Ken Livingston has repeatedly extolled MAB for ʻits unflinching 
commitment towards a stronger participation of the different Muslim groups in the British 
public and  political lifeʼ (Mabonline, 2003). As mentioned earlier, MAB reaped most of its 
success in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. Its strategy of forming ʻcross-confessionalʼ 
and cross-ideological alliances placed the group in an advantageous position for attracting 
disaffected activists. The MAB also became an important member of the Stop the War 
coalition, with Tamimi being one of the major speakers at its rallies and Altikriti chairing 
them. The centrality of this involvement has represented the best publicity for the 
organization, since it linked MABʼs efforts and agenda with the amazingly successful 
mobilization of the masses for the anti-war demonstrations. My point is that, if the MABʼs 
practice has been convincingly political, its discourse has lacked the same conviction, 
because it swings between being a pan-Muslim, cross-ideological group and a grass roots, 
civil-society organization. 
A further and interesting development was the emergence of a ʻMuslimʼ-leftist alliance in 
the shape of the RESPECT coalition. This alliance has been variously criticized and 
rebuked as an ʻunlikely marriage of convenience between Islamists and ultra-secularist, 
even atheist, Leftʼ. The argument goes that the ʻlatter is usually associated with support for 
abortion and homosexuality, whereas Muslims emphasise traditional family valuesʼ 
(Browne 2004). The MAB strongly supported George Gallowayʼs election bid in East 
London; it is certainly worth noting that George Galloway himself strongly opposes 
abortion as well. So perhaps, it might be argued that there is something more than a 
simple marriage of convenience between an ʻatheist partyʼ and a ʻMuslimʼ group, that their 
political discourses are not forbidden from interacting and their political practices are not 
banned from collaborating, unless the framework of analysis adopted is deeply 
ʻessentialisingʼ and substantially culturalist-orientalist. 
In this context, MAB also advised people on how to vote in other seats, listing the 
supported candidates on the basis of their opposition to the war, to the ʻrecently proposed 
Anti-terror legislation, and to the call for the immediate withdrawal of the British troops in 
Iraqʼ (Mabonline 2005). 
Certainly, it is rather difficult to assess what impact this had on the Muslim community, but 
this represented a strong expression of the MABʼs commitment to be involved in ʻpolitical 
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and social decision-making procedures and the installation of government as well as an 
act of daʼwah, in terms of propagating the Muslim position to the wider community and 
furthermore it was an act of jihadʼ.  Here again, the emphasis is placed on the practice and 
on the activism, but it is still discoursed as a Muslim position to be divulged to the rest of 
the society (Haddad and Qurqmazi 2000, 78). That means it remains within the 
claustrophobic boundaries of the community/faith-group discourse. 
By mobilising the public -- Muslims and non-Muslims -- against the Iraq war and by 
translating this into the electoral realm, it acted as mujahidin. The MAB approvingly quoted 
the words of Salma Yaqub about her involvement in the anti-war movement: ʻI actually saw 
it as our jihad reallyʼ (Mabonline 2005). This allowed the MAB to gain a wider popularity; to 
a certain extent, it also represented a clear point of connection with the Ikwan strategy as 
summarized by Tamimi, in the sense of adopting ʻthe strategy of peaceful and gradual 
reform of society and stateʼ (Tamimi 2005). The MAB also greatly supported the 
RESPECT candidate Salma Yaqub, by enormously praising her campaign and her political 
agenda. In the MABʼs terms, her campaign was a display of: 
ʻpeople-power and real democracy in action...It was the manner in which her 
campaign seemed to usher in a new era in politics for the people of her 
constituency, a form of politics with greater involvement from the youth and 
women, in which people felt they could speak and vote out of conscience rather 
out than traditional tribal or religious ties. This was not just tactical voting…this 
was a real movement for changeʼ (Mabonline, 2005). 
Regarding jihad, the MAB has never expressed support for particular movements or 
Islamist parties. However, Tamimi has described himself as a sympathiser and supporter 
of HAMAS. His papers include a detailed account of HAMAS jihad, including martyrdom 
operations. He also wrote a laudatory examination of Hizbullahʼs victory against Israeli 
occupation, remarking that ʻthe Israeli humiliating defeat at the hand of Hizbullah has 
proven beyond doubt that the Hebrew state understands no language but that of forceʼ 
(Tamimi 2002). On the other hand, Tamimi strongly condemned ʻthe atrocities committed 
in America on 11 Septemberʼ, and rebuked those Muslims  ʻwhose hatred for America 
prevents them from recognising the savagery and inhumanity of this attackʼ (Tamimi 2001, 
35). My point is that this argument is not sustainable, that there is a dichotomy or a 
schizophrenia in this attitude, as has been affirmed elsewhere (McRoy 2006, 56). It is a 
political, ʻdiscursiveʼ, and contextualised understanding of jihad, which pushed the MAB to 
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oppose the occupation in Iraq and unreservedly condemn the killing of British hostage Ken 
Bingley by insurgents (MAB press release, 2004). 
It is also worth noticing that the MAB attitude of active engagement with British civil society 
and politics has been severely criticized and condemned by some Islamist parties as well, 
like the Saved Sect, which defined the MAB as munaafiqeen or ʻhypocritesʼ. Likewise, the 
fact that MAB has both Sunni and Shiʼia members has variously been seen as a lack of 
credible ʻIslamist pedigreeʼ (Shareeah 2005). Another interesting aspect worth mentioning 
is that the Finsbury Park Mosque, long a hub of Salafi members and Supporters of Sharia 
headquarters, was taken over by the MAB supporters in 2005. This event clearly 
demonstrates how the Islamist arena in the UK, as elsewhere, is variegated, politically 
diverse and antagonistic. It is not monolithic in its political discourses and practices and it 
cannot be analysed as a uniform reality. In other words, there is nothing new, peculiar or 
different from all the other political movements or parties, which might share some 
fundamental ideological principles but differ in their discursive and signifying practices. 
Islamist discourses too are historical, contingent, contested and contextualised, unlike the 
representations offered by a dominant culturalist-orientalist approach, which depoliticizes 
them through their representation either as religious/faith-groups or as terrorists. 
Nevertheless, my argument is that the MABʼs practice of self-representation -- despite the 
strong emphasis on being politically active -- is politically disenabling too (Damasio 2002, 
112); it shows a lack of assertiveness in discoursing its political discourse, by always 
feeling the need to justify its political stance. It still remains within the culturalist-orientalist 
framework, which it constantly refers to, in order to be approved and allowed. 
 
 
Muslim Council Of Britain 
 
Following a meeting in Birmingham on 30 April 1994, the National Interim Committee on 
Muslim Unity (NIMCU) was formed to address the issues of how to coordinate Muslim 
activities and provide effective representation. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was 
the fruit of these discussions. In a document titled Invitation, the outcome is described as a: 
ʻcountry-wide process of consultation, which was the first of its kind to poll 
Muslim opinion across the whole of the United Kingdom…The Consultation 
process provided a clear signal from the community. It showed that the 
majority of Muslims in Britain felt that there is the need for a greater co-
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ordination and unity…The Muslim Council of Britain is a practical outcome of 
this process of consultationʼ (Muslim Council of Britain 1996, 12). 
What emerges quite clearly from these few lines, is that the origin of the body itself is 
deeply entangled with a strong political determination and a political practice which aims at 
becoming involved in the political debate. The process which gave birth to the Muslim 
Council of Britain has occurred through ʻconsultationsʼ among several Muslim 
organizations; that definitely gives MCB a very official and representative character among 
the ʻMuslim communityʼ. The first reflection here is that even while the determination and 
the agenda are characterized by a strong activism and a determination to be politically 
involved, the discourse remains firmly anchored to a ʻMuslim communityʼ register. 
In relation to this and to the genealogy of the MCB, there is another relevant document to 
take into consideration: Seeking the Common Good. Here the MCB justifies its existence in 
very alarmed tones as ʻa question of the very survival of the communityʼ (MCB 1997, 13). 
Specifically, the main threats perceived are termed as: Islamophobia, the events in Bosnia, 
and the Rushdie affair, which played a paramount role in urging the formation of the MCB, 
thereby demonstrating the need for Muslims24 to take up political action, to be politically 
active as Muslims. This development is confirmed by a clear reference to The Satanic 
Verses and the subsequent crises like the Gulf War and Bosnia, where ʻthe publication of 
grossly offensive and sacrilegious material have shown the need and the value of greater 
coordination within the Muslim communityʼ (MCB 1997, 13). The Rushdie connection -- 
which has been defined in the first part of this thesis as the first episode of an Islamist 
practice in Britain -- was made even more explicit at the inaugural conference of the body 
in 1997, where the ʻGovernmentʼs support for The Satanic Versesʼ was pointed out as having 
caused ʻdeep hurt and offence to Muslimsʼ. In the MCBʼs view, the other relevant issues in 
need of being tackled ʻare the Governmentʼs refusal to fund Muslim schools in line with the 
opportunities enjoyed by other communities, and its rejection of outlawing religious 
discriminationʼ (Muslimnews, 1997). 
It is unambiguous how the instances under scrutiny constitute very specific political 
matters, in need of being politically addressed and dealt with, by taking a political stand 
against the Government. What emerges powerfully is the urgency of a Muslim 
engagement with British politics in order to safeguard ʻMuslimʼ rights and the Muslim 
communityʼs own survival; something which starts from Muslim participation in British 
                                            
24 My emphasis. 
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public and political life. What is missing is a political discourse; Islamism is presented only 
as an exit-strategy for the communityʼs own survival (Essed 1991,7). It does not emerge 
as an assertion, but as a response to certain circumstances that threaten the Muslim 
community in Britain. 
At a meeting in Bradford on 25 May 1996, when the representatives of various formal 
Muslim groups decided to officially form the Muslim Council of Britain, there was a strong 
and unanimous rejection of any ʻghettoisationʼ by insisting that ʻMuslims must be 
concerned with the wider society in which we liveʼ (MCB 1997, 8). This immediately 
identifies the MCB as a party willing to be politically visible, heard and recognized. 
However, my argument is that this reasoning still displays a strong attitude of 
ʻghettoisationʼ because ʻMuslimsʼ are represented as a separate body in need of 
integration with the wider society. 
As a result of the MCBʼs active approach, one of its proposed activities was to effectively 
campaign in public on issues of shared concern, so there could never be ʻany doubt that 
the million Muslims or more in Britain can when necessary be mobilisedʼ (MCB 1996, 9). 
Very clearly, the MCB was established to form and develop a distinct, united Islamic25 
identity for Muslims in Britain: ʻto create more avenues for Muslims of all cultural 
backgrounds, to associate and interact to remove all racial, ethnic, national barriers and 
develop true Islamic identity and strength on the basis of that identityʼ (MCB 1996, 11). 
What these lines indicate is that the question of racial or ethnic classification was 
paramount for the MCB; it was expressed in a statement by the group on the issue of 
including the question of religious affiliation in the 2001 census. 
This was considered to be extremely important for the entire Muslim community, whereas 
ʻthe question on ethnicity in 1991 Census is increasingly irrelevant to Muslims in Britain as 
our identity is linked to our faith rather than ethnic originʼ (MCB 1998, 15). Here again is a 
clear statement of how ʻIslamʼ is lived, discoursed and practiced as a ʻreligiousʼ identity, 
which cannot be merged with other ʻidentityʼ categories as ethnos or race (Marranci 2008, 
56). The reflection here is that despite a definite political practice and agenda, the MCB is 
still locked within certain categories of analysis, where ethnos and race are replaced by 
religion (Grillo 2003, 112): the missing link is still the political discourse (and 
representation) as Islamists. The question on religious affiliation in the census was 
certainly a major MCB concern, which led the organization to strongly lobby the 
                                            
25 My emphasis. 
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Government, by specifically declaring that British Muslims, specifically British-born 
Muslims identify themselves on the basis of faith rather than ethnicity or national origins 
(MCB 1998, 18). 
The MCB has also pronounced its critique of Britainʼs domestic and foreign policy as being 
ʻinformed by the advice of its old school expertsʼ (UKACIA 1997, 9). Specifically, these 
remarks were strongly voiced during the Rushdie Affair, which also constituted an 
exemplary proof of the power battle between the different Muslim organizations (mostly 
revealing their lack of power and influence). In this realm, the MCB was formed as a 
means of dealing ʻdirectly with the Government on issues of religion discriminationʼ (Taylor 
1998, 124). The fact that the doors have been opened to MCB has raised the prospect of 
some progress being made in this area and the proposed Religious Incitement Bill has 
represented a strong signal of this. 
In terms of its ideological affiliation, the MCB has often been regarded as a pro-Jamʼat26 
organization. According to Q-news, the MCB is strongly dominated by pro-Jamaʼat 
elements, as the ʻCWC (Central Working Committee) shows that the majority belong to or 
have sympathies with a UK organization which is a sidekick of the Jamaʼat-e-Islami in 
Pakistanʼ (Faraz 1998, 21). It is certainly the case that a considerable number of 
organizations affiliated to the body are Jamaʼat related and it has been also said that the 
creation of MCB was something of a palace coup in British Islam by Mawdudists (Q-News 
1998, 15). However, it would be unfair to view the MCB as wholly Mawdudist; the diversity 
of its affiliates precludes its being depicted as a pro-Jamaʼat front. Though not every 
mosque is affiliated to MCB, the fact that it has been effectively recognised as the principal 
representative of ʻBritish Muslimsʼ by the Government, suggests that it has become the 
spokesperson and representative of Islamist and Muslims issues in Britain. Further, given 
the Pro-Jamaʼat and Ikwan ideological ascendancy in the MCB, its political discourse and 
practice have been influenced by the discourses and the thought of ideologues and 
thinkers such as Al Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi.  
Hence, it is evident how British Islamism is a more complex and mature discourse than the 
more traditionalist/ritualist South Asian variety brought over by the first waves of migration 
(Hasan 2002, 7). Moreover, the crucial role of Khurram Murad in the development of the 
Mawdudist ideology at the Islamic Foundation, and of institutions such as the YMUK, and 
indeed the vision of a Muslim Federation like the MCB itself, implies that Islamism in 
                                            
26 Jamaat-e-Islami is an Islamist party in Pakistan. It was founded by Mawdudi in 1941, and in 1947, it supported the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan (Roy 1996). 
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Britain as a political discourse and practice has been developing as a novel and 
indigenous product, by taking on board and mixing with other, and sometimes diverse, 
political discourses. 
In this context, the MCB has very often faced the problem of being forced to balance its 
positions, between being too close to the Government on the one hand, and too receptive 
to more ʻradicalʼ Islamist voices, on the other. However, on several occasions, the MCB 
has demonstrated that it is able to take a very serious stand on international issues by 
supporting the more grass-roots Islamist feelings. It is surely significant that soon after its 
foundation, it began to confront the government on issues like Iraq and the US bombing of 
Sudan and Afghanistan. In the light of the Chechen War and purported Human Rights 
abuses by Russian troops, it strongly condemned Blairʼs reception of Russian President 
Putin in April 2000 and even announced that it was joining a demonstration against the 
visit (MCB press release, 13 April 2000). 
On 10 September 1999, Sacraine (of the MCB) wrote to the Foreign Secretary urging that 
the ʻFCO  should marshal its diplomatic strengths and ensure that the status of Jerusalem 
is not altered. The British government should further ensure that no country should 
relocate its embassy to Jerusalem. It should also dissuade the US from doing so out of 
unprincipled opportunismʼ (MCB 1999, 6). In light of this strong statement, I argue that 
there are several points worth analyzing. 
It is apparent how political crises such as the Rushdie affair, Bosnia and the Gulf war have 
pushed British Islamists to develop an Islamist practice and how the MCB has officially and 
determinedly taken up the role of being the primary representative of British Muslims. 
However, the MCB has not fully used the chance of discoursing a proper Islamist 
discourse, taking refuge, instead, in the (Muslim) community discourse. 
The most obvious indication of MCBʼs ʻrepresentativeʼ role was when the Government, in 
making arrangements with the Association of British Hujjaj for a temporary consulate in the 
Holy City, suddenly decided to alter the composition of the delegation handling consular 
representation in order ʻto allow MCB general secretary Sacraine to be joint headʼ, rather 
than have it led by Lord Ahmed of Rotterham (Q-News 2000, 17). Likewise, the MCB has 
also obtained a certain degree of credibility within the British Muslim community, by being 
assertive, not just about specific concerns, but generally active and operative (i.e., 
political) in order to push the government to consider and remedy their issues. 
It might be said that the very existence of a body like the MCB is proof that the core of 
Muslim/Islamist identity in Britain cannot be defined by features like race or ethnicity 
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(Essed 1991, 67). It is built around ʻIslamʼ lived, discoursed and inhabited as religion and 
as political discourse (El Zein 1977, 231). The MCB, nonetheless, misses out on spelling 
the political discourse more clearly. There is still a timid, reticent political attitude in terms 
of self-representation (Damasio 2002, 115), as if the MCB needs to display a good Muslim 
reputation (read non-political) in order to be accepted by the Government. 
This has led the MCB to lobby the Government to insert a religious question in the census. 
The MCB has also strongly addressed questions of Islamophobia in the media; it 
managed, for example, to push The Daily Mail to apologize for the headline ʻMoslem plot to 
bomb Londonʼ, and to get the BBC World Service to commit itself to cease coupling the 
words ʻextremist/terroristʼ with ʻMuslim/Islamʼ (MCB 1997, 2-4). The previous MCB 
secretary Sacraine (now substituted by Muhammad  Abdul Bari) often had to negotiate the 
stormy waters of the relations with the British Government, wider UK society and the other 
Islamist parties. His intelligent public image, his education and his friendly manners were 
essential in the aftermath of 9-11 (the ʻmost testing period for British Muslimsʼ, as declared 
by Sacraine in his valedictory speech in 2006). In his view, the 9-11 and 7-7 events clearly 
showed ʻBritish Muslimsʼ the need to turn a page and usher in a new era of political 
activism, by not being driven just by the concept of a faith-based community as developed 
through the late 90s. This new phase requires a novel sort of mobilization and more 
political structure. This process, according to Sacraine, has progressively taken off in the 
aftermath of 9-11, even though relations with the Government and the Labour Party were 
severely tested by the Iraq War (as was demonstrated by the MCB press release titled ʻUK 
Muslims reject neo-Conservative/Zionist plans for Iraqʼ and dated 11 April 2003). The 
observation here is that despite good intentions, the MCB still seems very locked into a 
ʻpolitics of identityʼ discourse (Sacraine 2006), and even with more emphasis on political 
activism, their political discourse continues to be affected by the category of the ʻfaith-
communityʼ; it is a product of their reluctant self-representation as Islamists in Britain. 
A clear proof of this can be found in Sacraineʼs words, who -- quoting the Sirah as a basis 
or guide -- claimed that the electoral participation by Muslims was not just ʻtactical or an 
expedient course but a religious obligationʼ (ibid.,). It is important to note that voting is 
certainly a political act, aimed at being politically effective and politically active. The 
representation of this act as a ʻreligiousʼ obligation reveals the very shortcomings of the 




Muslim Public Affairs Committe UK 
 
The Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK is certainly an interesting Islamist group in the 
UK. It is difficult to recognize a major external influence on its aims and strategy. It has no 
headquarters, being mainly a website group that first became politically active through 
(and because of) the net. It constitutes a specific case of how media, and in particular the 
new media like the Internet, are tools of empowerment and environments of political 
action. They do not just transmit contents and information but act as the place to share 
them and thereby form the discourse and the practice. The point here is to understand 
whether such ʻvirtualʼ political activism performed by MPAC is framed and discoursed 
through an Islamist discourse, or whether there is a legacy of ʻgrass-rootsʼ activism. 
MPACUK was originally set up as a media monitoring e-group, in order to fight the bias in 
the British media and redress the balance. As declared on their website, MPACUK is a 
system of media monitoring, political lobbying and grass-root community and institutional 
activism to allow the individual and the community the ability to change their own situation 
and the situation for Muslims at large (MPACUK, 2005). Its ʻIslamismʼ is substantially built 
through the practice of ʻpolitical lobbyingʼ, which demonstrates its attitude of being actively 
engaged with the British society and politics; however, it still lacks a ʻpolitical discourseʼ to 
some extent. 
Its main aim is centred on the transformation of what it sees as negative UK domestic 
policy and foreign policy (notably on Palestine). The first concern is related to the very 
ʻlocalʼ British context and the second to other international issues, such as Palestine and 
Iraq. These concepts are expressed very succinctly by MPACUK when it defines its main 
quest and political agenda as a focus on changing the situation for which ʻMuslims too 
many times are made to feel as Britain has done them a great favour by allowing them to 
live and work here…Muslims are law-abiding citizens and as such have a right to be 
heard, a right to be listened, and a right to be taken seriouslyʼ (MPACUK 2005). 
Whereas a large number of Islamist groups usually begin by drawing upon some person or 
event in Muslim history as their example -- Muhammad himself, the Righteous Caliphs, the 
Muhagiroun -- the model proposed by MPACUK is paradoxically ʻthe Zionist lobbyʼ. 
MPACUK indicates that there are over 100 members of the Friends of Israel lobby in the 
Labour Party alone, and this gives Zionists a very loud voice simply because they are 
active. If the Muslims could learn from their example, ʻwe would never have to suffer in 
silence againʼ (ibid.). Needless to remark that the emphasis is still placed on the ʻMuslim 
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communityʼ and the fact that the model is represented by a ʻlobbyʼ suggests the idea of a 
certain lack of confidence in discoursing a more structured Islamist discourse, taking 
refuge, instead, in a ʻmore practicalʼ attitude. It is an Islamist practice which appears not 
confident enough to be constructed as a discourse. The Israeli lobby is considered as 
exemplar of what can be obtained by successful organization and mobilization within a 
ʻminorityʼ in Britain, this mainly involves tactics such as ʻcanvassing, leafleting outside 
mosques and homesʼ, and ʻaiming to telephone every Muslim householdʼ (Muslimnews 
2001). 
Another example of this attitude can be seen in relation to MPACUKʼs approach toward 
the UK Government, which it sees as ʻusing the Muslim groups and individuals to support 
its policies rather than taking into account the Muslim voicesʼ (MPACUK 2003). The 
confrontational approach of MPACUK is not directed only at the Government, but also at 
some Islamist leaders. The main difference is that whereas other Muslim groups might 
criticise certain leaders on essentially doctrinal grounds, MPACUKʼs approach is directly 
practical and uncompromising. For example, during the 2005 election, it lambasted 
Ibrahim Masters, Chairman of the Lancashire Council of Mosques, for supporting Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw, the MP for Blackburn, in spite of what MPACUK saw as his negative 
stance on Iraq and Palestine (MPACUK 2005). Masters was quoted as saying ʻthe contact 
we have had with Mr Straw has resulted in many improvements for Muslims in 
Blackburn…We do not want to burn our bridges and ruin the work of 20 years just because 
of what is happening in Iraq and Palestineʼ (ibid.). In response, MPACUK strongly criticized 
this attitude, by labelling Masters as a ʻtraitorʼ who ʻsold out Palestine for 20 years with the 
Labour Party and few mosquesʼ (ibid.). In the same passage, there is a reference to the 
Righteous Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, who first expressed the notion of accountability in 
terms of a duty pending on the community to correct the Caliph when he deviated from the 
right path. That is to say, MPACUKʼs frame of critique against Masters remains within a 
textual justification, which indicates a form of the culturalist-orientalist approach that 
mirrors the representation of the dominant toward the Islamist parties. 
Besides, Masters represents a typical case of MPACUK criticism against ʻ1500 pathetic 
mosque leadersʼ, who ʻdo nothing to mobilize Muslimsʼ (MPACUK 2003). Here again, there 
is a strong emphasis on the notion of mobilizing the masses as a vehicle for change 
(which echoes the propaganda of Leninist-inspired leftist parties). Yet, there is no mention 
of an Islamist discourse and the aim is represented as the ʻmobilizationʼ of an 
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undifferentiated mass of Muslims: the definition of the political actor continues to reside 
within the domain of the category of religion. 
MPACUKʼs tirade, however, is not just limited to certain categories, like traditional Muslim 
leaders, but it is also targeted against other, more ʻradicalʼ, Islamist groups such as HT, 
specifically on the basis of their political practice. To an extent, similar criticism is also 
levelled at the ʻtraditionalʼ leaders; that their passive approach to British society damages, 
first and foremost, the interests of the Muslim community in the UK and abroad. In 
MPACUKʼs view, HTʼs rejectionist approach is strongly counterproductive; it prevents the 
Muslim community from having any influence on Government policy. In MPACUKʼs own 
words, if HT members are asked what Muslims should do, they ʻwill collectively shout: to 
establish the Khilafaʼ. According to MPACUK, the HT political programme feeds on utopian 
far-fetched plans, which do not help the ʻMuslim causeʼ in Palestine, Kashmir or anywhere 
else (MPACUK 2002). 
On the same basis, MPACUK has been dismissive of Omar Bakri and his supporters 
because, in its eyes, they have damaged the image of Muslims in Britain. In a press 
release, Bakri is defined as a ʻfoolʼ and his supporters as ʻbaboons who…had scored 
another goal for the Zionistsʼ (MPACUK 2003). Likewise, Abu Hamza is denounced for 
essentially the same reasons, ʻhe cannot make a logical argument stand on any interview 
and always utters mindless remarks that make us all look stupid and ignorantʼ (ibid.). 
In this context, it is not too off the mark to state that the main concern for MPACUK is the 
empowerment of the ʻMuslim communit. This target is considered as essential and the 
means to achieve it are envisaged in the full involvement with the British political life and 
system. The discursive apparatus for such participation appears to be of secondary 
importance, and I argue that this is MPACUKʼs main shortfall. Consequently, the outcome 
is that its Islamist practice too ends up being framed within a ʻMuslim communityʼs own 
survivalʼ policy, which is hailed in a period of multiculturalist frenzy, but is the first to be 
blamed as self-ghettoisation in period of turmoil.  
In very clear and powerful terms, MPACUK affirms that the freedoms and benefits that are 
enjoyed by other British citizens are being denied to the Muslim population (MPACUK 
2003) by still representing ʻMuslimsʼ as a separate community identified by its membership 
to Islam. 
MPACUK also identifies democracy with Shura, thereby indicating its compatibility with 
Islam.  Democracy is understood as a ʻsense of Responsibility and Accountabilityʼ, and so 
it is ʻvery much there in Islamʼ. A Surah in the Qur’an is taken as reference in order to prove 
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that ʻthe political system in Islam totally depends upon Shooriat (consultation)ʼ (MPACUK 
2005). 
With regard to jihad, MPACUK members regularly describe themselves as mujahidin, and 
they explicitly affirm that their understanding of jihad is political and non-violent. In 
MPACUK terms, political activism is the most powerful weapon in order to advance the 
Muslim cause; there is no need to take up arms but there is a dire need to be proactive by 
using tools such as e-mails, leaflets, and the ballot box. According to MPACUK, Muslims 
are allowed to embrace arms in two main instances: firstly, against an oppressive 
government and secondly, in self-defence. Neither of those two cases applies to Muslims 
in Britain and therefore British Muslims are not supported if they decide to wage a violent 
local jihad (MPACUK 2003). Generally, MPACUK does not express sympathy for specific 
armed groups, but neither does it condemn groups such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. The 
jihad of such groups, although violent, is understood within the context of the Palestinian 
cause and according to the peculiarity of their struggle to survive. Even so, MPACUK has 
strongly condemned Al-Qaidaʼs killing of innocents and they supported the Islamic Society 
of Britainʼs 9-11 commemorative event in 2002. 
To conclude, it is reasonable to state that MPACUK, since its foundation, has grown in 
size. Its website claims millions of hits and it has also been the subject of a TV 
programme, Operation Muslim Vote. This programme showed MPACUK in action in the 
run-up to the 2005 general elections, trying to unseat Blackburnʼs Jack Straw and 
Rochdaleʼs Lorna Fitzsimmons, both Labour MPs. In particular, Straw certainly showed a 
lack of knowledge and information, when he confused them with the Saved Sect, and then 
claimed that they were well-funded. This allowed Bukhari, MPACUK leader, to point to his 
less than abundant possessions. MPACUK was involved in several controversies during 
the campaign. The first was when Bukhari and Muddassar Ahmed, MPACUK project 
managers, were physically attacked by supporters of the Labour peer Lord Adam Patel in 
Blackburn, and those actions were caught on film. The second concerned Lorna 
Fitzsimmons. A local group that MPACUK was working with during the elections incorrectly 
identified her as being Jewish, which led to accusations of anti-Semitism by certain media 
and obliged MPACUK to issue an apologetic statement. In this, MPACUK said that it 
ʻunequivocally apologizes to Lorna Fitzsimmons for this inaccurate statement and 
sincerely regrets this mistakeʼ (MPACUK 2005).  Alongwith this, it declared that ʻMPACUK 
will continue its campaign against the MPs on the basis of their policies…as active 
members of the pro-Israeli lobby groupʼ (ibid.). 
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MPACUK carried on campaigning against her and although it cannot be proven that its 
intervention was decisive, the combination of anti-war backlash, MCB direction to vote for 
candidates based on specific policies, and the on-the-spot canvassing by MPACUK may 
have contributed to her defeat. It was an outcome triumphantly celebrated by MPACUK as 
a jihad victory ʻfor the children of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and most of all, for our 
faith in Godʼ (MPACUK, 2004). The use of the rhetoric on Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan 
is quite frequent; however, it mostly functions as propaganda and does not replace a more 
substantial Islamist discourse (Varisco 2005, 78). MPACUKʼs main concern is the 
empowerment of British Muslims in Britain and it is essentially projected towards this 
target; it is politically active and involved with British domestic and foreign policy. This is 
the main angle from which MPACUK plans are conceived. 
Soon after the election results, MPACUK made clear that its jihad was centred on 
domestic anti-Muslim prejudice and on Palestine. It declared that its campaign would 
intensify through the elaboration of a strategic plan over the next few years, and that it 
would attack traditional Muslim leaders. In this context, MPACUK issued a proper 
Manifesto focused on the message ʻhold your leader to account, by getting involved in the 
political systemʼ. MPACUK presents itself as a model and a ʻteacherʼ for the Muslims, by 
educating them so they can understand how the election process works. The fight -- the 
Manifesto continues -- is being ʻled by young men and women in their early to mid-twenties, 
who spend out of their pockets and work in their spare timeʼ (MPACUK 2004). Once again, 
it is hard not to notice here echoes of the concept of the party as a vanguard leading the 
masses to revolution. This follows an idea first developed by Lenin at the beginning of 
1902 and is also present in the writings of Mawdudi and Qutb. However, the central idea of 
ʻMuslimsʼ in need of being educated and informed about the election process reveals a 
certain paternalistic attitude and it also depoliticized the Islamists: they are represented as 
ʻMuslimsʼ, an undefined mass, only identified by their religious membership (Grillo 2003, 
116). 
The centrality of the MPACUK (Islamist) practice revolves around keywords such as 
democracy and jihad and the need to translate these ʻideas into practical actionʼ first and 
foremost within the UK context. This is seen as the necessary step in order to ʻempower 
British Muslimsʼ and render them able to influence and have their say on international 
issues. 
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It is also interesting to see how MPACUK is mostly formed and supported by British-born 
Muslims and how this element could be considered as essential to a very ʻmilitantʼ, 
participationist expression of Islamism in the British context.27 
Therefore, it might be stated that, paradoxically, the very British-ness of the second and 
third generation Muslims (McRoy 2006, 191) paves the way to a more ʻdecisiveʼ action. 
Nonetheless, despite such pro-active approaches, the parties analysed in this chapter still 
portray themselves by mirroring the image and representation offered by a dominant 
culturalist-orientalist approach (i.e., representation as a religious community and faith 
group, lacking any political attribute). 
The interesting aspect in relation to the practice of self-representation offered by the 
parties featured in chapter 5 is that their practice is definitely within the tenets and 
ʻdiscoursesʼ of Islamism. They are political, as can be seen from their participation in the 
election process, the various anti-war campaigns and their strong ʻpoliticalʼ activism. But, 
what is lacking is their assertiveness in vocalizing and discoursing that identity and that 
choice of being Islamists. As argued very often in this chapter, the Islamist actors featured 
here are still very much trapped in a culturalist-orientalist representation, which, finally, 
denies their political identity and marginalizes them as political actors. It seems that they 
are in constant need of justifying and explaining their political stands in order to comply 
with the way they are represented by the dominant discourse. As I put it, they allow the 
Government to allow them to speak and act.  
I analyse and discourse this dynamic through the concept of a fetishism for politics and 
power: the repression and denial of a strong desire for both politics and power, so that 
political participation is represented as a ʻprivilegeʼ granted by the dominant discourse. 
The Islamist parties featured in the next chapter (the rejectionists) show a more 
confrontational approach towards the Government, but ultimately, they reflect and mirror 
(on the level of self-representation) the very culturalist-orientalist representation of them -- 
in a more covert way, as through diverging lenses, but along the same line of a fetishism 






                                            
27 This same ‘demographic’ element is characteristic of the other Islamist parties featured in the next chapter of the 
present dissertation: their political action and their Islamist practices are focused on a rejection of the UK political 






Representation and self-representation of ‘radical’ Islamism in the UK: through 
the mirroring lenses of the political self 
 
The present chapter analyses the practices and discourses of the Islamist parties grouped 
as rejectionists (they reject the British political system and they refuse to take part in it). 
Some of the parties featured here plan to take over power in Britain and establish an 
Islamist government, while some others plan to do this in the Middle East and North Africa. 
My argument is that despite the fact that their attitude is more vocal and confrontational 
than the participationist parties featured in chapter 5, their Islamist practices, discourses 
and self-representation still mirrors the categories of representation imposed upon them by 
the dominant culturalist-orientalist approach. 
As my fieldwork findings show, they nurture a similar fetishism for politics. In their case, 
this does not happen through the discursive practices of the community group (as in the 
case of the participationist parties), but through the Islamist discourse of an ʻIslamic stateʼ, 
where the ʻpoliticalʼ is at the service of the ʻspiritualʼ. However, paradoxically the exact 
reverse happens -- i.e., the process of ʻsecularizationʼ of that religion. 
Furthermore, after two years of intense fieldwork, what has powerfully emerged is that 
these parties leadersʼ strongly enamour power and want the upper hand vis-a-vis their 
ʻenemiesʼ, political antagonists, and also their acolytes. This puts to rest the concept of a 
future Islamist government where the ʻspiritualʼ prevails over politics. 
Such a schizophrenic attitude is explained in my thesis through the dynamic of a fetishism 
for politics that weakens them as political actors. Likewise, this attitude is represented and 
discoursed by the dominant culturalist-orientalist approach through the categories of 
ʻreligious fundamentalismʼ and ʻterrorismʼ. This implies the lack of any intention on the part 
of the Dominant (UK Government) to enter into dialogue with them; an attitude which 
finally ends up threatening national security. 
Therefore, my argument is that the fetishism for politics, on the level of representation and 
self-representation -- mystifying what is political behind the categories of religion and 
terrorism -- depoliticizes the Islamist parties on the one hand, and it causes the 





Hizbu ut Tahrir and the diverging lenses of the self-representation 
 
The first party analysed in this chapter is Hizbu-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). It was 
founded in Palestine in 1953 by Sheik Taquiddin-an-Nabhani and belongs to the group of 
British Islamist parties, which I call ʻrejectionistʼ because they refuse to take part in the 
British political and public life. 
The core of its political discourse is that the depressed political condition of Muslims in the 
contemporary era is a result of the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and, thus, they 
believe that the way to revive their glory is to reconstitute the Khilafah. The essential idea 
behind HT can be found in An-Nabhaniʼs book, The Islamic State, where the Ottoman 
regime is blamed for causing intellectual stagnation by closing the doors of ijtihad and 
neglecting the Arabic language, and for failing to understand ʻthe intellectual and legislative 
side of Islamʼ (something that led to perplexity when the Industrial Revolution and 
democratic ideas transformed Europe) (An-Nabhani 1998, 168). An-Nabhani rejects and 
fiercely opposes all forms of secular ideology, including democracy. He insists on the 
Khilafah not as just as a possible expedient, but as a sort of ʻscriptural injunctionʼ, 
confirmed by the Qur’an (ibid., 222). The conditions for being a Caliph are that he must be 
male, sane and Muslim, which immediately excludes women and non-Muslims. He also 
specifies in detail how the Islamic state should be structured, something not resembling 
any actual and contemporary political entity (not even Iran, which is a ʻmockery of an 
Islamic state, devoured by greediness for powerʼ).28 
Thus, the perfect Islamic state as envisaged in a structure based on seven pillars: the 
Khalifah, the Assistants, the Commander of Jihad, the Judiciary, the Wulaa, the 
Administrative System, and the Majlis-al-Ummah. There are four principles of the ruling 
system in the Islamic state: 
• The Sovereignty belongs to the Shariʼah; 
• The authority belongs to the Ummah; 
• The appointment of one Khalifa 
• The Khalifah alone reserves the right to adopt the Shariaʼ ah rules. (ibid., 221). 
                                            
28 Extract from an interview with Taji Mustafa, the media representative for HT. The interview (which is contained in 
the appendix) was conducted on 6 June 2006 at the HT headquarters in Gloucester Road, London. 
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There is a powerful emphasis on a single Caliph, in order to support the idea of a united 
pan-Islamic state ʻwithout divisions among the Muslim brothers, which are source of 
confusion and weaknessʼ.29 Another relevant aspect of HT political ʻdiscursiveʼ innovation 
is that both Shiʼia and Sunni members are accepted, as a sign, both of their ʻintellectual 
ijtihadʼ, and the effort towards an ʻintelligent dialogueʼ for the construction of Khalifat. The 
fundamental idea is that the Khilafah will be established after ʻdedicated work of 
preparationʼ through daʼwah and ʻMuslims will be happy and willing to work in order to 
achieve this, to implement Islam where it is not implemented, to change the Dar-al-Kufr 
into Dar-al-Islamʼ. From its origins in Palestine, HT has spread to other countries, 
especially in Central Asia, where there have been several claims of involvement in the 
protests that shook Uzbekistan in 2005. Apparently, there are more HT prisoners in 
Central Asiaʼs prisons than those of any other movement (Rashid 2002, 115). However, it 
is banned in Germany and in ʻmost of the M.E countries as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, as a terrorist and extremist partyʼ.30 In Britain, it was 
established by a Palestinian, Fouad Hussein, and was later headed by Omar Bakri, 
ʻdespite his claims that he was the actual founder and initiator of the movementʼ.31  
HT first came to public attention during the Gulf War, when some members visited the Iraqi 
embassy to urge Saddam to ʻannounce his acceptance of the office of the Caliphʼ (Taji-
Farouki 1996, 178). Le Bor quotes Zaki Badawi of the Muslim College as stating that ʻHT 
appeared after the Gulf War, after the delegitimisation of the regimes in the Gulf, which all 
appeared to be paper regimes, unable to defend themselvesʼ (Le Bor 1997, 140). The Gulf 
War and its many complications seemed to provide a springboard for the emergence of 
HT. Taji Farouki observes that the main attraction of HT was the fact that it was spreading 
a very simple message -- that the solution to all problems lies in the resurrection of the 
Caliphate -- crafted with an intellectual sophistication, ʻwhich appealed in particular to 
young Asian Muslimsʼ (Taji-Farouki 1996, 177). Surely one of the partyʼs biggest triumph 
was the Khilafah Conference in August 1994, held at Wembley Arena, ʻwhere thousands 
of Muslims gathered -- for the first time -- to start discussing, planning and thinking about 
their future as Muslimsʼ.32 The conference called for ʻthe overthrow of the existing order in 
the Muslim world and the establishment of a single Islamic caliphate, which would come to 
                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 Extracts from a personal chat with Majid Nawaz, former member of HTUK. The interview (contained in the 




the defence of Muslims whenever they faced dangerʼ.33 It has been argued that the 
Wembley conference brought together diverse anti-Muslim Brothers elements, all sharing 
a revolutionary ideology and a willingness to adopt an anti-Saudi stance. In fact, Zaki 
Badawi has remarked that the Wembley conference ʻmarked the final blow to all Saudi 
efforts to control Muslims in Britainʼ (The Sunday Telegraph 1994). 
HT also achieved a great popularity among students, managing to quickly recruit a large 
number of young members. Its strong stance on Palestine and homosexuality, coupled 
with its inflammatory rhetoric, certainly attracted many young people. These were second 
and third generation Muslims, ʻwho were looking for some strong catalyst to channel their 
frustrations; who were rejecting the Islam brought over by their fathers, as ritual and 
backward, but interested in hearing its revolutionary message, as a way of feeding new 
hopes for their futureʼ.34 HTʼs inflammatory rhetoric and allegations of violent threats have 
fuelled condemnation from the National Union of Students; for example, a Sikh welfare 
officer, speaking at the 1995 NUS conference, claimed to have received ʻdeath threatsʼ 
from HT (Muslim News 1995). 
In the aftermath of the 9-11 terror attacks and after the departure of Omar Bakri, HT 
became less public for a while. In 2003, it organised a conference in Birmingham under 
the provocative title ʻBritish or Muslim?ʼ; this attracted 8000 people. Once again, it came to 
public attention through the protests at the prospect of the Iraq War, with tables at Hyde 
Park and local rallies pushing its literature. However, it was derided when, during the anti-
war campaign, it distributed stickers and leaflets that urged ʻDo not stop the war -- except 
through Islamic politicsʼ. This was meant to emphasize the importance of avoiding Kufr 
politics, by advising UK Muslims to demand from the Qatari and other Muslim embassies 
ʻthat their countries prevent the Americans from launching war from their soilsʼ. HTʼs next 
major appearance came with the hijab episode, when 16 year old Shabina Begum won her 
High Court Case concerning the right to wear it. Her victory speech resembled a very 
political declaration, referring to ʻa world where Muslim women, from Uzbekistan to Turkey, 
feel the brunt of policies guided by western governmentsʼ, and declaring that her triumph 
was: 
ʻa victory for all Muslims who wish to preserve their identity and values in 
face of an atmosphere that has been created in western societies post 9-




11, an atmosphere in which Islam has been made a target for vilification in 
the name of the ʻwar on Terrorʼ (Aslam 2005, 67). 
It is easy to observe that the declaration issued by the young Muslim girl sounded 
ʻorchestratedʼ and the reference to Uzbekistan was certainly peculiar. The simple reason 
behind such rhetoric effort lay in the fact that Shabinaʼs brother was an HT supporter and 
HT was proud to confirm that it had helped Shabina and advised on her case. This was 
surely an unusual tactic for an Islamist party which rejects involvement in the British public 
and political system and does not regard any ʻman-made lawʼ as legitimate. Yet this might 
be just one of several inexplicable, slightly paradoxical and contradictory stances of the HT 
and its Islamist politics, that are finally aimed at establishing the Khilafah. 
There is little doubt that the main event in the UK that triggered off a heated debate around 
HT and ʻits extremist and dangerous Islamist ideologyʼ (The Independent 2005) was the UK 
War on Terror. This anxiety escalated in the aftermath of the 7-7 London bombings; since 
then there have been different political moves and parliamentary debates in order to ban 
the party on the charge of glorifying terrorism (Home Office, 2006). HT was prompt in 
responding to such a proposal; writing to the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke that it 
saw the Government proposal as an expression of the ʻGovernmentʼs own form of 
fanaticism and extremism to curtail legitimate political debate in Britain for their own 
political endsʼ. Similarly, their Chief Media Advisor Dr Imran Waheed stated that the 
proposal was ʻa clear proof of the governmentʼs failure to face the political opinions of the 
party through rational debate and discussion and a desperate attempt to prevent the British 
public from hearing the opinions of the Muslim communityʼ (HT press release 2005). In the 
same letter, it was highlighted that HTʼs objective was to establish a Caliphate in the 
Muslim world through peaceful means, not by advocating the violent overthrow of any state 
but rather by da’wah. It was specified in the other documents that HT was not planning to 
take over power in Britain or to establish a Caliphate state here. Rather, it hoped to convert 
Britain. In this framework, the role of the Muslims in Britain and other Western countries 
was to support the work of the Muslims in the Muslim lands. In other documents, the 
establishing of a Caliphate in Britain is not excluded apriori, but the need of da’wah 
succeeding in turning Britain into a Muslim majority country is also declared. In that case, 
there is a three stage plan to implement: 
• the stage of culturing: this involves finding and cultivating individuals, who are convinced 
by the thought and the method of the party; 
 171 
• the stage of interaction: this implies interacting with the Ummah, in order to encourage 
the Ummah to work for Islam and to carry the Daʼwah and so that it works to establish 
Islam in life, state and society; 
• the stage of taking the government: this means to take the Government and implement 
Islam completely and totally and carry its message to the world. (HT 1999, 32). 
This also involved seeking nusrah (ʻhelpʼ), in the sense of protection, just as the Ansar 
provided to Muhammad in Medina. Such a long term plan also requires interaction with the 
wider community, which ʻallows us to present our values as well as trying to engage with 
various public bodies in society without compromising our idealsʼ (Aldred 2004, 57). 
Allegedly, this is exemplified in the structure and organization of HTUK, as it is led by an 
ʻexecutive committee, and elections are held to determine the composition of this 
committee. The elections take place every two years and the entire membership takes part 
in this electionʼ (Abedin 2008). Here again, it seems slightly unusual for a party which 
rejects ʻman-made decisions and lawsʼ, to use an electoral system for appointing its 
leadership. Likewise, the ʻinteractionʼ stage is envisaged as ʻencouraging the Ummah to 
work for Islamʼ, which is a peculiar way of presenting and framing a political plan, where 
the Ummah should benefit from the establishment of an Islamic state and not be the 
means in order to achieve it. Within the same framework, the Khilafah itself seems a rather 
vague ideological construct instead of being a pragmatic and achievable political entity 
whose establishment should bring benefits to the Islamic community. Even so, note how 
the definition and representation of Islam (the self-representation) appears to be very 
similar to the culturalist-orientalist one. More specifically, it echoes the clash of civilizations 
theory, where Islam is represented as a monolithic, totalizing entity, like a living being, with 
its own life, whose needs have to be fulfilled by the community. What is overlooked (in 
both cases) is that this Islam exists but through the lived experiences, the interactions, the 
discursive operations and the signifying practices of its agents. Representation and self-
representation of Islam and Islamism are discoursed through the same ʻreifyingʼ practice, 
which stigmatizes and reduces a variegated, contested, historical, political and social 
reality to a uniform entity, that is simply artificial and manufactured in its attributes, and 
deprived of agency. 
Within the culturalist-orientalist approach and Hungtintonʼs theory, the purpose was to 
identify a new enemy and define a new front to rally and fight against. In HTʼs case, it 
might be argued that  the objective is the need to gather supporters for a political plan. 
Such a political plan is more easily divulged and promoted if it is personified and simplified, 
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reduced to a monolithic entity, a nearly utopian reality, where everything is legitimized and 
secured under the vessel of Islam. Further, it can be argued that the operation of reification 
in relation to self-representation, helps in gathering supporters and making them acolytes. 
In other words, by depriving the whole community -- the Ummah, the Us group -- of 
agency (by presenting it as a uniform entity) more leverage is given to the ones -- among 
the Us group -- who have a leading role: the party leaders. That is to say, the mirroring 
dynamic of representation and self-representation, in relation to Islamism and specifically 
to HT, interacts and discourses here, with other elements residing within the 
representational practice: fetishism, enamourement with power and the desire to take over 
power. 
In this context, despite HTʼs intentions of engaging with the wider community in the UK 
and of supporting a ʻrational and open debateʼ, its members have always completely 
rejected any form of participation in the UK elections, on the basis of refusing to join a kufr 
political system and by defining voting as a ʻsinful diversionʼ (Kassem 1997, 74). During 
the 2005 elections, for example, HT ran a campaign against voting , but this was couched 
in more ʻaccessibleʼ and less inflammatory terms than those of the other rejectionist 
parties. The alternative put forward was to strengthen the communityʼs Islamic identity and 
extend daʼwah to non-Muslims. HT also rejected RESPECT, regardless of the latterʼs 
acknowledged opposition to the occupation of Iraq and Palestine, because of its policies 
on homosexuality and abortion (which are strongly opposed by HT as ʻun-Islamic 
practicesʼ) and because it did not support the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq and 
Palestine (Standforislam, 2005). 
In terms of promoting a rational and constructive debate with non-Muslims, HT seems 
ʻstrangelyʼ unequivocal in its views on democracy. HT considers democracy to be an 
infidel system and thinks only the Sharia should be implemented. It affirms that the 
Ummah does not possess the right to legislate because ʻAllah is the legislator…However 
Allah has given the authority of rule and the implementation to the Ummah and therefore 
given it the right to elect or appoint a rulerʼ (HT 2000, 52). HT does allow for a plurality of 
parties with the proviso that they must all be established by Muslims and committed to 
Islam. There is little doubt that such positions are in contradiction with the oft-declared 
intentions of opening the debate and starting the dialogue with non-Muslims political actors 
and parties who have different beliefs and ideologies. HTʼs stances could be neatly 
described as ʻattempts to curtail the legitimate political debate for its own political endsʼ. 
Recall Waheedʼs words in the letter addressed to the then Home Secretary Charles 
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Clarke, in which he accused the Government of ʻextremist and fanaticist behaviourʼ for 
proposing to ban HT; that is plainly an example of a mirroring dynamic between 
representation and self-representation. However, these considerations are further explored 
and better conveyed through some of the interviews and informal chats that I had with the 
political actors themselves, the members of HT. 
One thing that has always caught my attention is HTʼs professional attitude in presenting 
its political programme; its undisputable ability to talk and intervene in the debate, its 
display of efforts to conduct an open and rational debate with their detractors and with the 
non-Muslims. 
But this is half the story. An important aspect related to the qualitative research method is 
that the context and the time are as important as the subjects and objects of the study 
itself. To admit this is not to undermine or weaken the scientific value of the findings 
obtained through qualitative research by calling them ʻrelativisticʼ and volatile, but it is to 
stress the importance of conducting a ʻthick descriptionʼ of the context and the subjectsʼ 
interactions within it. 
My point here is that the in-depth, face-to-face interview is very fruitful but it has to be 
collated and added to the experience of being a participant and  non-participant observer, 
It is by adopting such an eclectic method that the contradictions, the multifaceted 
meanings, schizophrenic discourses, ʻfetishistʼ repressions start to emerge and be spoken 
aloud. In so doing, the collection of political pamphlets, press releases, and official 
declarations also become more ʻdiscoursedʼ, to the extent of constituting signifying 
practices. 
To clarify these concepts, I will relate the personal chats and interviews that I had with 
members of HT and report about my experience as a non(participant) observer, attending 
their meetings and workshops. Hopefully then, the signifying practices and the fetishism 
for politics and power, as well as the inner paradoxes, will become more apparent. 
The core idea of HT political agenda is that the institution of the Khilafah will constitute a 
ʻstabilizing force for the Muslim worldʼ. This is a political plan, which is supposed to bring 
benefits to the community. In relation to the concept of authority, it is declared that the 
Caliphate is a political system35 whose head is legitimized only through popular consent. 
The Caliphate -- it is also declared -- engages voices of dissent through the political 
                                            
35 According to what is declared in HT official documents, ‘The Khilafah’ in Islam is inherently a political system, a 
complete and totalizing way of life for the entire community, therefore it seems strange here the stress on the ‘political 
aspects’ of the system. 
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system by providing extensive channels for accounting all parts of the stateʼs apparatus. 
My interviewee36 continued by stressing that, once elected, the head of the state is bound 
to an agreement with the people through the baya contract. The baya contract -- it was 
explained to me -- stipulates a number of conditions for the leadership of the state 
including the condition that he manages the affairs of the people on their behalf. Until this 
point, I was greatly impressed with the use of political concepts and notions, which 
appeared exclusively human-made. Besides, to me, the terminology used appeared 
slightly westernized (which should sound paradoxical and perhaps culturalist-orientalist, in 
that it supposes that certain structures of the Modern state are the product of the modern 
Western history). Yet strangely, these notions seemed tailored for a Western audience. I 
hesitated about this specific epistemological and doctrinal point, venturing to point out the 
human and ʻmundaneʼ aspects of this system; I also expressed surprise at a certain lack of 
ʻdivine involvementʼ. The careful response I received was that the laws which regulate the 
Khilafah state originate exclusively from the source of Sharia, the implementation of which 
is presided over only by the most eminent and qualified judge in the state, who is granted 
extensive powers by the Shariʼah. They form the ʻCourt of Unjust Actsʼ, which also 
monitors the Caliphʼs legal adoptions, with the power to demand revocations.  That said, 
my argument was that in spite of the divinely inspired written text, there was a further 
stage, which implied that the act of interpretation and decision-making still resided with the 
ʻhumanʼ. It was then explained to me that in addition to the Court of the Unjust Acts, there 
was another important institution that forms part of the Caliphateʼs accountability 
architecture. It is a representative assembly whose members are elected directly by 
citizens and can be from any ethnicity, gender or creed. This could not dissipate my 
doubts and additionally made me more curious about the terminology and the schools of 
fiqh (madhab) adopted by the Khilafah state system. Now, the response was sensibly 
laconic, simply stressing that HT encourages ʻopen debateʼ and therefore the Khilafah 
state will variously adopt the four schools of fiqh. At this point, I highlighted that this was a 
further proof of man-made decisions in terms of selecting interpretations. My interviewee 
stressed that the judges in charge receive their powers from the sharia and ʻthey are the 
best man at doing this jobʼ; this sounded like a repetition of something declared earlier on, 
and possibly an assumption, not an explanation. The interview ended and my curiosity 
about those unclear aspects of the Khilafah state grew. 
                                            
36 Interview with Taji Mustafa is contained in the appendix. 
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My next opportunity to further the discussion arrived when I was invited to a meeting 
organized by HT on ʻ Radicalisation, extremism and Islamismʼ.37 This time I had the 
chance of sitting near the Chairman and UK Executive of HT, Dr. Abdul Wahid, and 
therefore, of exchanging some views on the theme of the Khilafah state. My interest was 
still focused on the variable use of the schools of fiqh, which now became five in Dr. 
Wahidʼs words.38 Apart from this curious slip, once again, the prevailing impression was 
that -- despite HTʼs intentions of instituting an Islamic state where the political dimension 
could not be dissociated from the spiritual one -- the political was actually winning over the 
spiritual, in terms of relations of power and the struggles for it, the discourse of power and 
its signifying practices. 
My next move was to ask some practical questions in relation to such a ʻselectingʼ 
dynamic, which would have finally clarified my doubts. Though my query revolved around 
the mechanism and the structures of the Khilafah state, I ended up understanding 
something deeply related to the substance and the discursive formations of the HT 
ʻIslamist discourseʼ. To my surprise, my interlocutor could not remember the names of the 
five schools of fiqh,39 and I also found out that he was not fluent in Arabic, the original 
language used in the sacred texts. This apparently minor detail triggered a series of further 
questions, more about HT than the Khilafah state. With this specific curiosity, I asked other 
HT members attending that meeting about their level of Arabic (and therefore about the 
language used in the sacred texts objects of their study). The responses I received 
confirmed my suspicions: the language commonly used was English, as most of the 
members were Urdu speakers and -- in some cases -- as second, third generation Bengali 
and Pakistani, they could only speak  English. At the European level of HT, the language 
used for reading the sacred texts and for writing pamphlets, documents and letters is 
English. This is then translated into other European languages, according to the specific 
country where HT is based (i.e., France, Italy, Spain). The translation from Arabic to 
English is very careful, and to certain extent, very ʻcatchyʼ, in order to appeal to a crowd of 
Western-based supporters, Western-educated sceptical listeners and Western-minded 
detractors. To someone who knows Arabic and has read and studied the main texts of the 
Islamic schools of fiqh, some concepts expressed and promoted by HT in its documents 
                                            
37 The meeting was held in a conference centre in East London, Commercial road, on 13 July 2007. 
38 This is an informal chat and not a proper interview, therefore it will be not transcribed in the appendix. 
39 The four schools of fiqh (madhab) are Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi and Maliki. There is a fifth school of fiqh, Jafaari, 
which is not recognized by the Sunni, just by the Shi’ite fiqh (Guillame, 1954). 
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and publications, seem slightly manipulated or tailored to implement the Khilafah state. If 
this same subject (myself in this case) decides to conduct a research project on HT as a 
participant observer, he/she will find the rhetoric and oratorical skills of his/her subjects of 
study and their ability to appeal to their audience,  as being truly remarkable. 
To put it differently, there is an overwhelming and overpowering dimension, which is 
constantly re-surfacing here, despite my intervieweesʼ denial: politics, and above all, a 
fetishism for it. Its prevalence is achieved, paradoxically, whenever it is denied any 
possibility of a delinking between religion, state and society. The other important aspect to 
consider is power and relations of power, where the ʻspiritual dimension and basis to 
Islamic polityʼ (HT 2005, 38) is clearly overshadowed. The writings on the Khilafah and on 
the Islamic state system produced by HTUK constantly stress the openness and great 
level of tolerance in Islamism. For example, ʻwhat distinguishes Islam...is the existence of 
a detailed system of governance…for the good of mixed communities comprising both 
Muslim and non-Muslimsʼ (HT 2005, 29). These declarations were clearly jeopardized 
when I ventured to ask Dr Wahid about the treatment of the apostates in the Khilafah. After 
a brief hesitation, his response was: ʻQur’an is clear about the apostate: the capital 
penaltyʼ. Such a reply left me slightly perplexed and I wondered how the population in the 
Middle Eastern countries -- the supposed basis for the future Khilafah state -- would 
receive statements like this. Besides, I then recalled my conversation with the HT media 
representative Taji Mustafa,40 who had quoted a poll conducted ʻamong the population of 
the Middle East, by HT party branches, where it emerged that 87% of the population want 
the institution of the Khilafah stateʼ. I also recalled that HT branches are banned in most of 
the Middle Eastern countries and citizens suspected of being HT supporters41 are jailed for 
years ʻafter fake trialsʼ.42 Again, I was at square one and I started questioning how the 
ʻgeneral upheaval in support of the Khilafahʼ could actually happen across the Middle 
Eastern countries. Apart from the fact that they are banned as an Islamist party, perhaps 
their actual popularity was not so widespread; therefore, their political plan could only be 
implemented by a violent and abrupt takeover of political power. Once again, the prevailing 
dimension was power, a struggle and a desire for it, and ultimately, for politics. It was 
stated that the HT members would move to the Khilafa state and encourage ʻall the other 
                                            
40 See the appendix for the complete interview. 
41 There was the case of three members of HTUK, who were jailed in Egypt for four years under the accusation of 
trying to implant HT in Egypt (where the party is banned). They were Majid Nawaz, Ian Nisbet and Reza Pankhurst. 
42 Extract from the interview with Taji Mustafa. 
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Islamists across the world to move thereʼ as they could finally ʻlive in a state freed from 
imported political structures, alien to the values of the Muslim worldʼ.43 Needless to remark 
that expressions like the ʻMuslim worldʼ resemble a culturalist-orientalist approach, where 
Islam is presented as a unifying and totalizing entity, which swallows histories and stories 
of dynamic interactions, exchanges, transformations within the variegated and rich social, 
political and ʻculturalʼ contexts. Paradoxically, this (HTʼs) is also the approach adopted by 
the likes of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, authors whose scholarship is 
considered crucial to USAʼs foreign policy interests and who are accused of ʻdrawing false 
battle lines between the West and Islamʼ (HT 2005, 31). 
Furthermore, the mere conceptualization of Western Islamists promoting and pushing for 
the institution of the Khilafah, leading the ʻKhalifa upheavalʼ, without having ever lived 
ʻthereʼ, without even being able to speak Arabic, ironically evokes certain past ideas and 
political plans, which started to take shape in Europe at the end of the 19th century among 
Zionist political circles,  (the latter are otherwise labelled as ʻinvaders, colonizers of the 
Palestinian landsʼ, HT 2005a, 13). Here again, there is an aspect of a mirroring effect: the 
unconscious emulation of the ʻenemyʼ strategy (Zionists are always represented as 
enemies in the HT Islamist discourse). 
The idea of the Khilafah state stretching across the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia 
is in itself a progressive and -- to a certain extent -- a revolutionary plan, which is more 
than just an example of ʻan indigenous political system consistent with the values of the 
Muslim worldʼ44. It is difficult to imagine the possibility of simply retrieving an historical past 
-- which formally ended in 1924 (the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formal end of 
the Khilafah system) -- by deleting centuries of political, historical, social, economic events, 
transformations and interactions. Such a plan of recreating a past historical experience 
(which ultimately never occurred in the terms indicated by the HT leadership), is definitely 
a revolution, which could take place only by uprooting existing institutions and abruptly 
taking over power. Finally, this does not represent an effort to have an impact and to 
change Western politics toward the Middle East and the ʻIslamic worldʼ: it is a blatantly 
new foundational act, which requires the complete erasure of previous ʻstrataʼ. This leads 
me to comment that the widespread idea of HT as a political movement, which aims to 
bring back medieval political structures (The Times 2004) is clearly flawed. I argue that the 
exact reverse is actually true. HTʼs plan resembles a drastic innovation: its political 




discourse, semantics and practices are totally innovative, as they are performed by a 
Muslim minority in a European country. The HT members themselves reject the label of 
innovators as well,45 since their declared intention is to finally restore an indigenous 
political system that has been contaminated by centuries of foreign interventions and 
occupation in the ʻMuslim worldʼ. According to their view, the Khilafah system is the only 
political structure which permits them to ʻrespect, protect and promote the moral and 
spiritual values of Islam, by forming an integral whole with its political viewpointʼ. 
As the interviews and conversations mentioned above have shown, the ultimate dimension 
of the Khilafah (Islamic state) is politics and the struggle for power, both within the party 
and in the supposed-to-be Khilafah state. Ironically, such an effort would definitely promote 
a strong ʻsecularizationʼ of Islam. This is firmly denied by the political actors themselves, 
and finally, missed by their detractors who categorise them under the label of ʻreligious 
fundamentalistsʼ. Thus, both representation and self-representation are affected by a 
mirroring effect, and as such, the images represented are the same but turned upside 
down: loyalty to the past becomes backwardness. Besides, both parties overlook the fact 
that they -- in a similar manner -- project the exact opposite of what happens in reality, by 
being the reflecting surface of the Otherʼs representation and the negative of what actually 
occurs outside their discursive practices. This process happens under specific constraints 
and repression, which I call the fetishism for politics: it deflects the interaction between the 
two parties (the dominant and the dominated) and it leads to a political stalemate and the 
persistence of a security threat. 
 
 
Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect 
 
The mirroring effect within the practice of representation and self-representation (as 
explored with HT) finds a further expression in the case of two other Islamist parties:Al 
Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect. They, similarly, reject the British system but they plan 
instead of overtaking it. 
Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect are both offsprings of Al-Muhajiroun, a group founded by 
Omar-Al-Bakri and then disbanded in 2004. The two groups openly support Al-Qaida and 
the 9-11 and 7-7 suicide bombers, by hailing them as the ʻMagnificent 19ʼ and the 
                                            
45 This was the reaction when, during a personal chat with Dr. Wahid, I pointed out that perhaps they were innovators 
and revolutionaries, and not ‘preservers’ of the Islamic system of the Khilafa. 
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ʻavenging heroesʼ respectively. Their leaders Anjoum Choudari and Abu Izzadin are both 
part of the team of ʻMuslim lawyersʼ defending Omar Bakri together with the Saudi born 
lawyer Muhammad-al-Massari, head of the CDLR (Commission for the Defence of the 
Legitimate Rights), now based in London. 
Mr. Choudari and Mr. Abu Izzadin follow the ASWJ (ahl-al-Sunna-wal-Jamaa), that means 
to follow only the Qur’an and the Sunnah in accordance with the understanding of the 
Companions and the family of the prophet Muhammad. They both adopt this approach by 
basing its stance on a hadith that emphasizes the purity of the first three generations: 
1) The first generation -- the Messenger Muhammad and his companions; 
2) The second generation -- those who followed the first generation (known as the 
Taabiʼeen); 
3) The third generation (ended 240-260AH) -- those who followed the Taabiʼeen 
(Thesavedsect, 2004). 
It must be stressed that they emphatically dissociate themselves from those traditionally 
seen as Salafis: the Wahhabi scholars collaborating with what the Sect sees as the ʻKafir 
Saudi Regime, who do not enter any struggle against Kufr, shirk or the Tawaagheet. 
However they are just happy and content with just speaking about Allahʼs names and 
attributes all day and always dig on the mistakes of Muslimsʼ (Thesavedsect 2003). 
The ban imposed on Omar Bakri in August 2005 and him being disallowed from returning 
to Britain after a short visit to Lebanon prompted an exasperated response from Choudary 
and Izzaadin. Choudary described the move as a ʻKangaroo system of justice…they say 
that there is freedom of expression here but he has been banned because he was a voice 
of dissentʼ. The Al Ghurabaa website issued a release saluting Bakri, now ʻfreed from this 
prison of Britain…while his flags are at half mast, Mr Tony Blair cannot spend his days in 
power without fear from your promise of the black flag of Islam flying over 10 Downing 
streetʼ (Alghurabaa, 2005). 
Likewise, the related ʻSaved Sectʼ website issued a message referring to Bakri as our 
ʻbeloved teacher and scholarʼ, and spoke of the divine favour that allowed them to learn 
Islam with: 
ʻa scholar al-Sunna-wal-Jamaaʼah such as yourself...in a time when we used to 
be clean-shaven, listen to music, smoke, freely mix in colleges and universities, 
disrespect our parents, wear designer clothes, swear, betray our covenants, not 
pray and knowingly disobey our lord; you were the only one, who was out there 
challenging the Western, non-Islamic way of life openly and publicly, not fearing 
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from the blame of the blamers and the propaganda of the mediaʼ 
(Thesavioursect, 2005). 
These topics, voiced in a more belligerent and loud tone, were exactly the ones discussed 
in a meeting held to ʻcelebrateʼ the first anniversary of the 7-7 London bombings. I had the 
opportunity of attending this meeting as a ʻdistantʼ non-participant observer. ʻDistantʼ is the 
best way of describing my actual ʻgeographicalʼ position in the room, in relation to the 
members of Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect. The fact that I was not wearing any hijab (I 
did not think it disrespectful or essential to have one as I was not inside a mosque) meant 
that they relegated me to the back of the room, on the exact same side as the other 
ʻWesternsʼ, namely, some journalists from the BBC. Among them, there was only one 
lady,46 who was wearing the head-cover. She was allowed to sit in front of me, but behind 
her male colleagues. At the end of the session, Abu Izzadin pointed at me, as the ʻnaked 
womanʼ in the room. 
The meeting, which was chaired by Abu Izzadin and Anjoum Choudary, started by first 
mourning the departure of ʻour beloved teacher and scholarʼ Omar Bakri, who was praised 
for speaking the truth and for having resisted the attacks of the disbelievers. To be more 
precise, Choudary declared that ʻthe more we used to see the disbelievers and hypocrites 
attacking you, the more it increased our faith and belief that you were speaking the 
truth…as this is something which the messenger of  Allah used to face on a daily basis 
from the enemies of Islamʼ.47 
 
Omar Bakri was addressed as a sort of divinity, represented there as a transcendent 
entity, a spiritual guide, whom Choudary was invoking and supplicating, by speaking 
directly to him, in front of all the other party members and disciples. As if to confirm this 
perception, he continued by saying that ʻyou will be pleased to know that we will continue 
with our work here in order to distinguish ourselves from the disbelievers and fulfil our 
                                            
46 Apparently, as Peter Taylor confirmed to me, the BBC always prefers to send male journalists, as they consider the 
presence of a female journalist counter-productive to the job. On that day -- he explained me -- there had been an 
emergency and they had to send a woman to take the place of her male colleague. He also complimented me for my 
courage in attending that meeting as a lone young woman. Ironically, the basic idea of reflecting stereotypes works 
perfectly in this case. 
47 
 Those quotes, and the ones that follow, are excerpts from a meeting that I recorded, on 7 July 2006 in Leytonstone, 
East London. The theme of the meeting (jointly organized by the Saved Sect and Al Ghurabaa) was: ‘Are we ready for 
another 7-7?’. 
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duties and obligations wherever we are…you will be greatly missed here...May Allah unite 
us again, if not in this world, in the Hereafterʼ.48 
After this sort of invocation, the meeting started and the theme was ʻAre we ready for 
another 7-7’?. 
The first convenor was Abu Izzadin, who opened his intervention by defining 9-11 and 7-7 
as a ʻwake up call for the whole world, to signify that the idea of integration is flawed and 
unrealisticʼ. In his words, the attacks have had the important role of dividing and defining 
the two camps: the Ummah of the believers and the camp of the Munafiqiin and hypocrites 
headed by the likes of George Bush and Tony Blairʼ. The reactions to those attacks had 
been the beginning of a ʻCrusade against Islam and Muslims, which forced Muslims to 
make a choice between the two fronts, either support Bush or support al Qaida and 
Osama Bin Ladenʼ. The notion of two separated camps was strongly stressed by Abu 
Izzadin, to the point that Muslims collaborating with the UK government were called ʻthe 
secularist and hypocrites from the MCB, MPAC, IHRCʼ, and regarded as ʻchimpanzees 
who sold their beliefs in order to achieve positions and power as MP, judge, doctors or 
police chiefsʼ. The core argument of his speech -- which was rhythmically marked by the 
same rhetoric question (are we ready for another 7-7?) -- was that the events of the terror 
attacks were simply acts of retaliation, which were directly caused by the occupations and 
wars waged by the West against the Muslim World in the last centuries. In this connection, 
Abu Izzadin shockingly declared ʻnot to feel sorry for the 52 victimsʼ, as they were not 
Muslims and they constituted such a small percentage ʻin comparison with the millions of 
children killed in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan...besides, the Muslim community is 
experiencing 9-11 and 7-7 everyday, at the hands of the Western Powersʼ. 
So far, his discursive approach had shown an exact resemblance to what he was strongly 
criticizing, for example, Bush-Blairʼs bipolar division of Humanity between Christians and 
Muslims, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, all reinforced by the notion of a forthcoming 
Crusade to wage against the Enemy (Muslims in one case and Christians in the other). 
The same attitude is also embraced by the culturalist-orientalist framework, which is based 
on the idea that the Other is the different, and as such, the inferior, the unacceptable, in 
need of being ousted and ultimately dominated and destroyed, for being inadequate. Here 
again, representation and self-representation mirror each other; specifically reflecting the 
negative of the Otherʼs image, as it were, through diverging lenses. Moreover, this occurs 
                                            
48 Ibid. 
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within the domain of a struggle for power and it is driven by the desire to have the upper 
hand. 
Mr Izzadin continued by saying that, ʻMuslims humiliated feel the need to defend the 
honour of Islam and of the Ummah, to the point of sacrificing their own life. As such they 
are martyrsʼ. Abu Izzadin was also explicit about Democracy, which he rejected because it 
enshrines popular rather than divine sovereignty and is built on lies and the ʻgreed for 
Powerʼ. He therefore envisaged Britain becoming an Islamic state, by means of both 
daʼwah and jihad, which he regarded as a fard obligation. He then declared: ʻI want Britain 
to become an Islamic state. I want to see the flag of Islam raised in 10 Downing 
street...Islamising Britain is a divine dutyʼ. At this specific point, members of Al Ghurabaa 
and the Saved Sect started chanting from the audience: ʻIslam in Downing Street! Islam in 
Downing Street!ʼ, as if it were a war motto to exorcize the forthcoming battle or the 
beginning of a Crusade to defeat the enemy and to pave the way for a new ʻIslamicʼ 
system, regardless of the existing political, social, indigenous structures. It is obvious that 
a project like this very closely resembles the ʻimperialisticʼ, ʻcolonial policiesʼ of the West in 
the Muslim world (the same ones which led to the ʻhumiliation and suffering of the Ummah 
for centuries and which have to be stoppedʼ).49 My point here is that the dynamic 
connecting the practices of representation and self-representation is based on a mirroring 
process, where the ʻselfʼ reflects the Otherʼs image, but denies its representation. This 
happens under the constraints of a repressed desire for power, and the denial of a strong 
enamourment with politics: namely, fetishism. 
The second part of Izzadinʼs speech was focused on the ʻevilʼ role of the media in 
demonizing Muslims by waging a propaganda war to support the UK government and the 
ʻEvil forcesʼ. The example taken to support the argument was the episode of the killing of 
the Brazilian electrician Charles de Menezes,50 which was ʻinitially welcomed by the media 
as the elimination of another Muslim and therefore a triumphʼ. In Abu Izzadinʼs view, the 
same event also stood as a clear proof of the incapacity of all the ʻ007 danger mouse [sic] 
working for the English Government, who committed a gross mistake and desperately tried 
to cover it upʼ. The idea of the incompetence of the Government and its flawed policies 
was used to explain the 7-7 attacks in themselves, and to predict more similar episodes in 
the future. In his reasoning, the terror attacks constituted a reaction to the Western policies 
                                            
49 Ibid. 
50 The reference here is to the unfortunate and dramatic event of the killing of an innocent Brazilian electrician who 
was mistaken for a terrorist. This happened inside the Stockwell tube station in London on 22 July 2005. 
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in the Middle East and therefore the culprit had to be envisaged in the likes of Bush or 
Blair. He showed a schizophrenic attitude toward the events, which, at times, were 
regarded as victories for the ʻIslamic frontʼ, and at other times, regarded as the outcomes 
of the Westʼs mistakes. The positive connotations were always attributed to the Islamic 
side (the Us group) and the negative to the West (the Other/Enemy). To conclude his 
speech -- with an outspoken rhetorical attitude -- Abu Izzadin reiterated his question on 
whether we are ready for more events like 7-7. This time, his answer was a loud 
affirmative yes, which was hailed by the audience. 
Anjoum Choudaryʼs intervention came next. His speech was characterized by powerful 
oratory; he opened by asking the same rhetorical question. He focused on the political 
aspects of the anti-Terror war that -- in his view -- was mainly ʻmeant to weaken Islam and 
to disband the Muslim communityʼ. In his words, the driving force ʻbehind the draconian 
anti terror legislation is fear of the superiority of Islam as a religion, as an ideology, as a 
political system, fear that one day Islam will dominate the worldʼ. Likewise, the events of 7-
7 were addressed as an unmistakeable sign of the strength of Islam and of its believers 
and of the weakness of a decadent British society, founded on alcohol, drugs, casinos and 
dysfunctional familiesʼ. According to this view, the total lack of values and moral conduct 
has always been a fact of English history to the point that Choudary loudly affirmed: 
ʻBritish values are basically fish and chips and nothing moreʼ. This resembled an 
excessively ʻreductionistʼ approach; belittling the ʻOtherʼ, and trivializing him/her in order to 
justify his/her submission. The English lack of values was presented as a main factor that 
would lead to the Islamic flag and the Islamic state to be ʻone day dominant and 
established in the whole worldʼ. This also sounded like a brutalized and reversed version 
of the colonial concept of ʻthe white manʼs burdenʼ (Kipling 1899), with the ʻeducationalʼ 
and ʻdevelopmentalʼ purposes being unmasked as sheer domination, justified by a 
supposed Islamic moral superiority, in place of Western technological advancement. 
As in the case of Mr Izzadin, Choudaryʼs discursive approach was established on a bipolar 
division between Islam and the rest of the world, between the forces of Evil (West) and the 
forces of the Good (Islam), so that Islam would ultimately triumph over the Enemy who is 
ridiculed and reduced to a few insignificant features. In the same way, at the level of self-
representation, there was an interesting reification of Islam. It was presented as a 
monolithic block, characterized by unchanged and unchangeable moral values, but at the 
same time, deprived of human agency, of history, of geographies: a sort of inanimate 
entity which would destroy the Other, the West. That is to say, the self-representation was 
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mirroring the representation offered by the culturalist-orientalist approach. In the culturalist-
orientalist case, the main aim is to deprive the Other (the Islamists) of his/her agency and 
political credentials, in order to prevail over and subdue him/her; in Choudaryʼs case, 
paradoxically, the aim is substantially the same. To put it another way, the personal 
fascination with power, and mainly the preoccupation with taking power, could reasonably 
lead to a belittling of the Other; not just the Other on the ʻenemyʼ front, but also the Other 
ʻamong Usʼ (to prevail over and to get absolute control, even among the rest of Us). Here 
again, one possible explanation of such a mirroring process between representation and 
self-representation could be found in a sort of fetishist fascination with politics, power, and 
ultimately, leadership. 
To conclude his intervention, Mr Choudary -- again, in a rhetorical fashion -- asked 
whether we were ready for another 7-7, and like Mr Izzadin, his answer was a triumphant 
and loud yes for the Islamic flag in Downing street. 
The ʻcontextualʼ aspect of the meeting, its contents and paradoxes can be better illustrated 
by collating them with some extracts from a personal chat that I had with Mr Choudary a 
few days after Al Ghurabaa and the Saved sect were both banned, having been accused 
of glorifying terrorism. 
It is particularly useful to analyse the interview contents in comparison with the arguments 
and the discourses put forward during the meeting on the 7-7 terror attacks. This is 
because -- as I said before -- by collating different sorts of fieldwork experiences and 
ethnographic data, the subjects of study are better observed in their performing practices 
and discourses (according to the different contexts, interlocutors or audience). 
My first question to Mr Choudary was about his reaction to the decision taken by the then 
Home secretary John Reid to ban the two parties (Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect). His 
view was that the action represented a clear example of a total: 
ʻfailure for the British government and the capitalist ideology and the 
principle of freedom and Christian liberalism. Al-Ghurabaa and the Saved 
Sect are ideological movements and political movements…[the 
Government] rather than engaging in dialogue and discussion…they have 
sought to try to silence any voices…I think this is a victory for Muslimsʼ.51 
My next question was strictly related to my surprise at hearing the event being described 
as a victory, and learning that Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect were ideological and 
                                            
51 This is an extract from the interview with Mr Choudary that happened on 18 July 2006 in East London. It is 
contained in the appendix. 
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political movements. Those attributes are novel and mostly ʻextraneousʼ to the vocabulary 
and discourses of Salafist Islamist movements, whose core fundament is that Islam 
comprises all, it is an all-encompassing model and conduct for life, ʻthe true path and it is 
not absolutely a mere ideology or vulgar politicsʼ (Bakri 2002). Choudaryʼs answer 
elaborated on why that was a victory, but it was vague and inconsistent in relation to the 
political and ideological aspects of the two movements. According to his reasoning, ʻwhen 
someone does not have a counter argument and they cannot deal with ideas and thoughts 
which people carry, then the easy thing is try to ban the other voiceʼ. Interestingly enough, 
instead of explaining -- as I had asked him to do -- the use of the terms ideological and 
political, he reinforced that conceptualization by affirming that ʻif you start to stop people 
propagating their thoughts and ideas, then you will push them underground…Ultimately I 
think this will just quicken the victory for Islam because when you try to ban something, 
people become more interested in itʼ. My reaction to such phrasing was stupor as -- once 
again -- Islam was depicted as an ideological system, whose final victory would be 
prompted by the fact of being banned and prohibited, and not by the assumption that it 
was in fact the ʻbest, true model of lifeʼ as emphasized by Mr Choudary himself, during the 
meeting held a few days before, with the rest of the members of Al Ghurabaa and the 
Saved Sect. One could see that there was a ʻdiscursive practiceʼ and a ʻsignifying practiceʼ 
(Foucault 1981), which was ultimately conforming (or adapting) to the different contexts 
and audiences; surprisingly schizophrenic in its content, to the point of utterly denying 
what was previously held as an absolute ʻtruthʼ. This was an open play of sheer fascination 
with power, and the aspiration or preoccupation with the taking of power. It also indirectly 
demonstrated the process of secularization of ʻreligionʼ each and every time that it was 
conceptualized, discoursed, performed and signified as a totalizing system and conduct of 
life for the whole community. The proof of the fact that my interlocutor was affirming what 
he would have then utterly denied -- his contradiction in terminis -- came when I asked 
whether he would have appealed against the Home Secretaryʼs decision. His response 
was definitive and contained. He stated that: ʻWe are not interested in appealing, in going 
to court. At the end of the day, the courts and the appeals process is all part of the same 
system. We believe in Islam as an alternativeʼ. That -- he meant -- as a substitutive 
system, which would eradicate and take over the existing and previous one. It sounded 
paradoxical, especially as he was criticizing the British government for not allowing any 
dissenting voice. Here again, there was a slightly schizophrenic behaviour: a projection of 
a series of converse images, self-reflecting and inversed representations. But, above all, 
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there was an intense enamourment with power and, also, a strong desire for taking over 
power, and this irreversibly aspires to a new foundational political act. It is far from being a 
retreat into dark Mediaeval systems of governments (Zakaria 2001), as Islamists 
programmes are often depicted. 
My point is that the signifying practices analysed here have been developing in this way 
under the constraint of a denial of what was ultimately desired but not expressed. What I 
call the fetishism for politics: a greed for final supremacy and absolute power which also 
leads, sometimes, to a temporary and convenient suspension of the fundamentals of the 
original discourse. This stands as a further paradox in relation to groups which are 
represented by the dominant culturalist-orientalist discourse as fundamentalists, and which 
represent themselves as Salafi or the true followers of the primitive, pure and true form of 
Islam. 
To conclude, my ethnographic work has clearly shown that the practices of representation 
and self-representation in relation to Islamist parties are deeply affected by a mirroring 
dynamic, within the domain of a fetishism for politics and power.  
My argument is that the Islamistsʼ project of establishing the Khilafah, in order to 
implement the Sharia Law and a truly Islamic system of life where politics is inherently 
embodied in religion, will paradoxically prompt the secularization of that religion, where the 
final and ultimate dimension is politics, and within that, the struggle and the preoccupation 
with taking Power. 
What has emerged from my fieldwork, is that the political actors (Islamists) themselves 
share a powerful fascination, a fetishism for politics and power, short of any so-called 
ʻIslamicʼ connotation. Ironically, they declare that their struggle is aimed at instituting an 
Islamic system, where the ʻpoliticalʼ is at the service of the Spiritual, as it was under the 
Prophetʼs community. This is the reason why they describe themselves as Salafi or 
followers of the primitive and pure form of Islam. Such a description is received and 
discoursed by the ʻPowerfulʼ (Marranci 2006, 56) culturalist-orientalist representations as 
implying Fundamentalists: fanatic religious mullahsready to plot terrorist attacks against the 
West and the Western systems of life. The outcome is that both parties reflect the Otherʼs 
representation. This representation neglects the political dimension and deflects the 
interaction between the two parties, with negative results: the loss and lack of political 
relevance for Islamist parties, and the persistence of a security threat, which ultimately 









The tragedy of Islamism in Britain: a fetishism for politics 
 
 
ʻLet’s face it. We are undone by each other. And if we are not, we are missing something. This 






The present dissertation has been an account and an analysis of the discourses and 
practices of a large number of Islamist parties in the UK over a period of nearly 20 years 
(1989-2007). This was a period when they came under increased public attention during 
the debates over multiculturalism and the supposed threats to security from the rise of 
ʻradical Islamʼ. 
The preceding chapters have dealt with stereotypes, epistemological categories, and 
practices of representation and self-representation. I have argued against the 
commonplace culturalist-orientalist approach, a dominant discourse, which denies and 
rejects any ʻpoliticalʼ in relation to the Islamists. Within such a framework, Islamism does 
not even exist as a concept: either it is a matter of a private professed belief (Islam), or it is 
a terrorist disruption of the Western democratic systems, which needs to be eradicated. 
My answer to this Manichean framing has been both theoretical and practical. 
Theoretically, my choice is to adopt the constructionist approach, which sees ʻculturesʼ and 
ʻreligionsʼ as political acts, within the terms of a power-relationship. And practically,I 
decided to carry out two years of fieldwork amongst British Islamists. 
My ethnographic work has been fundamental in unearthing a very interesting element in 
relation to the political actors themselves: their sheer fascination and enamorment with 
power and politics. This refers to their strong desire to have the upper hand, not just over 
their antagonists, but also over their acolytes and their imaginations and fantasies of self-
representation. 
Besides, the fieldwork findings have also suggested that there is a perverted dynamic that 
one needs to take into consideration: a mirroring effect between the dominant culturalist-
orientalist representation of Islamists and the Islamistsʼ self-representation. Further, the 
resulting images (representations) are similarly affected by a fetishism for politics, which 
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leads both parties (the dominant and the dominated)to fail. It is a ʻtragedyʼ -- as I see it -- of 
frustrated political actors on one side and a persistent security threat, on the other. 
There is a recurring paradoxical ʻleitmotivʼ in the debate on ʻIslamʼ and the West. 
Discussion (including those on policy matters) on such a topic schizophrenically 
complicates the boundaries between fairly diversified and opposing political and religious 
schools of thoughts, even though the parties involved seem not to notice the inner 
anomalies involved. Let me give some examples. 
Secularists and feminists strongly oppose the so-called fundamentalists, and although they 
are mostly from the Left, they often end up supporting authoritarian but secular regimes 
against the Islamists (from Algeria to Saddamʼs Iraq). Other leftists, as secular as the 
former group, but who defend the Third World and promote multiculturalism in the West, 
nonetheless campaign to see the headscarf allowed in European schools. Many anti-
imperialist militants, although supposed to promote womenʼs rights, supported the Taliban 
when it came under US attack. A rightist French essayist might write a book claiming that 
radical Islam is a plot to destroy Europe (Del Valle 1997), while others on the right would 
claim that President Chirac opposed the war in Iraq to placate the French Muslims. 
Likewise, in a country like France, the extreme right National Front can call for the 
expulsion of Muslims, but also call for supporting for Saddam Hussein against the United 
States (Roy 2004, 327). That is to say, the usual faultlines (Left/Right, 
nationalist/universalist, secularist/ religious) are very porous and not helpful in order to 
explain the current alignments in the debate on Islam. 
An observation must be made here: we certainly live in a time of great intellectual 
mongrelism, when cultural, political and religious categories (mostly spurious) are used to 
construe complex and multilayered political discourses and practices. In this framework, 
the ʻemptyʼ category of Islam has become the focus as well as a culprit within a debate 
born after the collapse of the USSR (Del Valle 1997, Hungtington 1997, Kepel 1997, 
Kramer 1996). It seems that there was a need to identify and locate a new Evil, while re-
defining the borders and the identity of the West, at the same time. More specifically, there 
has been an impelling need to establish a relationship between a given society, a culture, 
a political system and a territory, in a strong attempt to re-map the world (Appadurai 1996, 
32). And so, the need to define a new threat has been accompanied by the urge to locate it 
in terms of geography, territory and places. Sometimes (as in the case of Iraq and 
Afghanistan), it has been possible to potentially resort to a specific country chosen as a 
war target. In other cases, this option of finding a geographical location has been slightly 
 190 
less available, since there was no foreign country where the enemy (the ill-defined Islamic 
terrorist) could be located. The ʻEnemyʼ, now, appeared to be in our vicinity, living in the 
same cities and countries as a Muslim minority. The solution is then offered by the 
discursive practices of the dominant culturalist-orientalist approach: the use of clear-cut 
terms such as ʻterroristsʼ, ʻreligious fundamentalistsʼ, ʻjihadistsʼ has been (and it still is) an 
example of this practice to define the ʻOtherʼ and build a metaphorical (discursive) ʻwallʼ to 
exclude him/her. 
The peculiar aspect of this story has been that this discursive ʻOtherʼ (Muslims and 
Islamists in the UK) did not belong to another country, far away from Us, and it did not 
speak another language, incomprehensible to Us. Surprisingly, this Other was born in the 
same country as ʻUsʼ, speaking the same language with the same local accent: he/she 
was in our ʻproximityʼ (Levinas 1996, 45). But he-she discoursed a discourse, which 
appeared to be made of other symbols, which could not be immediately recognized or 
harmonized with our own. My thesis has stressed that this has been a fundamental 
moment in the history and geneaology (Foucault 1977) of the practices and discourses of 
Islamists in the UK, as represented by the dominant culturalist-orientalist approach. To 
acknowledge the vicinity of the ʻOtherʼ as such resulted in (led to) us feeling threatened by 
him/her who was different, irreducible, but not so distant from Us, in terms of space. It is 
the rupturing, disrupting and suturing point at the same time (Butler 2004, 130). It 
separates while it creates the ʻOtherʼ, stemming from our own fears, insecurities, 
inadequacies and ultimately desire to prevail over it. This is a simple way of explaining the 
ʻOtherʼ, the Islamists, as represented by the culturalist-orientalist approach, which is 
analyzed and criticized in this dissertation. Moreover, this Other has been also made the 
object of fetishism: it has been depoliticized, antagonized and ostracized. 
The so-called popular debates on ʻIslamʼ as the enemy within or the Public enemy number 
one, are ultimately debates to define and strengthen our identity as ʻUsʼ, or the ʻWestʼ. 
Olivier Roy gives an apt exampleof this in relation to the ʻheadscarfʼ affair in France. The 
issue arose from some hundred individual cases of girls wanting to wear headscarves (or 
veils) to schools (Roy 2004, 336). It became a national debate with the creation of a 
commission, a vote in Parliament, weekly debate on television, and several passionate 
opinion pieces in the press. By contrast, the headscarf is not an issue in Britain, where 
even policewomen are allowed to wear it.  This easily demonstrates that the issue of Islam 
and the West is actually linked to discourse and a practice of French ʻsoul searchingʼ about 
the meaning of laicism in the creation of national identity, and about the relationship 
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between the state, church and civil society. In other words, the French model of the nation-
state seems to be in crisis due to several factors such as European integration and 
globalization, but the ʻdebate on Islam is a way to externalize and intellectualize the issueʼ 
(Roy 2004, 337). 
However, as argued in the course of this dissertation, the dominated (Islamists) hold a 
relevant role in this ʻplayʼ. They have been counteracting the dominant discourse in several 
ways, and the quest for a strict application of the sharia (this is invoked by several Islamist 
groups based in different European countries, Dassetto 1996, 89 constitutes an example. 
My argument has been that such an attempt arises from an effort to present, represent 
and inhabit a ʻselfʼ which strives to be absolute and totally disconnected from the ʻOtherʼ (in 
this case the West); opposing and fetishisizing it at the same time. 
Nevertheless, this self is just the ʻotherʼ face of the same coin -- the same supposedly 
unaltered absolute, which tries to be delinked from the ʻOtherʼ and from his/her being. 
Through the mirroring practices of representation and self-representation, it is unaware of 
the fact that it is connecting with  the Other, while longing for separation from it (Butler 
2004, 141). 
This happens under the constraints of fetishism: the denial, the repression, and the 
antagonizing of a strong enamourment with politics and power, nurtured by both parties (the 
Dominant and the Dominated) within their power-relations. The idea of a fetishist relation 
to power and politics (as nurtured by the Dominant and the Dominated), helps in analysing 
the discourses and the practices of the UK Islamists facing and confronting the UK 
Government on Islamic and Islamist issues. Such a conceptualisation helps us understand 
the political hiatus and the ʻpoliticalʼ misunderstandings between the UK governmentand 
the Islamists. It allows us to advance the hypothesis that both parties are leading actors in 
a tragic play (Barker 1997) of a fetishism for politics, which drives both to a negative end. 
In fact, this fetishist dynamic has been fundamental in understanding that, the often 
claimed52 inseparability of religion and politics in Islam is not a truism (Varisco 2005, 45), 
but a topic for investigating the relations between the categories of Islam, religion, and 
politics. As in so far as speaking in terms of if it is still makes any sense to talk in terms of 
ʻcategoriesʼ makes sense, (Burchell 1991, 87). As I elaborated before, the 
conceptualization of both religion and politics is the context and the contest over the 
ʻdiscoursingʼ and ʻpracticingʼ of symbols, the social construction and inhabitation of their 
                                            
52 The reference here is primarily to the ethnographic findings, interviews and personal chats contained in chapter 5-6 
and in the appendix. 
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meanings, and conversely, their reuse in a subversive and ʻabusiveʼ way. Furthermore, 
instead of religion, I have spoken of religiosity, or the way the believer lives his/her own 
relation to religion; this has constituted the main discursive practice of Islamism and 
Islamists in Britain. My argument has been that the notion of politics as centered on power-
relations and interests needs to be spelt out better and more comprehensively. In this 
framework, Kyosty Pekonenʼs definition of politics as a ʻstruggle about peopleʼs 
imaginationʼ (Pekonen 2009,200) can be seen as a corrective to the more conventional 
thinking. Broadly speaking, I have conceived politics as a competition and struggle over 
the management of the discourse and practice of symbols (Geertz 1973, 193-233); politics 
as a Leviathan has been thus transformed into politics as a symbol-maker. 
Another important point that I have tried to develop in the thesis is that, no one group or 
political actor possesses ʻthe monopoly on the management of the sacredʼ (Kane 1992, 9), 
i.e., its discourses and practices. Thus, while Islamist leaders assert their values and 
visions to be timeless and immemorial, it should not obscure the fact that they are subject 
to modification and change, re-use, subversion and abuse (Butler and Scott 1992, 45). 
As I have emphasised often in the dissertation, this process specifically occurs in contexts 
where Muslims live as a minority, in the West for example. My argument is that being part 
of a minority group is a matter of feelings and perceptions (alienation), and not of numbers 
and statistics. Furthermore, living as a Muslim minority also means experiencing the 
delinking of Islamic ʻcultureʼ and ʻreligionʼ. Because of this, Islam is experienced only as a 
ʻreligionʼ. Religious norms have no relationship with social and political spheres; religion is 
de facto confined to the private sphere (Roy 2004, 148). This implies a growing process of 
individualization of religious practices. It is a straightforward, and practical way of 
explaining the concept of religiosity, i.e., how believers experience and formulate their own 
relationship to religion, as well as the discoursing, inhabitation and practice of that 
meaning as a ʻ livedʼ relation to the ʻrealʼ. 
 In this framework, Eickelman and  Piscatoriʼs concept of the ʻobjectification of Islamʼ 
proved to be very helpful. To be able to define Islam becomes a prerequisite for any 
Muslim living with a ʻminorityʼ status, because Islam is no longer embedded in a culture 
and a social practice (Eickelman-Piscatori 1996, 38). My point has been that the answers 
to questions like ʻWhat is Islam’, or ʻWhat does Islam say about this and that’? are less 
important than the actual processes that they trigger. Everybody who asks and answers 
those questions, participates in the process of objectification of Islam, where the meaning 
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created is by -- formulation and discursive practice,  more than by the content (Asad 1993, 
68). 
In other sense, the passage to the West functions as a good opportunity to rethink an 
Islam rid of cultural and national particularities. The new communities can work at a 
reconstruction, or a re-formulation of ʻIslamicʼ discourses and practices. Some of my 
interviewees have acknowledged immigration to be a positive factor; as a means to uproot 
Muslims from pseudo-Muslim cultures and to promote a return to the true tenets of religion. 
My argument is that the ʻIslamʼ taking shape in the West is an ʻ Islamʼ in vitro, a new 
experiment, something of a novel development, which is ʻde-culturedʼ and ʻde-
territorializedʼ. As such, it is not a territory, but an environment, a platform for a political and 
social future. 
In my work, I also felt the urge to clearly spell out my subjects of research. My research is 
not generally about Muslims living in Britain, mosque–goers, children of Muslim parents or 
people with a specific ethnic background (an Arab, a Pakistani). My subjects are those 
among them who place their Muslim identity at the centre of their political practices: 
Islamists. Islamists are people who use and discourse the vocabulary of Islamic metaphors 
to think through their political destinies; who see their political future in Islam. Islam is not a 
monolithic edifice and, there are several different shades of discourses, discursive 
practices and formations within it. I strongly argue that Islamism is a political discourse, 
and as such, it is akin to other political discourses like socialism and liberalism. My point 
has been that just as it is possible and valid to speak of political dscourses such as 
socialism, even when it includes many varieties and many differences; it should be 
similarly possible to speak of Islamism. Islamism is a discourse that attempts to centre 
Islam within the political order. Islamism can range from the assertion of a Muslim 
subjectivity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles. 
Some authors (Kepel 1997; Mandaville 2001; Roy 1996) distinguish between Islamism and 
fundamentalism. According to their view, fundamentalists are those who aim to see the 
establishment of an Islamic state while Islamists are those who aim for the Islamization of 
society. (which does not necessarily means the capture of the state and the political 
power). My position has been that I definitely see Islamism as a political project but my 
notion of the political is not limited to projects which aim directly at seizing power through a 
singular founding act (El Zein 1977, 110). The political is the moment of the institution of 
the social (Laclau 1990, 31; Varisco 2005, 8). It may involve a capture of the state 
apparatus by a dedicated vanguard, but it may also include a more diffused strategy of 
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reform of civil society (Sayyid 1997, 17). Thus, within my broad definition of Islamism as a 
political project, there is room for very different strategies of Islamization. Likewise, I do not 
agree with the authors (Kepel 1997, Mandaville 2001, Mamdani 2004, to name but a few) 
who distinguish between Political Islam and Islamism on the basis that the first notion 
indicates movements simply aiming at reforming the society according to Islamic 
principles, but without planning the seizure of political power, while the second notion 
indicates movements planning to institute an Islamic state. My thesis has considered both 
agendas as political, regardless of the actual or planned targets. I did not speak of 
ʻPoliticalʼ Islam mainly for the reason that doing so presents and stresses the concept of 
the political merely as an attribute stemming or juxtaposed with a professed faith called 
Islam. Of course, the political discourse is related to some core assumptions and tenets of 
Islam, but they are lived, discoursed, mobilized, practiced and inhabited in the realm of the 
political (Varisco 2005, 16). This is the realm of power struggles and the symbol-making, 
therefore, it is not, just an appendix to ʻIslamʼ, as the reductive and simplifying expression 
ʻPolitical Islamʼ might suggest. The political discourse is represented, shared, elaborated 
and disputed within a different context and its discursive nature and formations are 
different from those of a private professed belief. On the other hand -- as explained before 
-- my main interest has not been particularly centered on any specific strategy of 
Islamization. Rather, I am keen to understand how, over the last twenty years in Britain, 
Islamism has come to occupy an increasingly prominent place within Muslim imaginings, 
dreams and expectations. 
Within this framework, I found it necessary to examine the main events that signified the 
birth of an Islamist identity in Britain: the Rushdie affair, the Gulf and the Bosnian crisis, 
the Oldham, Burnley and Bradford riots, 9-11, the Iraq war and the 7-7 bombings. My 
principal aim was to comprehend the genealogy of the process that British Islamists have 
ʻcoursedʼ in order to graft their practices and discourses on a ʻtransplantedʼ set of Islamic 
tenets, and what totally new shoots emerged there from. I have strongly opposed the 
culturalist-orientalist assertions that the answer to the ʻAl-Qaeda type of violenceʼ is in the 
Qur’an and in Islam, as a set of beliefs. My argument has been that the Al-Qaeda type of 
violence is not an isolated phenomenon. Suicide attacks became a standard of guerrilla 
warfare in the 80s through the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eealam, who supposedly 
practiced Hinduism. Hence, it is difficult and rather misleading to link suicide attacks to 
specific religions or cultures. My interpretation has been that the real genesis of Al-Qaeda 
violence has more to do with a Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt for an 
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elusive ideal world, than with the Quranic conception of martyrdom (Asad 2006, 41; Gray 
2007, 5). Recall that the figure of the lonely metaphysical terrorist who blew himself up 
with his bomb appeared in Russia at the end of the 19th century (Malraux 1934). Al-
Qaedaʼs type of ʻjihadʼ could be more related to the ethos of a Western terrorist; it is 
significant that Al-Qaedaʼs pool of recruitment has more to do with the West than with the 
Middle East (Asad 2006, 29). It follows, then, that the discourses and practices of British 
Islamism, (of Islamist parties in the UK) to be located and ʻdiscoursedʼ within the specific 
British context and geographical space. The reference to the global ʻUmmahʼ is the 
rhetorical vocabulary of a political discourse. The political groups can certainly discourse 
through the vocabulary of religion, but this does not make them ʻfundamentalistʼ or 
terrorist. In other words, the analysis ought to focus on, and consider their political aspect, 
without censoring and degrading it behind ʻreligiousʼ and ʻsecularʼ categories (as is done 
within the culturalist and orientalist frameworks). 
To develop this argument, I considered it useful to examine the main sources of the 
Islamist discourses (Qur’an, hadith, sharia). I wanted to show how these sources are 
differently discoursed and practiced by the British Islamist groups who are the subjects of 
my analysis. I focused on the several different and interpretations and practices of jihad, 
leading to the point that Jihad is what the Islamists say Jihad is (Marranci 2008, 24). I 
summarized the main points of the endless debate on the compatibility of Islam and 
Democracy, concluding that -- as a system -- Democracy is compatible with different sorts 
of political discourses and practices, and, as such, with Islamism too. My argument has 
been that there is no need to ossify the debate around ʻDemocracy and Islamʼ, by adopting 
a ʻfoundationalʼ approach which turns Democracy into the Dominant discourse and treats 
the ʻpracticesʼ of Democracy as ʻtechnologiesʼ of Domination that discipline individuals into 
docile bodies (Foucault 1969). 
I have been bold enough to state that a democratic Islamic state is possible, thinkable and 
implementable, by taking Democracy as a tool, a sort of somatic practice (Foucault 1988, 
18), which can be used according to Islamic guidelines. Beyond this, there are human 
agencies, discourses and practices to take into consideration; there are political 
discourses and discursive practices that ought to be examined in light of their coursing, 
cooperating, clashing and finally failing to interact. By neglecting this dynamic, we refuse 
to address both -- the analysis in itself and our possible analytical mistakes. My analysis 
has not been just the product of my own reading and perusal of written texts. I have felt the 
need to expand, question, inhabit, displace, and unsettle those same reflections by 
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entering the ʻdiscourseʼ and practice to share the ʻexperienceʼ with the British Islamists 
themselves. Two intense years of field-work helped me to analyse the discourses and 
practices of self-representation offered by the Islamists themselves. The Islamistsʼ 
representation discoursed by the culturalist-orientalist approach (chapter 1 and chapter 4) 
has been placed metaphorically in front of the Islamistsʼ self-representation (chapter 5 and 
chapter 6). The outcome of this analytical strategy has been to see the mirroring dynamic 
between the practices and discourses of representation and self-representation. 
On the basis of my ethnographic enterprise, I have divided the Islamist parties into two 
groups: the participationists and the rejectionists. The first are groups willing to participate 
in the British political and public life and -- as such -- intrinsically ʻwillingʼ to take part in the 
political practice but less outspoken in terms of a ʻpoliticalʼ discourse (the Islamic Human 
Rights Commission, the Muslim Association of Britain, the Muslim Council of Britain, the 
Muslim Public Affairs Committee). The rejectionists are those who refuse to take part in the 
British political system; they either plan to move abroad in order to establish a Khilafah, or 
alternatively, plan to take over power in Britain (Hizbu-Ut-Tahrir, the Saved Sect and Al-
Ghurabaa). Their approach toward the UK Government is confrontational and outspoken 
on the discursive and practical levels. They are very political and entangled within a 
power-relationship, but they fetishize their ʻpoliticalʼ by affirming that their efforts are aimed 
at establishing an Islamist system where the political is overshadowed by, and at the 
service of, the ʻSpiritualʼ. and overshadowed by it. I content that the exact reverse is true. 
 
 
The Islamists’ quest 
 
As I have tried to show with the findings of my fieldwork, the parties discussed as 
participationists are mostly characterized by a firm desire to change the UK Governmentʼs 
approach toward Muslim  (and Islamist) issues. 
In other words, behind and beyond ideological affiliation and discursive constructions, what 
clearly emerges is a mostly political practice, which lacks, however, a political discourse; I 
have labeled this as the unpolitical discourse of being political. A common trait of their 
agendas is a plain and strong emphasis on political activism and interaction with the wider 
British civil society to convey and let the message of ʻIslamʼ (read Islamism) be heard and 
known. However -- quite interestingly -- the majority of these groups have refused any 
political label, opting instead to remain in the category of ʻfaith groupsʼ, thus taking a 
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collaborative and non-confrontational approach. They take refuge in the realm of ʻreligious 
groupsʼ, claiming a disinterest in politics, which they characterize as a ʻstruggle for power, 
dictated by human greedʼ.53 
It is difficult not to question such a discoursing and practising of ʻpoliticsʼ, when these same 
groups campaign for, and strongly, support Palestine as a liberation struggle. the 
Palestinian struggle can hardly be construed through the category of ʻreligionʼ; its origins 
and developments suggest that it is a conflict of the ilk of national independence wars or a 
ʻpost-colonial liberation struggleʼ (Massari 1979, 82). One possible reading of such a 
depoliticized attitude (as of these parties) could be that of the ʻcolonizedʼ being the exact 
image of the colonizerʼs imagination (Memmi 1969-2003, 189). In this case, the 
participationist parties (unconsciously) mirror the culturalist-orientalist approach toward 
Muslims and Islamists which explains everything through the category of Islam, either in 
negative or in laudatory terms. In any case, both parties are locked in the same culturalist-
orientalist representation, which depoliticizes political actors, dismisses political discourses 
and reduces political practices to the functions and needs of a multicultural society, where 
ʻculturalʼ, ʻreligiousʼ ʻethnicʼ clusters and ossified communities (Burak 2002, 134) need to 
be integrated. 
My argument has been that the participationist partiesʼ approach is very damaging for the 
Islamist quest. It has been responsible for undermining and delegitimizing their political 
role and relevance. The outcome is that they allow the Government to allow them to 
speak. At the same time, they have let culturalist-orientalist misrepresentations and 
ʻterroristʼ, ʻfundamentalistʼ outcries speak on their behalf. 
It is also relevance to see how these parties are mostly formed and supported by second 
or third generation British-born Muslims, and how this element contributes to a very 
specific (British), local expression of Islamism. This is because their practices and 
discourses do not happen in a vacuum unfettered by context and the constraints of 
surrounding discourses. Technologies of domination and technologies of the self are 
always interrelated and contribute to construction, reconstruction and subversion of the 
self in the world, and within dominant discourses and practices (Fortin, Vieira, Tremblay 
2009, 49). 
                                            
53 Excerpt from the interview with Emdad Rahman, contained in the appendix. 
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This ʻBritish-nessʼ is also characteristic of the other groups featured in the present thesis, 
but their political discourse and Islamist practices are focused instead, on the rejection of 
the UK political system and on the need to subvert it (i.e., the rejectionist parties). 
It might also be stated that, paradoxically, the very British-ness of the second and third 
generation Muslims, combined with their specific choice of embracing Islamism as their 
political identity and discourse, paves the way for a more ʻdecisiveʼ, sometimes ʻradicalʼ, 
action (McRoy 2006, 123), together with the constant need of remarking, re-coursing, 
discoursing and fantasizing (fetishizing) about that choice, by projecting its outcomes and 
representing its tenets as unchangeable. 
I found the representation offered by the culturalist-orientalist approach, and the self-
representationof their discourse and practice, to be strictly related. My argument has been 
that similar to the participationist parties, there is a ʻmirroring effectʼ between the 
essentialized representation of Islam and Islamism proposed by the culturalist-orientalist 
approach and the self-representation voiced by the ʻradicalʼ Islamists themselves.In other 
words, there is a sort of paradoxical dynamic, which means that categories imposed from 
above, become unconsciously internalized from below. Moreover, both parties nurture a 
form of fetishism for politics: the repression of a strong desire for it, on the one side, and 
the exorcism of a political discourse and practices, on the other.  
I argue that dismissing this element of the analysis could mask a refusal to address our 
own failure to make a serious (read political) examination of the phenomenon of Islamism. 
The construction and fetishization of the Other is the main discursive practice at the base 
of, both the blowback-inducing Islamophobic anti-terrorism policies employed by the 
Government, and the flawed actions carried out by the Islamist parties in the UK. 
My dissertation has examined this dynamic and its negative implications. Finally, I will use 
a poignant tale to commence concluding. The strategy of the War on Terror reminds me of 
an Iraqi story of a Baghdad Caliphʼs tailor. The Caliph wanted to punish a tailor who had 
overcharged him. He ordered a henchman to hang the tailor at the gate of his house. The 
henchman came back saying that the tailor was too big for the gate, to which the caliph 
answered ʻFind a smaller tailor and hang himʼ. Likewise, it is the Dominant discourse, the 
discourse of the establishment, of the state and the defense apparatus, which ʻtailorsʼ and 
discourses the enemy. In addition there is a kind of blindness in acknowledging our own 
role in ʻtailoringʼ the enemy. 
The ill-defined ʻIslamic terrorismʼ is related more to the de-territorialization of the ʻMuslim 
worldʼ, than being strictly connected to the Middle Eastern conflicts. Unfortunately, the 
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strategic responses to it -- as emerging from the state -- have continuously missed or 
misinterpreted this point, by downplaying or neglecting the discursive formations and 
practices of the Islamist groups. These are born from, and discoursed through, a political 
genealogy: terrorism and violence are just contingencies within it. 
The Governmentʼs approach has had two major bearings. The first is that the fight against 
terrorism has been understood and elaborated in terms of territory and states, as 
embodied in the expression ʻwar on terrorismʼ. The campaign in Afghanistan might have 
made sense, to the extent that Bin Laden had ʻa territorial sanctuaryʼ that had to be 
destroyed (Gregory 2004, 11), but once he became de-territorialized, what was the logic 
behind the occupation? 
The second strand is as follows. The culturalist-orientalist representation of Islamism, 
which has imbued the strategic policies towards ʻIslamic terrorismʼ and Islamist parties, 
has never taken into consideration, elements such as the passage to the West, the de-
territorialization of Islam, and its transformation into a new environment. Therefore, the 
policy responses have been, at best, irrelevant, when they are not politically misleading 
and backfiring. The culturalist-orientalist approach misses the point of the ʻwesternizationʼ 
of Islam. The fact is, Islamist groups in Europe are established by, and comprised of, a 
Muslim minority of second and third generation people who  live, inhabit and discourse 
Islam as their political future: the Islamists. As my thesis proves, most members of the 
Islamist parties in the UK are born and bred54 in the UK and they speak perfect English, 
even as they discourse values, codes and practices, which are not visibly recognized as  
ʻindigenousʼ but resemble otherʼs (meaning that they were formed outside a certain 
dominant Western discourse). Therefore, they have either been relegated by the 
Government into the non-confrontational, depoliticized domain of the ʻfaithʼ groups (a 
domain that some of the Islamist parties themselves have been willing to belong in), or 
they have been witch-hunted as ʻreligious fundamentalistsʼ, ʻterroristsʼ, and finally banned 
and ostracized from British public life. 
As my dissertation suggests, this attitude from the dominant is most damaging in the long 
term, for the democratic process itself and for national security as well. On the one hand, it 
debilitates the democratic process as it depoliticizes some political actors behind ʻfaith 
groupʼ categories of representation; it sees them as just the representatives of the 
ʻcommunityʼ that they were born into. They are viewed as standing for the preservation and 
                                            
54 Personal chat with Maajid Nawaaz contained in the appendix. 
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conservation of some ʻinnateʼ traits: not as actors advancing something ʻnewʼ, but instead 
as defending something ʻascribedʼ to them by birth. In this way, they are not discoursed as 
ʻpoliticalʼ actors, struggling and competing over power, within a power relationship (Varisco 
2005, 11). 
On the other hand, the same culturalist-orientalist approach ostracizes some other political 
actors, by representing them as ʻreligious fundamentalistsʼ and ʻterroristsʼ. Paradoxically, 
by doing so, the final effect is their empowerment; by discoursing and representing these 
political actors as ʻoutsidersʼ, they become a special threat (ibid., 16). They are ascribed a 
status of ʻexceptionalityʼ, which translates into their being ousted from the power struggle, 
which they could simply lose by taking part in it. 
But this story has two sides as there are two leading actors to play its tragic plot. 
The Islamist activists themselves (as my interviewees have declared) nurture a certain 
apparent ʻdisgustʼ for politics and power (my thesis has discoursed this within the 
vocabulary of a fetishist relationship). In other words, they utterly deny and despise (as if it 
were a taboo) what they secretly desire (fetishism). They declare that their struggle is 
aimed at instituting an Islamic system where the ʻpoliticalʼ is at the service of the Spiritual. 
My argument has been that, paradoxically, the exact reverse is true. Their efforts would 
definitely promote a strong ʻsecularizationʼ of Islam; which is denied (repressed) by the 
political actors themselves, and exorcized by their detractors (the dominant discourse) 
under the label of religious fundamentalism. 
Thus, the ʻfetishismʼ for politics deflects the interaction between the two parties, and is 
ultimately responsible, both for the political ʻfailureʼ of Islamist parties, and for the string of 
past and future terrorist attacks. The novelty of my approach has been to analyze the 
hiatus between the two parties -- the political stalemate and the security threat -- through 
the convex mirror of repression and exorcism; politics, as discoursed and practiced 
through the emotional, the visceral, the allegoric, and the de-sacralization of the secular 
and the religious at the same time. 
There is no space or talk of a terrorist strategy here. Nevertheless, terrorism is still a ʻreal 
security threatʼ (Borradori 2003, 92) that could be dealt with, more effectively, by using 
intelligence and more accurate, less Islamophobic policy tools; without waging wars. 
There is nothing called a ʻgeo-strategy of Islamʼ (Samaddar 2001, 43), because Islam is 
not, and it has never been, a territory or a state. Instead of a land of Islam, there are 
Muslims, who are negotiating new identities in a de-territorialized Islam, discoursing new 
discourses, and experiencing new practices. When these same subjects think about their 
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political future by using an Islamic vocabulary, they represent and inhabit their discourses 
as Islamists. 
The so-called (and misspelt) politicization of Islam -- Islamism -- is a phenomenon that 
should be recognized, addressed and dealt with politically, within the political arena, while 
remembering that terrorism is a marginal phenomenon that reveals a lot; it obliges 
everyone to go beyond misinterpretations, misgivings, culturalist and orientalist categories 
of thoughts. 
I may have spent too much time dealing with the differences between Islamism and 
terrorism, but political violence can always occur within the different interacting, provoking, 
and clashing political discourses and practices, regardless of the genealogy they are 
discoursed through. This happens within the larger framework of the relationships 
between: modern religiosity and secularization; dominant discourses and the strategies of 
opposition; status quo and the will to subvert it; powerful desires and fetishist repressions. 
My hope is that the present thesis will contribute to an ʻawakeningʼ, that will -- open up the 
political horizon to signifying representations; encourage dialogue with otherly discourses; 
push forward the interaction with practices of contestation, rejection and subversion; and 
limit the uses, abuses and re-uses of fetishist mechanisms of oppression and exorcisms of 
power and politics.  
Finally, this should impel us to reinvigorate a process of critique, of questioning, of coming 
to understand the difficulties and demands of ʻcultural translation and dissentʼ, and to 
create a public space in which ʻoppositional voices are not fearedʼ (Butler 2004, 151), 
neglected, degraded or ostracized, but valued for instigating a functioning, meaningful 
democracy that they occasionally -- even if by default -- perform. In that case, we will 
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In this section, I provide a transcript of the interviews conducted as part of my 
ethnographic research. The Islamist activists and party members indicated here are those 
who have agreed to be interviewed and have their names disclosed. The interviews lasted 
between one and two hours and one lasted 5 hours (interview with Mr. Taji Mustafa) and 
took place in their houses or in public places like tea rooms. 
There are other ʻpersonal chatsʼ with Islamist activists which cannot be reported here for 
various reasons. 
Sometimes, the interviewees themselves asked not to be reported, quoted or referred. I 
have definitely fulfilled their wishes and I retained something of that experience in terms of 
understanding the reasons behind such choices. At other times, my interviewees were 
under-aged, therefore I am compelled by ethical and moral reasons not to report or quote 
our exchanges. More than interviews, we exchanged ʻinformal chatsʼ at the Islamist 
partiesʼ meetings that I attended as a participant and non-participant observer. 
These ethnographic data are all reported and referenced in the main text of my 







Interview with Taji Moustafa, media representative of HT. The interview was conducted on 
6th June 2006 at the London Continental Hotel, Gloucester road, London.   
 
 
Q: Could you please give us a brief biography. 
 
A: I was born in London but my parents are originally from India. I am an IT support 
engineer by profession. I joined the circles of Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1992 at the age of 16. I 
became a member in 1994 after completing studies in the three core books of the party. At 
that stage I took the Qasam (the oath) of the party. 
 
Q: When did you become the media representative of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK? 
 
A: In the year 2000. 
 
Q: How did this come about? 
 
A: I was elected to the Executive committee of the UK party. Throughout the party globally, 
HT holds elections for its Executive Committee. As you may know HT is divided into 
Vilayas (provinces). In our case in the UK, we are not strictly speaking a Vilaya, but we are 
a branch that is entrusted with its own administrative affairs. There is an executive 
committee charged with executing these tasks and elections are held to determine the 
composition of this committee. The elections take place every two years and the entire 
membership of the party in any given province takes part in these elections. I was elected 
as media representative in 2000, 2002 and 2004 
 
Q: Are you coming up for re-election this year? 
 
A: We have just had the elections and I was again elected together with 8 other members 
onto the UK Executive Committee. 
 
Q: Give a brief account of HT's activities in the UK. 
 
A: In the UK, HT works on 2 levels. Firstly with the Muslim community, explaining the duty 
to work for the Khilafah (Caliphate) state, living by Islam in the West without loosing our 
identity and projecting a positive image of Islam in Western society. Secondly with the 
wider community, by articulating the cause of the Muslim world, presenting a case for the 
Khilafah state as a valid model for the Muslim world and explaining Islam as a political and 
intellectual system. We have had numerous conferences, seminars and debates to 
achieve this, as well as opening up a line of dialogue with Western thinkers. 
 
Q: Give an account of how HT assesses 9/11 and its consequences. 
 
A: As far as the events are concerned, in particular the assaults on the World Trade 
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Center and the Pentagon, we said that such attacks are not condoned by the Shari'ah. We 
immediately declared that this is not the proper or even effective method of fighting 
Western imperialism. We do see Western imperialism as the key factor in the continuing 
decline of the Islamic world and we do impress upon Muslims that they have to confront 
this imperialism. However that confrontation should be well planned and should not involve 
actions that are not only against the Shari'ah but are in fact self-defeating. The correct 
method is to establish a strong, modern and viable Islamic state, i.e. the Khilafah state, 
and the manner by which we can achieve this is to remove the rulers of the Muslim world.  
 
Q: How do you assess the consequences of 9/11; do you think America has benefited 
from these attacks? 
 
A: The immediate reaction of course was the declaration of "War on Terror" by America 
which is in reality a cover for a war on Islam and Muslims. After 9/11 America invaded two 
Muslim countries and imposed its own sovereignty on these countries through the might of 
its military. America has been working hard to remove any semblance of political Islam. 
The Americans have put forward policy initiatives that engage with Muslims at one level 
but only in a way that dilutes Islam and reduces the Islamic ideology to a mere religion that 
is compatible with Western capitalism. The sum of these actions has mobilized Muslim 
opinion decisively against America and the West. Muslims are acknowledging more and 
more that the governments of America and the West are enemies of Islam and do not wish 
to see them prosper.  
 
Q: Therefore do you not concede that in this sense, i.e. by establishing a consensus 
against America in the Muslim street, the attacks on 9/11 serve the long-term interests of 
Islam? 
 
A: I don't like to put it in those terms. I would like to say that the consequences of 9/11, in 
particular the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, have harmed Muslims 
and led to the brutal death of thousands. But it has also raised the levels of concern and 
awareness of Muslims regarding the true nature of America and her allies.  
 
Q: You mentioned the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; how do you see the resistance in 
these countries? Is this resistance legitimate according to HT ideology? 
 
A: We say that such resistance is condoned by Islam. Islam permits Muslims to resist the 
occupation of their land. The American invasions of these 2 Muslim countries are no 
different than the Serbian war against the Muslims of Bosnia back in the 1990s. 
 
Q: How do you conceptualize this resistance; do you just call it conventional resistance 
against occupation or do you in fact see it as Jihad? 
 
A: It is important here to describe what we understand to be Jihad. We say that the work 
required for establishing the Khilafah state does not involve in any of its stages the 
concept of material struggle or Jihad. We say that this work must emulate the Prophet 
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Mohammad's (PBUH) method, which was essentially peaceful. However there is a 
difference between establishing a Khilafah state and defending one's land. It is the duty of 
Muslims to defend their lands from invasion. 
 
Q: So resistance here is different than Jihad. 
 
A: No, we say that any form of material resistance comes under the rubric of Jihad. The 
subject of Jihad has very clearly defined rules and there are specific rules relating to 
targets, methods and the humane treatment of prisoners of war. The West often likes to 
distort Jihad by depicting it as acts of random violence.  
 
Q: According to some sources, in the instructions to its followers before 9/11, HT 
recommended the use of flying objects against Western targets, is this true?  
 
A: It is categorically not true. This is the first time I have heard it and it comes across as a 
clumsy attempt at propaganda and disinformation. There is a lot of this nonsense around. 
For instance, the Uzbek government has recently produced papers describing what I 
would call phantom articles accredited to members of HT. I don't think even Western 
commentators take these shoddy propaganda campaigns seriously. 
 
Q: Do you think most of these disinformation campaigns originate in Central Asia where 
some of the governments face a serious threat from HT? 
 
A: Recently, yes. But the Jordanian government has also in the past decades 
disseminated disinformation about the party. We think that most of the Arab governments 
and the Muslim governments strive to discredit the party. Their people though are highly 
supportive of the Khilafah and HT. HT branches have conducted a poll  in the Middle East 
where it emerged that 87% of the population wants the institution of the Khilafah.  
 
Q: HT maintains that Jihad is only permissible if it is sanctioned by the Khalifah (Caliph). 
How does this square with violence undertaken in the name of Jihad in various Muslim 
countries, particularly those recently invaded and occupied by the Americans? 
 
A: I should elaborate more on the concept of Jihad. Jihad as a defensive enterprise can be 
undertaken with or without an Amir and with or without an Islamic state. This is because it 
is the duty of every Muslim to defend his land and property. Therefore the defensive Jihad 
requires no authority to sanction it. 
 
Q: Are you making a distinction here between defensive and offensive Jihad? 
 
A: I am yes.  
 
Q: Can we reduce this distinction to improvisation and planning? In other words, in the 
case of defensive Jihad, Muslims can improvise and resist the invaders, whereas offensive 
Jihad requires the authority and planning apparatus of an Islamic state.  
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A: Yes, absolutely. In an offensive situation, where there is an Islamic state that possesses 
the appropriate political and military capabilities, it is the only authority that can sanction 
and undertake offensive Jihad.  
 
Q: Where does HT's doctrine of non-violence come from? 
 
A: HT works to re-establish the Khilafah state. In this endeavor we are obliged to emulate 
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUM) in his struggle to establish the first Islamic state in 
Medina 1425 years ago. The Prophet established this Islamic state without resorting to 
violence against the Quraish. Instead he worked to mobilize public opinion in favor of Islam 
and endeavored to sway the political and intellectual elites of the time. This was despite 
the provocations, the persecutions and boycotts of the Muslims and the threats to his own 
life. We adhere closely to this struggle because we believe this is the correct and effective 
way of reviving the Islamic state. None of the recent historical experiment has anything to 
do with an Islamic state and cannot be considered as an example of a Khilafah. 
 
Q: So you believe that mobilization of public opinion amongst these Muslims around the 
world is an effective way of reviving the Caliphate? 
 
A: Absolutely! The only manner in which an Islamic state can arise is for public opinion to 
be in favor of it. We are not interested in imposing a state on the people. We wish to 
engage with the public, the thinkers and the elites and build a powerful support base for 
the return of this state. Once the state will be established, all HT members will move there 
and encourage all the other Islamists across the world to move there as well as they can 
finally live in a state freed from imported political structures, alien to the values of the 
Muslim world. 
 
Q: What I understand of your analysis of Jihad and violence is that there is no clear cut 
and tightly held belief in non-violence. For instance you say that attacking American forces 
in Iraq is justifiable, but the problem is that you can easily take that a step further and claim 
that attacking U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia is justifiable in the same vein. 
 
A: No, in fact we say that attacking U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia does not resolve the 
main problem of the Muslim Ummah (Community). It does not address the real issue, 
which is in this case the Saudi government. The way to deal with that is to mobilize Saudi 
opinion against the House of Saud and not to engage in rash and ultimately self-defeating 
acts of violence. 
 
Q: Do you mean that attacking U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia would inadvertently bolster 
America's regional hegemony? 
 
A: Possibly. The problem is that America has created a climate where the overwhelming 
majority of Muslims—even those one could consider secular—are strongly anti-American. 
In this climate there are bound to be sincere Muslims who wish to take direct action 
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against America. HT advises these Muslims to hold back and think about the causes of 
American interference in the internal affairs of Muslim countries. The main cause is the 
rulers over the Muslims and the priority must be to remove them.  
 
Q: Let us discuss the specifics of HT ideology. One of the striking features of your ideology 
is that you reduce politics to a tight relationship between the state and the Ummah, 
thereby drastically narrowing the scope of politics.  
 
A: I disagree with your statement. We say that politics in Islam is about looking after the 
affairs of the people. The state looks after these affairs by implementing the Islamic 
system. The people in turn have a duty to account the state by forming parties and joining 
the Majlis al-Ummah (the Ummah Council) that represents different constituencies. 
 
Q: Okay, the key question here is how the people account the state; surely they must be 
organized. 
 
A: Absolutely. These institutions which I mentioned are not to be organized by the state. 
We say that political activity must be the preserve of all the people and not just a select 
few.  
 
Q: You say the Islamic state will allow the formation of political parties. Will they have to be 
exclusively Islamic? 
 
A: The society we envisage is a one where political parties should be formed. HT literature 
makes the point in no uncertain terms that one of the key factors behind the decline of 
Islam and its civilization was the gradual eroding of the checks and balances needed to 
account the state. Parties have a long tradition in Islamic history and in the early periods 
were an effective method for holding the rulers to account. 
 
Q: But is it the case that these parties will have to conform to Islam and there will be no 
scope for parties and interest groups that fall outside the confines of what you would call 
Islamic? 
 
A: Absolutely. These groups will have to be formed upon the tenets of Islam and parties 
that are not based upon Islam will not be allowed. However this does not mean that if they 
held a valid Islamic opinion that was premised on a legitimate interpretation of the Islamic 
texts they would be persecuted in the event of this opinion conflicting with the opinion of 
the Caliph.  
 
Q: How about if they wanted to reform the structures of the Islamic state and perhaps even 
reform it beyond recognition? 
 
A: We have to make a distinction between structures that have been ordained by the 
Islamic texts and those that perform a purely administrative function. We say that the state 
has to modernize administratively according to the needs of the day. For instance Omar 
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Ibn al-Khattab, the second of the rightly guided Caliphs of Islam, borrowed the Diwan 
administrative system from the Persians. Therefore as far as the reform of the 
administrative organs are concerned there is plenty of scope for change. However when it 
comes to institutions that have been ordained by Islam, there is no scope for alteration. 
 
Q: In effect the fundamental features of the Caliphate are perennial, right? 
 




Q: Okay a few questions on Aqeedah (doctrine). Would you say HT has reduced Aqeedah 
to a form of organizational control in the party? 
 
A: No, HT does not adopt an Aqeedah. HT is a  party and thereby allows all Muslims to 
join the party as long as they believe in the core beliefs of Islam. HT is above all interested 
in being a platform for all Muslims in their endeavor to create the Khilafah state. 
 
Q: How do you interpret Aqeedah? 
 
A: Aqeedah is the core creedal concepts that Muslims believe in. Aqeedah is distinct from 
Ahkam Shari'ah which constitutes the rules and regulations that are based on Aqeedah. 
The differences of opinion arise from different interpretations of Ahkam Shari'ah. Aqeedah 
constitutes the basic tenets of Islamic belief which then leads to different branches and 
these have caused legitimate differences of opinion and contentions throughout Islamic 
history. HT does not subscribe to any particular view when it comes to these branches; 
rather we make sure that our members adopt the core basis of Islamic belief.  
 
Q: How about your constitution for the future Islamic state which has 186 articles. Is that 
based on a combination of Aqeedah and Shari'ah? 
 
A: The Islamic state should not adopt an Aqeedah. It should not adopt one of the branches 
I alluded to earlier. For instance, when HT members met with the late Ayatollah Khomeini 
before he took power in Iran and presented him the proposed constitution, they impressed 
upon him that the Islamic state should not promote a particular branch of Aqeedah.  
 
Q: Is your constitution derived from all shades of Islamic Fiqh, and opinions? 
 
A: Absolutely. The Islamic state should embrace and defend all Muslims, irrespective of 
their idiosyncrasies. Moreover, the Islamic state should not even adopt a particular state 
Mazhab (school of thought), rather it should strive to represent the diversity inherent in 
Islam. 
 
Q: Is this constitution really the definitive blueprint for the future Islamic state? 
 
 235 
A: We call it a proposed constitution because the future Caliph may not be a member of 
HT. In that case we will propose this constitution to the future Caliph and present it as the 
sum of all the work and research we have done in this field, in the form of a working 
document which he can accept, amend or indeed reject in favor of his own opinion and 
Ijtihad (interpretation).  
 
Q: Then is there scope for radical alterations in this constitution? In other words, it is not 
set in stone? 
 
A: This constitution is based on Ijtihad. It is based on a comprehensive and robust 
interpretation of Islamic texts and traditions. 
 
Q: Then the core of this constitution is likely to survive, is it not? 
 
A: We would hope so. Nevertheless one of our functions today is to present this 
constitution to various Islamic groups around the world. We draw them into a debate and 
ask them to comment on this constitution. On many occasions, critical feedback has 
convinced us to modify certain aspects of this constitution.  
 
Q: What is going to happen to HT once this Caliphate becomes reality? 
 
A: We say that there is a great danger in the Islamic state being closely aligned to political 
parties. We have written in our book "Ruling System in Islam" that there needs to be a 
clear separation between the Islamic state and political parties. However HT and other 
parties need to exist to create checks and balances and accountability in society. The 
party will work to consult and account the state. HT will never assume the role of a 
vanguard party. 
 
Q: How does HT ideology coincide and conflict with Wahhabism and Salafism? 
 
A: HT is not a Mazhab. It is a party. Both Wahhabism and Salafism are schools of thought. 
We debate with these schools of thought as we debate with others.  
 
Q: Has there been some penetration from these Mazhabs, in particular from Wahhabism? 
 
A: No, this is not the case when it comes to these particular schools of thought. However 
we present a unique model when it comes to adopting ideas, we are not interested in the 
origins of a particular view as long as it comes from authentic Islamic sources. The 
scholars within HT scrutinize these views and adopt them based upon what is strongest. 
So when formulating the constitution we adopted from the main schools of thought, such 
as Shafi' and Hanafi and also from opinions accredited to individual scholars.  
 
Q: What is the HT's position on Salafism? 
 
A: We have debates with other groups and schools of thought and we really prefer not to 
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publicize the content of these debates due to the Islamic etiquettes of debate and 
discussion.  
 
Q: Do you have these kinds of debates with Shi'as? 
 
A: Yes, as I mentioned, for example, before Nabahani interacted closely with Baqir al-
Sadr. 
 
Q: That is ancient history now! What about more recently? 
 
A: Recently we met with the late Ayatollah Khomeini and we have also met Shi'as from the 
Ahl ul-Bait society in London. Once they allowed one of our speakers to address their 
audience and we actually discovered that a lot of the differences that exist were debated in 
an amicable fashion. We are not really interested in flaming sectarian and Mazhab type 
differences.  
 
Q: But more broadly your methodology of unifying the thoughts, doctrines and opinions of 
Muslims has been a failure, has it not? I mean more than 50 years after the emergence of 
HT you have not achieved any of your core aims. 
 
A: This is a very interesting point. The West is probably in a constant state of denial when 
it comes to assessing the mood of the Muslim street. Today the overwhelming opinion 
among Muslims is for the implementation of Islam and the Shari'ah. Just look at the 
situation in Iraq where both Sunnis and Shi'as have united to call for Islam following the 
downfall of Saddam Hussein. We see a situation where the overwhelming majority of 
Muslims reject their rulers and are keen to seek Islamic solutions to their problems. 
 
Q: This may be the case but that does not mean they share your ambitions to create a 
Caliphate. 
 
A: Most Islamic groups today openly state in their constitutions the need to have a Khilafah 
state as their ultimate goal, albeit with differing methodologies. This is a reflection of the 
mood of the Muslims who have tried all ideologies and political systems but failed to better 
their situation. The central point to be made here is that the concept of the Khilafah state is 
not rejected by Muslims. 
 
Q: So what is stopping the onward drive to revive the Caliphate? Is it the regimes in the 
Muslim world that, according to you, are propped up by the West? 
 
A: Absolutely. If one of these regimes fell and an Islamic state came in its place this would 
create a domino effect and every puppet state in the Muslim world would crumble.  
 
Q: You really believe that once this state emerges all the nationalistic, sectarian and ethnic 
divisions that have been in the making for centuries, if not millennia, would just disappear? 
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A: As long as these sectarian and national identities are obstacles on the way of a unified 
Ummah, yes they will whither away. This does not mean however that different national 
characters and allowable customs will simply cease to exist, as long as these existed for 
the purpose of recognition not division.  
 
Q: Given the wretchedness of the Muslim world today and the ease with which it is 
overwhelmed and dominated by outsiders, don't you think what Nabahani called the gloom 
and decline of Islam and its Ummah is continuing unchecked? 
 
A: I have to correct you here. Nabahani did not say Islam is in gloom and decline, but 
rather it's Ummah and society is in gloom and decline. Islam itself is intact. The decline of 
Islamic society started with intellectual stagnation and the closing of the gates of Ijtihad. 
However this gloom is beginning to lift insofar as Muslims are more optimistic of their own 
capabilities and potential.  
 
Q: And you really think the future for the Muslim world is political Islam? 
 
A: That is not only its future; it is in fact the only way out. 
 
Q: I say this because some analysts contend that the fortunes of political Islam reached its 
peak in the late 1980s and in recent years it has been declining. Presumably you reject 
this notion outright. 
 
A: I absolutely reject this analysis. This assessment is based on superficial factors.  
 
Q: Their analysis is mainly based on the inability of Islamic opposition groups to dislodge 
these so-called corrupt regimes. The Algerian example is often cited insofar as the 
Algerian Islamists had the best chance to seize the state but were ultimately foiled through 
a mixture of military, security and political measures.  
 
A: Algeria is an exceptional case since the Islamic movement, in spite of being a sincere 
movement, had not studied the correct method of establishing the Islamic state. They 
undertook actions, namely joining the democratic process, which ultimately proved self-
defeating.  
 
Q: Okay, let us discuss the history of HT and its organization. Please give a brief account 
of HT's history since its inception in the early 1950s. 
 
A: HT was established in 1953 by Taqieddin Nabahani. It was established in al-Quds 
(Jerusalem) and in the 1950s it spread all across the Sham (Levant) region. In the 1960s it 
moved further a field, encompassing Turkey and North Africa and soon thereafter it spread 
all across the Muslim world. 
 
Q: Can we still speak of a single, coherent HT today? 
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A: Yes we can. We have one leadership, one global strategy to revive the Khilafah state 
and we are all unified in that objective. 
 
Q: How are your different branches coordinated? Would you say HT is a centralized party 
with a central executive directing all the Vilayas? 
 
A: Yes we have one central leadership or Qiyada headed by the scholar and thinker ʻAta 
Abu Rishtah. He used to be our spokesman in Jordan throughout the 1980s and was 
imprisoned by the Jordanian regime for being critical of it. Our central leadership sets the 
agenda and strategy internationally. That strategy is in turn interpreted and implemented 
by the various Vilayas around the world. The regional executive committees subscribe fully 
to the opinions and decisions of the central executive.  
 
Q: Where would you say HT was strongest in the world? 
 
A: I actually don't have that information. 
 
Q: Would you say it is still strongest where it all started, i.e. the Levant region? 
 
A: Wherever HT can operate openly and free of severe repression, you can see the overt 
existence of the Party and its activists. For instance, recently a judgment was passed in 
the Turkish courts ruling that HT is not a terrorist movement. Following that in the last 
month we have been holding demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul and other cities… 
 
Q: HT has a strong presence in Turkey? 
 
A: Yes, footage from Turkish media would attest to this. In Central Asia we have made 
major inroads in the past 2 decades. According to external commentators we number at 
least 7,000-8,000 in the prisons alone.  
 
Q: This presence in Central Asia has only come about in the past 2 decades? 
 
A: Actually I can't confirm that. All I can confirm is that post-Soviet era HT was able to 
publicly promote its ideology and hence gained massive support as a result of it.  
 
Q: Was the party severely repressed by the former Soviet Union? 
 
A: Yes. My understanding from some external sources is that many members were even 
exiled from their home countries. The Soviets ferociously repressed any Islamic activity. 
 
Q: Why is HT strong in Central Asia? 
 
A: You have to look at it from two perspectives, namely the history of the peoples and the 
call of the party. Regarding the history of the peoples we find that the Soviet Union brutally 
suppressed Islam for many decades. As a result of that brutal suppression Islam became 
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a hidden religion. Following the demise of the Soviet Union there was a genuine and 
sincere resurgence of Islam. HT began to address these societies and educate their 
masses in the ideology of political Islam.  
 
Q: This is perplexing since there are local alternatives to HT. For instance there is a robust 
national/Islamic movement in Tajikistan. In the same vein the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan is a local rival to HT. Moreover for a people who have recently been freed from 
the shackles of a super state it would seem odd to long for joining another super state, 
albeit an Islamic one. 
 
A: But the Khilafah state will reflect the beliefs of the people. This is the key difference 
insofar as the Soviet Union did not reflect the beliefs and culture of the people. On the 
contrary it represented values that were wholly alien to Muslims.  
 
Q: So you think there is a genuine yearning for the politics of pan-Islam in Central Asia? 
 
A: There is a genuine yearning for the establishment of the Khilafah state and the Islamic 
system amongst Muslims all over the world. The Muslims of Central Asia are not an 
exception to this. 
 
Q: Do you think the Central Asian governments are making inroads in their disinformation 
and propaganda campaigns against HT and discrediting it in the process? 
 
A: They have been conducting far more than just a disinformation campaign! When 
Karimov said that he will fight ideology with ideology and thought with thought, he actually 
meant boiling some of our members alive and punishing them with the most barbaric of 
punishments. However this brutal strategy—which Karmiov is taking to extremes—has 
been the mainstay of the Arab regimes for many decades and hitherto it has failed to 




Q: Okay, let us discuss broader issues. You mentioned the late Ayatollah Khomeini earlier, 
what were the nature and intensity of contacts between Khomeini and HT? 
 
A: We met Khomeini in France before he took power and impressed upon him the need to 
rule by Islam, establishing a state for all Muslims and not subscribing to a narrow school of 
thought which creates division. The initial discussions were positive. Consequently we sent 
a delegation to Tehran led by the late Ahmed Daur, the famous Jordanian member of HT 
and former member of the Jordanian Parliament. On that occasion, we were unhappy with 
the response we received from Khomeini, and understood after discussions, that Iran was 
on its way to becoming another colorless Muslim state.  
 
Q: I had heard that an HT delegation from Pakistan had met with Ayatollah Khomeini 




A: No this is incorrect. The delegation initially met him in France, consisting of our 
members in Europe and then met him in Tehran, headed by Ahmed Daur.  
 
Q: What does HT make of the Islamic regime in Iran? After all, some commentators in the 
Muslim world contend that it has presented a successful model of political Islam for the 
past 25 years. 
 
A: We don't regard it as an Islamic state. Its model for political Islam does not go beyond 
empty rhetoric and sloganeering against America when it is politically expedient. It is a 
nation-state based on sectarian principles, a mockery of an Islamic state devoured by the 
greediness for power. The ruling system that is implemented, contradicts the concept of 
the Khalifah running all the political affairs of the Ummah. Instead it establishes on one 
hand a theocracy and on the other a republican system – both concepts are alien to Islam. 
Unfortunately the past 25 years have distanced some people in Iran from Islam, not 
endeared them to it.  
 
Q: So you believe it is just as bad as the other regimes in the Muslim world? 
 
A: Islam calls all regimes that do not implement Islam Dar al-Kufr (unbelivers' countries). 
Therefore from this perspective, the Iranian regime, like the other regimes, needs to be 
replaced by the Khilafah system.  
 
Q: But compared to the other two models of political Islam in recent times, namely 
Afghanistan and Sudan, many would say the Iranian example has been much more 
successful. 
 
A: How could it be successful when it has failed to win the support of its own people? We 
hear reports these days that the some Iranian people are even turning away from Islam 
because of the conduct of their rulers, especially in the ineptitude of these rulers to 
address the problems of the people and regulate their economic and political affairs. No, I 
think we can safely say the Iranian regime belongs to the aforementioned camps.  
 
Q: How about Sudan? Back in the early 1990s many Islamic groups in the West, 
particularly here in London, hailed Sudan as a genuine Islamic state. 
 
A: Except HT. We explained to the supporters of Sudan that the ʻIslamic experiment' of 
Sudan was no more than some rulers playing to the popular demand for Islam to be 
implemented in state and society. The Sudanese experiment hinged upon implementing 
Islam gradually because it was falsely believed that implementing the whole of the Shari'ah 
would be impractical. What occurred was a selective implementation of some Shari'ah 
rules, without the necessary frameworks that Islam gives when implemented completely, 
including the checks and balances required to account the state. It is interesting to note, 
the supporters of Sudan no longer praise it with such enthusiasm.  
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Q: What about the Taleban? 
 
A: Unfortunately the Taleban were not in a position to establish a viable and secure Islamic 
state due to the security situation at that time in Afghanistan. We also had some problems 
with their conceptualization of what an Islamic state is, and feared that the necessary 
research and study were not undertaken. However the reality is, the Taliban no longer rule 
Afghanistan. Instead America does.  
 
Q: Are you adamant that HT has never accepted financial or logistical support from any of 
these three regimes or from any other government in the world for that matter? 
 
A: Absolutely! HT has always kept its distance from the rulers in the Muslim world. Our 
record of struggle and sacrifice testifies to this. HT is banned virtually everywhere in the 
Muslim world and almost everywhere our members are thrown in jail, tortured and even 
killed. Our message has never changed over the past 50 years, we oppose all 
governments of all shades in the Muslim world – and value our independence. Accepting 
any form of support from any of these governments contradicts our very existence, namely 
to re-establish a Khilafah state free from colonialist interference.  
 
Q: Going back to the question of violence, please provide a final critique of Islamic groups 
that have taken up arms against their governments, particularly in Algeria, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
A: Islam mandates that the method to re-establish the Khilafah state is to establish it 
through intellectual and political work. The Prophet (PBUH) never raised up arms to 
establish a state, rather he worked according to a fixed method in emulation of this. To 
raise up arms against the regimes contradicts the Islamic method, in our opinion. 
Furthermore it does not address the problem correctly, as the regimes are one component, 
albeit very critical, to the present set-up. We need to convince the sincere members of the 
elites of the viability of Islam so that the Islamic state arises upon a strong powerbase.  
 
Q: What were the circumstances behind the arrest of 3 HT members in Egypt? 
 
A: These members went from Britain, for a mixture of reasons ranging from furthering their 
language to business. The Egyptian government at that time cracked down upon the Party 
in Egypt and arrested a handful of our members including the 3. One of our members, 
Reza Pankhurst, was tortured by electrocution and they all suffered sleep depravation and 
coerced confessions. After a farcical judicial process, which was continuously adjourned 
due to the judge going on vacation, all defendants received a jail sentence ranging from 1 
to 5 years. The members from Britain received 5 years. Far from being demoralized, we 
see this as part of the work to establish the state. In fact they are seen as heroes by most 
in the Muslim community in Britain.  
 
Q: What about the British-Asian suicide members who attacked a bar in Tel Aviv in April 
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2003; is it true that they were affiliated to HT even though it is widely accepted they were 
acting individually? 
 
A: No, this is not true, and in fact as far as I know no one has ever stated this. They were 
rather involved in other groups.  
 
Q: How do you see the patterns of al-Qaeda style terrorism developing in the medium to 
long term future? 
 
A: I have very little information in this regard, so cannot comment on how it will develop. 
But America and her allies have to realize that with every military onslaught against 
Muslim countries, they are creating a hotbed of discontent. Today, you merely have to visit 
the home of a Muslim and they will elaborate on their hatred for Bush and Blair.  
 
Q: Do you think an attack equaling or exceeding 9/11 is likely in the short to medium term 
future? 
 
A: If you mean in the Western world, I really can't say as I don't know. But I suspect due to 
the absence of the Khilafah state, the Muslim world will witness attacks far exceeding 9/11 








Interview with Anjoum Choudary, leader of Al-Ghurabaa and ex member of al 




Q: I would like to start with your personal history. When did you join Al Muhagirooun? 
 
A: I studied Islam from the age of 5. In the following 10 years I came across many Islamic 
teachers, ranging from Sufis, Usuliʼs, Ahl-ul-Hadith and Muslim Brotherhood (MB), I joined 
al Muhagirooun in London, later on in my life.  
 
Q: Could you give me some dates? 
 
A: I was born in 1967 in London. I pursued my Islamic studies alongside my support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood until the age of 17, and then I briefly joined Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) before 




A: I supported the Sirian MB and  joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in London  and, after that, al 
Muhajiroun and then I founded al Ghurabaa.. 
 
Q: Did you ever meet any of the Muslim Brotherhood from Syria? I am referring to people 
like Adnan Saad al-Din and Issam al-Attar. 
 
A: No, I heard about them, but I did not meet them. I use to know Sheikh Saʼeed Hawa 
(ra), Sheikh Marwaan Hadeed (ra), Sheikh Omar Jawad, and Sheikh Adnan Uqlah.  
 
Q: How would you assess the Islamist challenge to the Baathist regime in Syria today? I 
say this in light of the fact that many exiled Brotherhood leaders have now gone back to 
Syria and seem to have made their peace with the Baathist regime. 
 
A: There is still some opposition, but the Brotherhood itself can no longer be regarded as a 
true opposition force. 
 
Q: Because they have extensive surreptitious links to the regime? 
 
A: Yes, they have now entered into dialogue and discussion with the regime. They are 
becoming a state party. I was proud of my affiliation to the old Muslim Brotherhood, but the 
Muslim Brotherhood today really disgusts me. They are becoming co-opted into the 
political systems of the countries in which they operate. In Egypt, the Brotherhood even 
wants to change its name to receive greater recognition. 
 
Q: How active is the armed Islamic opposition in Syria? 
 
A: The Jihadists in Syria have now become proper Salafis and are basically linked to al-
Qaeda. 
 
Q: How come we donʼt hear about them, there has not been a dramatic attack on the 
 244 
Baathist regime for many years? 
 
A: That is because they are busy elsewhere, particularly in Iraq. 
 
Q:   Did you ever study anywhere in the Middle East 
 
A: Yes, I spent 6 months studying in Al-Azhar, but I was not able to complete my studies 
since conflicts arose between the tutors and me. Therefore I went to Saudi Arabia in 
December 1983 where I first heard of Sheik Omar Bakri . I re-started my education in 
Mecca in an establishment called The Islamic School of al-Saltiyah. 
 
Q:  When did you hear of the Al-Muhajiroun and where it was established?  
 
A: It was established in Mecca by Sheik Omar Bakri, our teacher and guide. Al-Muhajiroun 
first came on the scene on March 3, 1983. Our sheik Omar Bakri had links with Hizb-ut-
Tahrir (HT) in Beirut and maintained contacts with it in Cairo. But in Saudi Arabia, there 
was virtually nobody affiliated to HT. Sheik Omar Bakri started forming HT cells in Saudi 
Arabia, and by 1983 he had built a team of 38 brothers. Some of these people were 
previously affiliated to Juhaiman al-Utaiba and some were Salafis. However, HT was 
banned in Saudi Arabia; at the same time HT leaders in Kuwait were reluctant to form or 
organize any activities in Saudi Arabia. A serious dispute broke out between Bakri and HT 
organizers in Kuwait who subsequently suspended his membership in the party. Therefore 
on March 3, 1983 — the 59th anniversary of the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate — 
he launched a separate organization with the help of these 38 brothers and called it Al-
Muhajiroun. 
 
Q: In a way, Al Muhajiroun were formed by default? 
 
A: Yes, in fact Sheik Omar Bakri had worked hard for three years to build a platform for HT 
in Saudi Arabia, and the upper echelons of the party did not appreciate his efforts. From 
an Islamic perspective, there was no choice but to organize the dedicated cadres  he had 
built up under the aegis of Jamaat al-Muhajiroun. 
 
Q: Do you know why it is called ʻJamaatʼ (Community) because it is a benign term as 
opposed to ʻHizbʼ (Party), which has obvious political connotations? Were there any 
political calculations behind the selection of this name? 
 
A: Yes. If our teacher had chosen the prefix ʻHizbʼ, i.e. ʻPartyʼ, the organisation would have 
fallen foul of the Saudi authorities.   He chose ʻAl-Muhajirounʼ, as this means ʻEmigrantsʼ 
and refers to the early followers of the Prophet Muhammad (saw). 
 
Q: I want to speed up the chronology, so after al-Muhajiroun were established in 1983, 
when did  Sheik Omar Bakri leave Saudi Arabia and come to the UK ? 
 
A: He came here to Britain in January 1986. 
 
Q:  Do you know why he decided to transplant al Muhajiroun to Britain? Was he expelled 
from Saudi Arabia? 
 
A: Yes. When he became independent of HT, he got bolder. They started a stickers and 
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leaflets campaign in the major cities, attacking all Kufr systems (i.e. man-made regimes), 
including the al-Saud Regime. 
 
Q:  Al Muhajiroun and Omar Bakri seem to have been openly challenging the Saudi regime 
with these activities. 
 
A: Not openly. They pasted and distributed stickers and leaflets in an underground 
manner. The regime was not able to trace the massive sticker campaign to Al-Muhajiroun 
as they worked furtively and were skilled in these activities. They built up dedicated cells. 
Our people studied Islam during the day and engaged in distributions and other activities 
during the night. 
 
Q: How would you define the nature of the Saudi regime. I say this in light of the fact that 
many of the Islamic activists that eventually ended up in Afghanistan and formed Jihadi-
Salafi groups, were initially sponsored by the Saudi regime. 
 
A: I always believed the Saudi regime was Kufr. This is because I subscribed to the HT 
ideology which condemned all regimes in the Muslim world as Kufr. 
 
Q:  Do you know whether Omar Bakri ʻs expulsion from Saudi Arabia was conducted in a 
civilized manner? 
 
A: Not at all. He was first arrested in Jedda in 1984 and he was subsequently released on 
bail. They found nothing on him apart from some glue and leaflets, which were going to be 
distributed around Mecca. They were not able to link him to any recognizable organization 
like HT. He and the other member simply presented themselves as Muhajiroun (emigrants) 
who had left their countries in the hope of securing sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. The next 
time they arrested him was in December in 1985 in Riyadh. They raided one of his houses 
at a time when he was teaching from the subversive book, “The Money Circulation under 
the Khilafa System”, which had been written by Abdul Qadeem Zalluom, one of the early 
leaders of HT. This destroyed his alibi, as they made a direct connection to HT. 
 
Q: How did he end up in Britain and started al Muhajiroun there? 
 
A: The reason he came to Britain was because he had a multiple-visa. He never planned 
to stay in Britain. His plan was to go to Pakistan or Malaysia. 
 
Q: Why Pakistan? 
 
A: Pakistan is the ideal place for Islamic activities, it has nearly 150 million Muslims, and it 
gives you access to hundreds of millions of Muslims in India, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. 
People in the Indian Subcontinent believe in Islamic nationalism and hence it is easier for 
them to digest the Khilafah message. 
 
Q: And why Malaysia? 
 
A: It has a dedicated Muslim population. There are links to Muslims in Indonesia, Central 
Asia and China. Anyway he could not go anywhere else. He was wanted in Syria, and the 
Syrian security services in Lebanon had raided his house and killed one of his brothers.  
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Q: Before we discuss the development of the Muhajiroun organization in the UK and 
elsewhere, could you provide a brief insight into the history of HT since its inception in 
Palestine in 1951? 
 
A: It was obviously founded by Sheikh Taqi-ud-deen Al-Nabahani in Palestine in 1951, 
who believed firmly that the malaise of the Muslim Ummah was rooted in the destruction of 
the Khilafah (Caliphate) in 1924. In the beginning the group founded by Nabahani was 
known as al-Hayʼat al-Tahrir al-Islami [3] and spread to Lebanon and Syria in the period 
1951-53. Its early leaders were Ibrahim Hamdan, Shuqeiri and, of course, Sheikh Taqi 
Nabahani. They tried to establish themselves legally in al-Quds (Jerusalem) but the 
authorities refused to recognize them. Consequently the core group became more 
confrontational and began to tout itself as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party). The 
authorities then began to arrest the active membership and the party subsequently went 
underground. 
 
Q: When exactly did Hayʼat al-Tahrir become Hizb-ut-Tahrir? 
 
A: In 1953. 
 
Q: So initially, the core membership was based in Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, 




Q: How did HT spread beyond this region and into virtually every country in the Muslim 
world? 
 
A: Sheikh Nabahani married in Lebanon and his wifeʼs family happened to be wealthy. 
They lent him considerable financial support and he used the inflow of funds to develop 
robust units in Lebanon, Jordan and that area in general. Then it spread to Iraq and Egypt, 
and in the 1950ʼs, 1960ʼs and 1970ʼs, it spread to all corners of the Muslim world. 
 
Q: Okay, so by the 1960ʼs and 1970ʼs HT had become a universal phenomenon? 
 
A: Yes, they were everywhere. 
 
Q: But not in Iran? 
 
A: Actually HT sent some teams to Iran. They did not believe, like I do now, that Shias in 
general and Khomeini in particular, are Mushrik (Polytheists). They saw Khomeini as a 
Muslim, but viewed his regime as Kufr (non-Islamic). 
 
Q: So what happened? 
 
A: They sent some teams to Iran after Khomeini came to power and offered to make him 
the Khalifah (Caliph) of all the Muslims. 
 





Q: And of course Khomeini rejected their offer? 
 
A: Khomeini rejected their offer despite the fact he was a champion of the Velayat al-Faqih 
system. 
 
Q: But Velayat al-Faqih is another form of caliphate, would you not agree? 
 
A: Yes. But the mainstream Shias reject Velayat al-Faqih. 
 
Q: But do you accept Velayat al-Faqih as legitimate Islamic discourse? 
 
A: Before I became a Salafi I believed that Velayat al-Faqih as a principle can facilitate the 
unity of the Shias and the Sunnis. However at that time most senior Shia leaders, people 
like Ayatollah Al-Khoʼee, rejected the principle and this undermined its potential. 
 
Q: Okay, going back to HT, they have never had any serious organization in Iran, have 
they? 
 
A: They donʼt have any membership in Iran. 
 
Q: Is this rooted in the Shia-Sunni split? 
 
A: Yes. Also the HT insists on ʻadoptionʼ, basically you have to adopt their principles and of 
course the principles of HT diverge significantly from the beliefs of Jaafari Shias. 
 
Q: Okay, let us put all this into perspective. Are you saying that HT looks at itself as some 
kind of mother organization or holding company and in order to become part of it you have 
to accept certain rigid pre-conditions — and once these have been accepted you are co-
opted as some kind of franchise? 
 
A: Actually they donʼt believe that. They believe they are a distinct theological and juridical 
school. They have developed sophisticated principles and ideas regarding economic 
systems, social systems and legal systems that need to be adopted. This is why Shias 
could not really join HT, because they believe in 12 infallible Imams and hence have 
multiple sources of reference as far as the practice of Islam is concerned. 
 
Q: Why is it that HT has such a strong presence here in the UK? 
 
A: Because our teacher and guide Sheik Omar Bakri established it (smiles). When he first 
came to Britain, half of him was Ikhwani-Jihadi and the other half was Salafi-Tahriri, in 
short,  he was the perfect  combination of different modes of knowledge and he channelled 
all this energy into developing networks here in the UK. 
 
Q: Did he operate under the name of HT? 
 
A: Not initially. At that time, the Amir of HT in Germany visited him and said that he had 
heard about his departure from the party in 1983 and expressed his regrets about that. He 
offered him the chance to operate as a ʻmemberʼ of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). This effectively 




Q: Was there no HT structure here in the UK before  Sheik Bakri arrival? 
 
A: There were two brothers only. Together, they set upon developing the party here in the 
UK. They built basic units and in time these units multiplied. Of course we could not call 
ourselves HT proper. I had been following Sheik Omar Bakri teachings from the time I was 
in Saudi Arabia then met him again in London and decided to join him.  
 
Q: How did the Al-Muhajiroun fit into all this? 
 
A:  We kept this as a separate platform.  We contacted our brothers in Saudi Arabia and 
instructed them to pursue their underground activities as part of the global HT network. 
 




Q: What made you leave the HT umbrella entirely in 1996? 
 
A: Our teacher Sheik Omar Bakri had built the teams from nothing in this country and had 
been their leader in the UK for 10 years before finally resigning on 16 January 1996 in 
response to a violation of Islamic rules by the worldwide Amir of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 
 
Q: What had brought this about? Was it due to lax organization and the penetration of 
undesirable elements? 
 
A: Our activities in the UK (from 1987-1996) awakened all the sleeping cells of HT around 
the world. After Sheikh Nabahaniʼs death in 1977, the party experienced severe 
persecution by all Arab regimes, and this led to retreat and stagnation. It also sparked 
internal disputes between various members of HT in Jordan and the leadership committee. 
However, after our departure from HT in 1996, the old internal disputes arose again and 
this time around caused an official split in the party. I am not saying that the official split of 
1997 was caused by our activities; in fact it could not have been as we had left a year 
earlier to re-launch Al-Muhajiroun independently from HT. 
 
Q: Did the split have global ramifications? 
 
A: Yes. A man called Abu Rami and his followers dismissed the Amir of HT, Abdul 
Qadeem Zalloum, who at that time led HT from a secret location, and established a 
separate organisation. The Zalloumis became HT Camp 1 and the followers of Abu Rami, 
the so-called Nakithoun (renegades), became known as HT Camp 2. 
 
Q: Which one is stronger? 
 
A: HT Camp 1. 
 





Q: How significant is HT Camp 2? 
 
A: They are big in Jordan. 
 
Q: And this original split manifested itself in all HT organizations around the world? 
 
A: Yes, the split was everywhere. But the splits multiplied. HT Camp 1 split again, and the 
new faction became known as Hizb Waed (Party of Promise) and is led by Mr. Muhammad 
Showeiki. There was yet another split, and HT Camp 4 are known as the Reformers of 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and are led by Iyad Hilal in America and Dr. Tawfiq Mustafa in Germany. 
 
Q: How do you assess the individual strengths of these four camps? 
 
A: HT Camp 1 remains the strongest. The next strongest is HT Camp 2. The third one, 
Hizb Waed, is only present in Jerusalem. As for the reformists (HT Camp 4), they merely 
constitute a few individuals who aspire to re-unite Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 
 
Q: How are camps 1 & 2 represented geographically, especially in places like Central 
Asia? 
 
A: In Central Asia they are all HT Camp 1. There are very few HT Camp 2 people in 
Central Asia. 
 
Q: You cited violations of Islamic laws as the main reason behind your and Omar Bakriʼs 
departure, briefly explain these violations. 
 
A: It related to the methods involved in establishing the Khilafah system and many other 
Aqeedah (ideological) and Fiqh (Jurisprudence) issues. 
 
Q: Please elaborate on this. 
 
A: Muhajiroun and HT disagreed on three points.  
 
1- Muhajiroun engage in the divine method to establish the Khilafah wherever they have 
members, whereas HT works to establish the Khilafah only in a specific Muslim country 
(they called it Majal—i.e. geographical area in any part of the Muslim world) and restricted 
their membersʼ activities outside the Majal. 
 
2- Muhajiroun follow the Aqeedah of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaʼahv (ASWJ) and the path of 
Al-Salaf Al-Saalih (companions and family of the Prophet), whereas HT subscribe to a 
different Aqeedah. 
 
3- Muhajiroun believe in twinning Daʼwa (the call to Islam) and Jihad, whereas HT does 
not believe that Jihad can be waged by agents not affiliated to the Islamic state. 
 
Q: Please elaborate on the Aqeedah of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaʼah (ASWJ). 
 
A: The followers of ASWJ, in summary, follow only the Quran and the Sunnah in 
accordance to the understandings of the Companions and the Family of the Prophet 
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Muhammad. We follow the Nahj-ul-Salaf (the path of the pious predecessors). The central 
theme is Al-Talazum (Correlation), which forbids divorcing Shariʼah from Aqeedah. In the 
Salafi worldview there can be no separation between Aqeedah and Shariah; they have to 
be moulded together. Moreover Iman (faith) is no longer an issue of the heart, Iman must 
automatically entail action. It goes further than this, insofar as there must be a union 
between Koran and the Sunna as core constituents of Wahy (revelation). 
 
Q: What you are outlining here is, in its simplest form, a merger between theory and 
praxis. 
 
A: Indeed, thought determines action. 
 
Q: The idea of combining theory and praxis has Marxist overtones, would you not agree? 
 
A: This is the Salafi approach, and the difference is that Marxist theories are man-made 
whereas Islamic ideology is divine insofar as it is derived from the Quran and Sunnah.  
 
Q: The worldview that you are outlining has broad implications, particularly insofar as it 
makes the agency of the Ulama (religious scholars/clerics) superfluous. 
 
A: We want Ulama as long as they promote the pure concept of Islam with complete 
Talazom between Al-Baatin (the inner) and Al-Zaaher (the outer). There is no scope in 
Islam for divergent schools of thought or sects. Who can understand Islam better than the 
Prophet and his companions? Who aided the Prophet in the major battles of early Islam 
like Badr and Khandaq? The Hanafis, Shafiʼis, Tahriris? Of course not! The Prophet fought 
alongside the Sahaba (companions & family). 
 
Q: Presumably this elaborate Salafi ideology that you are describing is firmly established in 
your organization. 
 
A: Anybody who does not follow the path of the Salaf cannot join al-Muhajiroun. 
 
Q: Apart from these theological and ideological disputes, did the fact that Mr Omar Bakri 
and yourself were maintaining a parallel organization in the form of al-Muhajiroun cause 
any friction between you and HT? 
 
A: The real dispute was over the methodology to establish the Khilafah, they did not like us 
attacking man-made laws here in the UK, and they did not like the fact that we were 
condemning the policy of John Major and the British government. 
 
Q: Okay, I want to move on now and address some of your recent activities. You told the 
Birmingham Sunday Mercury in December 2000 that Muhajiroun recruits people for Jihad 
in places like Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir. Did you have the organization in place 
to recruit and direct these people to those theatres of conflict? 
 
A: That is not true. I never recruited people to go abroad and fight against anyone. 
However, people used to come to us if they wanted to join Jihads abroad but soon 
discovered that we are merely Jihad sympathisers. Anyway, legally speaking, all our 
activities were permissible during that period. We did not breach any laws as we were 
helping suffering people overseas. 
 251 
 
Q: Were you involved in sending young men to theatres of conflict? 
 
A: No, I was not. I used to encourage people to go to Bosnia to help their Muslim brothers 
and sisters, when the law in the UK permitted that type of intervention. But when the law 
forbade it, we stopped these activities altogether. 
 
Q: To which law are you referring here? 
 
A: The new law against terrorism. 
 




Q: To which location did you direct most of the young men who came to your organization? 
 
A: We used to help mostly in Bosnia and Kosovo as part of a broader humanitarian effort. 
 
Q: In another interview with Milanʼs Il Giornale your teacher and mentor Mr Bakri said that 
the ʻInternational Islamic Frontʼ (IIF) is the political wing of Osama Bin Ladenʼs 
ʻInternational Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusadersʼ. What were the 
implications of this statement? 
 
A: Another fabrication and distortion from the media!  Sheik Omar Bakri and myself did set 
up the IIF in August 1990 as a political platform to oppose the stationing of American 
forces in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. This was designed to act as a broad umbrella for a 
range of UK-based organizations. 
 
Q: Therefore there are no connections to the ʻInternational Islamic Front for Jihad Against 
the Jews and the Crusaders set up by Bin Laden in 1998? 
 
A: Of course not. But certain people exploited this coincidence. They tried to portray us 
[as] the political wing of Bin Ladenʼs military structure and this used to make me laugh. I 
wish we had a connection, as there is no shame in being linked to Sheikh Osama Bin 
Laden. 
 
Q: But there was clearly an ideological link. 
 
A: If you mean devotion to the sect of ahlus-Sunah wal-Jamaʼah it is true, but I have never 
met Sheikh Osama Bin Laden in my life. 
 
Q: Al Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri and yourself are even known in Thailand. The Bangkok Post 
once reported that training camps for Thai Muslim separatists were partly financed by your 
organization; is there any veracity to these allegations? 
 
A: Another fabrication from the media! All that happened was that some Chinese Muslims 
came to Britain seeking financial help to build mosques and schools and we obliged. 
 
Q: Who helped them, Al-Muhajiroun? 
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A: Yes, as a charity organization we used to raise funds for Muslims in need to ease their 
suffering just like any charity would do. 
 
Q: How did you raise these funds? 
 
A: We held public talks and mobilized our followers to undertake fund-raising activities on 
behalf of fellow Muslims abroad within the framework of the law. 
 
Q: Did you run any commercial enterprises and businesses to raise money? 
 
A: No, we have never done that. 
 
Q: How do you raise your money now in light of the recent anti-terrorism legislations? 
 
A: Al-Muhajiroun has always had three sources of income. Firstly, every member has to 
contribute a third of his salary if he is working. 
 
Q: And if he is not? 
 
A: Then he will have to make commitments to the activities of the organization. Secondly, 
we sell audio cassettes, videos, CDʼs, and thirdly, we receive donations from Muslim 
businessmen here and abroad. 
 




Q: Going back to your activities now, was Bin Laden really scheduled to send a video 
cassette to the rally for Islamic Revival in September 1996? 
 
A: In 1996, a letter from Bin Laden was published in the Independent and the Quds al-
Arabi, and we simply made a copy of it and said we were going to read it in public. The 
media simply sensationalized this. In the same vein there was to be no tape from Sheikh 
Omar Abd al-Rahman. 
 
Q: But where do the media get all these sensational stories? 
 
A: You know very well that the media loves to sensationalize these things. 
 
Q: But is there anybody in your organization who is helping them in this process? 
 
A: Not at all. You know very well that they used the same tactic against Marxists and 
Communists. 
 
Q: You are alluding to psychological warfare here, right? 
 
A: No. All I am doing is making people aware of the other side of the story. 
 
Q: But you are not doing a good job of this; cynics would say that you simply make it 
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worse by making sensational statements. 
 
A: We try to counter their propaganda. We always issued denials at first, but then there 
came a time when we just grew tired of making denials. We figured that if they want to give 
us publicity we should just leave them to it. 
 
Q: What caused the cancellation of the Islamic Revival Rally? 
 
A: It was MI5 (British Intelligence Service). They intervened with the London arena and 
suddenly the arena increased the costs and the insurance by astronomical amounts. They 
were trying to force us to cancel but we would not oblige them. In the end they refunded 
our money. 
 
Q: Did MI5 approach you directly about the event? 
 
A: Yes, they contacted me first as Sheik Omar Bakriʼs  solicitor. They told us there would 
be a security risk as we had invited different organizations and speakers. 
 
Q: Did MI5 interview you personally? 
 
A:  Yes as Sheik Omarʼs solicitor.  
 
Q: From the meetings you had with them, did you ever get the impression that they had an 
in-depth knowledge of your organization? 
 
A: We knew we were being continuously monitored by Special Branch; they even said this 
to us on many public functions. 
 
Q: But Special Branch does not have the analytical and political skills to make proper 
sense of Islamic organizations. They are good at conventional security work like 
surveillance and monitoring of communications, but the analytical work is carried out by 
MI5. 
 
A: Even none of the senior people from MI5 who met us asked me the kind of complex 
questions that you are putting to me in this interview. 
 
Q: This does not mean that they donʼt have an in-depth understanding of where you are 
coming from and where you could be heading. 
 
A: I donʼt think so. Anyway I will let you [in] on an open secret. We never published any 
leaflet in the UK without sending a fax to all media organizations, including the Police 
press officer. This foiled the machinations of anyone who might have been tempted to 
distort what we were saying.  
 
Q:  So you are part of Sheik Omar Bakriʼs legal team? Whatʼs its name? 
 
A: The Society of Muslim Lawyers. We are Sheik Omar Bakriʼs student.   He teaches us 
Islamic law and  we help him to make sense of English law. 
 
Q: Are  you  all British Muslims? 
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A: Yes, we all are as most of the Islamists in the UK, born and bred here.  
 
Q: How come you have never sued any publication for libel? 
 
A: How can we do that? You know very well that in this country, major publications have 
unlimited budgets. In any case we would not stand a chance in front of a jury because 
there are likely to be people there who disagree with my views. 
 
Q: Like who? 
 
A: Homosexuals, Jews etc.  Owing to the jury-based system of libel adjudication in this 
country,  we would not stand a chance of winning as  we have to present our case in a 
public arena, and of course we have been consistently demonized in this public arena. 
 
Q: What do you make of English law in particular and Western jurisprudence in general, is 
it not an effective way of organizing society and guaranteeing some justice? 
 
A: I believe Islam is superior. The law here does not protect the average person – it only 
protects the one who understands it. This is very unfair from an Islamic perspective as the 
law is designed to be an intrinsic part of social welfare. 
 
Q: Why is Islamic law superior, because it is simpler? 
 
A: Exactly, besides it is divine.  
 
Q: Okay, letʼs discuss 9/11 and its aftermath. How do you see 9/11? 
 
A: The fact that Americans were attacked was no surprise, what was surprising is that they 
came under such a devastating attack in their own country. The attacks were really a 
magnificent operation in every way. They were magnificent terrorists. 
 
Q: “Magnificent Terrorists”? This strikes me as a classic oxymoron! 
 
A: What they did was an act of terrorism no different from what the US forces have been 
doing in Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan both before and after 9/11. 
 
Q: Were their actions Islamic? 
 
A: Islamic or not, it was an act of terrorism.  
 
Q: Were their actions Islamic? 
 
A: The Prophet Muhammad once said to the enemy: I have come to terrorize you; he said: 
“O, people of Qureish I have come to slaughter youʼ; in another quote he said: ʻI am the 
Prophet who kills while laughingʼ. 
 
Q: Are you sure these traits are attributable to the Prophet Muhammad? 
 
A: I can quote to you the authentic references. Anyway for me “terrorism” is not 
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necessarily a bad word; it depends on the context and whether it is based on the 
commands of Allah. 
 
Q: Do you believe there will be another attack equalling or even exceeding the 9/11 
assaults? 
 
A: I believe this phenomenon of al-Qaeda is not going to stop. The phenomenon of 
martyrdom operations is contagious as the Prophet Muhammad correctly said. 
 
Q: What do you understand by the term al-Qaeda? 
 
A: Al-Qaeda for me, are people who revived the memory and traditions of the Messenger 
Muhammad (saw) and his companions, and follow the path of the late Salaf such as 
Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (ra), Sheikh Ibn Taimiyah (ra). But of course we do 
not encourage Muslims in Britain or in any other Western country to copy al-Qaeda as we 
are all bound by the ʻCovenant of Securitiesʼ.  
 
Q: Okay, all this is beginning to sound somewhat bizarre, you stress the importance of this 
Covenant and yet maintain that it is Islamic to slaughter thousands of innocents. 
 
A: Of course nobody cares about the untold number of Muslims slaughtered by the 
Americans, but when Kafirs are killed it is different. 
 
Q: Okay, would you concur with the analysis that from a Western perspective the only 
solution to the challenge posed by the Salafis is a security one? 
 
A: There is a solution, hands off Muslim lands! 
 
Q: That entails concessions in foreign policy—concessions that are unlikely to be made. 
 
A: Then they (Kafirs) will go to hell, and we will go to paradise. The Magnificent 19 did not 
come to negotiate. 
 
Q: Are you absolutely sure there will be more attacks like it? 
 
A: The phenomenon of fighting the occupiers has now become an overriding wish for 
millions of Muslims. 
 
Q: You are neglecting the practical dimensions of all this—after all, what allowed these 19 
to strike so efficiently? The Taliban regime in Afghanistan facilitated the convergence of 
what one notable researcher has referred to as the ʻthree elements of al-Qaedaʼ and of 
course the Taliban are no longer dominant in Afghanistan. 
 
A: That plan was concocted in the U.S. and it had nothing to do with Afghanistan…. 
 
Q: But most of the support networks emanated from Afghanistan-based operatives and 
planners. 
 
A: The operation was not that sophisticated; a group of men seized planes with knives, 
and they could have planned this anywhere in the world, even in a room in Zimbabwe. 
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Q: But al-Qaeda has been severely weakened since the war in Afghanistan. 
 
A: Come on! Al-Qaeda is still intact. 
 
Q: How come we have not seen a dramatic attack in the West since 9/11? 
 
A: Al-Qaeda is not interested in small attacks. Of course al-Qaeda freelance supporters 
carry out such attacks in places like Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, but the real al-Qaeda is 
not interested in these minor attacks, they go for massive operations. When they want to 
strike they will strike. Also bear in mind that the Americans are not holding any al-Qaeda 
people in Guantanamo Bay. 
 
Q: Really? What about Abu Zubaida? 
 
A: Abu Zubaida was killed in Pakistan according to sources close to al-Qaeda. 
 
Q: Are you sure about this? 
 
A: They want to fool the world. 
 
Q: What about Khaled Sheikh Muhammad? 
 
A: He has been arrested, but he was never part of the hard core of al-Qaeda. 
 
Q: What about [Ramzi bin al-] Shibh, he was arrested and taken away by the Pakistani ISI 
agents in full view of the cameras. You will be hard pressed to get better proof than that. 
 
A: That was somebody else. 
 
Q: You are saying that al-Shibh is still at large? 
 
A: You need to ask these questions from al-Qaeda, I am not al-Qaeda. All I am saying is 
that you are seeing everything from one side and that is the propaganda disseminated by 
the CIA. The CIA knows exactly what they are up against; they are up against the most 
determined Salafi-Wahabis who have come together in al-Qaeda. That is why the 
Americans are trying to stop the dissemination of works by Sheikh ibn Abdul Wahab. They 
are also trying to change the curriculum in some countries. But by starting the war against 
Islam they have imperilled their own future. 
 
Q: Okay Mr Choudary let us move onto other things, what do you make of the name 
ʻLondonistanʼ? 
 
A: Nobody wants to establish an Islamic state here in the UK, but we will continue to work 
for Islam. 
 
Q: I was not referring to that, the name is used to characterize the high concentration of 
Islamic activism here in the UKʼs capital. 
 






A: Because the British elites are very clever, they are not stupid like the Americans. 
Remember these people used to rule half of the world. 
 
Q: Okay, but why are they specifically harbouring so many Islamists? 
 
A: I believe the British recognize that the Khilafah will rise again one day, and they are 
anxious to influence this process. 
 
Q: Do you really believe this? 
 
A: The British are not like the French and the Germans, they donʼt slap you in the face, 
they stab you in the back. They want to buy some of these Islamic groups. 
 
Q: Has there ever been, to your knowledge, a secret deal between some Islamists and 
British security whereby radical Muslims would be left alone as long as they did not 
threaten British national security? 
 
A: I believe all the people referred to as “moderate” Muslims have at one time or another 
struck deals with the British government. But the British have been unable to corrupt 
radical groups like the HT. 
 
Q: Who are these moderate Muslims? 
 
A: The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK, UK Islamic Mission, Gammaa Islamiyah, Muslim 
Council of Britain, Islamic Human Rights Commission, Muslim Association of Britain, 
Muslim Public affair Committee and the Iranian opposition groups, the so-called Ahlul Bait 
groups, 
 
Q: The Ahlul Bait societies are not Iranian opposition; on the contrary they are aligned to 
the Islamic regime in Tehran. 
 
A: Whatever! All the Shia groups enjoy excellent relations with the British government, and 
this includes the Khoʼee foundation in London. Abdul-Majid Al-Khoʼee, who was killed in 
Iraq, is reported to have pledged allegiance to the Queen, and look at the punishment that 
Allah meted out to him in Iraq. Also this man Baqir Hakim. 
 
Q: You are referring to Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim, the former leader of Supreme Council of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)? 
 
A: Yes. He used to make typical Shia statements against the Sahaba (companions of 
Prophet Muhammad); in particular he used to make the greatest insults against Aisha and 
look at what happened to him; Allah sent somebody who blew him into a thousand pieces. 
 
Q: Who killed Hakim, al-Qaeda? 
 
A: Al-Qaeda has no time for people like Hakim. They are minor players in the wider 
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scheme of things. They are focused on America. The Shias themselves or the Americans 
could have killed Hakim. If you look at the history of the Shias since the dawn of Islam you 
will see that it is full of splits, internal conflicts and betrayals. The Shias themselves killed 
Imam Hussein in Karbala and then said it was Yazid who committed the atrocity. 
 
Q: Okay, let us discuss the security situation here in the UK; it is often said that you are 
under constant surveillance, are we under surveillance right now? 
 
A: To be honest, I think everything I say and do is monitored. 
 
Q: How many times have you been interviewed by MI5? 
 
A: I cannot really differentiate between MI5, Special Branch or the Police; they all 
represent the same authority as far as I am concerned—and I have been questioned by 
these people on at least 16 occasions. 
 
 
Q: I have noted a discrepancy in the way you assess the British; on the one hand you 
maintain that British security is poor, while on the other you assert that the British are 
comparatively clever as they used to rule half the world, so what is your real position? 
 
A: I meant that their understanding of Islam is poor. But I believe the really clever people 
are the elites in this country, as they know how to divide Muslims. 
 
Q: Who are these elites? 
 
A: The landlords, think-tanks and the decision makers. 
 
Q: Have you ever had any reason to suspect that your organization has been penetrated? 
 
A: I believe they have tried to do this, as the British are desperate to buy intelligence. 
 
Q: Do you have security procedures in place to prevent this? 
 
A: Yes, through teaching intensive theology to all new recruits. If they find it boring they will 
run away after six months. 
 
Q: But competent spies can be very persevering. 
 
A: Okay, if they persevere then they will become Muslims. 
 
Q: I see. Would you then consider using this new convert as a double agent? 
 
A: No. Why would I want to penetrate them? It is forbidden in Islam to have contacts with 
non-Islamic authority. Anyway, I believe their intelligence is not efficient, as they have 
arrested people on several occasions and subsequently let them go. I have heard some of 
them were important figures. 
 
Q: Had they inadvertently come across senior figures in the Islamic underground? 
 
 259 
A: I heard that they arrested two people who had come from abroad and subsequently let 
them go, and they just disappeared from the country. 
 
Q: Who were they? 
 
A: I donʼt know! The point to deduce from that random arrest is that the British have poor 
intelligence. 
 
Q: But would you say that they are now making a much more concerted effort to crack 
down on underground Islamic activism? 
 
A: I believe so, yes. 
 
Q: Are you not afraid that one day they will arrest you or other members of al Ghurabaa? 
 
A: No. It will never happen 
 
Q: Okay, you mentioned Abu Qatada earlier, what do you make of this man? 
 
A: He is a great Ulama and committed Salafi insofar as he subscribes to the ethos of Ahlus 
Sunna va al-Jammaa. 
 
Q: When exactly did he come to the UK? 
 
A: I think in 1994. He came from Jordan. 
 
Q: Why was he arrested? 
 
A: He was arrested for no reason as the new anti-terrorism law enables the authorities to 
detain suspects without charge. 
 




Q: Are they mostly Algerian? 
 
A: Yes, they are mostly Algerian. There is also Khaled Fawwaz, the Saudi oppositionist. 
 
Q: You donʼt think Fawwaz is linked to al-Qaeda? 
 
A: No, he is not; in fact he left Bin Ladenʼs office in London in 1995. The point is, that these 
people have been interrogated heavily, but the British have nothing on them. 
 
Q: Why are they being held then? 
 
A: Because they have enacted this new law, and they have to show something for it 
otherwise they will come across as ridiculous. 
 
Q: Okay, mr Choudary..Where is all this heading, is it a fight to the finish between the 
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United States and the Salafis? 
 
A: Allah knows best, however, our main concern is to please Allah, and to die in the cause 
of Allah and go to Jannah (Paradise). If the U.S. continues with her policy against Islam 








Interview with Mr Anjoum Choudary after al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect were banned. 
The interview took place on the 18th of July 2006, in Ilford, East London.  
 
 
Q: Have you had time to hear what John Reid has said?  
 
 
A: I think this is a failure for the British government and the capitalist ideology and the 
principles of freedom and Christian liberalism. Al-Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect are 
ideological movements and political movements. We have been very vociferous in 
opposition to the governments foreign policy, the Draconian laws which they have 
introduced over the years and the corruption in the Western system manifest in the judicial 
system, the economic system. We have always propagated an alternative blueprint for the 
way that society should be run, in accordance with Sharia law. But, it seems to me rather 
than engaging in dialogue and discussion, which would be more fitting for a government 
which propagates democracy and freedom, they have sought to try to silence any voices 
which present sound, alternative arguments and I think this is a victory for Muslims and I 
believe that is how it will be seen around the world.  
 
 
Q: How can you describe it as a victory? 
 
 
 A: When someone does not have a counter argument and they cannot deal with the ideas 
and thoughts which people carry then the easy thing is to try to ban the other voice. That is 
what has happened here. The government haven't come up with a cogent argument 
concerning their foreign policy. They have no rational and logical reason for introducing so 
many Draconian laws in this country which violate their own concepts of human rights and 
civil liberties. There is no evidence to suggest we are anything other than an ideological 
and political movement. We have been functioning here for the last ten or 15 years and 
nobody has ever been arrested for any terrorism related offences. You'd be hard pushed 
to find anyone who has any convictions short of fly posting or placarding. This is a failure 
of the capitalist ideology. I believe Islam will continue to be the fastest growing ideology in 
the West, the Muslims will never stop propagating what we believe and what this will do is 
it will militarise many people because if you start to stop people propagating their thoughts 
and ideas then you will push them underground and, obviously, after that you have no 
control over them. Ultimately, I think this will just quicken the victory for Islam because 
when you try to ban something people become more interested in it. 
 
 
 Q: You would deny glorifying terror? 
 
A: We don't glorify terrorism any more than Tony Blair and George Bush glorify the 
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. I do believe that the people in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
a legitimate right to defend themselves. I believe that anyone who dies defending life or 
property dies a martyr. I believe that people have legitimate grievances as opposed to 




 Q: What's next? 
 
 
 A: I think the Muslim community here are willing to sacrifice everything they have to 
please Allah. This will never stop anyone propagating Islam. 
 
 
 Q: Will you set up a new group? 
 
 
A: I think people will continue propagating Islam and if you are unhappy with the name, 
then you won't know what people are doing from now on. They will do it differently, they 
may not do it under any organisation. We have a right and an obligation to propagate 
Islam publicly and openly. If it reaches a situation when the life and the wealth of the 
people is violated then what happened on 7/7 could very well reoccur. People like us trying 
to prevent another 7/7, but it seems to me the government are fuelling more of a frenzy 
within the Muslim community. They are banning people who have a purely ideological and 
political opposition to their policies and ultimately they are fermenting more of the same of 
what took place on 7/7. I think that the government are sitting on a tinderbox and that it's 
liable to blow up in their face as it did on 7/7. It's a real shame that if the Muslims cannot 
fulfill their responsibilities then we will go somewhere else. As I said, I do believe it's a 
failure of the capitalist ideology, of the government. It's very easy to ban someone, it's hard 






A:  We're not interested in appealing, in going to court. At the end of the day, the courts 
and the appeals process is all part of the same system. We believe in Islam as an 
alternative. The courts are just the right hand of the British government. If the government 
thinks it is going to silence us, then it is not going to succeed. I am a spokesman for al 










Interview with Dr Abdullah Sufi, Imam of the North Finchley mosque and member of the 
London-based Saudi opposition group, Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights 
(CDLR). The interview was conducted on the 31st of May 2007, in his house, North Finchley, 
London. 
 
Q: What kind of Islamic ideology does the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights 
promote? Do you consider yourself a Wahabi organization?  
 
A: The word Wahabi has become a misnomer. The U.S., for example, uses it to denote 
Jihadists. They called the Taliban Wahabists, but this was not true. Wahabism has several 
essential ingredients, and we don't consider ourselves to be Wahabi. We do, however, 
share the Jihadi spirit.  
 
Q: Then in what way does your version of Islam differ from the official religious 
establishment in Saudi Arabia?  
 
A: The official clergy are basically a government party. They are well organized. Their view 
is that the regime has flaws but these can be corrected from the "inside." They basically 
believe that the regime is Islamic and thus legitimate.  
 
Q: How about the dissident clerics. Do your views differ from theirs?  
 
A: The radical forces can roughly be divided into two branches: First, there are the 
Jihadists, who say the regime is Kufr (i.e., belonging to the realm of the disbelievers), 
therefore it has to be fought and destroyed.   
 
Secondly, there are people who say indeed the regime is Kufr, but this does not mean that 
everybody who serves the regime is a disbeliever. They say the regime has to be 
overthrown but not necessarily through violent means alone. This is the view of the CDLR.  
 
Q: I take that to mean you believe violence is needed to engineer the collapse of the 
regime.  
 
A: We believe that any way to remove the regime is legitimate. However, we are more 
inclined to move the masses toward some kind of revolt or popular uprising, perhaps along 
the lines of the French and Iranian revolutions. We also do not rule out winning over 
powerful factions in the military and subsequently convince them to move against the 
regime. This will minimize bloodshed. But I should add that the legal and moral issues are 
exceedingly complex!  
 
Q: There are of course dissident forces both inside and outside the country who do not 
want the regime to go in its entirety.  
 
A: There is an in-between group. They are mostly from a Salafi background, who have 
been influenced by the "Muslim Brotherhood." Most of them take inspiration from 
Mohammad Sorour and hence they are called the Sorouri Group.  They are reluctant to 
move against the regime. They believe it has many faults, but they hesitate before calling 
for its overthrow. They possibly have the best intentions, but they lack any coherent 




Q: There are of course those who say the Saudi royal family has become so embedded as 
an institution that it now represents Saudi national consciousness. Therefore, getting rid of 
it would cause an enormous amount of harm to the country. How do you respond to these 
people?  
 
A: It is mostly an issue of symbolism. And of course, symbolism is important in 
understanding the behavior of the wider masses towards the political realities. But never 
forget that the al-Sauds were once a small and irrelevant tribe. By aligning themselves with 
the Wahabi movement they evolved, over two and a half centuries, into the powerful 
establishment we see today. The legitimacy of the regime has always rested on its claim to 
be Islamic. That has been undermined, so everything else is coming under question. And 
most people are aware of this. The whole structure of the regime is now in peril. What you 
call Saudi national consciousness never existed although the regime tried to create 
something in that direction in the last thirty years, albeit to no avail.  
 
Q: Are the people really that critical of the regime?  
 
A: There was a recent poll in Kuwait, which is regarded as much more secular and pro-
Western than Saudi Arabia, in which 74.5 percent of respondents said that they 
sympathized with bin Laden and consider him to be a hero. If a similar poll was conducted 
in Saudi Arabia, I am sure that over 85 percent would register approval with bin Laden.  
 
Q: What tactics does CDLR use to engineer the collapse of the regime? Do you follow the 
so-called Horizontal Trend Movement of Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia?   
 
A: Yes we are very strong horizontally. But we have also developed strong theoretical and 
scholarly capabilities. We admire Hizb al-Tahrir because they have developed a 
constitution of the Islamic state. They have worked out all the characteristics of the Islamic 
state, from women's rights to elections. Clearly their constitution contains certain scholarly 
and theological biases, but the important point is that nobody else has done this before. Of 
course we disagree with many aspects and details of Hizb-al-Tahrir's constitution, but at 
least they have put something on the table. So we are very strong theoretically. We do 
have some vertical capabilities, but our activist network and organization is not properly 
structured. We are hoping to improve this in the future through the formal establishment of 
a properly organized and well-structured political party.  
 
Q: How do your views differ from those of Osama bin Laden?  
 
A: Osama bin Laden is a military leader. He was appointed by the Afghans as Amir of the 
Arab Mujahedin. Because he has been engaged in fighting for decades, OBL and his 
followers have not had time to study recent developments and innovations in Islamic 
politics and philosophy. They have no detailed theory of the Islamic state in whose cause 
they are fighting. They believe in the Islamic state in a very general sense, and they have 
no real program. This is the essential difference between OBL and CDLR. Moreover, bin 
Laden's obsessive concentration on the U.S. is not really wise. Bin Laden forgot or 
neglected for tactical reasons that the U.S. did not invade Saudi Arabia. It was invited in by 
the Saudi royal family. The regime invited the U.S. and it has to pay the price.  
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Q: There are some people in the U.S. who claim that bin Laden receives support from 
certain quarters in the Saudi regime.  
 
A: There are two types of people in the regime who support bin Laden:  
 
1) Some are sincerely fed up with the corruption and lack of respect for Islam.  
 
2) The others hope to use the Jihadis for their "power game" inside the royal family. Turki 
Al-Faisal, the ex-intelligence chief and current Saudi ambassador in London, is one of the 
prime suspects.  
 
Q: There have been suggestions that CDLR is increasingly promoting a pan-Islamic 
agenda and is no longer exclusively focused on Saudi Arabia. How do you respond to 
these charges?  
 
A: Any Islamic movement worth its salt has to become international. When the Saudis 
passed the Saudi citizenship law in 1932, the regime ceased to be an Islamic order. An 
Islamic state has to be internationalist and inclusive. Islamic tenets demand nothing less. 
But really we at CDLR remain focused on Saudi Arabia. We may publish an article against 
Musharaf or any other leader from time to time, but on the whole our focus is on Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
Q: You have mentioned Hizb-al-Tahrir and said you admire them. Is it not the case that 
Hizb-al-Tahrir is primarily a British Islamic party?  
 
A: No, this is a misconception. Hizb-al-Tahrir is still a prime party in Jordan, Palestine and 
even Pakistan. The Pakistanis are so terrified of them that they have recently moved 
against the party. In fact they are thinking of banning it. The party is also very strong in 
Uzbekistan. And of course Hizb-al-Tahrir was the mother of most Jihadi groups in Egypt.  
 
A: Now, focusing back on Saudi Arabia, do you think the Saudi regime has been able to 
orchestrate a peaceful transition after King Fahd's death?  
 
Q: Well, the U.S. pressure on them is enormous. In fact, American pressure has been so 
great that the possibility of internal squabbles escalating into open fighting has been 
reduced. The Saudi regime is basically made up of five pillars or entities. These are:  
 
1) Al-Jawharah bint Ibraheem, the youngest and favorite wife of King Fahd. She guards 
her influence zealously for the benefit of her son, Abdul-Azeez. She controls the royal 
office and the seals. She is well-educated and sophisticated.  
 
2) Abdullah. He is the Crown Prince and exerts control through the National Guards and 
has relatively good tribal connections.  
 
3) Sultan. He controls the Defense Ministry in addition to enormous financial assets.  
 
4) Nayef. He controls the internal police apparatus. This is a considerable force numbering 
hundreds of thousands.  
 
5) Salman. He controls the media and has a strong presence in intellectual circles and 
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some middle class factions.  
 
Q: So there is a fine balancing act between all these factions.  
 
A: Yes!. The regime has no vision, no program, no strategy and no long term planning. 
They just manage tactically from day to day with one sole objective: To stay in power at 
any price.  
 
Q: What impact will the jailing of Sheikh Aki Bin Khudeir have inside Saudi Arabia? How 
popular is he?  
 
A: Khudeir was very popular in Jihadi circles. He is hostile to Shias since he is a classic 
Wahabi. Therefore Khudeir appeals to some of the strongest and most relevant sections of 
the society. But there are other forces out there and for them he has little or no appeal. But 
Khudeir has discredited himself by recently repenting and endorsing the Saudi regime. 
This has undercut his appeal within the Jihadi constituency. But in a way his "repentance" 
has weakened the regime because:  
 
1) Some Jihadi circles are now free to recruit from other sections of the society. Especially 
now that they are no longer under Khudeir's influence or the influence of other clerics of 
"classical" Wahabi persuasion.  
 
2) Khudair's "repentance" was most likely elicited through torture and was broadcast a few 
days after the Al-Muhayya compound bombing. This depicts a weak and desperate regime 
trying to get intellectual support from anywhere and by any means!  
 
Q: Mamoun Fandy notes in his book on Saudi opposition movements that Saudi opposition 
leaders are more interested in maintaining their separate voices as critics of the regime 
rather than engaging in coordinated action. Is this a fair assessment?  
 
A: It is only fair in a comparative sense. Saudi opposition politics is a very recent 
phenomenon. Comparing Saudi opposition to places where there have been modern 
organized political activities for 100 years is unfair. You need to have a well-established 
political culture to realize the possibility of "separate voices" engaging in "coordinated 
action". Such culture is historically lacking in Saudi Arabia and we have to develop it.  
 
Q: Are you referring to other Arab countries here, places like Lebanon and Egypt?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: What implication will this lack of political maturity have for the survival of the regime?  
 
A: The regime has survived until now, not due to any real internal strength--it is as stable 
as a house of cards. However, the winds of popular political maturity are not yet there, so 
the house of cards persists. But this is now changing, and I am sure the regime will go in 
my generation. It may take some time, but eventually the regime will disappear.  
 




A: (Chuckles)  
 
Q: Do you believe it is a war against Islam?  
 
A: Yes, there is no question about that. But they will sooner or later realize that their 
aggressive policies will fail. They will kill a lot of Muslims in the process because they have 
advanced technology and they bomb from high up in the air, but they will blink first. Take 
Iraq for example; everybody is surprised that the resistance has started so quickly. I 
thought it would take a year or two before the resistance would start in earnest. But it has 
happened much more quickly than that. And in Afghanistan as well there is now rigorous 
resistance.  
 
Q: Do you think the U.S. will eventually fail in Iraq?  
 
A: It will take a few years but they will fail. They will begin to make blunders, like bombing 
whole cities, the kind of things they are doing in Afghanistan right now. But of course Iraq 
is much more sophisticated and they will not be able to cover up their crimes there.  
 
Q: Was al Qaeda behind the London bombings?  
 
A: Al Qaeda has now become a jackass suitable for carrying any load. They are blamed 
for everything. There may be a hard core group called al Qaeda, but most of these 
bombings are by local groups.  
 
Q: But don't you think there are connections between these local groups and a wider 
international network?  
 
A: The connections are ideological and mostly informal. It is very difficult to forge 
operational connections. The real point is that Western intelligence can not penetrate 
these groups. We are talking about two divorced worlds with diametrically opposed 
cultures. Western intelligence is used to using bars, prostitutes and dancing clubs to 
entrap people, and of course the Jihadists have nothing to do with these things. Even 
Saudi intelligence, many of whose officers are devout classic Wahabists, has a hard time 
penetrating these groups. I knew someone in Kabul, and he told me that almost every one 
in Kabul knew, just before 9/11, that something big was going to happen in America. But of 
course Western intelligence had no clue. The best way to think of al Qaeda is by using the 
cluster bomb analogy. A large bomb is aimed at a target but before it hits the target, it 
divides into hundreds of small and independent bomblets.  
 
Q: And the targets are Western interests and corrupt local governments?  
 
A: Exactly!  
 
Q: That is very interesting!. Now do you think the Islamic regime in Iran could serve as a 
model for the future Arabia?  
 
A: No, I don't.  
 
Q: What are your views on the Islamic Republic?  
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A: That regime has never been able to surpass nationalism and sectarianism. I also find 
the Velayat al-Faqih doctrine abhorrent. It smells and tastes like the Catholic Church!  
 
Q: But some say the Velayat-e-Faqih doctrine is Sunni in origin.  
 
A: No, it is not. It is a principle to substitute for the infallible hidden Imam during his "great 
absence"  and now it has just become a tool to ensure the continuation of that regime. The 
regime in Iran is much better than the others in that region, but ultimately it is, strictly 
speaking, not an Islamic state. It is an Iranian and sectarian state with some Islamic 
orientation and plenty of empty Islamic rhetoric very much similar to Saudi Arabia. No 





Interview with Majiid Nawaaz, conducted on the 12th of July 2007 upon his resignation from 
Hizbu ut Tahrir. Majiid was imprisoned in Egypt for 5 years as member of HT. I met and 
interviewed him for the first time in 2006 when he was released from this terrible ordeal and 
still a very active member of the party, part of the Executive Committee. The following are 
excerpts of our second interview and meeting.  
 
 
Q:  It is possible for you to explain the reason why you joined Hizbu ut Tahrir in the first 
place and when. 
 
A: I joined HT when I was 17. My family is from Pakistan and I was born in Essex.  I joined 
the party as I was desperately looking for some motivations and answers in my life, some 
points of references. My family is Muslim and I was Muslim myself but I never liked or felt 
close to the kind of Islam my father and my mother were professing. Their Islam was to me 
synonymous with tradition and therefore it was outdated and lacking in spirituality and 
relevance for me by then.  
I was an angry teen-ager and events like the Bosnian war or the second Gulf war made 
me realize that there was the need for an Islamic renewal and HT seemed to offer that.  
 
 
Q : The first time I met you, you had been just released from prison in Egypt. The reason 
why you were imprisoned is because you were a member of HT.  Do you regret that? 
 
A:  No I do not regret anything. The time in prison made me stronger and I had the chance 
of reading the Quran and understanding the ʻtrueʼ sources of Islam, which they have been 
skillfully ʻdressed upʼ during the time I was part of HT. This had led me ultimately to resign.   
 
Q: Thatʼs very interesting. So before we go into more details, what- would you say- was 




A: If I had to use just one word to explain it, I would say that the primary reason was  a 
substantial disagreement with the leadership of the party. 
 
 
Q: What kind of disagreement? Which one was the issue at stake? 
 
 
A: From inside, on a very spiritual level, I started to analyze my entire life journey and I 
started to understand that I was actually staining my true beliefs, by coming to numerous 
compromises for reason of power and politics.  
In prison I had the chance of reading several books and mostly commentaries by ʻulama. 
The interesting aspect is that none of them would ever speak of ʻPolitical Islamʼ or 
ʻIslamismʼ or of an Islamic state to be re-established in the present conditions and times. 
That situation has to be placed within a specific historical context with specific historical 
settings and political needs. Thinking of repeating the same experience crossing centuries 
of history and cultural changes is an orientalist  approach, not dissimilar from that one 
employed by people like Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes. 
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Q:  How would you define an Islamist? 
 
A: An Islamist for me is someone who decides to make Islam as his-her political identity. 
An Islamist is totally different from a Muslim. A Muslim is a person, who follows the 
teachings of Islam in his-her everyday life but this does not mean that he-she wants to mix 
his-her own private religion, spirituality, set of beliefs with politics. That would imply to deny 
the sacred, the spiritual aspect of religion. That would mean to reject religion and Islam. 
 
Q:  Do you define yourself as an Islamist?  
 
A: Not at all and anymore. I am just a Muslim now and definitely I reject my past as an 
Islamist.I am a Muslim who tries to apply and employ Islam in his everyday life and I do not 
want to mix Islam with politics. This is dangerous, anti-Islamic and it damages enormously 
the Muslim communities in the entire world. 
 
 
Q:  Would you agree with me if I say that the idea of ʻ dyn ua daulaʼ is very difficult to 
implement in a secular context and in the Middle East too? 
 
A: Yes! To be honest with you, I think that nowadays it is impossible. It is all about politics 
and the political dimension will always prevail. People (Islamists) who declare the 
possibility of establishing an Islamic state are deceitful as they use religion in order to 
achieve political gains. It will always end up in a power struggle defined by man-made 
decisions and drives. 
 
Q:   Do you still think that H.Tʼs plan is plausible? 
 
A:  Not at all and it never was but I was too weak and blind to realize it during my time with 
them. The only way they can actually realize their political plan is if the US (or another 
super power) backs and finances them. They will never conduct a peaceful revolution in 
the Middle East as they want us to believe.  The only way  to achieve power for them is 
through ferocious  and violent conquest: not peaceful and definitely not Islamic.  They are 
dangerous. No one really likes them in the Middle East, as they can clearly foresee the 
threat they represent. 
 
Q:  Have you heard that David Cameron in the first 2 PM questions last week asked Brown 
to ban HT? 
 
 
 A:  Yes! I have heard that but they should not as they will give them more reasons to feel 
marginalized and therefore they would feel more powerful and driven. 
 
Q:  Do you think that there are different kinds of Islamism as there can be different and 
disparate interpretations of  the Qurʼan? 
 
A:  To me, Islamism is a way of variously mis-interpreting and using the Qurʼan and the 
Islamic message, according to different political interests and gains. But it is definitely a 
manipulation of a religious text.  And as I said earlier on, it is not a matter of religion but of 
politics.                     
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And what I'd like to emphasize is that such a policy is not agreed upon within Islamic 
theology. I think that what I taught when I was a member of HT has not only damaged 
British society and British Muslim relations and damaged the position of Muslims in this 
society as British citizens, I think it's damaged the world. What I had been propagating was 
far from true Islam. I began to realize that what I had subscribed to was actually Islamism 
sold to me in the name of Islam. Now I am involved in trying to counter the black and white 
mindset that I once so vehemently encouraged. Although I was young when I was 
recruited to HT I take full responsibility for my actions. I made the decisions that I did and I 
am responsible for undoing them. With this in mind I hope to publish a series of papers 










The following are excerpts of an interview with Mr Emdad Ramdan, ex member of IHRC and 
sympathizer of Tablighi Jamaat.  The interview was conducted on 15th of September 2007 in 
his house, Bromley by Bow, East London.       
 
 
Q: Where were you born?  Could you please give me a brief biography? 
 
A: I was born in London, in Newham but my family is from Lahore, Pakistan. My mother 
and my father came to England after they got married in 1958. My wife is original from 
Pakistan too but she was born and raised here in the UK. So we are both British. 
 
Q:  Could you tell me a bit about your political experience as ex member of IHRC and now 
a Tablighi Jamaat supporter, if I can define you in this way? 
 
A:  Yes you can definitely define me as a Tabligh Jamaat supporter. First of all, I do not 
like to talk of politics as my past and present is Islam and not politics which is just struggle 
for power dictated by human greed. I joined IHRC at the end of the 1990s as I liked the 
fact that they were not a confrontational party and they were fighting for Muslim rights 
around the world, with a special focus on Palestine. They were not just using some sort of 
political propaganda but actually engaging with the issues at stake. 
 
Q: I understand. But do not you think that the Israeli-Palestinian war is definitely political 
and not a matter of religious belief? 
 
A:  If you are Muslim, a practicing Muslim as I am, everything related to Muslims anywhere 
in the world is a matter of concern for the Muslim community, too. Islam is a total and 
encompassing entity, which includes what the West would call politics. The only difference 
is that a Muslim living in a non Muslim society, has to be careful of every step he-she 
takes. They must be conscious of what they are doing at all times.  
 
Q:  How would you then describe politics? 
 
A: I told you earlier on.  Politics to me is a matter of greed and desire for power. If you are 
a true Muslim you cannot be interested in that. It is not Islamic at all. I am not interested in 
politics but in the well being of the Muslim community, anywhere in the world. 
 
Q: Thatʼs fine. Did the IHRC fulfill your expectation in terms of lack of political activism? 
 
A:   Yes. It did. The IHRC started when it split off from the Muslim Parliament of Great 
Britain and its power struggles. It has always had a collaborative attitude with other faith 
groups. This is what I liked more. It does not have any political affiliation or programme. Its 
main concern- as I said- is the rights of Muslim in the world. So it could organize events 
with other faith groups, Jewish groups, Catholic ones without any problem or division that 
politics would otherwise create.  
Q: I understand. So when and why did you leave IHRC and joined Tablighi Jamaat ? 
 
A: I joined TJ in 2004. The reason why I left IHRC  is very simple and not related to my 
lack of support for IHRC. At that point of my life I felt that an organization like TJ was just 
closer to my own spirituality and my way of living and interpreting Islam. It was not a 
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political choice, as neither IHRC or TJ are political at all. 
 
Q:  There have been ʻrumoursʼ that TJ is an organization to recruit ʻjihadistʼ in Europe on 
the behalf of Osama Bin Laden. I am here referring to an article by Alex Alexiev appeared 
on the Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005. What do you think of that? 
 
A: I support and have meetings with members of TJ and we are definitely not terrorist or  
recruiting terrorists on the behalf of Osama Bin Laden. Quite the opposite. TJ is a very 
spiritual organization, not interested in the outside world of politics, economics or power 
struggle. Its name means ʻProselytizing Groupʼ, that is its main purpose: to spread Islam. 
There is not talk of terrorism in spreading Islam. We try to live by the Quʼran, following the 
teachings of Muhammad (pbuh). 
 
Q: But if I remember right, Muhammad community was inherently political. Religion and 
politics were bound together.  So how could you justify the statement that there is no 
politics in TJ proselytism or action?  Are you not contradicting yourself?  
 
A: Not at all. During the time of Muhammad, politics was at the service of religion. In the 
Western world, politics is just desire for control and power. Therefore a true Muslim should 
just reject politics as such. 
 
Q: Thatʼs very interesting and now it is clear to me.  So what do you think of the act of 
blowing himself up , of being a suicide bomber? Is this act Islamic? Like the 7-7 bombers? 
 
A: Not at all.  Suicide bombers are first of all very ignorant of the Islamic teachings and 
they are not Muslims when they kill other people, themselves and leave their family 
behind. My believe is that those are men and women with serious mental and behavioural 
problems and they should be treated and cured (if possible) as such. They are Western in 
their ideology and product of Western problems. They have been created by the West and 
the Western politics in the Middle East: a sort of Frankestein monster. There is not an 
exact cure for them and the current war on Terror surely is not one. But my point is that 
Islam and the Muslim community should not be blamed for the terroristsʼ actions and 
should not be paying for their mistakes.  
 
 
Q: I totally agree with you. So what do you think of people like Anjoum Choudary from Al-
Ghurabaa or Omar Bakri who call the 9-11 bombers the ʻMagnificent 19ʼ? 
 
A: I do not think much of them as people and as Muslims. To me they are a group of 
clowns, attention seekers. They are bogus men. They just do not understand that they are 
serving the West and the media interests. To me they are the worst enemies of Islam, not 
their champions as they want to depict themselves. But Muslims have already ridiculed 
them and not recognized them as their leaders. To me, they will not last much and soon 
the young minds that they have corrupted will realize what kind of people they are and 
mostly that  it is not Islamic what they are trying to propagate and teach. Actually quite the 
opposite.    
 
 
Q: I understand.  Why do you think that TJ members are unwilling to release interviews 
and meet journalists? Donʼt you think that this increases the suspicion around them? 
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A:  Not at all. TJ is a spiritual group and not interested in the outside world or in any of the 
current political problems or world affairs issues. Why they should share their views, 
opinions, way of life with people who are very dissimilar to them.? 
 
Q:  That is called communication, dialogue, exchange that should be encouraged in a 
society, not avoided or demonized, in order also to dissipate false allegations. Last 
question before closing. Do you think that Muslims in the UK have been marginalized and 
made objects of racism? 
 
A: I do not think so. I am a Muslim and I was born here so I am a British Muslim. I think 
that Muslims in the UK benefit of great freedom and enjoy many opportunities that they 
would not have otherwise, if they lived in any of the Muslim countries. I think that there is 
not racism or Islamophobia in this country.  Muslims that they say so are those who are 
creating the problem and who are happy to stir up troubles in order to get some recognition 
and power. As I said before, this is not what Islam requires you to do. Islam is synonymous 
with peace, love and not divisions and hate. Who is propagating those kinds of feelings is 
not a Muslim to me and does not deserve any credit. 
 
 
 
 
